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INTRODUCTION
This  submiss ion  has been a r r a n g e d  in  t h r e e  p a r t s  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  
8 papers  in  P a r t  1; 4 papers  + ap pend ices  in  P a r t  11;  and 4 papers  
in  P a r t  111. Each paper  might  be r ega rded  as a c h a p t e r ,  b u t  s i n c e  
they  have been assembled r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y  i n t o  one volume a cum ula t ive  
p r o g r e s s i o n  from one to  th e  nex t  i s  n o t  always e v i d e n t .  These papers  
have v a r i e d  s t a t u s .  Most a r e  p u b l i s h e d  in  some form,  b u t  t h e  papers  
in  P a r t  11 a r e  ta ken  from a book p u b l i s h e d  in  Bangladesh ( E x p l o i t a t i o n  
and t h e  Rural Poor)  in  which I was th e  dominant  a u t h o r .  These papers  
in  P a r t  11 were t h e r e f o r e  in ten d ed  as c l o s e l y  i n t e r r e l a t e d  c h a p t e r s ,  
along  w i th  t h e  a p p en d ices .  However i n d i v id u a l  i tems in  a l l  t h r e e  
p a r t s  w i l l  be r e f e r r e d  t o  as ' p a p e r s '  t h ro u g h o u t  t h i s  subm iss ion .
These papers  a r e  based on f i e ld w o rk  l o c a t i o n s  in South Asia -  
t h e  Kosi r eg ion  o f  N.E. B ih a r ,  I n d i a ;  Comilla  D i s t r i c t  in Bangladesh;  
and s u b se q u e n t ly  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  Bangladesh f o r  s h o r t e r ,  l e s s  i n t e n s i v e  
f i e l d w o r k .  The t h r e e  p a r t s  o f  t h i s  submiss ion r e p r e s e n t  t h e s e  t h r e e  
f i e ld w o rk  l o c a t i o n s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The r e s e a r c h  in  B ih a r  was suppor ted  
by an SSRC r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t  g r a n t  and invo lved  one y e a r ' s  r e s id e n c e  
in  Purnea D i s t r i c t  ( o f  t h e  Kosi Development Region) ,  B iha r  from March 
1971 t o  March 1972. The r e s e a r c h  in  Comilla  D i s t r i c t  was conducted  in 
my c a p a c i t y  as a Research C o n s u l t a n t  t o  th e  Bangladesh Academy f o r  
Rural Development (BARD) and was su p p o r ted  by a g r a n t  from The Ford 
Foundation .  F ieldwork and w r i t i n g  was c a r r i e d  o u t  between August  1974 
and September 1975 a l though  months o f  t h i s  p e r io d  was s p e n t  back 
a t  t h e  U n iv e r s i t y  o f  Bath to  e n a b le  me to  t e ach  my c o u rs e s  in  th e
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secônd sem es te r .  Subsequent  work in  Bangladesh ,  p a r t i a l l y  r e p r e s e n t e d  
by t h e  papers  in  P a r t  111,  has been based on r e g u l a r  b u t  s h o r t  v i s i t s  
to  Bangladesh from 1979 to  J u l y  1981,  ag a in  s u p p o r te d  by The Ford 
Founda t ion ,  as  a c o n s u l t a n t  to  t h e  M in i s t r y  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  and 
F o r e s t s  (Government o f  Bang ladesh ) ,  th e  M in i s t r y  o f  Local Government 
and Rural Development (GOB), PROSHIKA (a non-governmental  r u r a l  
development ag en c y ) ,  and to  The Ford Foundat ion  i t s e l f .
The f ie ld w o rk  l o c a t i o n s  have become th e  b a s i s  o f  a r r a n g i n g  t h e s e  
papers  bu t  o t h e r  c r i t e r i a  could  have been f o l l o w e d .  An obvious  one 
might  have been c h ro n o lo g ic a l  s i n c e  th e  papers  which appea r  he re  
have been produced over  a p e r io d  o f  e i g h t  y e a r s  d u r ing  which o r i e n t ­
a t i o n  and th e o ry  have deve loped .  The c h ro n o lo g i c a l  c r i t e r i o n  i s  
q u i t e  s t r o n g l y  r e p r e s e n t e d  in  th e  ar rangem ent  f o r  t h i s  subm iss ion .
In P a r t  1, the  e x c e p t io n s  a r e :  1 .6  was be ing  r e v i s e d  a f t e r  P a r t  11 
was completed;  1 .8  was i n i t i a l l y  w r i t t e n  f o r  a c o n fe re n c e  in  P a tn a ,  
B ih a r ,  Ind ia  in January  1979; 1 .7  was w r i t t e n  in  Summer 1979. The
ar rangement o f  papers  f o r  P a r t  111 i s  more com pl ica ted  s i n c e  3.1 and
3 .4  a r e  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d ,  both d e r i v i n g  from an e a r l i e r  d r a f t  no t  
inc lu d ed  in t h i s  subm iss ion .  This  d r a f t  was e n t i t l e d  'The Nature  o f  
Rural C lass  D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in  B an g lad es h ' .  I t  was p r e s e n t e d  t o  th e  
P eas an ts  Seminar,  Cent re  f o r  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  and Area S t u d i e s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  
o f  London, June 1977; and s u b se q u e n t ly  r e i s s u e d  in  Bangladesh ( J a n u a ry  
1978) by th e  A g r i c u l t u r a l  Development Agencies o f  Bangladesh (ADAB) 
f o r  c i r c u l a t i o n  and comment. I t  appea rs  in  r e f e r e n c e s  to  papers  in  
t h i s  submiss ion in both o f  t h e s e  forms.  Meanwhile a t h e o r e t i c a l  summary 
had been produced f o r  t h e  February 1978 i s s u e  o f  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  
Development S tu d ie s  B u l l e t i n  and t h i s  appea rs  as  3.1 in t h i s  su b m is s io n .  
The o r i g i n a l  d r a f t  was then  s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r e v i s e d  and updated  d u r ing
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1981 f o r  th e  October 1981 i s s u e  o f  th e  B u l l e t i n  o f  Concerned Asian 
S c h o la r s  and appea rs  here  as 3 . 4 ,  a f t e r  3 .2  and 3 .3  because  i t  
i n c lu d e s  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  them and o t h e r  more r e c e n t  m a t e r i a l .  However 
s in c e  3 .2  in c lu d e s  r e f e r e n c e s  to  t h e  o r i g i n a l  d r a f t  o f  which 3.1 i s  
t h e  summary, 3.1 has been inc lu d ed  s e p a r a t e l y  to  p ro v id e  some ch rono ­
l o g i c a l  coherence  t o  P a r t  111.
The r e l a t i o n  between 3 .2  and 3 .3  i s  more s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d .  3 .2  
d e r i v e s  from an i n v i t a t i o n  by th e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  (GOB) in  
February  1979 to  w r i t e  and c i r c u l a t e  in  Bangladesh an u n r e s t r a i n e d  
c r i t i q u e  o f  r u r a l  development p o l i c y  and modes o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  
Bangladesh ,  i n c lu d in g  t h e  r o l e  o f  some e x t e r n a l  a g e n c i e s .  This  p ap e r  
was r e v i s e d  and p r e s e n t e d  to  a one-day  c o n fe re n c e  on Bangladesh a t  th e  
I n s t i t u t e  o f  Development S t u d i e s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  Sussex in  J u l y  1979 
a t  which the  S e c r e t a r y  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  and o t h e r  o f f i c i a l s  o f  t h e  
Government o f  Bangladesh were p r e s e n t ,  along  w i th  o f f i c i a l s  from t h e  
Overseas Development M in i s t r y  (HMG), s t a f f  members o f  IBRD, and academics  
from a v a r i e t y  o f  UK and Bangladeshi  i n s t i t u t i o n s .  As a sequel  I was 
asked to  r e t u r n  t o  Bangladesh a t  th e  end o f  1979 to  ' r e v i e w  t h e  
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  th e  proposed Second Five Year P lan  f o r  
B ang ladesh ' .  This  broad t a s k  e v e n t u a l l y  b o i l e d  down t o  a pape r  comple ted  
in  f i r s t  d r a f t  dur ing  January  1980 and o r i g i n a l l y  e n t i t l e d  'How th e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  r u r a l  poor  can be inc luded  in  t h e  Second Five  Year 
P l a n ' .  In March 1980 i t  was r e v i s e d  and c i r c u l a t e d  by th e  M in i s t r y  o f  
A g r i c u l t u r e  to  key government and academic f i g u r e s  in  Bangladesh .
With some f u r t h e r  m o d i f i c a t i o n s  to  l e av e  o u t  s p e c i f i c  recommendations 
f o r  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  r e v i s i o n  between th e  M in i s t r y  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  and 
t h e  M in i s t ry  o f  Local Government and Rural Development,  i t  was th en
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p u b l i s h e d  in  Bangladesh in t h e  form which appears  as 3 .3  in  t h i s  
subm iss ion .
3 .3  has a seque l  which i s  no t  co n ta in e d  in  t h i s  subm iss ion .  This  
i s  an a c t i o n - r e s e a r c h  p r o j e c t  w i th i n  th e  M i n i s t r i e s  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e ,  
and Local Government and Rural Development,  su p p o r ted  by th e  Ford 
Foundat ion  t o  develop  t h e  ownership o f  i r r i g a t i o n  a s s e t s  among t h e  
r u r a l  l a n d l e s s  in  Bangladesh  on an exper im en ta l  b a s i s ,  and t o  review 
t h e  e x p e r i e n c e  as  a p r e lu d e  t o  a f u l l - s c a l e  programme on t h e s e  l i n e s .  
Th is  a c t i v i t y ,  d e r i v i n g  from P a r t  111,  r e p r e s e n t s  p a r t  o f  my c u r r e n t  
r e s e a r c h .  The f i r s t  exper imenta l  season  has a l r e a d y  been completed 
and reviewed in v o lv in g  my p a r t i c i p a t i o n  b e fo re  (August  1980) ,  dur ing  
( Jan u a ry  1981) and a f t e r  ( J u l y  1981).
An a l t e r n a t i v e  approach might  have been to  a r r a n g e  t h e  d imensions  
o f  c l a s s  fo rm at ion  and s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n t o  s e p a r a t e  p a r t s  w i th  
1 .2 ;  1 .6 ;  1 .7 ;  1 .8 ;  2 .4 ;  3 .2 ;  3 .3  s t a n d in g  t o g e t h e r .  However
t h e  theme o f  th e s e  papers  i s  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  u n i t y  between t h e  a n a l y s i s  
o f  r u r a l  c l a s s  fo rm a t ion  and th e  forms o f  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  In the  
p o s t - c o l o n i a l  c o n t e x t ,  e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  t h e  p re o c c u p a t io n  w i th  th e  
' o v e rd e v e lo p e d '  c h a r a c t e r  o f  s t a t e  a p p a r a tu s e s  by a u t h o r s  w i th  such 
d i s p a r a t e  o r i e n t a t i o n s  as Riggs (1961,  1964) and Alavi  (1972) ( s e e  
1 . 7 ) ,  t h e  c a s e  f o r  j o i n i n g  in the  r e j e c t i o n  o f  ' e c o n o m i s t i c ' i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s t a t e  a r e  c l e a r .  However i t  i s  e q u a l l y  n e c e s s a ry  
t o  avo id  a commitment to  th e  overdeve loped  t h e s i s  in i t s  'midwife o f  
m o d e rn i s a t i o n '  form w h i le  r e c o g n i s in g  th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  s t a t e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  as p a r t  o f  th e  p rocess  o f  c l a s s  f o rm a t io n .  Paper  1 .2  
was an e a r l y  a t t e m p t  to  s e t  o u t  t h i s  prob lem, a l though  i t  was a l s o
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p reo cc u p ied  w i th  e s t a b l i s h i n g  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  s t a t e  
and t h e  v i l l a g e  as  p a r t  o f  a c r i t i q u e  o f  B a i l e y ' s  e n c a p s u l a t i o n  
framework (B a i l e y  1969,  Chap te r  8 ) .  Paper  1 .2  concluded  ' t h a t  we 
a r e  n o t  s eek ing  to  a t t r i b u t e  in dependen t  v a r i a b l e  s t a t u s  t o  t h e  S t a t e  
o r  to  t h e  v i l l a g e  in o u r  d i s c u s s i o n s  o f  change.  R a th e r  we see t h e  
S t a t e  and v i l l a g e  ev o lv in g  in  d i a l e c t i c a l  u n i t y ,  as  a t o t a l  dynamic 
s o c i a l  system.  The v i l l a g e  t h e r e f o r e  c o n s t i t u t e s  an a s p e c t  o f  t h e  
t o t a l  sys tem,  r a t h e r  than  a s e p a r a t e  system in  i t s e l f .  (Paper  1 . 2 ,  
page 75).
The same co n c lu s io n  a l s o  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  th e  e n t i r e  r u r a l  system 
as  be ing ' p e r s o n n i f i e d  by t h e  r o l e  o f  the  q u a s i - c a p i t a l i s t ,  e n t r e ­
p r e n e u r i a l  r i c h  p e a s a n t ' .  Th is  r e f e r e n c e  was based  upon t h e  a n a l y s i s  
s e t  o u t  in  1 .1 .  While now I would n o t  wish to  push t h e  ' p e r s o n n i f i ­
c a t i o n '  formula too  f a r ,  t h i s  d id  r e p r e s e n t  an a t t e m p t  to  d e s c r i b e  
t h e  way in  which r u r a l  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p ro d u c t io n  were changing 
in  t h a t  p a r t  o f  I n d i a .  This  theme i s  en l a rg e d  upon e m p i r i c a l l y  in  
1 . 3 ,  1 .4  and 1 .5 .  Papers  1 .3  and 1 .4  were p repa red  e s p e c i a l l y  f o r  
The Kosi Symposium (Joy and E v e r i t t  Eds. 1976) ,  to  l o c a t e  t h e  con temporary 
a n a l y s i s  o f  myse l f  and o t h e r  c o l l e a g u e s  ( a t  t h e  I n s t i t u t e  o f  Develop­
ment S t u d i e s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  S u s s e x ) . i n  an h i s t o r i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  o f  
p o p u la t io n  expans ion ;  p a t t e r n s  o f  l and  s e t t l e m e n t ,  m i g r a t i o n  and 
te n an cy ;  and th e  development o f  commodity p ro d u c t io n  and a r u r a l  marke t  
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e .  For 1 . 3 ,  I was a s s i s t e d  by a c o l l e a g u e ,  S .D .B ig g s ,  in  
a ssembl ing  th e  d a t a  f o r  Tab les  11,  12 and 16. Paper  1 . 5 . 2  i s  a summary 
o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  Desipur  v i l l a g e  in th e  Kosi Region o f  B ih a r  from 
which t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  and m e thodo log ica l  d i s c u s s i o n  in  1 .2  was d e r i v e d .
In t h e  r e p o r t  to  th e  SSRC, 1 .2  appea red  as t h e  main s t a t e m e n t  w i th  an 
ex tended v e r s io n  o f  1 . 5 . 2 . as  t h e  s u p p o r t in g  em p i r i c a l  append ix .  S ince
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t h e  summary v e r s io n  o f  t h e  c a s e - s t u d y  has been chosen f o r  t h i s  s u b m is s io n ,  
to  avo id  too  much o v e r l a p  w i th  1 . 1 ,  i t  i s  p receded  by a s h o r t  d e s c r i p t i o n  
( 1 . 5 . 1 )  o f  t h e  f i e ld w o rk  and d a t a  on which i t  i s  based .
The o r d e r  t h e r e f o r e  f o r  P a r t  1 o f  t h i s  subm iss ion  r e f l e c t s  t h e  
l o g i c  o f  o u t l i n i n g  an h i s t o r i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e  on c l a s s  fo rm a t ion  and 
s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  (1.1 and 1 . 2 ) ,  fo l low ed  by f u r t h e r  em p i r i c a l  
e l a b o r a t i o n  o f  t h o s e  themes ( 1 . 3 ,  1 . 4 ,  1 . 5 ) ,  which p rov ided  t h e  b a s i s  
f o r  t h e  subsequen t  b ro a d e r  a n a l y s i s  o f  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and a c c e s s  
in  th e  reg ion  ( 1 . 6 ,  1 . 7 ,  and 1 . 8 ) .  S ince  t h e s e  papers  were n o t  a l l  
o r i g i n a l l y  des igned  t o  ap p ea r  s i d e  by s i d e ,  b u t  d e s t i n e d  f o r  d i f f e r e n t  
au d ien ces  on d i f f e r e n t  oc c a s io n s  t h e r e  a r e  some p o i n t s  o f  o v e r l a p  
which should  be noted  -  between 1.1 and 1 . 5 . 1 ,  and between 1 .6  (pages
317-320) and 1 .8  (pages  26 -30 ) .
Paper  1 .6  'Rura l  Development and th e  P o s t - C o lo n i a l  S t a t e '  was 
des igned  to  t a k e  th e  d i s c u s s i o n  abou t  t h e  s t a t e ,  and the  p o s t ­
c o l o n i a l  s t a t e  in  p a r t i c u l a r ,  beyond genera l  p r o p o s i t i o n s  to  an a n a l y s i s  
o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  between a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  p r o c e s s  and t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
o f  th e  s o c i a l  fo rm at ion  in  which i t  o c c u r s .  In o r d e r  to  do t h i s  i t  
became n ece ss a ry  to  c o n f r o n t  A l a v i ' s  t h e s i s  o f  t h e  overdeve loped  
b u r e a u c r a t i c  a p p a r a tu s e s  m e d ia t ing  between compet ing  b u t  n o t  c o n t r a ­
d i c t o r y  p r o p e r t i e d  c l a s s e s .  I t  was a l s o  n e c e s s a r y  to  c o u n t e r  p o p u la r  
assumptions  t h a t  p o s t - c o l o n i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in  t h e  s u b - c o n t i n e n t  was 
c o r r u p t i n g  the  fo rmer  b u r e a u c r a t i c  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  c o l o n i a l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .
Qui te  th e  r e v e r s e  was both observed  and argued  f o r ,  w i th  th e  d i s c r e t i o n ­
a ry  a u t h o r i t y  o f  e r s t w h i l e  h i g h - s t a t u s  f i e l d  o f f i c e r s  becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y  
Ci rcumscr ibed  by t h e  emergence o f  a r i c h  p e a s a n t / p e t t y  l a n d l o r d  c l a s s .
I t  was t h e r e f o r e  m a in ta in ed  t h a t  t h e  s t y l e  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r e t r e a t e d
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i n t o  b u r e a u c r a t i c  i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y  as  a d i a l e c t i c a l  r e sponse  t o  t h e  
a s s e r t i o n  o f  a new r u r a l  g e n t ry  o v e r  t h e  s t a t e .  Such an outcome 
was no t  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  A l a v i ' s  n o t i o n s  o f  r e l a t i v e  autonomy, and 
th e  temporary n a t u r e  o f  ove rdeve loped  a p p a r a t u s e s  was r e v e a l e d .  At 
t h e  same t ime i t  was p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  th e  t endency  to  b u r e a u c r a t i c  
r a t i o n a l i t y  c o n t r a d i c t e d  p a t t e r n s  o f  i n t e r a c t i o n s  in  which p e a s a n t s  
were invo lved  as  c l i e n t s  o f  s e r v i c e s  so t h a t  t h e  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  
problems o f  a c c e s s ,  them se lves  d e r iv e d  from th e  s o c i a l  f o r m a t io n ,  
r e i n f o r c e d  th e  c l a s s  based problems o f  acc e s s  and d e l i v e r y .
This  a n a l y s i s  a t t r a c t e d  t h e  a t t e n t i o n  i n t e r  a l i a  o f  M.Moore 
(Moore 1980) who took  i s s u e  w i th  m yse l f  and Alavi  o v e r  t h e  concep t  
o f  t h e  r e l a t i v e  autonomy o f  t h e  s t a t e  and t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  th e  
t r a n s i t i o n  from a c o l o n i a l  to  p o s t - c o l o n i a l  b u reau c ra cy .  Moore d id  
n o t  d i s t i n g u i s h  c l e a r l y  enough between A l a v i ' s  t h e s i s  and my c r i t i c i s m s  
o f  i t .  I t  seems he was m is led  i n s o f a r  as  I d id  t a k e  A l a v i ' s  use o f  
t h e  term ' r e l a t i v e  autonomy'  as  my p o i n t  o f  d e p a r t u r e .  I was i n v i t e d  
by Development and Change to  w r i t e  a r e p l y  to  Moore and i t  appeared  
a l o n g s i d e  h i s  a r t i c l e  in t h e  same i s s u e .  This  r e p l y  i s  in c lu d e d  in  
t h i s  submiss ion  as paper  1 . 7 .  Although i t  was i n t e n d e d  t o  be read  in  
c o n j u n c t io n  w i th  Moore's  a r t i c l e ,  i t  was a l s o  w r i t t e n  in  a way which 
e nab le s  t h e  p i e c e  to  s t a n d  on i t s  own as a sequel  to  'Rura l  Development 
and th e  P o s t - c o l o n i a l  S t a t e '  (Paper  1 . 6 ) .  I t  p roceeds  by a t t e m p t in g  
t o  d i s e n t a n g l e  th e  term ' r e l a t i v e  au tonomy ' ,  p o i n t i n g  o u t  t h a t  r e c e n t  
M arx is t  l i t e r a t u r e  on th e  s t a t e  has p r e s e n t e d  us w i th  d i f f e r e n t  ac c o u n t s  
l e a d in g  t o  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  outcomes which undermine th e  c o n c e p t ' s  c r e d ­
i b i l i t y .  This  e x e r c i s e  was t h e  n e c e s s a r y  p r e lu d e  to  a d i s c u s s i o n  o f  
t h e  c i r c u m s c r ib e d  c h a r a c t e r  o f  t h e  c o l o n i a l  s t a t e  and th e  myths 
conce rn ing  i t s  b u r e a u c r a t i c  e f f i c i e n c y .  This  p ro v id e d ,  in  t u r n ,  t h e
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b a s i s  f o r  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  o f  contemporary admin i­
s t r a t i v e  pe r fo rm ance ,  c o n t r a d i c t i o n s  which were r e s o lv e d  by an 
i n v o l u n t a r y  s h i f t  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  ideo logy  towards r a t h e r  than  away 
from b u r e a u c r a t i c  i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y .  The consequences  o f  t h i s  s h i f t  
were ag a in  p o in t e d  o u t  f o r  i n c r e a s i n g  th e  problems o f  poor  p e a s a n t  
a c c e s s  t o  p u b l i c  s e r v i c e s .  In t h i s  way t h e  r e p l y  t o  Moore ( 1 .7 )  becomes 
my own t h e o r e t i c a l  e l a b o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  arguments p r e s e n t e d  in  1 . 6 .
Paper  1 .8  becomes in  e f f e c t  a c o n c lu s io n  to  P a r t  1 ,  a l th o u g h  i t  
was i n i t i a l l y  w r i t t e n  b e f o r e  1 . 7 ,  undergoing  minor r e v i s i o n  in  J a n u a ry  
1981. I t  was o r i g i n a l l y  p rep a red  f o r  a co n fe ren c e  on t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  
o f  th e  Kosi R ive r  V a l l ey  w a te r  r e s o u r c e s  p r o j e c t ,  he ld  a t  t h e  C o l lege  
o f  E n g in e e r in g ,  Pa tna  U n i v e r s i t y ,  B ih a r  in  J anuary  1979. One purpose  
o f  th e  paper  was t o  d i s t i n g u i s h ,  f o r  o f f i c i a l s  and Ind ian  c o l l e a g u e s  
a l i k e ,  between t h e  n o t i o n s  o f  a r e a  im plem enta t ion  and a rea  p la nn ing  
as  one b a s i s  o f  c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  Kosi Development Programme. By 
rev iewing  th e  Kosi ' e q u a t i o n '  and some o f  i t s  h i s t o r i c a l  a s p e c t s ,  I 
was a b l e  to  p o i n t  o u t  t h e  i r o n y  o f  ' a  h ig h l y  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  r u r a l  c l a s s  
s t r u c t u r e  (which) emerged p a r t l y  as  a r e s u l t  o f  a r e c a l c i t r a n t  r i v e r ,  
t h e  c o n t r o l  o f  which ( t o g e t h e r  w i th  r e l a t e d  programmes) e x a c e rb a te d  th e  
problem o f  r u r a l  i n e q u a l i t y  by f u r t h e r  c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  th e  development 
o f  a r i c h  p e a s a n t / f a r m e r  c l a s s  in  t h e  r e g i o n '  ( 1 . 8 ,  page 10) .  This  
i n e q u a l i t y  i s  e x a c e r b a t e d  on acc o u n t  o f  th e  c l a s s  o r i g i n s  o f  t e c h n o ­
l o g i c a l  in n o v a t io n  i n  t h e  reg ion  (and e l sew here  in  North I n d ia )  and a 
f a i l u r e  t o  r e a l i s e  t h a t  a s  a consequence  t h e  problem o f  s t a t e  i n t e r ­
v en t io n  i s  one o f  a c c e s s  r a t h e r  than  adop t ion  ( 1 . 8 ,  page 1 3 ) ,  a concep t  
borne  o u t  o f  m o d e rn i s a t i o n  approaches  to  development.
Thus a second purpose  o f  t h e  p a p e r  was t o  i n t r o d u c e  t h e  n o t io n  o f
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a c c e s s  t o  an u n f a m i l i a r  aud ience  th rough  t h e  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  a p a r t i ­
c u l a r  a g r a r i a n  s o c i a l  fo rm a t ion  w i th  which t h a t  aud ience  was becoming 
d eep ly  in vo lved  in  both  s o c i a l  a n a l y s i s  and r u r a l  development a c t i v i t y .  
Th is  d i s c u s s i o n  was conducted  i n i t i a l l y  th rough  i d e n t i f y i n g  t h r e e  
d im ensions  o f  b i a s  -  c l a s s  i n f l u e n c e s  on s t a t e  p o l i c y  fo r m u l a t io n  
( p r o p o s i t i o n s  c l o s e l y  r e l a t e d  to  t h e  ' r e l a t i v e  autonomy'  d i s c u s s i o n ) ,  
th e  e x e r c i s e  o f  power by dominant  c l a s s e s  in  t h e  l o c a l i t y ,  and t h e  
c o n t r a s t s  between b u r e a u c r a t i c  and p e a s a n t  (as  opposed t o  c a p i t a l i s t  
fa rm er )  r a t i o n a l i t y  in  t h e  p ro c e s s  o f  p r o v id i n g  s e r v i c e .  This  t h i r d  
dimens ion becomes th e  focus  o f  th e  d i s c u s s i o n  th rough  e x p l o r i n g  th e  
idea  o f  a p p r o p r i a t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and th e  r e l a t e d  i s s u e  o f  adm in i ­
s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l .  The paper  conc ludes  by s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  outcomes a r e  
s i m i l a r  whether  t h e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  s e r v i c e  i s  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  o r  n o t  because  
th e  power o f  c e r t a i n  c l a s s e s  i s  s u c c e s s f u l l y  a r t i c u l a t e d  th rough th e  
f i r s t  two d imensions  o f  b i a s .  In n e i t h e r  s t r a t e g y  o f  p r o v i s i o n  a r e  
th e  p rocedu res  and outcomes a c c o u n ta b le  to  t h e  poor  and ' u n l e s s  t h e s e  
c l a s s e s  can deve lop  an autonomous and o r g a n i s e d  e x i s t e n c e  which would 
p rov ide  t h e  b a s i s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  th e  p r o v i s i o n  o f  s e r v i c e s ,  
then  t h e  a cc es s  problem w i l l  remain an i s s u e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  economy as 
well  as  a c l a s h  o f  r a t i o n a l i t i e s '  ( 1 . 8 ,  page 32) .
The papers  in  P a r t  11 a r e  th e  c h a p t e r s  and s u p p o r t in g  append ices  
f o r  which I was s o l e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  from th e  book E x p l o i t a t i o n  and th e  
Rural P o o r . The p a r t i c u l a r  c o n d i t i o n s  under  which t h i s  work was 
conducted  should  be no ted  s i n c e  the y  revea l  t h e  purpose o f  t h e  r e s e a r c h  
and i t s  p u b l i s h e d  outcome. In August  1974 I took  up an appo in tm en t  as 
Research C o n s u l t a n t  t o  t h e  Bangladesh Academy f o r  Rural Development in
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C om i l la ,  Bangladesh .  The Academy was under  th e  s u p e r v i s i o n  o f  th e  
M i n i s t r y  o f  Local Government and Rural Development,  and my a s s i g n ­
ment i n i t i a t e d  by th e  S e c r e t a r y  o f  t h e  M in i s t r y  was t o  examine r u r a l  
power s t r u c t u r e  in  Bangladesh and a n a l y s e  i t s  s i g n i f i c a n c e  f o r  t h e  
Comil la  c o o p e r a t i v e  model o f  r u r a l  development as  p a r t i c i p a t e d  in  by 
t h e  Academy. I was t o  b r in g  t o g e t h e r  a team o f  Academy s t a f f  and b u i l d  
up a r e s e a r c h  c a p a c i t y  on t h e s e  i s s u e s .  There were many problems.
F i r s t  i t  was re c o g n i se d  from t h e  o u t s e t  t h a t  th e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
such a r e s e a r c h  focus  would t h r e a t e n  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  ide o logy  o f  t h e  
model (and i t s  a d h e r e n t s )  which was based upon assumpt ions  o f  c l a s s  
homogeneity in  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  high p o p u la t io n  d e n s i t y  and l i t t l e  
v a r i a t i o n  in  l a n d h o ld in g  around th e  mean.
Secondly  a t  t h a t  t ime in Bangladesh most o f  t h e  r u r a l  r e s e a r c h  
had been conducted  th rough formal surveys  us ing  ' e n u m e r a to r s '  o f  
j u n i o r  s t a t u s  to  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  i n v e s t i g a t o r  w i th  th e  i n d i v id u a l  f a m i ly  
farm as  t h e  u n i t  o f  s tu d y .  The p r i n c i p l e  i n v e s t i g a t o r  would c o n s t r u c t  
a q u e s t i o n n a i r e  o f t e n  in  i s o l a t i o n  from the  s u b j e c t  o f  s t u d y ,  th e  j u n i o r  
enum era to rs  would c a r r y  o u t  th e  i n t e r v i e w s  ( u s u a l l y  u n s u p e r v i s e d ) ,  
o t h e r s  o f  s i m i l a r  s t a t u s  would t a b u l a t e  th e  d a t a  and the  p r i n c i p l e  
i n v e s t i g a t o r  would then  w r i t e  up a ' r e p o r t ' .  I doubt  whe ther  t h i s  i s  
an ad eq u a te  f i e l d  method f o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  economics bu t  i t  was c l e a r l y  
i n a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  r e s e a r c h  on r u r a l  power s t r u c t u r e .  Thus t h e  t a s k  
o f  b u i l d i n g  up a r e s e a r c h  c a p a c i t y  r e q u i r e d  a c o n f r o n t a t i o n  w i th  t h e  
s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  r u r a l  r e s e a r c h  by i n s i s t i n g  t h a t  the  a u t h o r s  o f  
r e s e a r c h  papers  p e r s o n a l l y  c a r r i e d  o u t  th e  f i e l d w o r k .  This  p r i n c i p l e
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reduced t h e  i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  some o f  th e  BARD s t a f f  t o  work w i th  me and 
i t  r e q u i r e d  c o n s i d e r a b l e  r e - o r i e n t a t i o n  and t r a i n i n g  f o r  t h o s e  who d id  
compr ise t h e  team.
T h i rd ly  even by 1974 in  Bangladesh few v i l l a g e  based s t u d i e s  
e x i s t e d  and i n t e r e s t i n g l y  the y  were dominated by e x p a t r i a t e  female  
a n t h r o p o l o g i s t s  who had focussed  upon th e  c u l t u r a l  b e h a v io u r  o f  r u r a l  
Muslim women. This  work has been im p o r ta n t  f o r  t h e  contemporary  
a n a l y s i s  o f  and r e sponses  to  th e  problems o f  r u r a l  women in  Bangladesh 
b u t  i t  on ly  m a rg i n a l l y  a s s i s t e d  our  concern  wi th  th e  r u r a l  p o l i t i c a l  
economy. The r e l e v a n t  sou rces  then  a v a i l a b l e  a r e  l i s t e d  in  t h e  r e f e r ­
ences  t o  paper  2 .2  and th e  b ib l i o g r a p h y  in 2 . 6 .  In p a r t i c u l a r  th e  
Ph.D. t h e s i s  o f  P .B e r to c c i  (1970) and th e  work o f  A.Abdullah (Abdullah  
and N ations  1974) were i n v a l u a b l e .  O uts ide  Comilla  and Michigan S t a t e  
U n i v e r s i t y ,  which p rov ided  t h e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  economics t e c h n i c a l  a s s i s t ­
ance to  th e  Academy and where he was r e g i s t e r e d  f o r  h i s  P h .D . ,  B e r t o c c i ' s  
work was r e l a t i v e l y  unknown. The c r i t i c i s m s  o f  B e r to cc i  which a r e  found 
a t  v a r io u s  p o i n t s  in  P a r t s  11 and 111 o f  t h i s  submiss ion  must  be 
c o n s id e re d  a l o n g s i d e  th e  in de b tedness  t o  h i s  work as a f r e q u e n t  p o i n t  
o f  d e p a r t u r e  in  th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  and p o l i t i c a l  economy 
in  Bangladesh.
F o u r th ly ,  t h i s  absence  o f  r e l e v a n t  l i t e r a t u r e  and o t h e r  secondary  
sou rces  was ev idence  i t s e l f  o f  th e  f a i l u r e  o f  s o c io lo g y  depar tm en t s  
in  th e  u n i v e r s i t i e s  o f  E as t  P ak is ta n /B an g lad esh  ( o r  P a k i s t a n  as  a whole)  
to  a d a p t  t h e  s u b s t a n t i v e  legacy  o f  Western l o c a t e d  th e o ry  towards  t h e  
dominant  r u r a l  c i rc u m s ta n c e s  o f  t h e i r  own s o c i e t y .  The dominance o f
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È n g l i sh  as t h e  academic medium a l s o  accounted  f o r  t h e i r  i s o l a t i o n  
from the  r u r a l  s o c io l o g y  t r a d i t i o n  o f  E as t e rn  Europe.  Fur thermore  
t h e r e  a r e  no an th ro p o lo g y  depar tments  in  t h e  u n i v e r s i t i e s  o f  Bangladesh .  
Rural s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  in  Bangladesh i s  s t i l l  dominated by t h e  d i s c i p l i n e  
o f  economics su p p o r te d  by t h e  odd p o l i t i c a l  s c i e n t i s t ,  d e v i a n t  s o c i o l o g i s t  
o r  e n g i n e e r .
F i f t h l y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  a t  t h e  t ime o f  t h i s  r e s e a r c h  a t  Comil la  i t  was 
im p o r ta n t  to  s t i m u l a t e  t h e  development o f  r u r a l  s o c i a l  s c i e n c e  th ro u g h o u t  
t h e  academic i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  Bangladesh by e a r l y  p u b l i c a t i o n  o f  ou r  
f i n d i n g s  and ou r  methods ,  s t r u c t u r e d  d a ta  s c h e d u l e s ,  and so on.  As a 
r e s u l t  t h e  f i r s t  e d i t i o n  was p u b l i sh e d  in March 1976 w i th  a second 
e d i t i o n  in  June 1978. The speed and l o g i s t i c s  o f  p u b l i c a t i o n s  had i t s  
c o s t s .  I t  seemed n e c e s s a r y  f o r  th e  p u b l i c a t i o n  to  appea r  under  th e  
e d i t o r s h i p  o f  one o f  t h e  Academy s t a f f  f o r  purposes  o f  fo l l o w in g  up 
th e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  work f o r  p o l i c y  and being in vo lved  in  d e v e lo p ­
ing th e o ry  and methodology.  M.Ameerul Huq was ap p o in te d  e d i t o r  as  
he was th e  s e n i o r  member o f  th e  team (my main c o u n t e r p a r t )  a l th o u g h  
he had worked in  an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c a p a c i t y  and had no t  been engaged 
in  f i e ld w o rk  o r  w r i t i n g  o f  s u b s t a n t i v e  p i e c e s .  He s t e e r e d  th e  manu­
s c r i p t s  through th e  p r i n t e r s ,  and s u p e rv i s e d  t h e  p ro o f  r e a d i n g .  I t  has 
t o  be unders tood  t h a t  w h i le  Bangladeshi  p r i n t e r s  may produce  E n g l i sh  
p u b l i c a t i o n s  t h e i r  p r o f i c i e n c y  in  Engl ish  can be very poor .  As a r e s u l t  
t h e r e  were many p r i n t i n g  e r r o r s ,  no t  a l a s  f u l l y  c o r r e c t e d  in  t h e  
p r o o f  r e a d in g .  Most o f  t h e s e  e r r o r s  have been c o r r e c t e d  by hand f o r  
t h i s  submiss ion .  Perhaps  more im p o r t a n t ,  t h e  f i e ld w o rk  had to  be w r i t t e n  
up under  c o n s i d e r a b l e  p r e s s u r e  in o r d e r  f o r  us t o  d e l i v e r  t h e  r e q u i r e d  
s e r v i c e  both to  t h e  Academy and th e  M i n i s t r y ,  b u t  a l s o  in  t h e  academic
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community o f  Bangladesh as  a whole .  The compromise w i th  r e f in e m e n t  
had t o  be s e t  a g a i n s t  t h e s e  o t h e r  c r i t e r i a  which amounted t o  urgency .
The genuine  demand f o r  a second e d i t i o n ,  now a l s o  s o ld  o u t ,  i s  perhaps  
e v id en ce  o f  th e  impor tance  o f  t h e s e  o t h e r  c r i t e r i a ;  and t h e  work 
seemed t o  have some impact  upon t h e o ry  and methodology as  f i e ld w o rk  
s t u d i e s  p r o l i f e r a t e d  d u r ing  th e  l a s t  f i v e  y e a r s  in  Bangladesh .
There were o t h e r  d i f f i c u l t  c o n d i t i o n s  n o t  r e c o rd e d  he re  f o r  
working a t  th e  Academy on s e n s i t i v e  i s s u e s  d u r in g  t h e s e  two tempestuous  
y e a r s  o f  p o s t - l i b e r a t i o n  Bangladesh .  D esp i te  t h e s e  prob lems ,  th e  
r e s e a r c h  c o n t r i b u t e d  to  a new p e r s p e c t i v e  in. th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  r u r a l  
c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  in Bangladesh.  I t  i d e n t i f i e d  p ro c e s s e s  o f  accum ula t ion  
and impover ishment  w i t h i n  communit ies  o f  s m a l l - h o ld i n g  p e a s a n t s ,  where 
t h e  i n c id e n c e  o f  l a n d l e s s n e s s  was r e l a t i v e l y  low, where no l a n d l o r d s  
e x i s t e d  and where p e a s a n t s  w i th  la n d h o ld in g s  above 5 a c r e s  were very 
r a r e .  These p ro c e s s e s  were dominated by th e  l i n k  between r u r a l  
i n d e b t e d n e s s ,  mor tgag ing o f  land  and r i c h e r  p e a s a n t s  as  moneylenders 
and u l t i m a t e  r e c e i v e r s  o f  land  below i t s  market  va lue  v ia  th e  accumula ted  
non-payment o f  high i n t e r e s t  r a t e s .  Even in  an a r e a  o f  i n t e n s i v e  and 
s u b s i d i s e d  a g r i c u l t u r a l  i n n o v a t io n  (an a s p e c t  o f  th e  Comilla  exper iment )  
t h e  r e t u r n s  on moneylending ( a s  w e l l  a s  t r a d i n g  and p e t t y  l e a s i n g )  were 
h ig h e r  than from a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t io n  e s p e c i a l l y  when th e  a s s o c i a t e d  
t r a n s f e r s  o f  land  a r e  c o n s id e re d .  In a d d i t i o n  r i c h e r  f a m i l i e s  were a b l e  
t o  d i v e r s i f y  t h e i r  economic a c t i v i t y  away from land  ( v i a  t r a d i n g ,  
r e t a i l i n g ,  and government employment) thus  reduc ing  t h e i r  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  
to  f r a g m e n ta t io n  th rough m u l t i p l e  i n h e r i t a n c e .  This  f i n d i n g  co n f ro n te d  
th e  Chayanovian a n a l y s i s  o f  c y c l i c a l  f o r t u n e s  favoured  by B e r t o c c i .
The r e s e a r c h  connec ted  t h e s e  p r o c e s s e s  to  an a n a l y s i s  o f  k in s h ip
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s t r u c t u r e s ,  f i n d i n g  t h a t  f am i ly  s o l i d a r i t y  was g iv i n g  way t o  c l a s s  
d i v i s i o n s  w i t h i n  ex tended  f a m i l i e s .  Such d i v i s i o n s  were r e i n f o r c e d  
th rough  m a rr i age  p a t t e r n s  which r e - a l i g n e d  n o t io n s  o f  l i n e a g e  s t a t u s  
and th e re b y  undermined th e  i d e o l o g i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  a g e n e a lo g ic a l  
b a s i s  to  s o l i d a r i t y .
However ex tended f a m i l i e s  were o f t e n  th e  b a s i s  f o r  forming 
c o o p e r a t i v e s  which were run f o r  t h e  b e n e f i t  o f  t h e  dominant  househo ld .  
This  was e s p e c i a l l y  t h e  ca se  where deep t u b e - w e l l s  were in v o lv ed  s i n c e  
the  ex tended  f am i ly  land  would be c o n t ig u o u s  th rough  i n h e r i t a n c e  
d i v i s i o n  bu t  th e  l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  well  and t h e  co n s eq u en t  command a re a  
would r e f l e c t  th e  marg ina l  s t a t u s  o f  t h e  weaker hou seh o ld s .  F i n a l l y  
the  s tu d y  p o in t e d  o u t  t h a t  s i n c e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  t h e  Comilla  
reg io n  were more f a v o u r a b l e  t o  th e  Comilla  c o o p e r a t i v e  model o f  r u r a l  
development than  e l sew here  in  Bangladesh where t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in  
landho ld ing  was g r e a t e r ,  i t  c o n s t i t u t e d  the  s t r o n g e s t  t e s t  o f  th e  
assumptions  abou t  s o c i a l  harmony upon which th e  model depended.  And 
s in c e  th e  d e l t a i c  r e g io n  o f  Bangladesh could  no t  be r e g a rd e d  as  s o c i a l l y  
and e c o l o g i c a l l y  homogeneous th e  forms o f  r u r a l  i n e q u a l i t y  would be 
d i f f e r e n t  from e l s e w h e re ,  and i t s  e x t e n t  e x a g g e ra te d .
The a r rangement o f  t h e  papers  in  P a r t  11 fo l low s  t h e  o r d e r  in 
which they  appea r  in  th e  book. However paper  2 .2  was w r i t t e n  f i r s t ,  
p r i o r  to  any s e r i o u s  f i e l d w o r k .  I t  was des igned  to  g e n e r a t e  some 
working hypotheses  d e r iv e d  p r i n c i p a l l y  from rev iewing  l i t e r a t u r e  on 
approxim ate s i t u a t i o n s  in  I n d i a ,  and r e l a t i n g  i t  t o  a v a i l a b l e  d i s c u s s i o n s  
o f  E as t  P a k i s t a n /B a n g la d e s h .  The paper  a l s o  had a t r a i n i n g  f u n c t i o n
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f o r . t h e  team assembled a t  th e  Academy s i n c e  i t  was t h e i r  f i r s t  
exposure  t o  t h i s  m a t e r i a l .  The paper  was c i r c u l a t e d  t o  them (and 
o t h e r s  in  Bangladesh) and became t h e  p o i n t  o f  d e p a r t u r e  f o r  a s e r i e s  
o f  d i s c u s s i o n s  in which I gave impromptu l e c t u r e s  on t h e o ry  and conce p ts  
b u t  a t  t h e  same t ime l e a r n t  from my c o l l e a g u e s  abou t  t h e  s t r e n g t h s  and 
weaknesses  o f  my p reconce ived  views.  The paper  was l e f t  i n t a c t  f o r  
p u b l i c a t i o n ,  s in c e  i t  r e v e a l e d  how th e  i n i t i a l  agenda o f  q u e s t i o n s  had 
been c o n s t r u c t e d  and th e  impor tance  f o r  f i e l d w o r k  o f  be ing  e x p l i c i t  
abou t  a s s u m p t io n s ,  concep ts  and t h e o r e t i c a l  p e r s p e c t i v e s .  H i t h e r t o ,  
r u r a l  r e s e a r c h  in  B ang ladesh /E a s t  P a k i s t a n  had pa id  s c a n t  a t t e n t i o n  t o  
p r e p a r a t o r y  t h i n k in g  mainly  because  i t  was conducted  w i t h i n  an o r thodox  
framework o f  n e o - c l a s s i c a l  economics.
Paper 2 .3  r e p r e s e n t s  th e  c a s e - s t u d y  o f  t h e  v i l l a g e  on which my 
own f i e ld w o rk  was c o n c e n t r a t e d .  For p u b l i c a t i o n  i t  was d iv i d e d  up 
by th e  e d i t o r  i n t o  4 s e p a r a t e  c h a p t e r s  (3 ,  4 ,  5 and 6) which i s  how 
i t  appea rs  in  t h i s  subm is s ion ,  w i th  c h a p t e r  6 as  th e  c o n c l u s i o n  to  
the  c a s e - s t u d y .
Paper  2 .4  r e p r e s e n t s  th e  co n c lu s io n  which I w rote  f o r  t h e  volume 
as a whole in  which a more d i r e c t  d i s c u s s i o n  abou t  p o l i c y  was r e l a t e d  
to  a g e n t l e  a t t e m p t  to  in c lu d e  th e  s t a t e  in  Bangladesh as p a r t  o f  th e  
problem. This  paper  was w r i t t e n  a t  the  t ime o f  t h e  s u c c e s s f u l  coup 
a g a i n s t  Sheikh Mujibur  Rahman in August 1975. I t  became t h e  Academy's ^
p u b l i c  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n t o  th e  h ig h ly  s e n s i t i v e  a r e a s  o f  r u r a l  d e v e lo p -  \
ment p o l i c y  and r u r a l  m o b i l i s a t i o n  du r ing  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  u n c e r t a i n  and 
u n s t a b l e  p e r io d .  I t  was w r i t t e n  and t h e r e f o r e  has to  be r ead  w i th  t h e s e
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c o n s t r a i n t s  in  mind.  L a t e r ,  some o f  t h e s e  themes were taken  up and 
e l a b o r a t e d  more e x p l i c i t l y  in  p a p e r s  3 .2  and 3 .3  o f  P a r t  111.
The c i rc u m s ta n c e s  in  which t h e  papers  o f  P a r t  111 were w r i t t e n  
and t h e  b a s i s  f o r  t h e i r  a r rangem en t  in  t h i s  subm iss ion  were d e s c r i b e d  
e a r l i e r .  Paper  3.1 s e t s  o u t  i n  schem a t ic  and i n t r o d u c t o r y  form an 
h i s t o r i c a l  acc oun t  from t h e  t im e  o f  P a r t i t i o n  o f  t h e  f a c t o r s  working 
a g a i n s t  t h e  development o f  c a p i t a l i s t  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  in  
a g r i c u l t u r e  th ro u g h o u t  Bangladesh and t h e  d i f f e r e n t  r e g io n a l  forms 
o f  a n t e d i l u v i a n  c a p i t a l  which emerged. These arguments were a c o n t i n u ­
a t i o n  o f  th e  themes developed  in  E x p l o i t a t i o n  and t h e  Rural P o o r , bu t  
now i n t e r p r e t i n g  d a t a  from h i s t o r i c a l  and o t h e r  emerging contemporary 
s ources  to  make compar isons  between d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  o f  Bangladesh w h i le  
a t  th e  same t ime r e l a t i n g  t h e s e  v a r i a t i o n s  in  c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  t o  t h e  
uniform a s p e c t s  o f  B an g la d e s h ' s  r e c e n t  p a s t .  Thus t h e  pape r  m a in ta in e d  
t h a t :
'The genera l  e f f e c t  o f  P a k i s t a n i  im p e r ia l i s m  was n o t  to  produce  
a uniform s e t  o f  re s p o n s es  a l l  o ve r  Eas t  Benga l ,  i n s t e a d  i t  was 
a r t i c u l a t e d  th rough  th e  i n h e r i t e d  r eg io n a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  in s o c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s .  Thus under t h e  ' m i n i f u n d i s t '  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  th e  Dacca- 
Comilla  r e g io n  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f  deb t  and mortgage were t h e  
dominant ' a n t e d i l u v i a n '  form to  emerge;  w h i l e  s h a re c ro p p in g  and 
l a n d l e s s n e s s  became more p r e v a l e n t  in  th e  West and North-Wes t ,  
where a c l a s s  o f  ' s u r p l u s '  Muslim p e a s a n t s  was e s t a b l i s h e d  in  th e  
form o f  l a r g e r  l a n d h o ld e r  and p e t t y  l a n d l o r d s .  This  i s  n o t  t o  
s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  o t h e r  forms o f  n o n -p ro d u c t iv e  r e l a t i o n  were n o t  
p r e s e n t  in  each o f  t h e  a r e a s ,  b u t  t h a t  t h e  v a r i a t i o n s  above 
c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  d e te rm in ing  r e l a t i o n  in  each c a s e ' .  (Paper  3.1 page 43)
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P aper  3 .2  was des igned  to  i n t r o d u c e  t h i s  view o f  r u r a l  c l a s s  
fo rm a t ion  i n t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  r u r a l  development  problems in  Bangladesh .  
I t  e x p l a in e d  th e  p r e s s u r e s  t o  produce  a framework f o r  t h e  e n t i r e  range 
o f  r u r a l  development a c t i v i t y  in  te rms o f  t h e  i d e o l o g i c a l  r eq u i re m en ts  
o f  t h e  c l a s s e s  and groups domina t ing  t h e  s t a t e ,  t h e  Comil la  to t e m ,  and 
the  s t r u c t u r e  o r  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  f o r e i g n  a i d  and c e n t r a l  b u r e a u c r a t i c  
management.
The key problem i s  i d e n t i f i e d  o f  a d e q u a te l y  r e f l e c t i n g  s o c i a l  and 
e c o l o g i c a l  h e t e r o g e n e i t y  in  a u n i v e r s a l  fo rmula which s p e c i f i e s  th e  
r e s o u rc e  and i n s t i t u t i o n a l  c o n t e n t  o f  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in  t h e  form 
o f  th e  I n t e g r a t e d  Rural Development Programme (IRDP).
IRDP i s  th e  framework f o r  r e p l i c a t i n g  t h e  Comil la  exper im en t  
th ro u g h o u t  Bangladesh.  But t h e  Comilla  exper im en t  canno t  be r ega rded  
as  a s uccess  even on i t s  own t e r r i t o r y ;  and th e  even more h e a v i l y  
s u b s i d i s e d  i m i t a t i o n  o f  i t  by The World Bank in  i t s  7 thana  Rural 
Development 1 p r o j e c t  in  Bogra and Mymensingh D i s t r i c t s  has r e v e a le d  
s i m i l a r  problems o f  t r y i n g  to  m o b i l i s e  a r u r a l  p o p u l a t i o n  on an 
e g a l i t a r i a n  b a s i s .  The r eg io n a l  v a r i a t i o n s  in  landow nersh ip  and tenancy  
p a t t e r n s ,  and t h e r e f o r e  in  t h e  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  f u r t h e r  
confound th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  an e x t e r n a l l y  imposed c o o p e r a t i v e  s t r a t e g y  
which i s  based upon a de n ia l  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  c l a s s  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in 
r u r a l  l o c a l i t i e s .
The p r e v a i l i n g  côrvï&^Stw o f  IRDP, m a in ly  on t h e  grounds o f  
'management ' and ' d e l i v e r y ' ,  have encouraged  an a l t e r n a t i v e  framework
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c o n s i s t i n g  o f  a ( d u a l )  combinat ion  o f ;  f i r s t ,  a commercial o r i e n t a t i o n  
s u p p o r ted  by s p e c i a l i s t  s e r v i c e s  ( i . e .  t h e  T r a i n in g  and V i s i t s  system 
now sponsored  by The World Bank) t o  deve lop  c a p i t a l i s t  f a rm ing  among 
r i c h e r  p e a s a n t s  and l a n d l o r d s ;  and s e c o n d ly ,  r e l i e f  ( i n  e f f e c t )  f o r  
. the remaining c l a s s e s  th rough  a ' b a s i c  n e e d s - t a r g e t  g roup '  approach .
The paper  somewhat g loom ily  p r e d i c t s  an outcome which resem bles  an 
em ascu la ted  v e r s io n  o f  IRDP, combining d e l i v e r y  o f  s e r v i c e  and s u b s i d i e s  
t o  th e  commercial farming  c l a s s  w i th  ad hoc b u t  well  p u b l i c i s e d  re sponses  
to  th e  poor  based upon use  o f  b a s i c  n e e d s / t a r g e t  group f o r e i g n  a i d  
budge ta ry  heads.
A response  to  t h e s e  ' f ramework '  problems i s  t o  emphas ise a s t y l e  
o f  r u r a l  development a c t i v i t y  in  which c r e a t i o n  by l e a r n i n g  and p a r t i ­
c i p a t i o n  i s  s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  t h e  c u r r e n t  e x t e n s i o n  p r a c t i c e  o f  p e r s u a s io n  
and programming. I n s t e a d  o f  t a r g e t  groups d e f in e d  e x t e r n a l l y ,  development 
groups should  emerge th rough  s e l f - d e f i n i t i o n  prompted by t h e  promise o f  
e x t e r n a l  s u p p o r t  f o r  p r o d u c t i v e  p r o j e c t s .  F i e l d  workers shou ld  be 
encouraged to  conduc t  independen t  a p p r a i s a l s  o f  s i t u a t i o n s  gu ided  by a 
con t inuous  p rocess  o f  r eg io n a l  zoning  along  a number o f  s o c i a l  and 
e c o l o g ic a l  v a r i a b l e s ,  and to  engage in  lo c a l  e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n .
F i n a l l y  the  paper  a rgues  t h a t  t h e  language o f  r u r a l  development 
m is leads  us i n t o  assuming th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  p la ns  and p ro p o s a l s  -  t h a t  
a complex s t r u c t u r e  o f  r e s p o n s e s  to  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  known be fo reh an d .
This i s  r a r e l y  th e  c a s e ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  a p p l i e s  to  Bangladesh where any 
u nders tand ing  o f  r u r a l  s o c i a l  p r o c e s s e s  remains f r ag m e n ta ry .  As f a r  
as  th e  r u r a l  poor a r e  conce rned ,  frameworks ( a l a s  r e v o l u t i o n a r y  ones 
too)  a r e  u s u a l l y  someone e l s e ' s .
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. These themes a r e  pursued  f u r t h e r  in  paper  3 .3  when t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  r u r a l  poor o f  t h e  Second Five  Year Plan (SFYP) in  Bangladesh 
a r e  examined in  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  l a n d l e s s n e s s  and r u r a l  un- 
and underemployment.  The paper  beg ins  w i th  a review o f  the  p rocess  
o f  p la nn ing  and th e  i n t e r e s t  groups invo lved  in  r u r a l  development in 
Bangladesh ,  emphasis ing  th e  p o l i t i c a l  n a t u r e  o f  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n -  
b u i l d i n g .  At th e  end o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  i t  draws t o g e t h e r  th e  t h r e a d s  o f  
t h e  c u r r e n t  p i c t u r e  i n t o  ' a  s c e n a r i o  o f  p o s s i b l e  s t a t e  p o l i c y  and a c t i o n ' .
The second s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  paper  i d e n t i f i e s  t h e  problems o f  e f f e c t i v e  
demand f o r  f o o d g ra in  which th e  p r o d u c t i o n - o r i e n t a t e d  i n p u t  supply  
s t r a t e g i e s  o f  the  SFYP (which a r e  su p p o r ted  s t r o n g l y  by The World Bank) 
w i l l  e n c o u n t e r ,  and which w i l l  have a d e p r e s s i v e  e f f e c t  upon any 
p r o j e c t e d  expans ion  o f  p r o d u c t io n .  This  co n c lu s io n  a r i s e s  from e a r l i e r  
an a l y s e s  o f  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  economy in  which n o n -p ro d u c t iv e  r u r a l  c a p i t a l  
has f l o u r i s h e d  ( see  2 . 3 ,  3.1 and 3 . 4 ) .
In t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  th e  pape r  a rgues  f o r  a programme o f  a g r a r i a n  
reform based upon th e  development o f  r u r a l  p ro p e r ty  r i g h t s  o t h e r  than  
land  such as w a t e r ,  which can be c o n t r o l l e d  by th e  l a n d l e s s ,  through 
which the  l a n d l e s s  can p a r t i c i p a t e  in  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p ro d u c t io n  and from 
which the y  can a c q u i r e  p u rchas ing  power. Such a s t r a t e g y  i s  r egarded  
as be ing w i th i n  th e  realms o f  p o s s i b i l i t y  f o r  s t a t e  a c t i o n  s in c e  i t  
does no t  invo lve  a head-on c o l l i s i o n  wi th  th e  landed i n t e r e s t s  r e p r e s e n t e d  
in the  s t a t e .
The paper  then  goes on to  s u g g e s t  a s e r i e s  o f  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  
f o r  such a s t r a t e g y  a r i s i n g  from o t h e r  ex p e r im e n t s ,  and r e t u r n s  to  th e  
theme o f  how government could  d e b u r e a u c r a t i s e  i t s  approach to  r u r a l
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development t o  a l lo w  a range  o f  such i n s t i t u t i o n a l  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  t o  
be d e v i s e d ,  t e s t e d ,  m od i f ied  and adop ted .  I t  has been g r a t i f y i n g  to  
o b se rv e  in  t h e  p r a c t i c a l  seque l  to  t h i s  d i s c u s s i o n  (with  th e  e x p e r i ­
mental  development o f  i r r i g a t i o n  a s s e t s  among th e  r u r a l  l a n d l e s s )  
t h e  number o f  unplanned and u n p r e d i c t e d  o r g a n i s a t i o n a l  forms among 
l a n d l e s s  group and com bina t ions  o f  them which have developed in 
r e s p o n s e  to  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  and manager ia l  im p e ra t iv e s  o f  a t t e m p t in g  
such a p r o d u c t i v e  a c t i v i t y  (Wood, J u l y  1981).
Paper  3 .4  deve lops  t h e  argument o u t l i n e d  s c h e m a t i c a l l y  in  3 . 1 ,  
a l th o u g h  (a s  e x p l a in e d  e a r l i e r )  i t  i s  a s u b s t a n t i a l l y  r e v i s e d  and 
updated  v e r s io n  o f  t h e  e a r l i e r  d r a f t  on which th e  3.1 summary was 
based .  I t  p roceeds  by d i s c u s s i n g  t h e  d i f f i c u l t i e s  and p i t f a l l s  o f  
employing a conce p t  o f  c l a s s  in  th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  changing r u r a l  s o c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s .  I a rgue  t h a t  i t s  c o r r e c t  use i s  c o n s i s t e n t  with  th e  p i c t u r e  
o f  r u r a l  s t r u c t u r a l  f r a g m e n ta t i o n  which must a l s o  be r e t a i n e d  in  th e  
a n a l y s i s .  O ther  acc o u n ts  o f  a g r a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s  in  Bangladesh a r e  
c r i t i c i s e d  f o r  be ing  a h i s t o r i c a l ,  f o r  making assumpt ions  about  homo­
g e n e i t y ,  and f o r  t h e  r e l a t e d  b ia s  o f  us ing  Comilla  ( t h e  most i n t e n s i v e l y  
r e s e a r c h e d  a r e a  u n t i l  t h e  m i d - s e v e n t i e s )  as  the  b a s i s  f o r  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s .  
Thus t h e  pape r  a t t e m p t s  t o  combine a r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  th e  h i s t o r i c a l  
s p e c i f i t y  o f  Bangladesh w i th  a s e n s i t i v i t y  towards i t s  i n t e r n a l  
r e g io n a l  v a r i a t i o n s ,  and t h e r e f o r e  i n t e r p r e t s  em p i r ica l  d a ta  with 
p r o p o s i t i o n s  conce rn ing  dependen t  accumula t ion  under the  c o l o n ia l  
c o n d i t i o n s  which p e r s i s t e d  in E as t  P a k i s t a n  du r ing  1947-71.
The pape r  i s  concerned  w i th  the  p ro c e s s e s  which have he ld  up th e  
development o f  c a p i t a l i s t  r e l a t i o n s  in a g r i c u l t u r e .  The a n a l y s i s
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p r e s e n t e d  has c l o s e  r e l e v a n c e  to  th e  arguments p r e s e n t e d  in  3 .3  
conce rn ing  c o n s t r a i n t s  on a g r i c u l t u r a l  p ro d u c t i o n  and t h e  low le v e l  
o f  e f f e c t i v e  demand. I t  i s  in  t h i s  way s eek in g  to  d i s p l a y  the  
impor tance  o f  an a n a l y s i s  o f  c l a s s  fo rm a t io n  in  th e  exam ina t ion  o f  
s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n .
The p ap e r  i s  o r g a n i s e d  under t h e  f o l l o w in g  he a d in g s :  to pography ,  
p o p u la t i o n  and r e g io n a l  v a r i a t i o n s ;  l a n d h o ld in g  and t enancy  b e f o r e  
1950; c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  and th e  E as t  P a k i s t a n  co lony  1947-71;  l a n d -  
ho ld ing  p a t t e r n s  d u r ing  1960-77;  and p ro c e s s e s  o f  c l a s s  f o rm a t io n .
This l a s t  s e c t i o n ,  b e fo re  a s h o r t  c o n c l u s i o n ,  examines some o f  t h e  
c a s e - s t u d y  work emerging from Bangladesh t o  a s s i s t  in  i d e n t i f y i n g  
th e  r e a l  s t r u c t u r e s  and meanings o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  which l i e  hidden 
in  th e  a g g r e g a t e  s t a t i s t i c s .
The q u e s t i o n  i s  a l s o  r a i s e d  abou t  th e  b a s i s  o f  r u r a l  s t a b i l i t y  
in  Bangladesh in  t h e  c o n t e x t  o f  the  p o s t - l i b e r a t i o n  s t a t e ' s  i n a b i l i t y  
to  g u a ra n t e e  th e  r i g h t s  to  p r o p e r ty  o r  work o f  v u l n e r a b l e  c l a s s e s ;  
i n c r e a s e d  p o p u la t i o n  p r e s s u r e ;  and th e  p ro ces s  o f  p a u p e r i s a t i o n  d e s c r ib e d  
in  the  p ape r .  An acc oun t  o f  such s t a b i l i t y  as e x i s t s  i s  p r e s e n te d  in  
te rms o f  s t r u c t u r a l  f r a g m e n ta t io n  and l o c a l i s e d  c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  which 
u n t i l  r e c e n t l y  a t  l e a s t  have fu n c t i o n e d  to  s e c u re  l a b o u r  s e r v i c e s  du r ing  
peak p e r io d s  u n d e r - p r e - c a p i t a l i s t  c o n d i t i o n s  through th e s e  v a r io u s  forms 
o f  dependency e i t h e r  w i t h i n  o r  between f a m i l i e s .  But i t  i s  he re  argued  
t h a t  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  to  p la c e  t h e s e  d i f f e r e n t  forms o f  c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  
i n t o  a c o h e r e n t  h i s t o r i c a l  and r e g io n a l  framework o f  a n a l y s i s .
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PART 1
PEASANTRY AND STATE IN N.BIHAR, INDIA
1-1
From Raivatto Rich Peasant
G eof Wood
In a village in No r th  Bihar, legislation has had the in tended  
e f fec t  o f  re mov ing  the zamindar .  But  the z a m i n d a r ’s 
successors,  his f o r m e r  tenants,  have emerge d  as a class o f  rich 
peasants,  whose e c o n o m ic  p o w e r  has been enhanced in a 
manner conducive to the sharpening o f  cleavages ajong n ew  
lines o f  class d i st inct ion.  The fo r m e r  sharecropper  is n o w  a 
landless labourer,  and  his p o v e r t y  is re inforced  b y  new  
d imens ions  o f  inequali ty .
An Emerging Class Although land reform legislation in India is com m only  
regarded as a futile gesture, reflecting the radical posturing of  
the ruling Congress Party, the abolition of zamindari in North  
India in 1950  has made a substantial impact upon the agrarian 
structure and the process o f  differentiation am ong the 
peasantry. Before 1950 ,  the role o f  raiyat was critical in the 
structure o f  exp lo itat ion  in the countryside. The raiyat 
represented the primary point in the system at which the 
surplus o f  produce, after consum ption  by himself ,  his tenants  
and his labourers, was aggregated. This surplus was then  
transmitted upwards through the medium o f  the raiyat in the 
form o f  rent. The upward flow of surplus sustained a 
dominant class o f  landlords, who for the m ost part were not 
themselves directly engaged in cultivation.
The abolition o f  this system  in 1950 had one significant 
long-term effect: the surplus which was previously ex ­
propriated in the form o f  rent from the raiyat was thereafter  
to a great extent retained by the raiyat for disposal by him.  
Henceforth developm ent strategies involving attem pts to  
increase agricultural ou tp ut ,  productivity and the am ount of  
agricultural surplus available for redistribution, either within  
the agricultural sector or outside it in the industrial sector,  
would have to  depend upon the interests and political strength  
of the raiyats, in their new role as an emerging class o f  rich 
peasants. That is the central them e o f  this paper, pursued in 
the context o f  a v i l la g e -D e s ip u r -w h ic h  1 studied in the Kosi 
region o f  North Bihar.
R a i y a t  O r i g i n s The zamindari revenue and tenure svstem is generally known
S o u f h  \ x t u n  k i ' x i c w .  \  < r l u m c  7,  N u t n h i T  1. O c t o h c r  l ‘' “ .
a n d  r e q u i r e s  o n l y  b r i e f  i n t r o d u c t i o n  h e r e .  I lie B r i t i s h  i n t e r e s t  
in t h e  r e g i o n  o f  t h e  K o s i  r i v e r  d a t e d  f r o m  a r o u n d  1 7 7  2 
i n i t i a l l y  as  a f r o n t i e r  d i s t r i c t  w i t h  N e p a l  t o  t h e  n o r t i t .  b u t  w i t h  
a d e v e l o p i n g  e c o n o m i c  i n t e r e s t  in i n d i g o ,  t o b a c c o  a n d ,  f r o m  
t h e  m i d - n i n e t e e n t h  c e n t u r y ,  j u t e .  I n d i g o  w a s  a p l a n t a t i o n  c r o p
grown by British se tt lers  for use as a d y e  in the  tex t i le  The Village ot
industry. Jute  o n  the  o th e r  hand b eca m e  the  principal cash Desipur
crop grown by  the  peasants  th e m s e lv e s  on  part o f  their
h old ings ,  ev en tu a l ly  rep lacing to b a c c o  as the m ain  source  o f
cash in c o m e .  T h u s  an early c o n cern  to  m ake the  area secure
from the north  s o o n  d ev e lo p e d  in to  the  n ecess i ty  t o  provide a
stable po lit ica l  and soc ia l  e n v ir o n m e n t  w ith in  w h ich  the
p roduction  o f  ind igo  and the  clearing o f  jungle  cou ld  take
place. In a d d it ion  to  the  adm inis trat ive  cos ts  o f  d o m in a t in g
such an area, e x p e n d i tu r e  on  infrastructural d e v e l o p m e n t -
railways and roads, e s p e c i a l l y - w a s  incurred, t o  fac i l ita te  the
transport and m arketing  o f  produce .  T h e s e  c o s t s  w ere  borne
largely out  o f  revenue co l le c te d  from  the land, rather than
through tax ing  prof its  or  im pos in g  tariffs on  im por ted  finished
c o m m o d it ie s .  C o n s e q u e n t ly ,  apart from  en cou rag in g  the
clearing o f  jungle ,  laying d o w n  indigo p lan ta t ion s ,  and
subsidising from  land revenue the capital  req u irem en ts  o f  a
marketing s y s t e m ,  the  main task for the  C o m p a n y  b e c a m e  the
con stru ct ion  o f  a land tenure sy s t e m  from w h ic h  it could
derive revenue w ith o u t  having to  incur the  c o s t s  and the
e n o r m o u s  adm in is trat ive  w ork  o f  c o l le c t io n .
Such a sys tem  d e p e n d e d  on tw o  ty p e s  o f  c o n d i t io n .  First, it 
w ould  have to  be c o n s is te n t  w ith  e f f ic ien t  e c o n o m i c  and social  
relations for the p r o d u c t io n  o f  cash crops by the  peasantry  
( init ial ly  to b a c c o  and, later on ,  ju te ) .  These re la t ions  involved  
a balance b e tw e e n  the  p r o d u c t io n  o f  cash crops and food  
crops, w ith  su ff ic ien t  left to  the  peasant and labourer after  
exp rop ria t ion  to  ensure that the c y c le  o f  p r o d u c t io n  could  be 
repeated. S e c o n d ly ,  there had to  be in cen t ive s  and o b v iou s ly  
rewards for th o s e  w h o  w ou ld  co l lec t  the revenue on b eh a lf  o f  
the C o m p a ny .
.After a few  false starts, the P erm anent  S e t t le m e n t  o f  1793  
in st i tu t ional ised  a land tenure  sy s te m  in w hich  local  landlords  
contracted  to  organise  the c o l l e c t io n  o f  rent on their estates,  
passing on a f ixed  p rop ort ion  o f  rent in revenue  to  the  
g overn m en t.  S u b se q u e n t  leg islation thr o u g h  to  in d e p e n d e n c e  
al low ed on the o n e  hand the  pro l i feration  o f  in term ed ia te  
co l lec tors ,  w h ile  at th e  sam e t im e  restr icting the  arbitrary  
f ixing o f  rents and e x te n d in g  s o m e  form al secu r ity  o f  tenure  
to  so m e  o f  the peasants.  T h e  sy s tem  achieved a startling
com plexity. Even for the Kosi area it is difficult to  offer a 
general description o f the hierarchy of tenure-holders since the 
status of the intermediary under law does not correlate with 
the quantity o f  land in his tenure.
The Village o f For Desipur, two further complications must be m entioned.
Desipur First, part o f  the village had been sub-contracted as a touji
right to a local Muslim, who then became a toujidar over that 
land and som e land in neighbouring villages. ^Secondly, a 
substantial proportion o f the village land (excluding the touji 
piece) was not rented to peasants on a raiyatwari basis (full 
security of tenure with the rent formally fixed) but either 
cultivated by the zamindar’s own servants, or let out to  
peasants under a sharecropping arrangement. The zamindar 
was therefore technically a raiyat on that land which was not 
occupied by other raiyats from the village. It should be added
that the zamindar lived in a village about fifteen miles away;
and the Muslim toujidar lived in the neighbouring village. Since 
1955, this Muslim toujidar has been the mukhiya (head) o f the 
gram panchayat, and has been unopposed since the first 
panchayat election.
Table 1
Distribution of population by caste—Desipur
No. of Total No. of Average No.
Caste Group Households Persons per Household
Mushar 81 451 5.5
Khangar 55 348 6.3
Muslim* 52 334 6.2
Santhal 24 142 5.9
Baishya Bania 24 113 4.7
Gwala (Yadav) 8 45 5.6
Kamar 7 34 4.9
Agrahari Bania 6 46 7.6
Dusadh 6 33 5.5
Chamar 3 21 7.0
Doam 1 2 2.0
Julaha 1 6 6.0
Gossain 1 4 4.0
Amin 1 7 7.0
Total 270 1,586
Mu.s lims co m p o .sed  o f  S u n a t i s  and Pafhan.s
These two landlords had as their patwaris- record keepers and 
rent co llec tors-th e  heads of the tw o lineages which are now 
among the strongest econom ically in the village.
Caste Groups The village is composed o f twelve Hindu caste groups, a
Muslim com m unity and a Santhal (scheduled tribe) 
com m unity. The distribution o f the main groups is shown in 
Table 1. The richer peasant class com es from the Khangar 
caste and the Sunati Muslims, and from these two groups com e 
the patwari lineages. The Khangars are designated as a 
scheduled caste in the Indian constitution , although the village 
itself lies in a scheduled caste constituency. However, the 
Khangars have been long established as the main Hindu 
cultivating group in the village, although it is misleading to  
assume that all of the Khangar households in Desipur enjoy 
the same econom ic and political status. The caste group and 
thé village is" dominated by tw o Khangar extended families, 
both owning tractors, while at the other end o f the scale there 
are some very poor Khangar households with small insufficient 
holdings, supplemented by sharecropping arrangements and 
some wage labour. One o f the tractor-owning Khangar 
extended famihes is headed by the eldest brother—Abhi Lai— 
who is acknowledged as the informal mukhiya o f the village. It 
is this man who used to be the patwari for the Muslim 
toujidar. He also used to be the panchayat sarpanch 
(unopposed) until his age recently compelled him to  
■’nom inate” a successor. The other tractor-owning Khangar 
extended family is headed by Basudeb. This household owns a 
shop and a mill and trades in jute, and Basudeb is the secretary 
of the Multi-Purpose Cooperative Society.
The Muslim com m unity is divided into two sub-castes; the 
Sunatis and the Pathans. The Sunati group is the richer, tracing 
its descent from two “ brothers” —Jitu Patwari and Bipath Ali.
It is probable that this is a m ythological lineage description 
uniting into one clan the two Sunati descent groups in the 
village. The two richest extended families are those o f Aziz 
and F akar-the grandsons o f Jitu Patwari and Bipath Ali
respectively. The Zamin
The Mushars are the most numerous caste group in the village, 
living in three tolas (caste-hamlets). They are scheduled caste 
Hindus, previously regarded as untouchable. The majority of 
the households are without land, and so their working 
members are em ployed as agricultural labourers or as 
ploughmen by the peasant households in the village. The 
Mushars as an agricultural labouring class are widespread in the
Defeated
area, but their numerical strength has been of little significance 
politically. Their livelihood is a precarious one. They are 
invariably and inevitably illiterate, dropping out o f education  
as soon as they are old enough for their labour to have a value 
to their family which it cannot afford to forgo.
Until the abolition o f  zamindari, those with substantial 
raiyatwari status on the land in Desipur were few. Wi’th the 
one exception o f an Agrahari Bania, the larger raiyats came 
from the Khangars and the Sunati Muslims. However, even 
these larger raiyats would have land on sharecropping tenure 
which som etim es exceeded their raiyatwari-held land. The 
Mushars were always labourers to these groups and also to the 
B a nias and Yadavs. In Desipur the Yadavs had discarded their 
herding occupation for peasant cultivation, and the Banias 
com bined cultivation with their trading activities. The Dusadhs 
came from a neighbouring village to settle on and claim rights 
to land on the very edge o f the Desipur village boundary. They 
are a scheduled caste led by Ram Prasad, who is literate, is a 
member o f the Samyukta Socialist Party (SSP), and is the 
secretary o f the Harijan caste organisation for the constituency  
area.
The Santhals came to Desipur during the 1950s. A group of 
them was persuaded to move from villages further to the west 
by the zamindar, Sashi Mohan, when, after the Act in 1950 
abolishing zamindari and the Survey and Settlem ent 
Operation—which came to Desipur in 1957 as a sequel to  the 
legislation—the peasant/sharecroppers in Desipur had made it 
increasingly difficult for the zamindar to cultivate his own  
land in the village, or even lease it out for sharecropping. Crop 
shares were not surrendered and the zamindar’s servants in the 
village were persuaded not to  work for him in order to induce 
him to hand over or sell his land to  the villagers. The zamindar 
responded by introducing labour from outside the village—the 
Santhals-prom ising that they would have raiyatwari rights 
over some o f  the land.
The Zamindar In 1950, the peasants o f Desipur were small raiyats and
Defeated sharecroppers. The resumption clauses in the abolition o f
zamindari ensured that the act in itself would not bestow on 
the villagers permanent occupancy rights over any land which 
the zamindar could demonstrate was under his personal
cultivation. Since the zamindar was claiming most of the 
Desipur cultivable land to be under his personal cultivation, 
the peasants in the village—especially the larger raiyats—were 
concerned that the new land reform measures would bring
t h e m  li tt le  b e n e f i t .  R e c o r d s  o f  o c c u p a n c y  for sh are crop p ers  
w ere  d i f f icu l t  for the  p easan ts  to  acq u ire ,  s in c e  the  la n d h o ld e r  
( th e  za m in d a r  in th is  case)  c o u ld  sh ift  his bataidars around  and  
w it h h o ld  rece ip ts  for  p a y m e n t  o f  rent. T h e  p r o b le m  for the  
villagers was to  co n v er t  the ir  s h a r e c r o p p in g  sta tu s  on the  land  
in to  raiyat s ta tu s  and to  get  c o n tr o l  o f  th e  land in the  
z a m in d a r ’s c u l t iv a t in g  p o s s e s s io n .
When the Santhals arrived, the other villagers were naturally 
very hostile towards them. But after about tw o years, the 
larger raiyats in the village started to persuade the Santhals to 
discontinue sharecropping for the zamindar, and to join the 
rest o f  the village in creating trouble for Sashi Mohan by 
claiming rights to land. In addition, both labourers and 
sharecroppers refused to hand over to Sashi Mohan his share o f  
the jute harvest. Eventually the Santhals threw in their lot 
with the other villagers, and the zamindar began to be 
persuaded that it would be futile for him to continue as the 
landlord in Desipur.
The new legislation in 1962 (The Bihar Land Reforms 
Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition o f Surplus Land Act,
1962) further weakened his legal position. This act provided 
for the fixing o f ceilings on land and restriction on the 
sub-letting and resumption of land for personal cultivation, 
and allowed for the acquisition o f the status o f raiyat by 
certain categories o f  under-raiyat. Surplus land could be 
acquired for redistribution by the state. To avoid harassment, 
the zamindar’s recourse—short o f  hiring a private army—would  
in principle have been to the law; but, since Sashi Mohan’s 
holdings now exceeded the new ceiling, the alternative of a
legal d e f e n c e  w as in fact  c lo sed  to  h im . G en era l ly  in the  Kosi  S ix  F am il ie s
region, the terms o f the ceiling legislation have not been
enforced by the administration, through fears o f agrarian
disturbance, but it has removed a weapon from the hands o f
those landlords who actually need to seek legal protection. If
peasants wanted to benefit from the new legislation, which
otherwise would have given them no direct help, they had to
supplement it by resorting to aggressive tactics.
The Raiyats as .. The landlord was compelled to respond. Confronted with
Victors individual opposition, Sashi Mohan could have used force and
probably would have succeeded. But, as an absentee landlord 
confronted with united opposition from the village leaders in 
the climate provided by the legislation, he was at last 
vulnerable. He decided to sell all the land in Desipur which he 
was claiming to be in his cultivating possession, and sever all
his con nection s w ith the village. The land was sold bit by bit 
over tim e, w ith som e o f  the Khangars and Sunati M uslims 
(in itially  the more privileged in their relations with the  
previous raj, and the m ore w ealthy) acquiring better land and 
at a faster rate. For this village at least the land reform  
measures had actually encouraged a redistribution o f  land 
away from the form er landlord class towards the peasants.
It should be pointed ou t, how ever, that the im m ediate e ffect 
o f this legislation generally in the Kosi region and other parts 
o f N orth India was not to increase the number o f  occupant 
cultivators or, significantly, the am ount of land in their 
possession. As the raiyats becam e direct tenants o f the state , 
their security o f tenure was enhanced, they were able to  buy  
and sell land, and the am ount o f  rent payable was reduced  
considerably. The legislation did not directly help the raiyats’ 
sharecroppers to get raiyatwari status. But the general result o f  
the legislation over tim e was to facilitate a steady alteration in  
the pattern o f occupancy rights in terms o f  holding size. The 
am ount o f land available for sharecropping declined as the  
introduction  o f  new agricultural technology m ade it m ore 
profitable for the raiyat to cultivate his holding personally; 
and those raiyats w ho were increasing their agricultural 
productivity or using their initial advantage at the tim e o f  the  
legislation to  engage in other profitable econom ic activities 
were better placed to acquire any land w hich cam e on to  the  
market. Only in a case such as Desipur, where the peasants 
successfu lly  disputed the am ount of land w hich the ex- 
zamindar claim ed to  be in his cultivating possession, was there 
an im m ediate redistribution o f occupancy rights over land
Six Fam ilies But the im m ediate redistribution o f land is not the on ly
criterion by w hich the legislation is to be judged. While still 
subordinate in the regional agrarian structure, the richer 
peasants o f the village acquired som e capacity to  accum ulate  
as a result o f  the land reform measures. Much o f  what they  
previously surrendered to  tenure-holders in the form o f  rent 
was now  retained by them  as a surplus w hich they extracted  
from their ow n tenants and landless labourers. The abolition  
o f zamindari gave raiyats control over this surplus, allow ing  
them  to  increase their consum ption and to invest in m ore land  
or in other econ om ic enterprises.
It will be rem em bered that at the tim e o f the abolition  the  
peasants in Desipur were differentiated by the sizes o f  the 
holding they cultivated, and their tenancy status upon their 
ho.Idings. It has also been pointed out that som e o f  the
extended families were in privileged relationships with the two 
landlords, employed as patwaris and having raiyatwari status 
over a higher proportion o f their larger holdings. These 
families exercised political control over the village, but the 
source o f this power was derived from a dependence on the 
zam indars-it was not autonom ous. The abolition o f  zamindari 
enabled two interrelated processes to take place among the 
peasantry in Desipur. First, econom ic differentiation occurred 
in a more dynamic way as the richer peasants used their 
surpluses for investment and in effect accumulated capital 
which further inhibited the capacity o f others in the village to 
accumulate. Sharp horizontal cleavages betw een classes o f  
peasant were created in the village; and the class unity  
generated by the fight against the zamindar disappeared. 
Secondly, political leadership in the village remained with the 
same families, but their power was now more autonom ous, 
derived from their absolute control over a significant 
proportion o f the principal means o f production—land. 
Whereas before, their status as tenants and the dependent 
nature o f  their political power had given them a static function  
as a vehicle for the upward transmission o f surplus, now they  
were emerging as a rich peasant class, consisting in Desipur of  
about six extended fam ilies, which was able to expand its 
econom ic and political dom ination o f the village.
Table 2
Distribution of land by caste in Desipur
No. of House-
Total No. holds Owning % o f Caste Land Owned of Land
Caste Households Land Owning Land by Caste, Owned by
Group in Desipur in Desipur in Desipur in Acres Caste
Khangar 55 53 96 613.37 55.0
Muslim 52 34 65 204.49 18.0
B. Bania 24 15 62 7T 29 6.2
Santhal 24 24 100 67.95 5.7
Ag. Bania 6 4 66 59.79 5.10
Yadav 8 8 100 43 .88 3.85
Mushar 81% 26 32 37.17 3.3
Artisan 6 6 100 26.46 2.4
Dusadh 6 2 33 4.08 0.30
Chamar 3 1 33 2.12 0.15
Total 265 173 1,130.40 100.00
Table 3 







































.01- .5 2 3 9 5 2 21
.51- 1.0 2 3 2 1 % 8
1.01- 2.5 15 11 11 10 1 2 2 1 .. 1 54
2.51- 5 .0 8 5 3 11 3 3 3 1 1 38
5.01-  7.5 5 4 1 3 3 16
7 .51-10 .0 5 1 1 7
10.01 + 16 10 1 1 1 29
Total 53 34 26 24 15 8 6 4 2 1 173
Total N o. o f  
Households 55 52 81 24 24 8 6 6 6 3 265
Landowners and If the contem porary distribution o f  land by caste in the village
Sharecroppers is exam ined, the superior p osition  o f  the Khangars is especially
evident. In Table 2, the castes are ranked according to  their  
jo in t total ow nership o f  land. Khangars and Muslims represent 
about 40 per cent o f the entire population  o f  Desipur with 73 
per cent o f the land ow ned. But th e  distribution o f  land within  
these castes is highly concentrated . Out o f  53 Khangar 
households, 37 have holdings o f  less than ten acres (see  
Table 3). From  34  landow ning M uslim s, 24  Muslim households  
ow n less than ten acres. Thus, o f  the 29 households ow ning  
land in excess o f  ten acres, s ix teen  are Khangars and ten are 
Muslims. These 29 households ow n  a total o f  70 1 .3  acres ou t  
o f  1 ,1 3 0 .4  acres. T herefore 16 per cent, m ainly Khangars and 
M uslims, o f  those w ho ow n land in D esipur have 62  per cent 
o f the land. A revealing d istinction  ex ists, how ever, betw een  
Khangars and Muslims ow ning m ore than ten acres. The 
six teen  Khangar households ow n 4 8 8 .3 4  acres, w hich  m eans 
that 9 per cent o f  the landow ning households possess 43  per 
cent o f  the land. The am ount o f  land ow ned by M uslims in  
this category is much less; ten Muslim h ouseholds ow n 129 .9  
acres—equivalent to  5 .6  per cent ow ning 1 1 per cent o f  the  
total.
Sharecropping is an im portant additional source o f  land to  th e  
poor peasant. Peasants (as landlords) are reluctant to  adm it to  
leasing out land for sharecropping since there are circum ­
stances under which the sharecropper can claim a perm anent 
right to the land. Informal sharecropping arrangements
therefore prevail, where the crop is divided 50 /5 0  between the 
cultivator and peasant/landlord despite the legal division o f  
seven-twentieths to the landlord. The peasant/landlord is now  
usually careful to shift his sharecroppers around between  
plots, so that they do not continuously cultivate any one plot.
The overall effect o f sharecropping in Desipur is to  bring a Changing Laboi
marginally higher proportion o f the population into a direct Relations
cultivating relationship with the land. But the sharecropper 
usually meets all the production costs, except in the case o f  
high-yielding varieties o f wheat, where the peasant/landlord  
may provide fertiliser, and apply for irrigation through the 
canal and possibly seed from the block office. He does this 
partly to secure the inputs to persuade the sharecropper to 
engage in intensive cultivation, and partly to  prevent there 
being any written evidence that som eone else is cultivating his 
land.
The significance o f the sharecropping relationship in the village 
class structure is com plex. Before the abolition of zamindari 
most of the peasants in Desipur, including the larger raiyats, 
were sharecropping som e land for a landlord (i.e. one o f the 
zamindars). Even som e of the labourers with no raiyatwari 
status over any land were sharecropping land. Of course there 
were large and small sharecroppers, but the relationship itself 
was not a factor differentiating classes o f peasant. It was 
therefore possible for the larger raiyats and sharecroppers to 
recruit the support o f smaller raiyats and sharecroppers in the 
struggle against the comm on oppressor-the zamindar. But 
after the legislation and the Survey and Settlem ent Operation, 
when the zamindar decided to sell his land the larger raiyats 
and sharecroppers ceased to sharecrop land at a rate inversely 
corresponding to their purchase o f additional land (over which 
they had raiyatwari status). Within a few years the richer 
peasants in Desipur had acquired sufficient land to let som e of 
it out to others in the village who still depended on 
sharecropping for their subsistence. The general pattern after 
this transfer o f land to peasants in the village was nevertheless 
a decline in the am ount of land available for sharecropping- 
many poor and middle peasants complain of this. At the same 
time this shift o f land ownership to within the village has 
increased the significance of the sharecropping relationship as 
a factor in differentiating those who still depend upon renting 
in from those who either subsist from what they own or who  
rent out land to sharecroppers. The latter category has becom e 
the peasant/landlord class, with a class of cultivating depend­
ants beneath it. The relationship is in most cases exploitative 
and highly insecure for the sharecropper. He is shifted around
from  p lot to  p lo t, and faces a declining supply o f  land 
available for rent. He therefore has to com p ete w ith  his 
class-fellow s in offering to surrender crop shares w hich are 
higher than the norm .
Changing Labour A phenom enon  interrelated w ith sharecropping is the state o f
Relations the labour market in the village. With the decline in the
availability o f  land for sharecropping, the "patterns o f labour 
supply and dem and altered. Where a poor peasant had 
previously depended upon sharecropping to  supplem ent the 
incom e from his ow n hold ing, he might now be com pelled to 
take up agricultural labouring instead. At the same tim e, the 
richer peasants were unable to  work all the land taken into  
raiyatwari status w ith  their ow n fam ily labour, and therefore 
regularly and system atica lly  hired labour on a daily basis. 
While the richer peasants’ demand for non-fam ily labour 
increased as a result o f their acquisition o f  larger raiyatwari 
holdings, the supply o f  labour also substantially increased as a 
result o f  the same process o f acquisition.
A pproxim ately  90  households in Desipur out o f  a total o f  265  
have no land registered in their names upon w hich a major 
cereal or cash crop might be grow n. There are a further 83  
households w ith less than 2 .5  acres registered. Som e o f  these 
83 have access to other land through sharecropping, but many 
o f  them  are dependent on selling their labour, thus adding to  
the pool o f  labour from  households with n o  land. A pproxi­
m ately 250  people (o f  w hom  100 are fem ale) depend m ainly  
on agricultural labouring for their livelihood. T o this must be 
added a further 100-150  w ho seek som e agricultural work o ff  
their ow n holdings during the year. It should also be 
rem em bered that a labourer, w ho is hired on a daily basis, is 
unlikely to  find more than six to eight m on th s’ work during 
th e  year. Very rarely at this level do alternative occupation s or 
sources o f  incom e exist (occasionally  these are to  be found in 
a relief programm e o f  earthw ork, or handouts o f  grain from  
the block  o ffice  through the gram panchayat m ukhiya). Most 
o f  the pure landless labourers are Mushars.
The relationships betw een  peasant and labourer are diverse; 
ranging from  patron-client situations o f th e  jajmani type  
(social d ivision o f  labour based on caste d istinctions) to a fluid 
market structure for labour on a wage basis. Previously a 
labourer w ould live on the land o f  his master (raiyat/share- 
cropper), rarely working for anyone else, receiving paym ent in 
kind, including gifts o f  c lo th , salt, etc. Thus labourers were 
tied to proprietors in a feudal structure. But though this
form al  m o d e l  o f  p ea sa n t - la b o u r  r e la t io n sh ip s  m a y  h ave  b r o k e n  
d o w n ,  the  c o n tr o l  o ver  lab ou r  by  regular p e a s a n t - e m p lo y e r s  
has n o t  d im in is h e d ,  b e c a u se  o f  an a p p aren t  la b o u r  surp lus  for  
th e  vil lage and th e  a b se n c e  o f  a ltern ative  e m p l o y m e n t  
o p p o r tu n i t i e s ,  in c lu d in g  o f  c o u r s e  the  la ck  o f  access  to  land .
Competition for The most com m on relationship now  is the daily hiring
Work arrangement, w ith a wage-rate for the village which is virtually
constant—Rs. 5 + 750 grammes of food grain. The appearance 
o f a free market for labour is restricted by a notion o f 
territory. There are three tolas (caste-ham lets) o f  Mushar 
labourers in Desipur and these are divided up among the 
peasant employers on a regular territorial basis. The rich 
Sunati Muslim peasants take the north tola, the rich Khangars 
control the south, nearer their own tola. The other middle and 
poor peasants have a less well defined labour territory, and 
their source o f  labour is less regular.
Credit, Comm ere 
and Technology
A recent evolving relationship is the contract arrangement. 
This occurs often when a poor or middle peasant at a period o f  
peak demand for labour simply cannot offer sufficient work 
on a daily basis to attract labourers from a longer period o f 
em ploym ent by a rich peasant. A labourer—often the mukhiya 
o f a Mushar tola who functions som etim es as a labour 
broker—is approached, shown the plot (usually for weeding 
but som etim es for transplanting) and a price is fixed for the 
job. The labourer then recruits and pays other labourers as he 
wishes. But he works them much harder, since the shorter the 
job tim e, the more the “ contractor” receives of the total price 
for the job, and at the same time the opportunity cost to him 
o f other em ploym ent chances forgone is reduced. This 
arrangement is now spreading to rich peasants who see it as a 
more efficient way o f getting work done. They claim that 
while they may pay the contractor as m uch—or even 
more—than on a daily basis, this way the work is done within 
tight schedules. The significance o f the contract method is to 
reduce the overall number of labour days in the village 
agro-economic system  and increase the insecurity o f em ploy­
ment. Politically, it works to prevent the forming o f any 
unified class consciousness among the landless labourers since 
it sets up the labour broker in each Mushar tola, and increases 
A the level of com petition for jobs.
Peasants as 
Moneylenders . .
In Desipur the previous jajmani system of relationships 
between peasant and dependant is disintegrating, a process to  
be explained by the transfer o f land ownership to peasant/ 
em ployers within the village. Their control over the principal
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Credit, C om m erce  
and T ech n ology
means o f  production  renders the ritual, caste aspects o f  the  
hierarchical patron-client system  superfluous. R itual equality  
and tolerance o f  untouchables (for  exam ple) m ay be espoused  
in the village, as the Khangars have now  op en ly  espoused  
them , w ithout a sense o f  threat. The d ifferen tiation  b etw een  
peasant (rich and m iddle especia lly ) and th e  labourer is m ore 
discrete, and is securely  located  w ithin th e  village political 
system . Social and political con tro l can be exercised  on the  
basis o f  transcendent econ om ic  relationsh ips, w ithout  
reference to  an authority  (the zam indar’s) ou tsid e  the village.
So far this paper has exam ined the im pact o f  the transition  
from  the zam indari system  upon  the capacity  o f  the richer 
peasant to  exercise econ om ic  con tro l over other groups in the  
village. The rem ainder briefly  discusses three sets o f  
ph en om en a—credit transactions, com m ercial activ ity  and new  
agricultural tech n o lo g y —w ithin the co n tex t o f the post- 
zamindari agrarian structure.
Peasants as Before the land reform  legislation , the principal m oneylender
M oneylenders . . .  in Desipur was Abhi Lai, w ho was the patwari to  the Muslim  
toujidar, and w ho had also a lucrative business trading in 
tob acco  betw een  the Kosi region and C alcutta. His capacity to  
lend in th e  village was enhanced in tw o w ays. First, he had a 
supply o f  finance for lending w hich  was independ en t o f  the  
zam indar. A nd, secon d ly , he had the status in the village as a 
patwari and as m ukhiya to  secure repaym ents o f  interest and 
principal. Apart from  A bhi Lai, o ther sources o f  credit derived  
u ltim ately  from the tw o zam indars, who w ould  ex ten d  loans 
to  their raiyats and larger sharecroppers. B ut th ose  in the  
village w ho could  not ob ta in  credit d irectly  from  the  
zam indars were dependent either upon A bhi Lai or upon the 
raiyats and sharecroppers w ho were regarded as cred itw orthy  
by th e  zam indars.
But after the abolition  o f  zamindari the structure o f  credit 
transactions altered critically . When th e  zam indars dis­
appeared, so  obv iou sly  did th e  flow s o f  credit through the  
tenant structure depend ent on them . But th is did n ot secure  
for A bhi Lai a m on op o ly  o f  the private lend ing m arket in the  
village, because other peasants w ere now  acquiring a surplus 
for possib le disposal in this way. But, o f  course, credit 
transactions occur in m any d ifferent form s, and th ey  vary in  
their sign ificance for the future o f  the agrarian structure. Many 
o f  the transactions w ithin the village rem ained the sam e as 
b efo re—advances to  labourers in the slack season for consum p­
tion , loans to  poorer peasants for the purchase o f  a bu llock ,
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and loans to those w ithout the savings to  cover contingent 
ritual expenditure. The difference was that there were now  
alternative sources to Abhi Lai and the zamindars, in the form 
of the emerging class o f rich peasant. (In addition there were 
institutional, government sources of credit for those who 
could contrive access to  them , although the purpose o f these 
loans was restricted to long or short term investm ents in 
production and did not include provision for the recurrent 
costs o f  production. These costs and other consum ption needs 
had to be met from private sources.) To establish a m onopoly  
over the scarce resource o f credit was, therefore, one more 
way in which this class had the chance to entrench its control 
over other peasant classes in the countryside.
However, the rich peasants’ function as a source o f private 
credit in the village is not autonom ous. In the structure of  
indebtedness, the hierarchy extends beyond the rich peasant 
to the entrepreneurs in the small market towns and the district 
capitals. A village shopkeeper, for example, in effect retails for 
a wholesaler but has to  surrender most o f his profit to the 
marwari, w ithout whom the com m odity could not have been 
obtained on credit in the first place.
Effects of the 
New Seeds
. . . and as Private and government sources o f credit finance both the
Tradesmen commercial and the farming activities o f the rich peasants.
While the poorer peasants have some sort o f access to 
government credit for agricultural production, the private 
extra-village sources o f credit are channelled exclusively  
through the rich peasant class. It is not uncom m on for a 
moneylender to borrow from a small town marwari in order to 
re-lend at higher interest rates in the village; but usually the 
structure is not so unsubtle as this. In Desipur one o f the 
Khangar households, headed by Basudeb, has established a 
small grain-milling plant—the only such plant in Desipur—on 
the basis o f private credit from a marwari in a nearby tow n. 
The same family has a government “ fair-price” shop, from  
which certain com m odities—kerosene, salt, sugar, e tc .-a re  sold 
under licence. There will be som e com m ission here. But the 
more important advantage is that when the villagers com e 
there, attracted by its being the only place where they can get 
these com m odities at a “ fair price” , they will also find cloth  
for sale; and this family has a m onopoly on selling cloth  in the 
tillage. To be creditworthy to the extent of establishing a shop 
requires security which can only be found in land that 
is—potentially at least—productive. Shopkeepers therefore 
invariably have to  be rich peasants, although the same does not 




E ffects  o f  the T he new  tech n o lo g y  in agriculture requires som e a lteration  o f
N ew  Seeds trad itional cu ltiva tion  practice. The new  seeds, to  be used to
m axim um  e ffe c t , need fertiliser, regular and careful w atering, 
extra w eed ing , and very thorough  preparation o f  the ground. 
O f the n ew  form s o f  m echanisation  regarded as part o f  this 
process, som e are ind ispensab le (e.g . tube-w ell borings and  
pum p sets in areas w ith o u t canal irrigation), w hile others are 
su b stitu tes for labour (e .g . tractors on larger hold ings). A ll 
th ese inn ovation s increase costs; but there is, o f  course, the  
ex p ecta tio n  o f  higher y ie ld s to  com p en sate . In D esipur, the  
new  tech n o lo g y  has been  applied to  w h eat, w ith  rice 
cu ltiva tion  rem aining largely u n affected . T he data suggest that 
rich peasants by virtue o f  the size o f  their hold ings have added  
to  their w ea lth  by cu ltivatin g  w heat w ith  th e  new  tech n o lo g y , 
but that th ey  crop less in ten sively  than m iddle peasants, have 
low er proportions o f  irrigated land and have low er y ie ld s per
acre. It a lso  appears that th e  h igh-yield ing w heat is grow n
m ain ly  for co n su m p tio n , so  that th e m iddle peasants have  
sign ifican tly  increased their level o f co n su m p tio n , th ough  n ot 
necessarily  their  savings. T he e ffect o f  the changes has been  to  
exacerbate the trends that already ex isted  in class d iffer­
en tia tion  am ong the peasantry. T hese trends have b een  
described above, and th ey  ch ronolog ica lly  precede the  
in tro d u ctio n  o f  the new  tech n o logy .
T w o T h em es T o  con clu d e  this account o f  the ev o lu tio n  o f  the agrarian
R estated  structure as person ified  in th e  roles o f  raiyat and rich peasant,
tw o  related them es m ay be restated . F irst, the land reform
m easures em b od ied  in  th e  legisla tion  abolish ing  zam indari have 
had a sign ifican t im pact u p on  the structure o f  rural socia l 
relations; but th is im pact has been restricted  to  the form ation  
o f  a rich peasant class, on  th e  one hand a llow in g  th e  form er  
landlords th e  o p p ortu n ity  to  m aintain their  in vestm en t in the  
cou n trysid e , and on  the o th er  making possib le  the co n tin u ed  
ex p lo ita tio n  o f  th ose  classes b en eath  th a t o f  th e  richer peasant 
proprietors. S eco n d ly , u ndue em phasis has been  p laced  u pon  
the inegalitarian sign ifican ce for the peasantry o f  th e  “ green  
rev o lu tio n ” ; th is has b een  lo o k ed  at here in a m uch  m ore  
realistic perspective.
T he accou n t has focu sed  a tten tio n  on th e  re lation sh ip  b e tw een  
rich p eop le  and productive resources, and poor p eop le  and  
p rod u ctive resources, w ith in  the c o n te x t  o f  open-m arket 
system s o f  asset d istribution . The h istorical q u estion  m ust be 
ask ed —h ow  did som e acquire these assets w h ile  o thers did not?
T h e  m a in  p r o d u c t i v e  a s s e t - l a n d - w a s  a c q u i r e d  b y  t h e  v i l la g e r s
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over a period of time. To buy land required capital—in the 
form of savings or credit. Those who could save were those 
who could produce with a profit beyond im m ediate con­
sumption requirements. Those who could expect land on  
credit were those who were already meeting their consum ption  
requirements w ithout borrowing or labouring and who would 
therefore be able to allocate their incom e from the land 
acquired through credit to  repay that credit. Each acquisition  
of land thereby further enhanced a peasant’s ability to  acquire 
more, provided that labour was not scarce and that he 
possessed or had econom ic access to  draught power. Owner­
ship o f bullocks was critical, so those who had been substantial 
sharecroppers as well as raiyats were favourably placed.
The effect was cumulative. The quantity o f  land leased out on 
sharecropping arrangements dropped as peasants took  it into  
personal cultivation. The labouring ranks were sw elled, as poor 
peasants became increasingly dependent on em ploym ent by 
other peasants who were acquiring the land. And as the 
landlords, ex-zamindars, disengaged from the village, so they  
ceased to function as a source o f loans and em ploym ent. As a 
result the peasants themselves, in addition to  Abhi Lai, began 
to advance various forms of credit in the village at high rates of 
interest. The effects arising from the principle that accumu­
lation by one is stagnation or loss for another became 
exacerbated. The developm ent o f the shops, the grain mill 
business and the extension o f trading activities by rich 
peasants represent later stages in this process. Into this 
emerging structure came irrigation and new technological 
opportunities in agriculture. Their potential effect could be 
(among some sections o f  the peasantry) to  divorce inequality 
from poverty. But currently poor peasants have to overcom e 
the problem o f access to these new opportunities, a problem  
which is to a large extent a function o f their status in the 
political and econom ic structures o f the pluralist-democratic 
state. Their poverty and that o f the landless labourer (the  
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A Peasantry and the State*
G E O F  W O O D
IN T R O D U C T IO N
The initial object o f this study w as to seek  an understanding of 
changing patterns o f political behaviour am ong the peasantry in the 
K osi region o f N orth-E ast Bihar. Since the late 1950s, the region has 
been the location  of intense developm ent activity: the containm ent of a 
flood ing  river, the construction of a canal network for irrigation, and 
(since 1965) the introduction of the Intensive A griculture A rea Pro­
gram m e to those areas in the region within the com m and of canal irri­
gation. T he central em pirical question taken to Kosi was; what values  
in the v illage (cultural, social and econom ic) are reduced or increased  
in significance w hen the penetration by institutions and values external 
to the village is intensified? T he related question was; how  do the values 
and socia l behaviour of the village affect the attainm ent of the goals of 
developm ent officia ls at the B lock , D istrict, State or N ational level?
T hese questions were to be answered by identifying what opportun i­
ties (and therefore what constraints) exist for actors in the v illage to 
engage in political activity in pursuit of their ow n interests. It w as sug­
gested that the form  o f this political activity is contingent upon the 
values reflected in the village social structure and upon the intensity  
w ith w hich external resources are introduced to the village. B y asking 
the questions in this way, the intention was to com bine tw o sets of  
interests —  those concerned with theories of change and those concerned  
with policies o f rural developm ent. T he policy assum ption w as that 
adm inistrators o f rural developm ent not only had to decide w hich strat­
egy to em ploy in distributing resources to initiate econom ic grow th but 
also had to ch oose  w hich strategy will lead to further self-perpetuating  
developm ent. It was argued that adm inistrators may have control over  
econ om ic incentives and the provision o f resources to im prove output,
* This paper is part o f  a larger work by the author, entitled “The Process of  
Differentiation among the Peasantry in Desipur, North Bihar, India”, which ap­
peared as Discussion Paper N o. 24 o f  the Institute o f  Development Studies at the 
University of  Sussex. England. August 1973.
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but that self-perpetuating developm ent depends upon the establishm ent 
of routine processes of interaction between administrator and villagers 
within a com m on set of values.
The theoretical fram ework within which these questions were posed  
and assum ptions made, was derived from  the contributions of social 
scientists exam ining and characterising the process of m odernisation and 
social change in the Third W orld. In particular the m odel o f encapsula­
tion proposed by Bailey* in which he distinguished between encap­
sulating (B ) and encapsulated (A ) political structures, appeared as a use­
ful conceptual device: not only for clarifying the process of m odernisa­
tion but also for characterising the process o f developm ent activity itself
—  where intense developm ent effort could be described as the m anipu­
lated incorporation of (A ) into (B). B roadly stated, the central hypoth­
esis in this m odel m aintained that structural tension between (A ) and 
(B) w ould be resolved in the dissolution o f the encapsulated structure 
(A ) into the encapsulating structure (B ), and that this process w ould  
reflect a higher degree o f overall structural differentiation consistent 
with the political and econom ic system s of an integrated nation-state.
! This form ulation represents the cornerstone of m odernisation theory,
i Peasant com m unities are regarded as discrete social entities responding
to an interference in their value-system s by State institutions in a m anner 
which inevitably leads to an overall pattern of increased role differen­
tiation. T he underlying prem ise here is that o f transitional dualism  —  a 
i society com posed  of traditional and m odem  elem ents m oving towards
; a state o f full political, econom ic and social integration within a national
j fram ework.
j In the proposal for research, w e referred to B ailey’s distinction be­
tween Structure (A ) and Structure (B):
i
I Structure B disposes o f greater political resources than Structure A, it
[Structure B] is large scale where Structure A  is small scale, and it tends 
to be m ade up o f specialised roles while the roles o f  Structure A tend to 
be undifferentiated . .  . ,-
T he original resea’rch plan was to identify two exam ples of Structure A  
which underwent different experiences of adaption to the values of Struc­
ture B.
This was to be done by varying the determ ination of the encapsulating
' F. G. Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils (Oxford University Press, 1969), Ch. 8.
- Ib idem, p. 147.
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Structure (B) to interfere in the affairs of Structure (A ). Bailey offers us 
a continuum of strategies for Structure (B) to interfere in (A):
(1) those in command o f Structure B have a choice to make in the degree 
to which they concern them selves with what gpes on inside Struc­
ture A;
(2a) predatory posture for the leaders o f Structure B: they do not concern  
themselves with what goes on inside Structure A, so long as the people 
who live under it ‘pay the revenue’;
(2b) ‘indirect rule’: agreement to leave intact the broad structure o f A  
providing this does not do violence to certain fundamental principles 
(‘natural justice’) w hich are embodied in Structure B. To re-organise 
means to create uncertainty, to risk explosions and to incur for 
certain the expenditure o f resources included in retraining people, 
even when this is possible;
(3) the ruling power takes the decision that Structure A  must be inte­
grated which in practice means radical change if not abolition.
This is in fact a judgment that the costs o f incorporating the personnel of 
Structure A  into Structure B will be more than offset by the resources 
which they put into Structure B.3
The Intensive Agricultural Programme (lA A P ) in the western part of 
P um ea District in the Kosi region was to be taken as an exam ple of 3 
above. The impact of this strategy upon Structure A  variables was to be 
com pared with a situation where the external interference approximated  
m ore to type 2b above. These Structure A  variables were:
(1) the resistance which the people o f Structure A  wish to offer, and 
this w ill depend upon the degree to which they esteem  their own  
political institutions and on the extent to which the values o f these 
institutions differ from  the values of Structure B ;
(2) the types of support which accrue to the people of Structure A: a 
unique and deeply valued ideology, providing cohesion as a pri­
mary focus of reference; inaccessible terrain; econom ic self-suffi­
ciency, etc.
W ith this m ethodological approach, the original aim of the project 
was to contribute to “politico-econom ic m odels of change in the context 
of rural developm ent programmes by identifying what factors control 
access to econom ic resources, and the way such access becom es cum ula­
tive and alters the structures of village life and the aspirations of the 
p eop le.”
® Ibidem, pp. 149-152.
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W hile this original aim rem ains in tact, the m eth od o log ica l approach  
has been  substantially  transform ed during the course o f the w ork. T here  
are tw o m ain  reasons for this. First, during the fieldw ork , acu te em piri­
cal d ifficu lties em erged  in attem pting a strict ap plication  o f  the approach  
through the techn ique o f com paring tw o  v illage situ ation s w hich  varied  
sign ifican tly  on ly  in  the extent of their in corporation  in to  an in tense  
d evelop m en t effort. Secondly , and in d ep en d en t o f  the tech n ica l lim ita­
tions o f the com parative m ethod , the theoretica l p rop osition s about 
m odern isation  and change from  w hich  the m eth od o log ica l approach d e ­
rived w ere critically  re-exam ined. T heir assu m p tions w ere con sid ered  
u ntenable, and the theory therefore inappropriate in exp loration s o f  co n ­
tinuity and change in N orth Bihar, and elsew h ere in the T hird  W orld. 
T h e theoretica l criticism s w ere stim ulated by exp erien ce in  the field , as 
w ell as by su bsequent attem pts to  produce a coh eren t fram ew ork  w ithin  
w hich  the m aterial cou ld  be analysed.
A  CRITIQUE OF THE INITIAL M ETHODOLOGY
T h is m od el o f encapsu lation  in m odern isation  theory p ostu la tes a sig ­
n ificant cleavage in ‘m o d e m ’ peasant society  at the boundary o f the  
village. T h e m ultip le, undifferentiated  structure o f  soc ia l relations em ­
b od ied  in the ‘jajm ani’ system  at the v illage level is con trasted  w ith  the  
structure o f  social interaction existing at other levels  elsew h ere in the  
society . T h e process o f m odernisation  is expressed  as the blurring o f  this 
cleavage. F or any on e village the analysis o f ch an ge w ou ld  first have to  
estab lish  the fact o f encapsu lation  and the ex isten ce o f a c leavage at the  
boundary o f  the v illage. A n d  secon dly , all indicators o f ch an ge w ould  
n ecessarily  have to  take the form  o f soc ia l facts w hich  tran scend ed  this 
cleavage. In  this w ay the nature o f the c leavage is assu m ed  to be of 
param ount sign ificance in th e understanding o f changing patterns o f  
p olitica l, econ om ic and social relations in the v illage to the exc lu sion  of  
other features o f the agrarian structure. T h e theory o f en cap su la tion  co n ­
fin es attention  to a sp ecific range o f  soc ia l p h en om en a  and estab lish es  
sp ecific , exc lu sive  criteria for the se lection  o f socia l facts in  the an al­
ysis o f  change and developm ent. T h e  con com itan t ten d en cy  in  this 
fram ew ork  is to  attribute sign ificance to  n ew  overt structural form s p re­
cise ly  b ecause their id iom  appears to con form  to the m o d e l —  for exam ­
p le, changing patterns o f labour relations in the v illage, a n ew  system  of  
land  tenure, or even  the norm ative p o litica l system  in vo lv in g  political 
parties and P anchayati Raj. In the en capsu lation  fram ew ork, these
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Structural forms logically feature as sym ptom atic of change and devel­
opm ent whereas it is perhaps m ore fruitful to retain the question of 
their significance in problem atic form rather than assume their signifi­
cance a priori.
There is a further problem  with this encapsulation-dualist formulation  
of change. The dualist framework assumes the existence at one end of 
the tradition-m odem ity continuum  of a differentiated sort of encap­
sulating structures which are the institutional characteristics o f the 
m odem  state. These are the structures —  it is argued —  which disturb the 
stm ctural-functional equilibrium of the encapsulated structures by ab­
sorbing them into the new equilibrium of the m odem  state. However, 
this approach begs the question of how  the encapsulating structures 
cam e into existence in the first place. It adheres to a stim ulus-response 
m echanism  of change without explaining the process whereby the di- 
chotom ous situation emerged. Y et if this dichotom y exists, this is pre­
cisely what must be explained in a theory of social change. In a country 
numerically dominated by its peasantry, the state cannot be regarded as 
a fixed or even prior entity in the process of agrarian social change. 
Stmctural change am ong the peasantry must inevitably alter the com ­
plexion of the State. If resources are distributed among the peasantry as 
part of the process o f ‘intervention’ or ‘penetration’ by the state, then it 
is important to understand not only the impact of the distribution but 
also why the State was associated with one pattern of distribution and 
not another. The institutions of the State are them selves the result of 
political and econom ic forces, so the m lers of the State are likely to 
defer to those forces in their allocative decisions. In this way the institu­
tions o f the State cannot be opposed to the forces from which they de- 
oi rive, and these forces exist in the village as well as elsewhere. It is im-
j  portant analytically to distinguish between the State opposed to sections
of people in a village or society, and the State as a reflection o f the
I  forces which differentiate the village into sections or classes. Seen in this
way, the dualist dichotom y with its stim ulus-response connotation in an 
intensive developm ent situation confuses the conflicts of interest be­
tween the regime (the m lers) and large sections of the weaker peasantry 
with the notion of the State as divorced from critical elem ents in the po­
litical and econom ic forces which define its institutional form.
From  these two principal points of dissatisfaction with the fram e­
work of analysis originally chosen for this study, other theoretical 
problems becom e apparent.
First there is the treatment of the village as a unit o f study. Village-
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level fieldwork should n ot im ply acceptance of the village as a societal 
isolate, a discrete social entity, although this is a com m on w eakness o f  
m any village studies. T he tradition of anthropological enquiry in India  
and to a great extent elsew here began in ‘iso lated ’ prim itive com m unities 
m oving m ore recently in to  rural societies o f d ifferent soc io -econ om ic  
form ation, in w hich clustered residential locations were no longer con ­
term inous with specific cultures but integrated into a w ider culture. In 
this w ay the concept of society  becam e m eaningful beyond the village  
to  in clu d e regular and structured interaction betw een peop le for w hom  
(som e o f them  at least) the place of residence (the village) w as no longer  
the primary elem ent in their identity and group attachm ent. In India  
this d istinction m ay be crudely characterised as the d ifference betw een  
tribal com m unities found in hilly  tracts and peasant societies found in 
the plains.
H ow ever, despite the increasing im portance o f other social categories 
such as caste and class to the analysis o f peasant situations, the ‘v illage’ 
still features prom inently as the unit o f analysis. T here is nothing a priori 
fa llacious about choosing the level o f the village at w hich to conduct 
fieldw ork on agrarian structure and change. B u t one cannot then  
proceed to assum e that on ly  the village is the social unit w ithin w hich  
interaction betw een its m em bers is significant. Y et m uch of village-level 
study work on peasant society in the sub-continent is characterised by 
the exam ination of econom ic and social exchanges, the pattern of 
alliances and group cohesion, and the exercise of political pow er within  
the village. A ccordingly, a structure for the village is arrived at through  
the process o f inductive reasoning from  the sp ecific m aterial obtained. 
This specific descriptive structure is then lifted through a few  levels o f 
abstraction and a general theory of village structures thus prom ulgated  
—  e.g. m odels o f factional politics, breakdowns o f jajm ani relationships, 
the contradictions between the com peting econom ic and ritual status 
fram eworks. T he process o f reasoning and fieldw ork directs attention  
exclusively  to phenom ena within the v illage and generalisations about 
the regional agrarian structure are derived, first, from  the assum ptions 
of typicality and, secondly, through the aggregation fallacy that the 
w hole is constituted m erely from  a sum  o f  its parts.
A n  im portant elem ent in our criticism  is not that this procedure for 
the study of peasant society ignores ‘forces external to the village’ or the 
‘outside w orld’, but that the procedure approaches the ‘external forces’ 
in the wrong m anner —  in short through an inductive em piricism  in 
which the village inevitably appears as antithetical to its external forces
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(the machinery of State etc.) having apparently had no previous contri­
bution in their com position. The corollary of this approach is the por­
trayal of social change in terms of the resolution of this tension between  
the village and its external forces.
Since our own analysis regards forces ‘external’ to  the village as a 
critical elem ent in the explanation of village social structures —  whether 
it be their persistence or propensity to change —  it is necessary to sum­
marise the treatment of the village-external forces dichotom y which ini­
tially inspired our work and which is now  the object o f criticism.
Com m on to m any of the attempts to define peasant society is the 
theme of dom ination by powerful outsiders who influence or even deter­
mine its productive activities and ‘culturally distinct characteristics’.'* 
Shanin refers to the ‘underdog position’: ’’Peasants as a rule have been 
kept at arms’ length from the social sources of power. Their political 
subjection interlinks with cultural subordination and with their econom ic 
exploitation through tax, corvee, rent, interest and terms of trade un­
favourable to the peasant.”® The historical descriptions of the European  
and Third W orld peasantries have em phasised —  often by em ploying the 
term ‘feudal’ —  this super-subordinate structure between the peasantry 
and the State. A  review of this historical literature need not be included  
in this report, but the them e of external dom ination is of course criti­
cally germane to our discussion of the peasantry and developm ent. 
Where, as in the case of India, the State —  through its regime —  formally 
disposes of substantial developm ent resources through its administrative 
institutions in terms o f com m odities and through its political institutions 
by virtue o f the legislative process, then the com m on assum ption is that 
change in peasant societies has to be and w ill be externally generated  
through intervention by the agencies of the State. The assum ption appears 
under m any guises —  planning, nation-building, integration, land reform, 
com m unity developm ent, and intensive agricultural developm ent.
The significant focus of change is then seen to occur at the boundary 
between the State and the peasant society —  em pirically regarded as the 
boundary of the village. This is conceived as the poin t of tension be­
tween discrete sets o f structures: the encapsulating and encapsulated. 
A nd it is with this focus that theories o f social change and the practice
* J. D. Powell, “On Defining Peasants and Peasant Society”, Peasant Studies 
Newsletter 7/72, I, 3, p. 97. Powell attempts a synthetic definition derived from 
the Biennial Reviews of Anthropology 1961-1967. See also Shanin’s reply in the 
following issue: I, 4.
® T. Shanin “Introduction” to T. Shanin (ed.), Peasants and Peasant Societies 
(Penguin, 1971), p. 15.
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of inducing social change m erge in their com m on  assum ptions. ‘D ev e l­
op m ent’ becom es a process of aggressive interaction betw een tw o sets 
of d iscrete structures. But the status of these external forces and struc­
tures has to be exam ined. In w hat sense are they external? Pow erful 
outsiders can on ly  be powerful and dom ineering within the con text o f  
an asym m etrical structure in  w hich they occup y superordinate roles —  
but their roles are functions of th ose occupied  by others, in this case  
the peasantry. T hus powerful outsiders are n ot external in the sense o f  
belonging to another structure, unless their pow er is based  so le ly  on  
coercion  and enjoys no other norm ative attributes o f legitim acy. A  
further sense o f externality refers to  those categories o f forces and struc­
tures w hich  the peasantry is incapable o f controlling, in fluencing or ab­
sorbing w ithout the integrity o f its ow n structures being affected . For  
exam ple, the com pulsory expropriation o f  produce from  sections o f  the 
peasantry forces them  to produce at a level beyond their ow n  subsistence  
requirem ents and thereby redefine their relationships both w ithin  the 
fam ily and betw een  fam ilies in the v illage to constitute a new  so c io ­
econ om ic form ation. But again the critical com p onent is coercion: other­
w ise the peasantry has voluntarily engaged in  new  form s of socia l action  
con sistent w ith  the external structures —  a process w hich  w ou ld  precisely  
negate their ‘external’ characteristic. T hus it is d isingenuous to  em ploy  
a m odel o f structural d ichotom y betw een  the State and the peasantry in  
developm en t situations w ithout also includ ing at least the notion  of 
coercion , if  n ot oppression (e.g. the Stalinist period of co llectiv isation  
and enforced  expropriation in the USSR).*
In m odernisation  theory and developm en t practice the w h ole  struc­
ture of exp lo itation  of the peasantry has been  avoided  in the proposi­
tions w hich  surround the m odel o f d ich otom ou s structures. T h e em piri­
cal assum ption o f the v illage as a societa l iso late has the m ethod ologica l 
effect o f d ivorcing the village from  the linkages betw een itse lf and the 
State w hich  are easily  recognisable as part o f the history o f ‘village In d ia’. 
T h e concern o f m odernisation theorists and developm ent practitioners 
alike to incorporate the peasantry in the villages in to  the generalised  
values and structures of the State —  expressed in the id eology o f its rulers 
—  does n ot take account o f the cum ulative effect o f  the previous sets of 
linkages w hich  w ere usually  o f a predatory and exploitative type. In the 
place o f such linkages (i.e. feudal structures o f expropriation, tenuous
® Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Penguin, 
1969). See the final chapter in which he discusses revolution. Also, D . Mitrany, 
Marx against the Peasant (Collier, 1961).
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but nevertheless real links with international capitalism ), we are offered  
the m odel of dualist econom ies, and dual societies. A  society is differen­
tiated into traditional and m odem  elem ents, featuring two co-existing  
relatively independent m odes of production —  one which is subsistence 
consisting of localised exchanges o f goods in kind often within one village, 
and the other open market, eventually capitalist, in w hich no one com ­
munity is able to produce all it needs to consum e a Ad so has to enter 
into relations with other com m unities by producing goods in excess of 
need or outside local consum ption habits altogether.
A  consequence of this project both at the fieldwork and the subse­
quent analytic stage has been an exam ination of this emphasis on dual­
ism  and tradition-m odem ity dichotom ies both in m odernisation theory 
and of course in the conceptions about planning rural developm ent. The 
wider significance of this exam ination relates to the emerging sociolog­
ical literature which is critical o f the general theoretical foundations 
upon which this dualist analysis of changing societies is based. W e refer 
to the general direction of this criticism, before pointing out the ways in 
which this study hopes to contribute to the debate both em pirically and 
theoretically.
In m uch o f the m odernisation and developm ent literature, the per­
form ance of Third W orld political systems cam e to be judged by some 
general criteria, by som e universal m odel for all political systems, which 
are becom ing m odem . T o conceive of a society which is m odem  or be­
com ing m odem ised involves the concom itant notion of ‘traditional’. This 
distinction is an old one in the literature, expressed in T onnies’ concepts 
of G em einschaft and G esellschaft, and Durkheim ’s w ellknown distinc­
tion between ‘m echanical’ and ‘organic’ society. The m echanical, tradi­
tional society was fragile, com posed as it was o f disparate groups— func­
tionally independent —  bound together by values w hose currency ulti­
m ately depended on the enforcem ent of a repressive law. The m odem , 
organic society, however, was founded on the division o f labour, so that 
groups becam e functionally m /erdependent and so m ust cooperate by 
virtue of their differences in order for any one of them  to survive. The 
boundaries o f conflict between different interests are determined by the 
nature of this organic integration so that Law refers to the rules o f pro­
cess by which different interests becom e reconciled and not to substan­
tive norms which are then im posed. W eber introduced the further dim en­
sion of govem m ent, distinguishing between ideal types of domination  
in a society —  especially between the legal and traditional types. Legal 
domination existed where a system of rules which are applied judicially
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and adm inistratively in accordance w ith ascertainable principles is valid  
for all m em bers o f the corporate group. T he persons subject to  com ­
m ands obey the law  rather than the persons im plem enting it. R elation s  
betw een rulers and ruled in this type are n ot therefore personal or arbi­
trary but based on  legal equality. T raditional dom ination bases the legit­
im acy of authority on custom . T he persons generally exercising the 
pow er o f com m and are usually ‘m asters’ w ho enjoy personal authority  
by virtue of their inherited status. T he ‘m o d em ’ State as it em erged for  
exam ple in W estem  E urope w as the prototype of W eber’s con cept of 
legal dom ination  —  to be contrasted with patrim onial and feudal societies  
w here the elem ents of traditional dom ination  occur in greater propor­
tion.
This socio log ica l tradition, absorbing the im portant contributions of  
R adcliffe-B row n, has culm inated in the m assive structural-functional 
form ulations o f  T alcott Parsons, w here ‘m o d e m ’ socia l system s are char­
acterised by a high degree o f functional specificity  in relationships, 
each set d ifferentiated in to  its respective stm cture (i.e. o n e’s em ployer  
is m ore likely to be a stranger than a v illage elder). This theoretical cri­
terion o f stm ctural d ifferentiation becam e the yardstick by w hich so c ie­
ties could  be classified  according to their position  on the tradition- 
m odem ity  continuum , and the speed and direction of their transition  
plotted accordingly. V ery frequently the traditional and m od em  elem ents  
of a society  w ere identified  by clustering P arsons’ p attem  variables (e.g. 
ascription-achievem ent, universal-particularistic) into internally con sis­
tent opposites, and an analysis o f dualism  for any on e society so derived. 
F or exam ple, recruitm ent to the civil service is based m ore on  ach ieve­
m ent, w hereas recruitm ent to a v illage leadership  role is m ore ascriptive. 
E ncapsulating and encapsulated structures are distinguished in this w ay.’
T he m ost detailed  theoretical exp osition  o f the structural-functionalist 
tradition in  relation to ‘developm ent’ is found in L evy’s tw o-volu m e  
work M odern isa tion  and the S tructu re o f  Societies,^  w here he uses this 
theory to  analyse social transform ations. It essentially presents a contin ­
uum  o f  increasing structural d ifferentiation (and therefore role differ­
entiation) alongside —  o f course —  greater functional specificity  as 
reflected in the increasing division o f labour. Thus societies m ove from  
segm ented , functionally  diffuse social structures through dualism  to ­
wards integrated, functionally specific socia l stm ctures —  structural dif-
 ̂ Bailey, Stratagems and Spoils.
® M. J. Levy Jr., Modernisation and Structure of Societies (Princeton, Princeton 
University Press, 1966).
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ferentiation. Pye sums up this tradition by conceptualising political 
developm ent in the introduction to his political culture volume:
The key elements of political development involve first, with respect to 
the population as a whole, a change from widespread subject status to an 
increasing number of contributing citizens, with an accompanying spread 
of mass participation, a greater sensitivity to the principles of equality, 
and a wider acceptance of universalistic laws. Second with respect to 
governmental and general systemic performance, political development 
represents an increase in the capacity of the political system to manage 
public affairs, control controversy, and cope with popular demands. Finally 
with respect to the organisation of the polity, political development implies 
greater structural differentiation, greater functional specificity, and greater 
integration of all participating institutions and organisations.»
This is not the place to engage in a general refutation of this theoretical 
tradition,*» although we may summarise the general criticism before 
turning to our specific point o f disagreement. T he tradition has been  
criticised for its ethnocentricity and the definition of an im plied end- 
state;** for its empirical inaccuracies in assuming a sequential develop­
ment path similar to that of W estem  Europe; for failing to distinguish  
between different types of traditional society according to their histori­
cal circumstances especially in relation to imperialism; and for a seg­
mentary and dualist m ode of analysis in which a world social system  is 
com posed of separate elem ents unrelated to one another. These criti­
cism s are, of course, interrelated. The assumptions for a sequential devel­
opm ent path are numerous: that the conditions exist in the Third W orld 
for a pattem  of developm ent on w estem  lines involving questions of 
land-m an ratios, com patible technological innovation, favourable market 
situation, com position of relative factor prices; that the balance of inter­
national trade, pattem  of capital investm ent and differential rates of
• L. Pye and S. Verba, Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1965).
*» See A. G. Frank, “Sociology of Development and Underdevelopment of Soci­
ology”, Catalyst (University of Buffaloo), 3, 1967. Also, A. W, Gouldner, “Reci­
procity and Autonomy in Functional Theory” in Llewellyn Gross (ed.). Symposium 
on Sociological Theory (New York, 1959). “The fundamental problem concerns the 
way in which the substantive referents of modernisation theory, however arrived 
at, are tied in at the level of theory formation with the ‘pure’ requirements of 
systemic interdependence or complementarity, and functional reciprocity.” Also, 
H. Bernstein, “Modernisation Theory and the Sociological Study of Development”, 
Journal of Development Studies, 7, 2, January 1971.
** For example, M. J. Levy Jnr., in Modernization: Latecomers and Survivers 
(London, Basic Books 1972), p. 3, where he takes “as the measure of modernisation 
the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power. The higher that ratio, the higher , 
is the degree of modernisation . . . . ”
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accum ulation w ill not affect Third W orld aspirations; and finally whether 
these aspirations exist in the Third W orld, and if so —  for w hom ? T he  
segm entary, dualist m ode o f analysis becom es an exercise in com para­
tive statics envisaging m ovem ent along a trad ition-m odem ity  continuum . 
M odernisation  theory is thus unable to appreciate the d ialectical unity 
of d evelopm ent and underdevelopm ent and the continuous dynam ism  
o f that situation. This is so  because its concentration  upon  the d istinc­
tion betw een traditional and m odern elem ents as reflected  in the por­
trayal o f a ‘dual’ society divides poor countries in to  backward and  
advanced sectors w ithout allow ing us to suggest that on e sector is a func­
tion o f the other. Instead, in the m odernisation theory o f  this dualist 
tradition, advanced and backward sectors are conceptu alised  as co in ci­
dent, each  one occurring desp ite the other. A s K ilson  w rites from  his 
research in  Africa:
It is precisely the inaugural m echanism s o f  the m odernisation process, 
nam ely the intrusion o f a m arket econom y and the im position  o f  a m odern  
adm inistration and tax structure w hich are the basis o f  the creation o f 
underdevelopm ent within the fram ework o f  the political econom y o f  im ­
perialism . *2
T he rejection o f socio log ica l dualism  and the accep tance of this m odel 
of dynam ic interdependence betw een different sectors, and betw een the 
divergent process o f developm ent and underdevelopm ent represents our 
central point of departure from  m uch of the literature on  village studies 
and peasant societies in India especially.
This dualist approach is m ost apparent in the w ork o f political 
anthropologists studying villages in India. T heir con cern  has b een  to  
define the relationship betw een a village with ‘d iscrete’ political, social 
and econom ic structures —  and the nation state, em bodying and pur­
veying a set o f universal rules. T he central prem ise is that an integrated  
political system  in a nation is a single structure w ith a set o f rules w hich  
define the roles for that structure. T he argum ent continues that although  
the v illage has been  form ally incorporated into the n ation al political 
structure through the representation of political parties in  state assem ­
blies and the national parliam ent, and through in India  the Panchayati 
Raj legislation , the result is not yet an integrated national structure in 
w hich one set o f  rules has been  accepted  by all. Instead, the result is
M. Kilson, “African Political Change and the Modernisation Process”, Journal 
of Modern African Studies, I, 4.
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one form alistic structure of behaviour which at present exists alongside 
other traditional ones —  this is the dualist conclusion.
It was from this position that our original methodological approach 
was derived —  especially from  B ailey’s contribution to the formulation  
as a sociological m odel o f the developm ent process. H e proceeded by 
distinguishing between conflict and contradiction.*® Conflict is governed  
by rules contained within a single structure and “will even play a part 
in maintaining that structure” . Contradiction describes a situation where 
“there are two or m ore structures, each with its own set of. rules, oper­
ating in a single social field” . By contrast with ‘equilibrium-maintaining 
conflict”, contradiction is ‘sym ptom atic of social change’. Social change 
is therefore the result of the tension in this duality as individuals con­
front the problem o f having to operate within two sets of rules (i.e. be­
tween Parsons’ internally consistent clustered sets of opposite pattern 
variables), one in the village and the other in situations external to the 
village. From  here, Bailey develops the theory of encapsulated political 
structures*^ as a way of characterising this dualism, precisely within the 
framework of the differentiation-integration m odel of social change. The 
encapsulating structure disposes of greater political resources, is large- 
scale and tends to be m ade up of specialised political roles. The encap­
sulated structure is sm all-scale and its roles tend to be undifferentiated. 
T he degree of interaction between the two structures intensifies as a 
result of nation-building attempts at modernisation and econom ic devel­
opment. A s a result o f this ‘penetration’, one expects the encapsulated  
structure to disappear —  its role pattem  to becom e differentiated and so 
the com m unity to be integrated into the polity.
This analysis o f the process of political developm ent and social 
change has two sets o f consequences. First, from the m odel a series of 
policy instruments can be identified which essentially depend upon 
benevolent m anipulation by well-m eaning elites with power.*® These 
policy instruments m ay be directly operated through legislation —  for 
exam ple, land reform , universal franchise, abolition of caste, com m uni­
ty developm ent and Panchayati Raj —  within the framework of parlia­
mentary dem ocracy. Or they may be activated indirectly by affecting 
the resource structure —  for exam ple, agricultural extension, the Inten-
F. G . Bailey, Tribe ,  C as te  a n d  N a tion :  a s tudy  o f  poli t ica l  ac t iv i ty  a n d  poli t ica l  
change in h igh land  O rissa  (Manchester, Manchester U.P., 1960), pp. 7 -8 .
Bailey , S tra ta g em s a n d  Spoils ,  Ch. 8.
See  for example: G .  Hunter, The A dm in is tra t ion  of  Agr icu l tura l  D e v e lo p m e n t  
(London, O .U .P .,  1970).
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sive Agricultural A rea Programm e, the introduction of new  technology, 
irrigation, credit facilities, support prices, taxation and education. Sec­
ondly, the evaluation of the im pact of these m easures usually takes the 
form  o f analysing change within the ‘encapsulated structures’, looking  
for indicators that the traditional, m ultip lex, undifferentiated role struc­
tures are breaking down and conform ing to the differentiation-integra­
tion m odel of socia l change and m odernisation. Such evaluations rarely 
take a form  w hich includes the dynam ic interrelations betw een target 
p opulations and the State, and any explanation  o f political processes of  
p olicy  form ulation and im plem entation. A nd  since the target popula­
tions are them selves part o f these political processes, their institutions 
m ust already integrate them  into som e relation to the State. Thus to  
concentrate upon the identification of discrete, village-level institutions 
and the exam ination  of their breakdown in  response to developm ent 
program m es assum es the param ount significance of that breakdown in 
explanations o f the structure o f agrarian relations. The problem  is not 
so m uch w hether these breakdowns do occur, or even  specifying the con­
ditions under w hich they occur, although m uch of the literature has been  
preoccupied in this way. Rather, the issue for us is whether these break­
downs are significant in affecting the political processes of p o licy  form u­
lation and im plem entation, and whether sets o f relationships other than 
those confined  to the boundaries o f the v illage are m ore significant in an 
explanation of persistence or change in the agrarian structure.
Clearly this review  of our initial m ethodology has condensed a con­
siderable ongoing epistom ological debate about the analysis of social 
order and social change. H ow ever, this summ ary establishes the basis 
for shifting the focu s of the study and the theoretical context within  
w hich problem s and relationships have been  selected for analysis. The  
m ethodological discussion which follow s is guided therefore by the con­
cern to locate the analysis of a peasant village within the evolution  of 
the m od em  State in India. It addresses itself to the question —  what con­
cepts and em pirical data are required to understand the structure of 
peasant societies’' in India, or elsew here w here conditions and experi­
ences h ave been similar?
THE PEASANTRY A N D  THE STATE; HISTORICAL ANALYSIS
(a) M e th o d o lo g ica l fram ew ork  fo r iden tify in g  change
It should now be clear that our original form ulation of the central issue
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and the corresponding characterisation of the development process have 
been superseded. The fieldwork experience in Purnea directed our at­
tention towards the process of developm ent and underdevelopment. If 
the underlying structure in this process is expressed as the m ode of pro­
duction —  a unitary conception of the social relations of production de­
lineated strictly in terms of the relationship to the means of production  
(property and m ore especially land) —  any explanation of the pattern of 
political and econom ic behaviour among the peasantry would have to 
be in terms of this central concept. A t the same time, the prevailing 
m ode o f production is conceived as pervasive throughout the State 
(whether in a relatively advanced stage or not). Its contribution towards 
an understanding of political and econom ic behaviour among the peas­
antry is therefore also a contribution to an understanding of the form a­
tion of the State and the institutions which reflect the position of the 
peasantry within the State: With this formulation, not only are we able 
to analyse the peasantry in terms of substructural change (i.e. changes 
in the substructural expressions —  econom ic, political, kinship, religious 
etc. —  of the underlying structure) within the state, but also we are able 
to address ourselves to the central empirical issues of poverty and in­
equality among the peasantry. The enquiry can also go a step further and 
m ake statements about the potential of different classes within the 
peasantry to disturb the social relations of production and change the 
com plexion of the state. Statements of this kind are of vital importance 
if the prevailing m ode of production expresses a highly unequal distri­
bution of wealth in which the poor peasantry and landless labourers 
especially are the major absolute victims. Their own developm ent w ill 
depend —  according to our formulation —  upon their capacity to alter 
the prevailing m ode of production. But an appreciation of this capacity 
depends upon the analysis o f their political and econom ic position in the 
existing m ode of production and therefore in the State. M ethodologi­
cally, such an analysis can only be conducted by concentrating upon the 
actual ongoing process of developm ent/underdevelopm ent, which is a 
historical process. The underlying structure of this ongoing process could  
not be understood by m erely describing the response in a village to the 
recent introduction of new  technological resources, or to tenancy legis­
lation and Com m unity D evelopm ent programmes since the 1950s. 
T hese recent events must of course be included in the story, but placed  
in their true perspective so that their significance is not overdramatised  
or distorted.
In our formulation the initiative for change can reside in principle
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with the poor peasantry and landless labourers. T he dualist-encapsula-  
tion form ulation con ceives only of innovative action by the rulers of the 
State, w ho by our definition are necessarily  those with a vested interest 
in preserving the prevailing m ode o f production . In this w ay the p ossi­
bility o f change in the underlying structure w ould  be excluded , thus 
reducing a p rio ri the significance o f substructural changes as a result of 
intervention by rulers. T h e w eakness o f this m ethod is thus clearly  
revealed. T hese substructural changes are in general regarded as ‘sym p­
tom atic o f  change’. H ow ever, the log ic o f the procedure dem ands that 
to  be sym ptom atic of change they m ust also  be sym ptom atic o f change  
in the underlying structure, but this they cannot be as a result o f inno­
vative action  by the rulers o f  the State. A n d  it is p ossib le w ith this logic  
for action by the p oor peasantry and landless labourers, although ex ­
pressed in new  substructural form s, to be a reflection  o f their subservi­
ent status in the prevailing m ode of production , in w hich case such  
behaviour w ould  n ot be sym ptom atic o f change. On the other hand, 
w hen the rulers o f the State em body in their innovative behaviour an 
aggressive assertion o f the prevailing m ode o f production (e.g. new  tech­
nology, including m echanisation in agriculture), such behaviour is m ost 
likely to p lace p oor peasants and landless labourers in the contradictory  
situation o f increasing dependence accom panied  by deepening resent­
m ent and opposition . The im portant phenom enon  to identify is n ot the 
substructural change per se  am ong the poor peasantry and landless  
labourers (or urban workers) but substructural change w hich expresses  
contradictions w ithin the prevailing m odes of production and w hich m ay  
therefore herald change at this fundam ental level, thus giving a signifi­
cantly n ew  com p lexion  to the State.
T his is a statem ent of procedures, o f m ethod ology , based upon  theo­
retical propositions about the developm ent o f the State. It is n ot intended  
to  suggest that revolution is im m inent, although it is im plied  in the 
theory that one should  be delighted at that prospect. First, it establishes  
an absolute criterion for the identification of socia l change —  a change 
in the prevailing m ode of production at the level o f the underlying struc­
ture in the society. "Second, it distinguishes betw een  substructural form s 
of behaviour w hich reflect the coherence of the underlying structure; 
and substructural form s v/hich express contradictions w ithin the under­
lying structure and which are therefore truly sym ptom atic of change. 
Third, it suggests that substructural form s expressing contradiction in 
the countryside are m ost likely found in ‘d evelopm ent’ situations in 
which the rulers o f  the State are in effect tam pering with the relation­
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ship between them selves (as rich peasants, landlords, merchants, urban 
bourgeoisie) and the poor peasantry and landless labourers.
It is equally im portant to em phasise that this is a m ethodology for 
organising social facts —  the identification o f which arises from theory. 
It is not therefore sim ply a procedure for eliminating from the analysis 
those substructural form s which do not express change in the underlying 
structure, in favour of those which are fundam entally sym ptom atic of 
change. Such a procedure of elim ination would itself distort the true 
nature of the situation. On the contrary, while this m ethodology allows 
for the possibility o f radical fundam ental change, and may even predict 
the conditions under which certain groups may initiate such change, it 
does not im ply the inevitability of such change, or revolution. Instead, 
it is a device for classifying sets o f relationships according to their im ­
plications for fundam ental social change. T he purpose of sociological 
enquiry and theory is to explain the maintenance of social order as well 
as to identify the conditions for its breakdown. The analysis of peasant 
social system s m ust include therefore an exam ination both of their 
essential perm anence and their propensity to change radically.
It m ust be admitted that theories of peasant social systems within this 
tradition of distinguishing between underlying structure and its substruc­
tural expressions are much less sophisticated and developed than their 
counterpart theories of advanced, industrial societies which assert the 
inevitability of revolutionary upheaval. To deny the inevitability of revo­
lution in peasant social systems tends to make the author of the denial 
guilty of a particular heresy. In response to this it is clear that much 
recent social science analysis o f Third World peasantry has been bem used  
by the rhetoric o f revolution. It is —  for example —  apparent from our 
work that horizontal cleavages in rural societies are not always signifi­
cant. The error m ade by revolutionaries and often their oppressors is to 
attribute too  m uch practical im portance to the appearance of cohesion  
am ong the poor and alienated. It was Marx himself who distinguised 
between the French peasantry constituted as a class by their m ode of 
production (class-in-itself), and the fact that they did not, by that token, 
autom atically form  a class (class-for-Uself)) insofar as “the identity of 
their interests begets no com m unity, no national bond, no political or­
ganisation am ong them .” ** It is a feature of this enquiry that a horizon­
tal cleavage between rich and poor might exist but that its contribution
K . M arx, “T he E ighteenth  Brum aire o f  Louis Bonaparte”, K. M arx and F. 
E ngels, S e lec ted  W orks  (L ondon , L aw rence and W ishart, 1970). p. 171.
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to a breakdown of the social order and the underlying structure tends to 
be overwhelm ed by the interdependence of rich and poor —  the internal 
logic of the peasant social system  in North Bihar. Thus, w hile there are 
sets of hypothetical conditions which w ould enhance the capacity of the 
poor and alienated to overturn the system , any analysis m ust o f course 
/  include the actual conditions which em asculate that potential capacity,
i- These observations have relevance at the theoretical level for they
jil; allude to the use of paradigms. A lthough M arx delineated capitalist
|i societies in terms which m ade the proletarian revolution inevitable, con-
I tem porary M arxists frequently —  with justification —  disassociate them -
C selves from  this ultimate rigid test by insisting that the M arxist paradigm
?| has nevertheless been particularly successful in  explaining the process
of capitalist society and the necessary conflicts betw een classes within it. 
It is possible as a M arxist to  understand the day-to-day crises of W estem  
capitalism , even in the continued absence o f a proletarian revolution. 
The task o f explaining the persistent poverty and the process of under­
developm ent am ong the peasantry in the Third W orld is analogous to 
 ̂ this —  the discovery of a paradigm w hich fits the case and allow s for a
I radical transformation of the situation w ithout dem anding such a trans-
I form ation as a test of its validity. T o insist upon such a test would
I  distort the nature of sociological enquiry and make us guilty of false op ­
timism.
(b) The breakdow n of feudalism : persistence or change?
W e com pared above the advanced state of theory on industrial society  
with less developed theoretical propositions about the peasantry within 
f  the tradition of political econom y. T he com parison was m ade within the
context of predicting system breakdown. H ow ever, the exam ination of 
the process of developm ent/underdevelopm ent am ong the peasantry 
should not be conducted in ignorance o f the links betw een the peasantry 
and advanced industrial sectors both within the state and outside it. W e 
contended ea r li^  that the process of developm ent/underdevelopm ent 
am ong the peasantry was an ongoing historical process and we have 
suggested that the m ode of production is the underlying structure o f that 
process. Marx distinguished between different m odes of production and 
■i presented them in an evolutionary schem a. In the preface to A  C on tri­
bu tion  to  the C ritique o f P olitica l E con om y  (1859) M arx wrote: “In 
broad online we can designate the A siatic, the ancient, the feudal, and 
the m odem  bourgeois m odes of production as so m any epochs in the
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progress of the econom ic form ation of society.” *’ A  vital elem ent of 
this schem e is a progressive correlation between increasingly ‘advanced’ 
m odes o f production and the all-persuasive State.** Indeed, Engels 
went further by arguing that the State only came into existence at a stage 
of econom ic developm ent where antagonistic social classes appeared. 
In M arx’s own writing on India there is som e confusion in this form ula­
tion of historical m aterialism which renders inappropriate a strict appli­
cation of the classificatory schem e, its evolutionary dimension, and 
therefore the derived portrayal o f the developm ent of the State. The 
A siatic society was defined as having an agricultural econom y based on 
the village system  of production and at the same time a centralised state 
and bureaucracy w hose power depended upon its regulation of worker 
supplies. It seem s that M arx was prepared to accept the encapsulation- 
dualist interpretation for India in which there were tw o levels o f politi­
cal organisation and action —  the existence of an authoritarian govern­
ment ruling through a centralised bureaucracy alongside and superim­
posed upon sm all, self-governing com m unities (village republics). This 
formulation conflicts with the general Marxist theory of the em ergence 
of the State as a concom itant phenom enon to the progress of econom ic 
form ation through advanced m odes of production and social differen­
tiation. H ow ever, M arx might be saved by his own empirical inaccuracy 
if we dism iss his quaint view of the village republic and m ove on to con­
sider whether the ‘feudal’ m ode of production is a more accurate 
description o f the situation.
It is here that we arrive at the point in the research where our theo­
retical, epistom ological and developm ental interests converge. The cen­
tral problem  refers to the validity and value of maintaining a distinction  
between the feudal and capitalist m odes of production. W e will argue 
that although their socio-econom ic and politico-econom ic substructural 
expressions reflect important distinctive patterns by which social order 
is m aintained and the capacity for radical transformation is constrained, 
it is not possible in a strict M arxist sense (labour theory of value, expro­
priation and appropriation of surplus) to distinguish between their under­
lying structural forms.
In C apital, M arx m akes a critical distinction between the notion of 
private property based on the individual’s own labour (which would
K. M arx, “P reface to the C ritique o f  P o litica l E con om y”, 1859, Selec ted  Works,  
p . 183.
See F . E ngels, “T he O rigin o f  the F am ily , Private Property and the State” , 
S e le c te d  Works,  pp. 4 6 1-583 .
K. Marx, Capital, Volume I, e.g. Chapter XXXII “Historical Tendency of 
Capitalist Accumulation” (London, Lawrence and Wishart, 1970), p. 761.
2° F. Engels, “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific”, Selected Works, p. 412.
2] Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, p. 419.
22 F. Engels, “Socialism: Utopian and Scientific”, p. 411.
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have been his village republics if they had in fact ever existed) and 
private property based upon the labour o f others.*» It is clear that both  
the feudal and the capitalist m odes fall into the latter category. T hus one  
must ask w hether there is a further sign ificant d istinction  within the 
second category of property —  to  w hich in terms of the labour theory of 
value and the process of expropriation and appropriation o f surplus, the 
answer m ust be in the negative. H ow ever, in term s o f soc io -econ om ic  
and p olitico-econom ic substructural expressions o f the relationship  
betw een the ow ner o f property and those w ho labour on  it perhaps the 
distinction is worthwhile. Feudalism  con n otes a system  of ‘hereditary  
ties of subordination’®» with sets o f m utual ob ligations and duties be­
tween m aster and servant, and often  “the lord together w ith h is peasants 
I  to a great extent constituted  a se lf-su fficing com m unity able to supply a
large part o f their needs from  loca l resources and w ith loca l sk ills .”®* 
T he peasant —  either through sharecropping or com pulsory labour —  
w ould in effect cultivate for the landlord o n  a portion  o f land; cultivate  
for his ow n  subsistence on another section  o f the land (or sam e land  if 
sharecropping); and w ould expect to graze cattle and co llec t w ood  from  
com m on land. In addition, the geographical m obility  o f the peasant was 
constrained either by the absence of alternative opportunities or by force, 
so  that h e was tied to the dom ain o f his m aster. T here is certainly p lenty  
of evidence of these relationships in  N orth  India. Capitalism , as w e  
know, connotes a m ore advanced stage in the soc ia l d ivision o f labour  
through the key concept o f surplus value and the d evelopm en t of com ­
m odity production. “It w as show n that the appropriation o f unpaid  
labour is the basis o f the capitalist m ode o f production  and o f  the exp lo i­
tation, o f the worker that occurs under it; that even  if the capitalist buys 
the labour pow er of his labourer at its fu ll va lu e as a com m odity  on the 
m arket, he yet extracts m ore value from  it than he paid  for; and that in 
the ultim ate analysis this surplus va lu e form s those sum s o f value from  
w hich are heaped up the constantly  increasing m asses o f capital in the 
hands of the possessing classes.”®® In this process production  becom es 
a social phenom enon, not m erely an individual one, since private prop­
erty is generated ^ d  m aintained by entering into social relations with  
others for their labour power. B ut this w ould  apply to feudalism  as w ell
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—  the principle of surplus value is com m on to both socio-econom ic for­
m ations. The distinction between the two socio-econom ic formations is 
then usually reduced to a contrast between labour power based on 
‘hereditary ties o f subordination’ and labour power on the open ‘free’ 
market —  wage labour. But our study shows that even with the increasing 
developm ent o f capitalist agriculture through the rich peasantry, labour 
relationships are constrained within a social fram ework in which the 
free market principle is not predominant. The corrollary of this is that 
even within a system  clearly identifiable as a feudal socio-econom ic for­
m ation, surplus can be expropriated, appropriated and capital amassed 
although generally it was consum ed or invested extensively in land 
rather than intensively in production. This was indeed the case in North  
India before new  forces of production appeared on the scene. In terms 
of relations to m eans of production and the expropriation of surplus 
value from surplus labour-power, it is therefore difficult to maintain, as 
Engels does, that “the capitalistic m ode of production was incompatible 
with the feudal system , with the privileges it conferred upon individuals, 
entire social ranks and local corporations, as well as with the hereditary 
ties o f subordination which constituted the framework of its social or­
ganisation.”®» The feudal substructural expression of the hierarchy of 
expropriators was clearly com patible with the interests of British capi­
talism during imperialism , despite the conflict between the values of 
ascription in feudalism  and the values o f achievem ent which underlay 
the liberal ethos of capitalism  in Britain. The distinction then between  
feudalism  and capitalism  does not refer to the principle of econom ic ex­
ploitation, but to  the different historical and cultural forms of this ex­
ploitation. T he transition from  feudalism  to capitalism  represents a 
change in substructural expression and the disposal o f surplus only. 
H ov/ever —  and this is vital to our analysis —  these changes in sub- 
» structural expressions o f the underlying structure of relations to the
m eans of production m ust be identified and classified according to their 
significance for the m aintenance of social order (and the underlying 
structure), or for the radical transformation of that order. W hile the 
framework for our analysis allow s for the possibility of radical transfor­
m ation by discarding the encapsulation-dualist m odel, our main argu­
m ent is that these new substructural forms contribute more to the m ain­
tenance of social order than to the possibility of its breakdown, with the 
implication that the underlying structure has essentially persisted. To
2® I b i d e m ,  p .  412 .
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pursue this argum ent, w e m ust understand w hy th ese  changes in sub- 
structural exp ression  have occurred  w hile rem aining con sisten t with the 
previous underlying structure.
(c) Im p e r ia l ru le a n d  in d ep en d en ce
F or an exp lan ation  o f this p rocess w e m ust return to  a d iscu ssion  o f the  
links b etw een  the peasantry and relatively  ad van ced  industrial sectors  
b oth  w ithin  the state and ou tsid e it. T h ese  links tak e the form  o f  a 
gradual entry o f  the peasantry in to  the com m od ity  m arket, a lthough the 
p easantry itself h as to be d ifferentiated  accord in g  to  the ex ten t o f in cor­
p oration . T h is p rocess of in corporation  is a critical fea tu re o f the history  
of im perialism , w hich  has con tin u ed  even  after th e form al acquisition  
o f in d ep en d en ce from  the B ritish . Furtherm ore, it is w ith in  the con text  
o f  the early  stages o f  this in corp oration  and the so c io -e co n o m ic  changes  
reflected  therein, that the ‘in d ep en d en t’ n a tion  state h as em erged .
It is through  a h istorical exam in ation  o f  th ese  p ro cesses  that the sig ­
n ifican ce o f contem porary so c io -e co n o m ic  form ation s am on g  the p ea s­
antry can  b e p laced  in their true con text. W liile  it is  n o t in ten d ed  to turn 
the study in to  a thesis on im perialism  in  In d ia , our an a lysis o f  the agrar­
ian structure during im perialism  in  P u m ea  and o f the p easan t v illage after 
In d ep en d en ce w ill dem onstrate the im portan ce o f  in clu d in g  this d im en ­
sion  in th e m eth od ology  o f research  on  the peasantry. F o r  the purposes  
o f this study, the interest in  im perialism  is  restricted  to  a d iscu ssion  of 
the im pact of the im perialist relationship  o n  the p a ttem  o f relations to  
the principal m eans o f producton  in  the cou n trystide —  lan d. Our focu s  
d oes n o t require us to  be con cern ed  with the h istorica l and econ om ic ex ­
p lan ation s o f im perialism , w heth er o f  the cap ita l exp ort or the search  
for m arkets sch oo l, except in sofar as an exam in ation  o f  the peasantry  
w ithin  th is h istorical fram ew ork w ill con trib ute tow ards exp lan ations o f  
the p ersisten ce o f im perialism .
In India , the B ritish  did n o t in trodu ce m on ey , com m od ity  production  
or class relationships. T he pre-B ritish  structure em b od ied  all these fea ­
tures w hich  w ere reflected  in  the m utual trade o f g o o d s b etw een  country  
and tow n  and a ten dency tow ards d ifferen tiation  am on g the peasantry. 
T rade w as by n o  rneans so le ly  in ternal. In ad dition  to  loca l handicrafts, 
m anufacturing w as quite d ev elo p ed  and a lth ou gh  n on -m ech an ised , did 
cater for an international market.®® H ow ever , the so c io -e co n o m ic  for-
2® H. R. Ghoshal, “Industrial Production in Bengal in Early N ineteenth Century” 
in B. N . Ganguli (ed.). Readings in Indian Economic History (London, Asia Pub­
lishing House, 1964), pp. 80-81.
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m ation in the countryside was feudal, and surpluses were appropriated 
for consum ption rather than for capital accumulation. The im pact of 
British imperial rule on this situation is com plex —  while the institutions 
of incipient indigenous (urban) capitalism  were destroyed, the feudal 
agrarian structure was reinforced and made more secure. Institutions of 
indigenous capitalism  were initially transformed into comprador ele­
m ents, subservient to the interests o f British capitalisih, through the pro­
cess o f enforced extraction of raw materials protected by the military and, 
after Britain’s industrial revolution, through the destruction of native in­
dustry by imported m anufactures. The basis for indigenous primitive ac­
cum ulation therefore becam e differential status in relation to land, since 
the m aintenance of an agrarian hierarchy com plem ented the interests of 
the imperial regime and British capitalism  through the agency of the East 
India Company. This is not to suggest that the Indian bourgeois classes 
were totally elim inated in this process but their interests com peted with 
those of British capital while the role o f the rural landlord remained by 
and large consistent with the interests of the imperial regime. The his­
tory o f the peasantry in N orth India (and in Pum ea, par excellence) 
during the two hundred years of British rule is dominated by the com ­
plementarity —  direct and indirect —  between the prevailing socio-eco­
nom ic form ation of the agrarian structure and the process of foreign 
capitalist accum ulation.
T he em ergence of a nationalist bourgeoisie allied to the rich peasant­
ry, and m ore specifically to the role  of the rich peasant rather than that 
of landlord, does not contradict the underlying principle of expropria­
tion through differential access to property but seeks to contain that 
principle within the boundaries of a nationalist state. Independence 
represents a bourgeois revolution in which the peasantry (e.g. through 
the Kisan Sabha and later Congress) were m obilised to undermine the 
pillar o f British dom ination by challenging the feudal system in the 
countryside. H owever, for the majority o f the peasantry, the undermining 
of feudalism  has not disturbed the principle of expropriation but has 
m erely unleashed a new  form through greater dependence on impersonal 
market forces for productive and consum ption com m odities in a system  
where indigenous capital is once again being aggressively accumulated  
as a result of expropriation, but now  within the context of international 
capitalist accum ulation. A s a result, polarisation between the peasantry 
and the bourgeoisie proceeds apace, as well as differentiation within the 
peasantry/. The history of imperial rule in Purnea District and the acqui­
sition of national independence demonstrate the relevance of this general
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empirical model fo r  an unders tand ing  of the con tem porary  features of 
the peasantry- in the region.
T h e British  interest in P u m ea  —  dating from  1 772  —  focu sed  prim ar­
ily  on  the p rod u ction  o f in digo, jute and tob acco . T h e first tw o w ere the  
m aterials for the grow ing B ritish  tex tile  industry. T h ere w ere adm in is­
trative costs for provid ing a stab le p o litica l and soc ia l en vironm en t 
w ithin  w hich  p rod u ction  cou ld  take p lace; and exp en d itu re required for  
infrastructural d evelop m en t —  railw ays and roads —  to  facilita te the  
transport, prim ary processin g  and m arketing o f p rod uce. T h ese co sts  
w ere b o m  largely  out o f revenue co llec ted  from  land, rather than  
through taxing p rofits, or im p osin g  sa les taxes or tariffs o n  im ported  
fin ished  articles. C onsequ en tly , apart from  stim ulating the grow th o f  
cash  crop  p rod uction  and arranging for its co llec tio n  and d ispatch, the  
m ajor co n ce m  b ecam e the co n stm ctio n  o f  a land  tenure system  from  
w hich  the g o v em m en t cou ld  derive reven u e w ithou t h aving  to  m eet the  
costs o f co llec tion  w ith  an en orm ou s input o f adm in istrative capacity . 
Such a system  w ou ld  o f  cou rse h ave  to b e  con sisten t w ith  effic ien t e c o ­
nom ic and socia l relations for the p rod u ction  of cash  crops w hich  
in vo lved  a balance b etw een  prod uction  o f cash  crops and fo o d  crops, 
w ith  sufficien t le ft  to the p easant and labourer after exp ropriation  to  
ensure that the cy c le  o f  p rod uction  w ou ld  b e repeated.
A t the sam e tim e, there had  to  be in cen tives and ob v iou s rew ards for  
th ose w ho w ould  co llec t revenue on  b eh alf o f the regim e. A fter  a  T ew  
fa lse starts, the Perm anent S ettlem en t o f 1793  in stitu tionalised  a land  
tenure system  in w hich  loca l landlords contracted  to  organ ise the c o lle c ­
tion  o f rent on  their estates, p assing on a fixed  p rop ortion  o f rent in  
revenue to  the govem m en t. (B y  1 9 2 5 , rent co llected  from  p easants ex ­
ceed ed  the revenue paid  to  the G o v em m en t by a fa cto r  o f  9 .) S ub se­
quent leg isla tion  through to  in d ep en d en ce a llow ed  o n  the on e hand the  
proliferation  o f in term ediate co llectors, w hile  restricting the arbitrary 
fixation  o f  rents thereby offerin g  som e form al security o f  tenure to  som e  
of the peasants. It w as this system  of lan d  tenure w h ich  pervaded the  
agrarian stm ctu re o f  the B en ga l P resid en cy , in clu d ing  P u m ea  D istrict, 
until its ab olition  in. 1950 .
T h e ach ievem en ts o f p o litica l in d ep en d en ce have of cou rse contributed  
to  the form al breakdow n of this feu dal agrarian structure, but it is argued  
that the underlying stm ctu re of exp lo ita tive  relations rem ains in n ew  
substructural form s. T h e fram ew ork  o f p o litica l op p o sitio n  in In d ia  
b efore in d ep en d en ce w as in flu en ced  by the very institu tions w hich  w ere  
being ch allenged . T h e British  G overn m ent d istinguished  very sharply
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between legitim ate forms of opposition and illegitimate guerilla tactics, 
and was of course unable to prevent the famous boycott of imported  
British cloth. One of the legacies o f imperialism was then a commitment 
to the process o f pluralist-dem ocratic political action. But the ideology of 
British liberalism  was m ore persuasive than this, including its own 
notions about property and the market econom y. Of course the peculiar 
feature of im perialism  is the arbitrary inter\/ention by govem m ent regu­
lation to restrict the free activity of the market econom y —  becom ing the 
sole purchaser of indigenous goods, and excluding imports from other 
imperial com petitors to dom inate the dom estic market. The acquisition 
of national independence puts an end to this arbitrary intervention —  
but not before the im pact of British capital has created the base for its 
own survival. During the im perialist period many econom ic roles 
developed which were consistent with and encouraged by the interests 
of the im perialist power —  in the countryside: the tax-farmer, the land­
lord, the trader, the m oneylender, the shopkeeper, the rich peasant 
growing cash crops; and in the cities: the comprador bourgeoisie —  the 
merchant and banker, a lim ited ‘national’ bourgeoisie dependent on 
British capital, as w ell as professional and administrative classes who  
were invariably engaged (and still are) in the accum ulation of wealth  
through the ownership of property.
The form ation of a pluralist-dem ocratic state with a parliamentary 
constitution after independence reflects the perpetuation of dominance 
by a bourgeois class. T he com prador bourgeoisie which has had a direct 
stake in the system  of pure im perialism  now has some political oppor­
tunity —  supported by its superior econom ic strength —  to defend its 
interests and current roles. M any have sw elled the ranks o f the ‘national’ 
bourgeoisie, allying them selves directly or indirectly with foreign capital 
though not n ow  exclusively British. T h e formal political system after 
independence therefore enables at the boundary of State capitalism  the 
m aintenance o f linkages with foreign capital. A nd since the resources 
available to State capitalism  are so constrained, the survival o f the State 
and its political system  critically depends upon those linkages. Business 
—  alm ost —  is as usual: from Pum ea the jute is exported, fertiliser and 
m achinery are imported; aid is invested in large infrastructural projects 
like irrigation and water m anagem ent or an oil refinery, the military is 
equiped and the debt repayments stretch into the future.®® The distribu-
2® S ee P. Patnaik, “Im peria lism  and the G row th  o f  C apitalism ” in R. O w en and 
B. S u tc liffe  (eds.). Studies  in the T he ory  o f  Im peria l ism  (L ondon, L ongm ans, 1972), 
p. 222. A lso  C. B ethelheim , India  I n d e p e n d e n t  (English translation; L ondon , M ac-
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tion of access to property, the internal flow s of capital and the pattern 
of savings and investm ent have changed slightly since independence but 
they rem ain dom inated by India’s position  as an unequal trading part­
ner in the w orld  system . The existence of the bourgeois state depends 
upon a political system  which protects the integrated, hierarchical 
system  o f econom ic relationships and allow s it to continue and flourish, 
connecting the countryside to the towns and cities through the extraction  
of surplus upwards to constitute the structure of neo-im perialist penetra­
tion. T he norm ative quality of form al dem ocracy, with w hich the p oliti­
cal system  is endow ed, has functioned to preserve this com plex, hierar­
chical m ode o f production which is the essence of the State —  w itness the 
disarray of the C om m unist parties in  W est Bengal.
T he substructural expressions o f this underlying structure in the 
countryside have o f course changed as a result o f the abolition of Z a- 
mindari. Land is held  by peasants w ho are direct tenants o f the state, so  
the tax-farm ers have disappeared. B ut som e of these tax-farm ers re­
tained large am ounts o f land in Purnea, m uch o f which is leased out 
(usually under a share-cropping arrangement) instead of being personally  
cultivated. Legislation on  land ceilings is ignored or by-passed, as are 
the law s for protecting or upgrading the tenancy status o f sharecroppers. 
The big landlords have disappeared, but m any sm aller ones remain —  
com bining the roles o f landlord, rich peasant and sm all-tow n entrepre­
neur. T h e com pensation for loss o f Zam indari rights is invested in trans­
portation (haulage and garages); m arketing (go-d ow ns); the private 
I  credit network; private system s o f agricultural input distribution; finan-
f| cing; sm all-tow n and village shops, and peripatetic sm all traders; som e
| i  sm all-scale m anufacturing and processing enterprises; urban property,
entertainm ent (cinem as) ; and their ow n farms.
I  R ecruitm ent to these roles is not exclusively based on prior landlord
status. Som e w ho were raiyats or even substantial sharecroppers before 
1950 have becom e rich peasants and landlords, and now  invest in ways 
sim ilar to those described above. A  few  have been successful enough to 
m ove into the district capital —  P u m ea  town; but for m ost their village 
rem ains the operational base although property m ay be ow ned elsewhere. 
It appears though that this recent addition to the class of regional entre­
preneurs has em erged from  a privileged raiyatwari class with substantial 
holdings; som etim es favoured subordinates of the zamindars and their 
interm ediaries; and having reputations as village and local tehsil 
leaders, often corresponding with superior caste status.
Gibbon and Kee, 1968), especially Chs. X and XI.
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The contem porary patterns of class form ation in the region —  as re­
flected in this profile of the ‘kulak’ —  arise out of the pre-1950 agrarian 
structure. The formal revenue structure —  the institutionalisation of feu ­
dalism —  has changed so that rent is no longer the m ajor vehicle for the 
upward transmission of surplus. But the distribution of access to prop­
erty —  land especially —  remains highly unequal, if less so than before. 
H ouseholds are differentiated through their ownership o f productive 
assets, o f which land is the m ost significant. The lim ited redistribution  
of secure rights to land after the A bolition of Zam indari A ct (1950) has 
created a significant class of rich peasants. This significance refers to the 
roles which they occupy in the new regional agro-econom ic substructure. 
They have becom e rich based on superior access to land —  but the pro­
cess of their ongoing accum ulation is not thus solely  explained. They  
may always have had superior access to land, but they have now  
emerged as a strong class because they can appropriate m ore of their 
own surplus (i.e. the surplus value of their sharecroppers and hired 
labourers, and the product of family labour beyond what is im m edi­
ately consum ed). Before, it was largely expropriated in the form  of rent, 
and appropriated by landlords for productive investm ent or consum p­
tion. N ow , the raiyat has greater opportunities not only for increasing 
the productivity o f his factors of production in agriculture (by using his 
profit to obtain m ore efficient factor ratios), but also for diversifying into 
other econom ic activity (e.g. primary processing, trading, m oneylending) 
and engaging perhaps in higher levels of consum ption (e.g. food, 
housing).
H owever, the em erging rich peasant class is not an autonom ous one. 
It is precisely the capacity and desire to accum ulate which m akes the 
rich peasant dependent on others, as others are dependent on  him. H e  
still has to surrender m uch of his surplus in order to use a proportion of 
it productively for his ow n use. In agriculture, the benefits o f machinery, 
fertiliser and new seeds are acquired by contributing to the profit o f the 
sellers and producers of those com m odities. Capital for investm ent 
(when assets are not liquid) is paid for by high rates o f interest on loans. 
H is produce is purchased, at low  village-harvest rates, and sold else­
where a n d /o r  later at higher rates by those with transport capacity and 
capital (or credit from a richer source) to store over time, until urban or 
rural scarcities yield high returns on investm ent. R ich peasants fre­
quently begin to diversify without any liquid assets or with only very 
lim ited savings, but their level of agricultural operation and extent of 
landownership functions as security. Credit for establishing a shop.
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buying a small milling p lan t or even for local m oneylending  is expen­
sive, o ften resulting in a low return  on  their own activity.
T hus, in  the p rocess o f b ecom in g  a rich peasant and m aintain ing the 
role o f q uasi-capitalist and sm all entrepreneur, the rich p easan t replaces 
th e raiyat as the critical ro le in aggregating surplus in the v illage and in 
supporting, through the cap ita list expropriation  o f  som e o f  th e surplus, 
an exten d ed  hierarchy o f surplus aggregation  in  the cou n trysid e.
A  prom inent feature o f the early m eth od o log ica l p rop osa ls for this 
study w as the analysis o f in teraction  b etw een  the v illage  and in stitu tions  
external to  it w ith in  the con text o f  d evelop m en t program m es. T h e  
assum ption  w as that the in trodu ction  o f  n ew  agricu ltural tech n ology  
(new  forces o f p rod uction ) constituted  a critical cau sal stim ulant to  
ch anging patterns o f  econ om ic  and p o litica l b eh aviour in  the v illage. T h e  
forego in g  general descrip tion  o f substructural ch an ge and n ew  so c io ­
econ om ic  form ations em erging am ong the p easantry in  P u m ea  suggests  
that the im pact o f  d evelop m en t program m es —  esp ecia lly  those sub­
sum ed under the general title o f  the G reen  R evo lu tion  — w as increm ental 
rather than critical. This observation  m ust b e em p hasised  sin ce it repre­
sents a m ajor departure from  the in itial fram ew ork  o f  an alysis. W e have  
discarded the in itia l stim ulu s-respon se type en cap su la tion  m odel, em ­
p loyed  in  a situation  o f aggressive p en etration  by ‘en cap su lating  p o litica l 
structures’ through d evelop m en t program m es, n o t on ly  b ecau se it is 
theoretica lly  m isleading in assum ing a d ich otom y b etw een  the ‘m od ern ’ 
State and the ‘traditional’ v illage but a lso  b ecau se it b eco m es h istorically  
inaccurate w hen  applied to  the analysis o f d evelop m en t situations. T he  
n ew  tech n ology  o f  the G reen R evo lu tion  exacerbates prior trends in class  
form ation  and substructural ch an ge —  eco n o m ic , p o litica l, soc ia l and  
cultural, and reinforces the underlying structure by contributing to the 
process o f  expropriating the surplus o f the peasantry.
In  outline, it is argued that the effort to  in crease the ou tp ut o f fo o d -  
grain am ong the peasantry is accom pan ied  by the further in tegration  o f  
the peasantry (th ough  quasi-cap ita list rich p easan ts) in to  th e capitalist 
m arket system . T h is is so, since the new  tech n o lo g y  is d ep en dent u pon  
m anufactured  inputs. R ich  p easants w ho ad opt n ew  seed s sh ould  buy  
the necessary com p lem en tary  inputs on  the m arket, u su a lly  through the  
m edium  o f State institu tions at the loca l level. T h ose inputs are fertiliser, 
irrigation equ ipm ent (if n o t ‘S tate’ canal w here charges are m ade, then  
tu b e-w ells  and p um pin g-sets), other m achinery, p estic id es and herb i­
cides. T o  buy th ese  inputs, the p easan t m ust sell som e o f  h is prod uce  
for cash, and sin ce it is assum ed that som e profit w ill accrue in addition
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to investm ent requirements in new technology and consumption needs, 
the peasant is encouraged to demand goods with no relation to the agri­
cultural sector.®» A s there are a few transistor radios and bicycles in the 
village, this aspect of the linkage remains marginal. However, the diver­
sification activities o f the rich peasants as w ell as the increasing intensity 
of cultivation function to enhance this integration of the rich reasahts, 
although it is the jute cash crop m ore than any expansion of foodgrain  
production which sustains this process. Thus it must be em phasised that 
the new agricultural technology of the Green Revolution, which bypasses 
jute, has to date only a marginal effect in Purnea upon substructural 
change and the ongoing incorporation of the peasantry into the com m od­
ity market although its function is to exacerbate both.
How ever, in our concem  to identify the possibilities for change in the 
underlying structure, it is germane to point out an inherent contradic­
tion in the Green R evolution, despite the tendency for the contradiction  
to be offset by unpredictable weather and ad hoc state procedures for 
subsidies and rationing. The fundamental contradiction refers to support 
prices. Prices are kept high as an incentive to produce, but this also 
keeps consum er prices high which hurts all those who must buy food  
with cash. The increase in numbers of landless agricultural labourers 
and wage labour arrangements (as contrasted with payments in kind) 
illustrates the significance of this proposition. Bardhan®’ shows that the 
lower-incom e groups often pay more than the rich for cereal foods, and 
there is evidence that this is true for the village in the study. Bardhan’s 
article indicates that real wage-rates have actually been declining. But a 
fall in support prices w ill reduce incentives to produce and therefore 
output, especially for those with narrow profit margins which would  
apply to many of the rich peasants in Purnea. T o maintain the level of 
output at current prices demands dom estic consum ption or export, but 
the high unem ploym ent and underem ploym ent (rural and urban) in 
India negates any possibility of a local demand to absorb rising produc­
tion. Thus the success of the new agricultural strategy depends —  ironi­
cally —  on the willingness of the developed countries to import grain 
from countries such as India. But developed countries have grain export 
problems too —  Canada for exam ple is trying to shift her produce to the 
Third W orld as her markets decline in Europe. If the Indian government
2® H . M . C leaver, “T h e  C ontrad ictions o f  the G reen  R evo lu tion ”, M o n th ly  R e v ie w  
(June 1972), pp. 8 1 -1 1 1 , especia lly  pp. 88 -8 9 .
P. Bardhan, “G reen  R evolu tion  and A gricu ltural L abourers”, E c o n o m ic  and  
Poli t ica l  W eekly  (July 1970). T able 8, p. 1243.
74 GEOF WOOD
radically low ered prices to avoid surpluses and budget deficits (incurred  
through offering subsidies), marginal producers for the m arket would be 
pushed back into subsistence w ithout any solution  to the poverty of 
those w ho buy grain with cash. U nder those conditions the rich peasant, 
the landless labourer and the urban proletariat w ould have m ore interests 
in com m on to defend than they have at present.
W hile the analysis of a single village cannot contain an exam ination  
of this level o f contradiction, the brief inclusion  of this argum ent 
dem onstrates the shortcom ings o f isolated  village-level studies and indi­
cates the validity of locating the analysis o f change in a village within a 
broad econom ic and political context.
It is evident from  the foregoing discussion  that the em erging role of the 
rich peasant occupies a central p lace in the exam ination o f substructural 
change —  political, econom ic and social. T he rich peasant em bodies the 
vital link in the chain of expropriation w hich is reflected in his political 
control over the rest of the peasantry and his social status w ithin it. In 
the region, the rich peasant has to protect h im self against the large land­
owners, the urban and peri-urban entrepreneurs; the marwaris, the 
transport operators, go-dow n m anagers, m erchants in grain, jute and 
livestock, dealers in com m odities like cloth, kerosene and salt where 
local m onopolies are possible; and the governm ent officials when they 
act on behalf o f the big landow ners and entrepeneurs. B u t whether the 
rich peasant is m obilised for the pursuit o f h is interests through political 
party ‘peasant id eology’, or through caste associations, or through wider 
kinship and other forms o f geo-political m obility, o f vital im portance is 
the security of his political and econom ic dom inance in the loca le  o f his 
m ajor econom ic activity —  the village.
T he role o f the rich peasant has been identified as critical by em p loy­
ing concepts and data w hich allow  the observer to analyse the agrarian 
structure o f the region as a w hole. T he role has not been  identified  by 
concentrating our attention upon  concepts and data w hich are appro­
priate on ly to tjie village level. H ow ever, by adopting a m ethodological 
approach w hich is essentially historical, we are able to describe the 
patterns o f generalised socio-econ om ic structural change in the region  
and thus obtain the criteria for an exam ination in depth o f som e of those  
changing relationships at the v illage level. A s the role o f the rich peasant 
is a critical one for understanding the regional agrarian structure as a 
w hole, it is for this reason that the rich peasant m ust be understood in 
the context o f the village, but n ot just sim ply on account of the rich
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peasants’ dom inance in village political and econom ic life. Thus, our 
exam ination o f the village is concerned with the econom ic, political and 
social processes over time which have contributed to the em ergence and 
m aintenance of a structure of relationships where the entire rural system  
is personified by the role o f the quasi-capitalist, entrepreneurial rich 
peasant. In addition, we should em phasise that we are not seeking to 
attribute independent variable status to the State orTo the village in our 
discussions of change. Rather, we see the State and village evolving in 
dialectical unity, as a total dynamic social system. The village, therefore, 






THE GROWING PRESSURE OF POPULATION
- Geof Wood and S. D. Biggs -
The Kosi Development Area, which comprises Purnea District 
and part of Saharsa District, was created in the wake of 
Prime Minister Nehru's decision in 1955 to harness the 
Kosi River. It has a total land area of 17,000 square 
kilometers and a population in 1971 of 6.3 million. The 
population density is only slightly higher than that for 
Bihar State but is twice the all-India average.
Estimates of population before the first regular census 
of 1872 have to be treated with great caution, and it is 
as well to remember also that the size of Purnea District* 
varied as boundaries were moved. The 1872 census gives 
a figure of just over 17 lakhs. The population then 
increased 7.8% to 18  ̂ lakhs by 1881 and a further 5.1% 
in 1891 to 19̂ 5 lakhs. This steady increase up to 1891 
reflected a high level of immigration. With the Kosi 
River moving critically west during 1850 - 75, an extensive 
area of land became fit for reclamation which attracted 
immigrants from the neighbouring districts of Bhagalpur, 
Monghyr and Darbhanga. The growth of population was 
mainly in the Western thanas of Dhamdaha and Forbesganj.
An increase of 28% in 1891 over previous estimates has 
been mentioned for Dhamdaha.
However, as in most districts of Bihar, the population 
actually declined in the period 1891 - 1900 by 19% to 
15.7 lakhs. There were severe outbreaks of cholera in 
1891 and 1900 which had the effect not only of reducing 
the population but also of slowing up the rate of 
migration into the area. The population then picked 
up slowly as the following table shows, although it did 
not pass the 1891 level until 1931.
* The Kosi Development Area is a recent administrative 
unit; the historical sections of this paper refer only 
to Purnea District :
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Table 10; >
Growth of Population in Purnea District 1872 - 1961
Year Population % Variation
1872 1,716,547
1881 1,848,107 + ■ 7.66
1891 1,943,349 + 5.15
1901 1,572,280 - 19.09
1911 1,689,514 + 7.46
1921 1,804,128 + 6.78
1931 1,951,401 + 8.16
1941 2,124,333 + 8 . 8 6
1951 2,254,565 + 6.13
1961 3,089,128 + 37.02
Source: Government of India 1961 Census
During the period 1911 - 1920, Purnea had epidemics of 
cholera every year from 1915 - 1919, The increases which 
did occur continued to be accounted for by immigration and, 
after 1921, by a steady fall in the mortality rate. The 
slight hesitation in the population growth rate between 
1941 - 1950 seems attributable to some emigration of Muslims 
to East Pakistan after Partition in 1947 and a decrease in 
the flow of immigration - although the Land Revenue 
Administration Report for 1945 - 6 reports a large influx 
of agricultural labourers. The dramatic increase of 37% 
between 1951 and 1961 (compared to a figure of 19.7% 
for Bihar as a whole) is explained by the 1961 Census in 
terms of a sharp decrease in the mortality rate with no 
corresponding lowering of the birth rate - a reflection of 
the general improvement in medical care and the resumption 
of migration as a result of increased employment opportunities 
directly or indirectly provided by the Kosi project. The 
most dramatic increase within the district was found in 
Araria subdivision (+45.01%) which includes the thanas 
of Raniganj and Bhargama (+59.56%) where much land was 
made secure from the risk of flooding by the construction of 
embankments to contain the Kosi. The time series data on 
the proportion of immigrants in the district (Table 11) 
seem to confirm this pattern. The implications of a 
sustained development of this trend are dramatic indeed.
Within the Kosi Region there has been a net movement of 
people eastwards from Saharsa to Purnea.
Table 11 ;
Proportion of Immigrants in Purnea District 1901 - 1961







Migration statistics not compiled, due to war expenditure. 
Source: Government of India 1961 Census
In the decade between the censuses of 1961 and 1971 the 
population of the Kosi Area grew from nearly 5 million to 
6.3 million - a compound rate of 2.4% per annum. Purnea 
District, with a population of 3,942,915 compared with 
Saharsa's 2,350,059, has 63% of this population. It has 
also exhibited the faster growth rate.
Occupation
Bihar as a whole has a predominantly rural society and the 
Kosi Area is one of the more rural parts of the State. In 
1971 only 10% of its population lived in urban areas 
compared with the all-India figure of 20%, while the figure 
for Kosi was only 6 %. This represents such a slight 
increase since 1961 (0 .6 %) that it can be concluded there 
has been virtually no process of concentrating people in 
the towns.
Within the region, Purnea District has a higher urban 
percentage as a result of the two major towns, Katihar 
and Purnea. After 1911, the .rural proportion in Purnea 
declined slightly, indicating not only urban growth in 
the four main towns (in 1961 their populations were :
Purnea 40,716, Katihar 59,419, Forbesganj 15,896, and 
Kishanganj 26,918) but the emergence of four other urban 
areas: Araria^, Kasba, Jogbani and Banmankhi Bazaar.
There are several reasons for the growth of these towns. 
Purnea itself, the District capital, has grown with the 
increasing involvement of government in rural deveopment, 
with the location of offices, residences for government 
officers and the consequent increase in the demand for 
service occupations, banking facilities, retailers and so 
on. The National Highway paisses through the town, which
'-A.
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has also been electrified, so garages and service- stations 
have proliferated. Furthermore, the Kosi Irrigation 
Project, until recently, had its main offices here although 
they have now been transferred to Saharsa. Katihar's 
growth is mainly attributed to the location of railway 
workshops, jute and flour mills, and finally to the 
establishment of Katihar as a subdivisional town, and it 
is also an important trading centre being so close to the 
border with West Bengal. Forbesganj and Jogbani have 
developed largely because of their position close to the 
Nepalese border, where the jute trade is flourishing and 
where of course some of the major work on the Kosi project 
has been carried out. In general, this slight trend of 
urbanization is therefore explained by the development of 
trade, but it is also often pointed out that the abolition 
of zamindari has encouraged many of the ex-landlords to 
engage in entrepreneurial activity. This process has brought 
many wealthier families into urban residence along with 
their dependants.
The occupational classification of the rural population is 
shown in Table 12 which reveals that the percentage of 
agricultural labourers rose in ten years from 30.6% to 
46.1% of the population.
As a result of changes in enumeration procedure and 
definition between the 1961 and 1971 censuses, comparison of 
the figures is not directly possible, and the change in 
employment composition in the past ten years may be less 
radical than these figures suggest. But it would, 
nevertheless, seem reasonable to conclude that 'agricultural 
labourer' has become the dominant occupational category. 
Moreover, the figure of 46% for that category is unlikely 
to be overstated.
Religion and Caste »
While overall figures on the religious composition of the 
District's population from 1901 are available, accurate 
data on the distribution throughout the districtare difficult 
to obtain. The population is almost entirely Hindu and 
Muslim, with the Hindus numerically dominant. In 1901, 
Hindus comprised 57.61% and the Muslims 42.33% of the total 
population. The corresponding proportions at the 1961 
Census were 62.13% and 37.68% respectively. However, the 
geographical distribution is rather significant, so that 
in the east of the District in the Kishanganj subdivision 
the Muslims are in a majority while Hindus quite clearly 
dominate in the west, (this has been the area of greatest 
immigration and settlement), following the movement of the 
Kosi River to the west and out of the District via the 
anchals of Dhamdaha, Rupauli, Barbara, Bhawanipur and 
Banmankhi. This historical development has important 
contemporary implications since it is only the western 
portion which is within the command of the canal irrigation 
and therefore within the scope of the Intensive Agriculture 
Area Programme (lAAP).
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One further comment must be made on the distribution of 
the population by religion. The Jains - who are Karwaris 
a commercial and moneylending community - comprise a tiny 
proportion of the population - .09% in 1961 representing 
a total of 2,912 in the district - but they are distributed 
almost exclusively through the bigger towns: Purnea,
(Gulabbag - the market centre), Forbesganj, Kishanganj, 
and also Banmankhi, Araria and Katihar.
The data available on the caste composition of Purnea's 
population are very patchy as the practice of compiling 
census data on caste was discontinued after 1931.
Since then the only caste details enumerated have been 
for Scheduled Castes and Tribes, for whom special provision 
in education and political representation was made in the 
Indian Constitution.
But as caste as a principle of stratification remains 
important particularly in relation to leadership and 
tenancy status, economic division of labour and political 
structure, it will be helpful to include some discussion 
on caste, identifying some of the local peculiarities.
Taking the term caste to refer to effective endogamous 
groups which maintain a social distinction based upon 
ritual status, association with a traditional occupation 
and a sense of ritual purity through religious observance, 
diet and avoidance of commensal relations outside the 
group, the concept is translated locally as jati. There 
are jatis within both the Hindu and the Muslim communities, 
although the Muslim jatis are fewer, consequently larger 
and are not differentiated so sharply on the criterion 
of diet. Including the Muslim jatis then, the District 
Gazetteer of 1911 lists 17 principal castes for Purnea 
District representing about 84% of the total population. 
According to these figures the single most numerous jati 
was the Sheikh (Muslim), and the three most numerous 
Hindu jatis were the Goala (Yadavas, traditionally herdsmen); 
Rajbansi (peculiar to Purnea with a shallow claim to Rajput 
status, but with strong Nepali/Mongoloid appearance); 
and Mushar - a scheduled caste consisting oredominantly of 
landless labourers. Of those three, the Goalas and the 
Mushavs are widely dispersed, while the Rajhansis reside 
mainly in a south-east to north-east belt or the District.
The 1931 figures are much more comprehensive and reliable, 
although since they have been aggregated to the District 
level there is no statistical indication of geographical 




Main Hindu Castes in Purnea District, 1931
Caste Numbers Occupation (when known)
Babhan (Bhumihar Brahman) 3,693 Cultivator, ploughmen
Bania 20,575 Trader and merchant 
(Bais and Agranati)
Brahman 34,940 Priest, but largely 
cultivators
Dhanuk 42,255




Kamar (lohar) 17,326 Blacksmith
Kanda 6,193
Kayasth 9,045 A literati caste
Kewat 36,854
Koiri 24,694 Vegetable growers
Barhi 22,450 Carpenter
Kunhar 13,355
Kurmi 12,774 Vegetable growers
Mali 5,590
Mallah 2,402











II of the Bihar and
The total represents just under half of the Hindu 
population for 1931. The remainder consists of smaller 
castes, often peculiar to Purnea District, Scheduled 
Castes - the Harijans - and some of the Scheduled 
Tribes. For Purnea, these are listed in Table 14.
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Table l4:























(Source: Tables XVII and XVIII of Volume VII, Part II of
the Bihar and Orissa Census Report of 1931)
In addition to referring to 'main' Hindu castes, the 1931 
Census has a further category of 'important' Hindu castes based 
presumably on land ownership, political power and representation 
in professions (including .government service). Compared with 
their incidence in the Province as a whole, the 'important' 
castes are numerically weaker in Purnea. This is partly due to 
the higher proportion of Muslims in the District, but it is also 
a reflection of the greater differentiation in the distribution 
of wealth and power there.
Land in Relation to Population*
Figures concerning the ownership of land - the principle source 
of wealth - are unreliable but, as the subject is important, |
Tables 15 and 16 are included here to give some idea of magnitudes. 
Table 15 gives an indication of the size of household holdings 
and the tenancy status of the cultivator. On the whole, |
these holdings are not a consolidated area, but are made up of 
small plots in different parts of the village. Tenants are .
usually sharecroppers who are moved each year by the landlord. I
They generally pay a produce rent of between a quarter to half 
of the gross output from the land. j
The estimates given in Table 15 show that over half of the 
holdings (55.7%) are below five acres, just over 25% are between j
5.00 and 9.99 acres, and the remainder are ten acres or more. '
On breaking the classification down by tenure type it can be 
seen that about 55% of all households were tenants on at least j
some of the land they cultivated, with most of the pure tenants 
having less than five acres. The majority of tenants-cum-owners 
had between 2.50 and 9.99 acres. Owner households were fairly |
evenly distributed over all size categories and made up a 
majority of the households in the smallest and largest acreage 
class. I
A very rough estimate of the amount of land which is cultivated i
by the four types of cultivator by holding size is given in Table J
16. The owner class has been separated into owner cultivators 
and the landlord-cum-owner cultivators. It has been assumed I
that only owners with 2 0 acres or more fall in the second group. 
Although 55.7% of households cultivated holdings of less than 5 
acres this represented only 2 0 .1% of the total cultivated land. |
About one-third of the land was cultivated by households 
with holdings between 5.0 - 9.99 acres, while nearly 30% was 
cultivated by households with holdings of 10.0 - 19.99 acres.
The remaining 18% was cultivated by households that owned or 
cultivated more than 20 acres.
It was estimated that just under 20% of the cultivated land was 
farmed by households that have tenant status. This falls more 
or less equally between the pure tenant and the tenant-cum-owner 
cultivator groups. It can be seen that the proportion of land 
that is owned by tenant-cum-owner cultivator increases as the 
size of the holding increases.
The next chapter looks in detail at the distribution of land 
including the likely effects of population growth on the 
status of the small cultivator. It foresees a decline in 
available tenancies, the displacement of families from the 
land and a growing body of landless seeking wage labour.













































(DNJ M a h-'m N) in 00 rt en -J LU en« • • • P u> O OUJ hj et» CD en 00 to enen ID lO un Ln
en en O OO
hh
1-3 
O ' rtto h-* P H*en 00 to VD M en 00 M en• • • • O t-" en to00 00 O »» -» ». •»en h-' en eo'J to LU
O o en en
to en to LU
O Ln O en LU LD to to
vo O lU en 00 h-> h-* en
KO O to en
O en 00
H- a: a o 
c:M  en
0 (D





p <n M O
O en to O P eu 1
to 00 o LU O LO KO p
KO 'O KO to Oen en en en »LOVD
(-* M MlO en en 00 H* LU tu en •
• « « » to O O Oto to to 00 »» •» ■» •* o•o en en enen co to en 1
O O O O
»»J to O en M LU to• • • ♦ en O o»o en M H*
O w to o00 00 -o to Oen en LU •o 4-
M en to to h3
O eu 00 eu KO en 0































































































O  Oo o Ln
H-
H-o o o oto00
hh
to
to  .u to o oa
H- cn
H-
r t  M 
(D r t  
5  ^ H-















THE LEGACY OF THE PAST: THE AGRARIAN STRUCTURE
- Geof Wood -
Introduction
Much planning literature has suffered from an over-optimis­
tic view of the capacity of state institutions to control 
and change social, economic and natural environment. It 
fails to appreciate the weight of historical momentum 
governing the pace and form of development of institutions 
and social processes, regarding them instead as readily 
replaceable or amenable to change. One consequence of a 
regional approach to planning is that it becomes difficult 
to ignore detailed and specific social, economic and envi­
ronmental realities. In this spirit, the historical dis­
cussion presented here identifies and describes the inertia 
of institutions and ongoing processes and assesses their 
momentum. The planning task requires the harnessing, de­
struction or dissipation of these inertias in the pursuit 
of planning objectives. But the formulation of planning 
objectives and the selection of policy measures is itself 
one of the processes constrained by these very inertias in 
a way that the study of the past and present social, eco­
nomic and natural environment amply reveals.
However, since such an historical picture will perforce be 
selective, an indication of the criteria to be employed 
should be made explicit forthwith. Obviously these must 
relate to the contemporary issues of rural development in 
the Kosi region (though our history deals only with Purnea 
District), notably the increase of agricultural production 
with an eye to income distribution and employment effects; 
the pattern of ownership over productive property, most 
especially land; the development of appropriate infra­
structures like irrigation - but also including the market­
ing and distribution of the product, as well as the pro­
vision of variable and financial inputs; the administration 
of development, revenue, and law and order; the political 
process both formal and informal through which the State 
acquires its particular complexion in the areas of policy 
formulation and implementation; and finally the grand 
themes of social order and division of labour, the nature 
of the 'conscience collective'.
The general features of this historical context during the 
period of British imperialism are characterized by three 
interrelated processes - peasant cultivation, the produc­
tion of raw materials for British owned manufacturing enter­
prise, and a system of revenue collection which was based
- ...
on a feudal analogy linking peasants to landlords. At 
independence the reality was not simply a traditional, 
backward peasantry which had to be 'modernized-* by benevo­
lent elites. There was the multi-dimensional reality of an 
agrarian system harnessed to the interests of international 
and, later, domestic capitalism, a system of tenure and 
level of technology conducive only.to low rates of agri­
cultural productivity, a concomitant low level of invest­
ment in agricultural infrastructure, and a structure of 
exploitation which pervaded the system from top to bottom 
(19 3).
The British interest in the region of the Kosi River dated 
from around 1772* initially as a frontier district with the 
marauding tribes of the Nepalese Terai to the North, but 
with a developing economic interest in indigo, tobacco and, 
from the mid-nineteenth century, jute. An early concern to 
make the area secure from the North soon developed into the 
necessity to provide a stable political and social environ­
ment within which the production of indigo and the clearing 
of jungle could take place. In addition to the administra­
tive costs of dominating such an area, expenditure on 
infrastructural development - railways and roads, especially 
- was incurred, to facilitate the transport and marketing 
of produce. These costs were borne largely out of revenue 
collected from the land, rather than through taxing profits 
or imposing tariffs on imported finished commodities. Con­
sequently, apart from encouraging the clearing of jungle, 
laying down indigo plantations and subsidizing from land 
revenue the capital requirement's of a marketing system, the 
main task for the British East India Company then dischar­
ging the imperial role in India was to -set up a reliable 
system of revenue collection.
Such a system depended on two types of condition. First, 
it would have to be consistent with efficient economic and 
social relations for the production of cash-crops by the 
peasantry (initially tobacco and, later on, jute). These 
relations involved a balance between the production of cash- 
crops and food crops, with sufficient left to the peasant 
and labourer after expropriation to ensure that the cycle 
of production could he repeated. Secondly, there had to 
be incentives and obviously rewards for those who would 
collect the revenue on behalf of the Company.
♦This chapter draws much of its evidence from the District 
Gazetteer of Purnea, in the Bihar District series, pub­
lished in 1963. This is in effect the District Gazetteer 
of 1911 by L.S.S. O'Malley(ICS) brought up to date and re­
vised by B.C. Roy Chaudhury in 1962 in his capacity as 
Special Officer, Gazetteer Revision Section, Revenue De­
partment, Patna.
95
The Company inherited a system of relationships not only of 
expropriation and exploitation but also those more associ­
ated with the term 'feudalism*, namely the relationships of 
protection, rudimentary security and a concomitant accep­
tance of the premises of the ongoing political and social 
order. Thus after a few false starts, the Permanent Settle­
ment of 1793 institutionalized a land tenure system which 
had emerged at the end of Moghul Rule and in which local 
landlords contracted to organize the collection of rent on 
their estates, passing on a fixed proportion in revenue to 
the government. This was known as the zam-indari system.
In this way, the Company established the basis for what 
developed into a form of indirect rule, co-opting the 
loyalty (or at least pragmatic acquiescence) of the indi­
genous rulers. Subsequent legislation through to indepen­
dence, and particularly after the 1857 Mutiny, allowed the 
proliferation of intermediate collectors, operating between 
occupiers and zamindars, while at the scune time restricting 
the arbitrary fixing of rents and extending some formal 
security of tenure to some of the peasants.
The Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885 represented some attempt to 
correct the naive assumptions initially made by the Company 
over the nature of the agrarian system they had found. It 
reflected a belated recognition of features of Moghul ag­
rarian structure and tried to replace through government 
statute some of the security for tenants which had been re­
moved by the Permanent Settlement and other legislation of 
the early nineteenth century. Its effect was to produce a 
tenure system of startling complexity.
The zamindari system was abolished in North India in 1950 
with one significant long-term effect: the surplus which 
was previously expropriated in the form of rent from the 
raiyat (the tenant cultivator with permanent occupancy 
rights) was thereafter to a great extent retained by him 
for disposal. Henceforth, development strategies involving 
attempts to increase agricultural output, productivity and 
the eunount of agricultural surplus available for redistri­
bution, either within the agricultural sector or outside it 
in the industrial sector, would have to depend upon the 
interests and political strength of the raiyats in their 
new role as an emerging class of rich peasants. However, 
the compensation arrangements for ex-landlords and tenure- 
holders were very generous under the terms of the Act, thus 
facilitating the expansion of an entrepreneurial class in 
the country districts both through their manipulation of 
marketing networks and their involvement in haulage, go- 
down s, primarÿ-processing, moneylending and so on. The Kosi
w :
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region in addition was characterized by a high proportion 
of zamindare and tenure holders with land from which they 
could not be alienated under the Act. Thus the raiyats as 
a rich peasant class do not alone dominate the contemporary 
agrarian system but they certainly typify its structure 
with ex-landlords as an entrepreneurial/rich peasant class 
representing a complementary part of the picture.* -
These themes will subsequently be taken up in greater detail 
but not before the particuleu: context of the Kosi region 
has been outlined to reveal the severity of life over this 
period.
'The River of Sorrow*
The district of Purnea has achieved considerable notoriety 
in the oral tradition of Bihar and among its civil servants 
especially. The area is flat - part of the great alluvial 
Gcuigetic plain criss-crossed with meandering rivers on 
their way from the Himalayas in the North (visible from 
the district on a clear day after the monsoon before the 
dust has risen) to the west-east flow of the Ganges.
The River Kosi - the product of three main tributaries (Sun 
Kosi, Arund and Tamar) meeting at a little gathering of 
dwellings called Triveni in the foothills - surges on to 
the plain at Chatra (the site of the new Nepalese canal 
irrigation system for that part of the Terai). From here 
it flows south over some thirty miles of the Terai before 
being tamed by the great barrage at Birpur on the Indian- 
Nepalese border and the embankments which direct it through 
the district of Saharsa (to the west 6f Purnea) and then 
bend it eastwards to.meet the Ganges on the southern border 
of Purnea District itself at Kursela.
But it was not always like this. The gradient below the 
Terai is negligible and when the Kosi floods on to the 
plain, swollen by the monsoon rain and the heavy load of 
coarse sand it washes down from the hills, it does not 
carve itself a channel but rather fans out as it silts up 
its own path thus flooding vast areas and, in the past, 
frequently changing its course as a result. Even although 
the Kosi is now contained by heavy double bunds, parts of 
Purnea District are regularly inundated as the marshes of 
water hyacinth become swollen in the monsoon. It is re­
corded that since the coming of the British the river moved 
some 65 miles westward to its present position from a 
course which used to flow just west of P u m e a  town itself. 
The movement was not always gradual - a westward jump of







twelve miles in a single year has been recorded (101,p. 55). 
Since the river carried much silt in its flow, this process 
of movement over the years devastated large tracts of agri­
cultural land variously estimated between 2,000 to 3,000 
square miles (30). Not surprisingly, the Kosi is described 
in many documents as the 'River of Sorrow of North Bihar'. 
But parts of this ravaged area, mainly in the western part 
of Purnea District, were soon reclaimed after the river had 
passed, when the price of land was naturally very low.
This encouraged migration from other parts of Bihar, with 
tribal labourers engaged by prospective raiyats and land­
lords to clear the young jungle.
As a consequence of this combination of terrain and climate 
there is a grim tale of floods, droughts and famines in 
the area. However, before referring to some of the major 
crises, it is worth noting that the District Gazetteer of 
1911 modifies the picture of gloom by remarking on the 
diversity of agricultural practice in the region. This 
diversity, which is itself the consequence of adaptation 
to a range of conditions of soils and drainage, reduced the 
likelihood of severe famines, and crops were not entirely 
dependent on direct rainfall as flooding provided irrigation 
albeit largely uncontrolled. Furthermore, although aghani 
rice was the major annual crop (56% of the cultivable area 
was estimated to be under rice), the bhadai rice crop (34%) 
and rahi wheat (39%) , pulses and oil-seeds could to scxne 
extent offset failures in the kharif-aghani seasons. Be­
cause the land level varied as a result of old river beds 
and other depressions, when lowland was inundated crops 
could still be grown on high ground and,even in years of 
drought,the lowland retained sufficient moisture to sustain 
a crop. In addition some castes were cattle-breeders and 
dairy herdsmen rather than cultivators and were able to 
graze their cattle on land rendered unsuitable for agri­
culture by the wandering river.
Despite these mitigating factors there have been serious 
famines and scarcities. There was a severe faunine in 1770 
as the rains failed. According to the English supervisor, 
Mr. Ducarrel, nearly 50% of the population in Purnea Dis­
trict perished - and there was consequent reduction in the 
quantity of land which was cultivated. In spite of this, 
the revenue assessment payable to the East India Company 
actually increased from Rs.9.59 lakhs in 1769 to Rs.13.55 
lakhs in 1771 because of the high price of rice (159, p.
2 2 ) .  -
It is ironic that this was followed in 1772 by a bumper 
rice harvest causing the bottom to drop out of the market 
so that the problems of revenue payment remained but for
3
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opposite reasons. Further féunines of less severity occur­
red in 1783, 1788 euid 1791 although officials dreaded also 
the bumper years as in 1786 when the price of rice was too 
low to cover the revenue. It seems that the next major 
famine was in 1874, again the consequence of poor rainfall. 
In 1873 the bhadai output had been half the^average, while 
the aghani was reduced to a quarter, and by January 1874 the 
prices of all grain had doubled. This famine was notable 
for the organization of relief, started in December 1873 
and lasting through to the end of September 1874 (the time 
of the bhadai harvest). The highest daily average atten­
dance on relief works was during May at 31,029 persons a 
day. After this scarcities were recorded for 1892, 1897, 
1906 - the latter attributed exceptionally to flooding.
The next scarcity of equal intensity was in 1957.
Both the tciming of the Kosi River and the harnessing of it 
for irrigation have been of major importance to the region; 
but other rivers continue to flood regularly. The Maha- 
nanda, for example, which flows north-south through the 
eastern part of the-District, regularly floods in the 
Kishanganj subdivision. This was especially damaging to 
the jute crop in 1909-10 and 1917-18. There were extensive 
floods from 1929 through to 1932, and, after the Bihar 
earthquake of 1934, flooding became virtually an annual 
feature in the district. 1956 was a year of very extensive 
inundation in all but the Araria subdivision (101,pp. 224-5).
The Era of the Permanent Settlement
The evolution of Pumea's agrarian political economy is best 
presented by describing the operation of the zamindari re­
venue and tenure system from 1793 to 1950, and by supple­
menting this with an account of the major non-subsistence 
features of agricultural activity - the production and 
marketing of indigo, tobacco and jute. In this way a pic­
ture of control over access to land - the principal means 
of production - emerges emd an understanding of the struc­
tures through which groups have accumulated wealth and ac­
quired status and power. This section focusses on the de­
velopment of the revenue and tenure system which, although 
it was abolished in 1950 through the independent legislation 
of the Lok Sabha and the relevant State Assemblies, is of 
major importance to a contemporary understanding of the 
agrarian structure in Purnea. The ongoing process of dif­
ferentiation among the peasantry has been critically deter­
mined by the structure of relations and control over land 
which developed during the period of the Permanent Settle­
ment (1793-1950) and by the very nature of the 'abolition' 
which had the effect of reinforcing some elements of that 
structure at the expense of others (209) . It is this 
structure that defines the constraihts if not, wholly, the 
objectives of contemporary strategies for rural and agri­
cultural development.
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As part of Clive's settlement with Emperor Shah Alam, a 
grant of diwani, or revenue authority, in Bihar and Bengal 
was made to the East India Company in 1765 and 1770. Mr. 
Ducarrel, the first English Collector, was posted to Purnea 
district to supervise revenue administration. At this 
time, the collection of land dues (the major source of 
public revenue) was farmed out to zamindarst usually land­
owners, but in principle anyone who could guarantee the 
amount. They would undertake to remit a stipulated sum 
to the Governor, retaining any additional amounts collected 
in the form of rent or other charges to defray costs of 
collection and, of course, to provide them with some profit 
from the exercise. The right to function as a zamindar was 
renewable annually through the Governor from the Nawab, and 
revenue demand was fixed for the district as a whole rather 
than, for example, on a pro rata basis as a proportion of 
a tenant's annual yield. The-Company simply inherited this 
system so that, when in 1770 a substantial proportion of 
Purnea * s population perished in the famine, the revenue 
demeind remained the same, thus increasing the eunount of 
rent to be paid by those tenants who survived.
The annual renewal procedure was replaced in 1772 by the 
Quinquennial Settlement under which the position of zamin­
dar was acquired by auction every five years. This was an 
attenpt to reduce the administrative responsibility for 
organizing those renewals and to introduce some greater 
stability into the system. However, it also prevented the 
overall authority from monitoring the tenure and revenue 
system on an annual basis, while simultaneously increasing 
the burden on the tenants since auctions were won by pro­
mising to remit more revenue than one's competitor. Thus 
in 1777 the practice of annual settlements with zamindars 
was reintroduced by the Company's Court of Directors. But 
this was not acceptable to the British Government which 
appreciated not only the economic importance of the East 
Indian Company but also the conclusion that the Compemy's 
efficient pursuit of profit ultimately depended upon a 
stable system of law and order and revenue collection which 
did not at the same time involve high costs in administra­
tion and policing. The India Act of 1784 directed the 
East India Company to adopt permanent rules for the settle­
ment and collection of revenue. The response to this order 
in 1789 was the Decennial Settlement with the zamindars made 
permanent in 1793, thus becoming the Permanent Settlement.
By this legislation zamindars vere made proprietors of 
their estates, which therefore became heritable and trans­
ferable, The Government's demand for land revenue was 
fixed in perpetuity, and the proprietors would be obliged
c '» '  k  a
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to sell their estates in cases of non-payment of revenue.
It is important to recognize that zamindars were not given 
complete freedom of operation within their estates - the 
exercise of their function as zamindars was subject to law. 
In this way the Governor-General in Council reserved the 
right to enact legislation for the protection ̂ an<̂  welfare 
of the tenants (the raiyats).
The organizational structure of zamindari became immediately 
complicated. Buchanan noted in 1810 that large portions of 
these estates were leâsed out to middlemen, known as mus- 
tajirs, who in turn divided their lease and let portions 
of it separately to 'under-renters'. And as the zamindars 
usually received a fixed income from their lessees, if they 
accumulated debts they were unable to meet them by increa­
sing the income from their estates. Hence the common para­
dox of a zamindar in arrears with his revenue obligations 
to the government even though the lessees were extracting 
enormous rents from the raiyats. But according to the 
Permanent Settlement, a zamindar was bound to sell his 
estate, or part of it, to cover his arrears. Estates not 
only changed hands therefore, but they were frequently 
broken up into smaller ones. As an indication of this 
process, in Purnea District there were initially 36 estates 
commanding altogether an annual revenue of Rs.12.5 lakhs.
By 1875 there were 1,629 estates, with a revenue of Rs.
11.75 lakhs. The picture is even more dreunatic when it is 
appreciated that six estates (out of the original 36) 
covered approximately.8Q% of the District.
Of those six, two remained largely intact throughout the 
entire period - the Dharmpur pargana, the estate of the 
Raja of Darbhëinga, and the Bemaili Estate which itself pros­
pered and grew during the period. As a consequence of 
their persistence, these two estates have been importêint 
politically in the evolution of the agrarian structure. 
Hoskins, in Chapter 4, treats the agrarian discontent on 
the Dharmpur pargana. The Banaili Estate remained in the 
same family although it was in the process of formal par­
tition at the time of abolition in 1950, and finally took 
the form of four branches. Under one General Manager. The 
Banaili zamindars exercised a formidable influence over the 
district, engaging themselves in government service, indus­
trial enterprises, the establishment of the first English 
daily newspaper in Bihar (TAe Biharee\ as well as exerci­
sing a powerful leadership over tenure-holders and tenants.
There were four other large estates, of which the Rani 
Indrawati's was the largest - comprising 2,000 square miles 
of scattered parganas. These were broken"up during the
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nineteenth century, part of the Rani Indrawati's estate 
being sold to A.J. Forbes, an indigo planter, after whan 
thana Forbesganj was named.. The problem of arrears which 
led to the partitioning of these estates is perhaps best 
placed in context by recording the observations of Buchanan 
at the beginning of the nineteenth century who, in comparing 
Purnea's zamindare with those of Dinajpur (in West Bengal) 
remarked:
" the zamindare are more proud,ignorant and 
slothful, live with much less splendour in
everything but equipage, delight more in a
crowd of parasites and religious mendicants, 
are more grossly-defrauded, act more meanly 
and oppressively towards their tenants and 
are more devoid of politeness^ towards 
strangers." (51)
Although under the terms of the 1793 Permanent Settlement
the right was reserved to enact legislation to protect the
tenant, the next piece of legislation in 1799 was designed 
to increase the power of semotion of the zamindar or tenure- 
holder over defaulting tenants and was directed in a very 
single-minded way towards the problem of ensuring revenue. 
This act, the Haft am (or Seventh Regulation) gave the zamin­
dare and tenure-hoiders power to distrain the property of 
a defaulting tenant without obtaining prior approval from 
a court or public officer.
Succeeding legislation had further exploitative implications 
for the tenant since the tendency for zamindare to lease 
out tenures to intermediaries was formulated and thereby 
reinforced. In 1812, zamindare were permitted to grant 
leases for periods beyond the previous restriction of ten 
years, creating in effect permanent tenure-holders, and in 
1819 the patni class of tenure-holder (once removed from a 
zamindar) was given legal status. A zamindar was then in 
in the position to let his estate in perpetuity to a pat- 
nidar for a fixed rent. The main condition of such a tenure 
(again aimed at securing revenue) was that in the event of 
a patnidar accruing arrears, the zamindar was entitled to 
sell the tenure to cover them. (In 1877, 409 patnie were 
recorded for Purnea.) Since these tenures were therefore 
in principle transferable they could function as collateral 
for credit. Thus many of the estates and tenures quickly 
fell under the influence of finemciers, with the implication 
that peasant surpluses in the form of rent were also ear­
marked for servicing loans through interest payments. Dar- 
patni and eepatni were under-tenure of-the second and third 
degree respectively, and these later acquired the same 
rights as patnidare. The muetafire appears to have had the 
role of actually collecting from the peasant.*
*For a description of his role see (l4). ' ! !
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From the primary collections of these contractors, admini­
strative costs had to be covered and a profit extracted 
at many levels before the stipulated revenue was passed on 
to the Company's Government. While it is impossible to as­
certain what the disparities were between the payments made 
by tenants (in various forms) and the revenue ultimately 
passed on to the Government, it is nevertheless as well to 
remember that offiaial gross rental payable^by a tenant 
included a road and public works cess. This was a variable 
amount emd came to exceed by far the extent of liability 
for revenue. The following table (18) records the increa­
sing disparity between revenue and gross rental liability 
in P u m e a  District for some of the years in the period 
1793-1930. The profits and costs of intermediaries and 
zamindare, whatever they were, have to be added to the 
gross rental figure given below. A mere glance at these 
figures indicates that while the land revenue was perma­
nently settled for the tenamt, his gross official liability 
in terms of rent was not.
Table 18 : Disparity between Revenue and Official Gross 




































(N.B. figures shown ±n lakhe as in original sources)
Èourcesl 1. Hunter, W.W., A Statistical Account of Bengal
Vol. XV, pp. 394 and 39é.
2-4. Road and Public Works Cess Valuation,Reports 
of years concerned.
5. Land Revenue Administration Report, Lower Pro­
vinces, 1909-10, 1910-11. Appendices XIX.
6-10. Appendices of Land Revenue Administration
Reports, Bihar and Orissa, of years concerned.
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According to the Census report for Purnea in 1891, most of 
the large zamindare were Brahmins 'whose ancestors had held 
property from before the British occupation.' From the 
same report it seems that, until the close of the nineteenth 
century at least, most of the tenures in the district were 
held by the upper castes. European planters often held 
tenures under the big zamindare^ It should be emphasized 
that the market for tenures was very competitive and with 
a fairly rapid turnover. But whenever a zamindari or tenure 
was sold, it went to the highest bidder who consequently 
increased the rents and charges from the tenants to ensure 
a return on his investment.
In the early period of the Permanent'Settlement, Buchanan 
(5Ï, pp. 427-8) divided the tenants into four categories. 
First there were upper castes like Brahmins, Rajputs, 
Kayastas, Sal^ads^ Pathans and Moghuls (the latter three 
Muslim castes) who occupied as a matter of right whatever 
lamds they required for their houses emd orchards, free of 
rent. This 'privileged class' was given land for cultiva­
tion at lower rents than other tenants. In the second 
category were often traders who tended to hire small plots 
of land for cultivation,' This group would cultivate with 
servant labour and paid very heavy rents. The cattle 
dealing Goalas were placed in this category. The third 
category included under-rctycte, who nevertheless had their 
occupancy rights recorded and sharecroppers {bataidare).
The fourth category in Buchanan's classification were under- 
raiyata without recorded occupancy rights, who hired land 
unofficially from tenemts at exorbitant rents. The con­
clusion from the classification was that in Purnea, the 
best lands were occupied by the highest castes at the lowest 
rents. Other tenants not only paid higher rents, but were 
expected to make up the deficit if one eunong them - raiyat, 
bataidar or under-raiyat - defaulted on his payments.
At this point the discussion must refer to three pieces of 
mid-nineteenth century tenancy legislation which are contra­
dictory and reveal the constant problem of reconciling an 
efficient revenue system with any kind of protection for 
the tenant. The 1841 Act emd the Revenue Sale Law of 1859 
allowed the purchaser of an estate which had been sold be­
cause of revenue arrears to enhance the rents, evict tenants 
where necessary, emd annul undertenures. Yet the 1859 Rent 
Act (Act X) and other legislation:curbed the z a m i n d a r f s  
rights to enhance rents and evict certain categories of 
tenant and a further act in 1869 protected occupancy raiyats 
from enhancement of rent. However,the impact of the pro­
tective legislation appears to have been no greater than 
that of its contemporary counterpart in the field of land 
reform. In the 1870s the Collector of Purnea estimated 
that tenants with occupancy rights did not comprise more 
than 25% of the tenant population and that only 6% were pro­
tected against the enhancement of their rents.
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The severe famine of 1874 brought the plight of the peasants 
in all the tenant categories to the notice of the British 
Government; the gross indifference of the zamindare and 
tenure holders had become obvious and memories of the Mutiny 
in 1857 were too strong to ignore the explosive potential 
of a mass of disaffected peasantry. As a result, the re­
lationship between the lemdlord, the tenant and the State 
was re-examined, and the conclusions finally expressed in 
the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1885. The Act attempted to pro­
tect the tengmt against eviction^ rent increase and illegal 
exactions. It removed a defect in the law relating to 
occupancy rights, and allowed a peasant who had been in 
possession of land for twelve years - either himself or 
through inheritance - to be considered a settled raiyat.
He would also acquire the same rights in any new land that 
he cultivated. Eviction for arrears of rent was forbidden. 
Holdings could only be sold through the Civil Court, thus 
ensuring there could be no illegal distraint of property.
In addition the raiyat was given the right of mortgaging 
his holding amd of subletting it for a period of not more 
than nine years (21, p. 27). One of the most important 
outcomes of this legislation was the preparation of a record 
of lamd rights, which had been neglected since 1793. The 
Act made provision for a comprehensive Survey and Settle­
ment operation which.was completed in P u m e a  District in 
1903, and produced the first listing of holdings by tenancy 
status for the District.
Table 19: Holdings by Tenancy Status for Purnea District 1908
Tenancy Status Number of Total Area % of Area
Holdinqs Held in Acres to Total
Occupied Area
1 .Land held by 
Proprietors .
2,554 49,844 2.2
2.Cultivated by - 
tenure-holders
47,303 426,788 19.0
03.Held hy raiyata 
on fixed rates
19,952 115,205 5.1















39,537 45,689 2.0 Igs
IE2
Source: Final Report of Survey and Settlement Operations in
Purnea 1908 ,pp. 108-11
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It is important to remember that the survey operation in 
effect conferred legal status upon the tenants as they 
were surveyed. The predominance of settled raiyata with 
occupancy rights was a prescriptive rather than descriptive 
statement and it is unlikely that their status was in all 
cases recognized by proprietors and tenure-holders either 
before or after the survey. The surprisingly high figure 
for lamd cultivated by tenure-holders must surely conceal 
at least a large number of sharecroppers, or other vari­
ations of non-occupancy status. It does appear as if the 
largest areas under the possession of the non-occupancy 
raiyata were in the thanaa of Korha and Dhcimdaha where 
Santhals and other tribes had settled after reclamation 
activity. Prior to the survey, the 1891 Census report gave 
an impressionistic description of tenancy distribution by 
caste as Buchguicm had done some 80 years previously. It 
reached a conclusion similar to Buchanan's, identifying the 
correspondence between high caste status and relatively 
satisfactory tenancy status. The pattern presented fits 
in with impressions of contemporary tenemcy and caste dis­
tribution, thus placing ongoing discussjLpns of social for-, 
mation and the process of differentiation in a relevant . 
historical perspective. It appears that a high proportion 
of the Brahmins and Rajputs held land on relatively low 
rents, along with the smaller number of Kayasthas - a 
literati caste, well represented in the Bihar Civil Service. 
The majority of Kurmis and Koiris were prosperous occupancy 
raiyata, followed by the Goalas, many of whom were also in 
non-occupancy tenancies.
The Bzüahcins (Bhumihar Brahmins) were noted as holding 
valuable occupamcy rights in land around P u m e a  town itself, 
as well as in the south and west of the District. This 
corresponds precisely to our impressions today of their 
location and the substantial size of most of their hold­
ings, despite the land reform legislation of the sixties.
At the lower end of the caste hierarchy, among the Kamar^ 
Lohar, Tanti, Teli and Turi, there were some non-occupancy 
raiyata, but it seems that the majority of them were share­
croppers. Among the Muslims, the Sheikh sub-caste, Kulahiya, 
often had occupancy rights at fixed rents. One plausible 
explanations of this is that the caste members were fre­
quently employed as minor officials by aamindara, tenure- 
holders or even by the government - so they would have en­
joyed a special relationship and privileged status within 
the village where they resided.
Despite the formal guarantee of greater security for the 
peasantry contained in the 1885 Act amd conferred during 
the Survey and Settlenent Operation, the reality for the 




according to Section 54(2) of the Act, tenemts had the op­
tion of paying their rents by money postal orders. This 
was a device whereby the tenant could avoid paying illegal 
cesses without having every time to seek the formal, expen­
sive and frequently biassed protection of the law. Unless 
they could find a flaw in the money order, proprietors and 
tenure-holders were thus prevented from charging illegal 
cesses. Payment by money order, therefore,; ceime to repre­
sent an ihdex of tension and mistrust in this relations be­
tween landlord and tenant. In 1901-2 there was sharp 
increase in the number of money orders used by the raiyats 
of Dharmpur pargana, as the process of the survey informed 
tenants of the amounts they were legally obliged to pay, 
provoking discrepancies between actual payments and the 
expectations of the proprietor and his agents, many money 
orders were refused (33, p. 70),
Alongside the money order procedure, there had to be 
provision for commuting produce rent into cash rent (Sec­
tion 40 of the Bengal Tenancy Act) and there were many 
applications to do this. In 1913 it was reported, however, 
that proprietors were refusing approximately 60% of the 
money orders remitted to them (35, p. 2). Receipts for 
money order payments were also being withheld, despite the 
penalties and fines for such action which would be imposed 
under Section 58 of the Act.
Over the following thirty years, virtually right up to the 
abolition of the system in the 1950s, the Land Revenue 
Administration Reports are replete with descriptions of 
conflict between landlords and tenants. The following 
incidents give a flavour of the evolving agrarian system 
and of â rapidly emerging orgemized political consciousness 
in which at least the dominant peasants (pat y a ta and sub­
stantial sharecroppers) were becoming Ihvbived;
In 1915 there had been a crop failure in Purnea, but re­
gardless of this, landlords filed suits for arrears of rent 
and tenants were harassed. In Kishangeuij subdivision, land­
lords tried to dispossess tenaints in order to raise rents 
and realize illegal charges { a b w a b s ) I n  1920 à movement 
was organized against the Bcinalli Estates, which was levy­
ing a mutation fee equal to 25% of the price of an occu­
pancy holding when it was sold. The saune report noted the 
pro-tenant activities of the political parties operating 
from Purnea town.
The more violent eruptions of agrarian discontent were 
prevalent in the Dharmpur pargana, not only between Darb­
hanga Raj and the major tenure-holderS and raiyats, but 
also between the larger raiyats (some of whom had occupancy 
rights over very large areas) amd the sharecroppers who.
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for the most part, cultivated this land* It seems that in 
1922-23 the Kiean Sabha (farmers' movement) had attracted 
the support of many raiyats and bataidara in the area, and 
this had led to numerous incidents where rent was withheld 
or only a portion of it remitted. It was also clear that 
many problems were caused by disputes over tenant status 
involving the different categories of migrant - Bhumihars 
and Santhals particularly - so that much confusion existed 
over rent liability, occupancy rights: and the status of 
sharecroppers. The problem was peculiar to this area, 
since parts of it (the Kosi Diara) were continually, being 
reclaimed for cultivation and therefore being settled on 
without occupancy rights being recorded. The Government 
moved to resolve the problem by introducing the spécial 
Kosi Diara Survey (1923-26) of those lands which had been 
reclaimed since the 1908 survey. The Collector of Purnea 
complained at t h i s ‘time and-later in 1928-about the indif- 
ference; of the Darbhanga ' Râj to any improvâneht of the 
economic and social condition of the tenantry.
In general it should be emphasized that although the under­
lying conflict simmered all the time, the flashpoints 
usually occurred at harvest time in the process of estab­
lishing rights over the harvested crop (or portions of it) 
when the peasant was asserting or reinforcing a claim to a 
certain tenancy status over the land on which the crop was 
cultivated. To lose a dispute in any one year, wea)cened 
one's long-term position since the previous statue quo 
could be used to defend a claim in the following year. It 
is common even now for the crop to be guarded at harvest 
time - perhaps by opposing sides to the claim - and for 
fights to occur in the fields. An incident in Rupeshpur 
in November 1971 should be seen in this context : fourteen 
Santhal sharecroppers were shot in the village of Rupeshpur 
in Damdaha Block by a group of landlords with whom they 
were disputing rights to harvested aghani paddy.
These confrontations at harvest times are seasonal expres­
sions of class consciousness, when the disputants tempor­
arily lay aside mutual dependencies between patron and 
client. Since the disputes are ultimately about ownership 
and access to the means of production, the potential outcome 
is very important to both landlord and claimant. The odd 
defeat iti battle is critically unacceptable to the landlord, 
since it'would set a dangerous precedent for future seasons; 
it would encourage further attempts to undermine him and 
foster the belief that organized class behaviour is fruit­
ful. The intensity of the conflict is constrained, however, 
certainly for the peasant, by the recognition that he might 
lose as he has done so often in the past, and that he will 




The years of depression in the 1930s intensified the contra­
dictions, while both the Kiean Sabha and Civil Disobedience 
campaigns of the Congress party (which later absorbed the 
Kiean Sabha) were raising the general level of political 
consciousness and spirit of defiance amongst the peasantry. 
The demamd £or the principal cash-crop of the area, jute, 
slumped on the world market, and its price fell along with 
that of the other cash-crop - tobacco. These conditions 
placed a heavy strain on the hierarchical systfem of expro­
priation. Neither the zamindare nor the Government^was very 
sympathetic, and the pressure on rent and illegal exactions 
iabwabe) was maintained. Partly to sustain the level of 
returns since 1933, the Government took an intransigent 
position (25) which caused some estates to be sold during 
the first half of the thirties in order to meet revenue 
obligations; other tenure-holders and zamindare continued 
to levy abwabe regardless of Government notices which 
stated that they need not be paid. During this time, the 
Kiean Sabha czunpaigned actively against the excesses of the 
landlords, and encouraged the peasantry to withhold pay­
ments in excess of the agreed rental. By the end of the 
thirties the Board of Revenue observed that the rent reduc­
tion operations which were prevalent in 1938 and 1939 had 
created a*no-rent* mentality on the part of the tenants.
It is worth pointing Out that in Bihar the first zamindari 
abolition act was declared ultra viree of the Constitution 
by the High Court at Patna following a submission by a group 
of landlords, and thousands of applications were filed 
(mostly by ex-landlords and wealthier raiyate) disputing the 
outcome of the survey and settlement operations which fol­
lowed the legislation. Thus the legacy of the Permanent 
Settlement remains ih the agrarian structure of social and 
political relationships today and is an important part of 
the contextIwithin;which State policies about rural govern­
ment are conceived and implemented. .
This discussion has concentrated upon the impact on agri­
culture of the quasi-feudal structure of social relations, 
institutionalized by the requirements of the British revenue 
and law and order administration. Society has been domina­
ted by a peasant mode of production set in the context of 
a particular social formation and it has been necessary to 
describe in some detail the structural evolution of that 
system. We have shown that this has critically involved 
the state on the one hand, and that, on the other, it has 
created the conditions for the emergence of class forces in 
opposition to itself - expressed in the formation and in­
fluence of the Kiean Sai2:a movement and the development of 
the Congress Party. Other chapters amplify some of these 
themes and analyse the new social formation processes and
I I
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n the emergence of a class of dominant rich peasants and ex­landlords as a component of the post-independence state in 
India. But the growth of this new class of rural entre­
preneurs allied with rich peasants cannot be fully appre­
ciated without some reference to the historical development 
of the production, exchange and distribution of commodities 
in Purnea.
Peasants and Commodities ~  - —
From the end of the eighteenth century, Purnea was an im­
portant area for the production and manufacture of indigo 
- a plant sown mainly in February and cut in early June - 
the juice of which was reduced to 'cakè' form and used as 
the raw material for dyes all over the world before the 
introduction of commercially viable synthetic substitutes 
early in the twentieth century. In 1810, according to 
Buchanan, there were sixty factories processing, indigo in 
ihirnea District involving an estimated 20,000 acres. The 
'factories', however, were usually small affairs, labour- 
intensive and technologicaiiy unsophisticated. The owners 
were predomiriàntlÿ Europeans some of -whom were plantation 
owners as well, although as a general rule large-scale 
European settlement was discouraged by the Government and 
finally constrained by statute. Indigo was therefore cul­
tivated under three systems. First, direct cultivation by 
plfuiters on lands held by the factory. Secondly, a system 
known as aaeaviwar w h e r e ^  tenants contracted to sow indigo 
on part of their holdings and sell the crop to the factory 
at a fixed price. Such a contract would often last for 
ten years. The third systeni was known as the khuekit 
whereby the cultivator sowed the plant and sold it to the 
factory, but as he was not under contract was free in his 
choice of production programme while at the same time being 
susceptible to market trends in the price for the commodity, 
However, each concern had a virtual monopoly over the mar­
ket for the plcint even under the third system, since con­
cerns did not compete in the same area and it was not 
feasible for a peasant to transport his crop to find the 
best price. Furthermore, even in the third system, the 
factory would frequently make advances to the peasant to 
cover the costs of production so the product was not free.
Most accounts are complimentary about the relationship be­
tween the planters and the peasants, but it was probably 
subservient rather than cordial. Many reports quoted in 
the District Gazetteer (101) argue strongly that the culti­
vation of indigo was profitable for the peasant, particular­
ly as - after ploughing - it was not a labour intensive 
crop and so was an attractive proposition when labour was 
still scarce. We can accept this argument only if it is 
placed in its total context, where the peasant in the other
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spheres of his productive existence is dominated by the 
zamindari system and dependent on it for a utiinimum of secu­
rity and for credit in times of distress or disaster. If 
the planters were not his oppressors, they were certainly 
not his allies for theirs was a contractual, single-stranded 
relationship sometimes based on the principles of the free 
market, while the peasant was bound by a web of dependence.
Jute has been a substantial commercial crop in the District 
since 1867, when the demand for gunny bags made its culti­
vation for the market a viable proposition. By 1873 it 
appears that 15,000 acres were under jute cultivation, and 
the District was exporting 2,00,000 maunde» After this the 
jute business expanded rapidly. With independence and par­
tition, jute production became even more important since 
the area which became East Pakistan had been a major pro­
ducer and was now a competitor with the new Indian Union 
not only for its domestic market, but also for foreign ex­
change earnings. Thus in 1953-4 Bihar accounted for 25.3% 
of the total acreage under jute in India; and, in Biheur,
Purnea with 2,46,410. acres under jute represented 81.2% 
of the total state acreage. This acreage has now expanded 
even further.
It was jute rather than indigo which stimulated infrastruc­
tural development in the District: the product was much 
more bulky and was -initially processed in Calcutta. For 
export from -the District, the railway was important and the 
Purnea section' o"f“the AssararBihar . State Railway was opened 
in 1887. But as production and trade expanded> it was 
clear that centres within Purnea with rail-links needed to 
be established, and they had to be in the North where much 
of the jute was grown. By 1908 Forbesganj in the Northwest and 
Kishanganj in the Northeast were developed as centres of 
the jute trade with rail links connected to the East Bengal 
State railway. At the beginning of the 1930s, there were 
250 miles of railway track in the district. By 1935, ac­
cording to the freight returns, 501,393 mawnde were handled 
through the Forbesganj station in one yeary and 476,932 
maunde from Kishanganj station. In 1923 a number of jute 
presses were established emd they proliferated. Two. jute 
mills were set up in Katihar in 1934 and 1935 and came to 
employ about 5,000 workers each.
Jute is of particular interest because it continues to be 
the main cash-crop of the area and,because of the marketing 
process> it illustrates the links between the peasant cul­
tivator and a wider market-oriented society which engulfs 
his own community while having its own separate morality.*
*For a theoretical discussion of this statement see (171), 
pp. 23-39 and (10).
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It is becoming apparent that the emerging class alliance 
between rich peasants and ex-landlords is expressed in the 
rural entrepreneurial activities associated with the market­
ing and processing of jute - the collection networks, trans­
portation (garages, road haulage), local supply monopolies 
giving credit to small producers, go-downs and also smug­
gling across the Nepalese border. With a base in jute, 
there is of course diversification into the retailing and 
marketing of other commodities like cloth, primary pro­
cessing like milling fppdgrains,.euid.the 'professional' 
moneylending in the market towns.
A short description of a long-established marketing-cum- 
credit system for jute-shows the typical relationship be­
tween the peasant and commodity. The essential feature is 
again a chain of intermediaries connecting the landless 
labourer and peasant t o . the-coromodity_* s ultimate market.
A peasamt' s jute is not all ready for sale at the ssune time 
since harvesting, retting and stripping operations may be 
spread over a period of as long as 3-4 months. For this 
reason, except for the richest- peasants engaging in large- 
scale jute cultivation, most of the marketable surplus of 
jute is sold in the village. This represents about 83% of 
the crop according to the results of the Marketing Enquiry 
conducted in 1954 (101,p. 279). Additional explanations 
for this pattern of sale are: first, the peasemt’s lack of 
capital which means that he cannot store; second, the dif­
ficulty tp him of transporting large amounts; and, thirdly, 
he will commonly have pledged some of the crop to a primary 
purchaser as the condition of an advance. Furthermore, the 
landless labourer who works for a peasant employer receives 
in payment one-eighth of the stripped crop. This is an 
important source of cash income for him and is usually sold 
immediately either back to his peasant employer, to a small 
village dealer, or by exchange directly for goods at the 
local shop.
On the whole the peasants will sell to peripatetic dealers 
who travel from village to village making small purchases. 
In many cases the dealers will have made advances, so that 
the selling price of the jute (low anyhow immediately after 
stripping, with a temporary glut on the market) will be 
fixed-in advance by the creditor often at 30-35% below the 
low market price. Thus the dealer, in a position to make 
hard bargains when the demand for credit is high, covers 
himself for a sharp drop in prices, but usually reaps a 
higher reward. Some of these dealers are not peripatetic 
but may themselves be rich peasants,-adding to their own 
stock since they have the capital to store against higher 
prices and make advances to others in their own and neigh-
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bouring villages. For some rich peasants trading in jute 
represents an importcuit supplementary source of income. 
Dealers collect the jute fibres from the villages and the 
local hate (small country markets), where the small primary 
purchasers may sell and they are then transported to the 
baling stations where the jute presses are located.
The next position in the hierarchy - arhatdar - will own 
a go-down in Forbesganj, Gulabhag (near Purnea town), Kish­
anganj or another block or sub-divisional centre. Arhatdare 
finance the smaller dealers, who have insufficient capital 
of their own, collect êind store the jute - either pressing 
it themselves auid selling directly to mills, or selling to 
presses. Above all, the arhatdar is a speculator who, be­
cause he owns storage capacity, aims to profit by holding 
the jute until the price is right. About a third of Pur­
nea' s pressed crop is purchased by buyers from Calcutta for 
milling. By financing the smaller dealers, the arhatdare 
ensure a tied collection network. They are in effect 
market-town money lenders, and are themselves often financed 
by banks or other trading agencies.
The emerging class of rich peasants and rural entrepreneurs 
owes its present existence to the place it held in the dying 
phase of the zamindar system. This enabled it to seize 
opportunities for consolidating a new position first during 
the survey and settlement operations and subsequently when 
programmes of State intervention, in irrigation and agri­
culture provided resources such as credit, new variable 
inputs and subsidized water. Rising agricultural output 
(considered elsewhere in this volume) has sustained a higher 
level of demand for consumption and investment goods and an 
increasingly conçlex market and distribution network. 
Nevertheless, although the new technology and wider markets 
are increasingly affecting the pattern of social relation­
ships in post-Independence India, it is land, and relation­
ships through land, which remains at the heart of the story 
and gives to other changes whatever significance they have.
1 5
THE PROCESS OF DIFFERENTIATION AMONG THE PEASANTRY
IN DESIPUR VILLAGE.
1 5  1
1.5 .1 FIELDWORK METHODS
Desipur V i l l a g e  (a f i c t i t i o u s  name) i s  lo c a t e d  in Raniganj Block 
o f  Purnea D i s t r i c t  in the  Kosi Development Region.  I t  l a y  w i th in  the 
command a rea  o f  the  Kosi Canal I r r i g a t i o n  System, and w i th in  the  
In t e n s i v e  A g r i c u l t u r a l  Area Programme (lAAP). The v i l l a g e  was o r i g i n a l l y  
s e l e c t e d  as an example o f  the  S t r a t e g y  3 op t ion  in the  model o f  i n t e r ­
vent ion  by S t r u c t u r e  B ( e n c a p s u l a t i n g )  in S t r u c t u r e  A (enca psu la ted )  
v a r i a b l e s .  (See page 47, 1 .2)
During the  dry months (October  to  m id -June ) ,  th e  v i l l a g e  was 
a c c e s s i b l e ,  bu t  dur ing  the  monsoon much o f  the  D i s t r i c t  was f looded .
In th e se  months,  Des ipur  could be reached only  by wading w a i s t  deep 
in wate r  and mud, and th e  same a p p l i e d  in moving from one c a s t e  
hamlet ( t o l a ) to  a n o th e r  in the  v i l l a g e .  This slowed up the  f i e l d ­
work, but  s in c e  most o f  the  v i l l a g e s  in the a re a  have t h i s  problem 
and s in ce  i t  f e a t u r e d  as an im por tan t  a s p e c t  o f  loca l  communication,  
i t  would have been in a p p r o p r i a t e  to  s e l e c t  a d r i e r  v i l l a g e .
I t  was im por tan t  to  t r y  and s t a y  in  the v i l l a g e ,  bu t  the  req u es t  
and acceptance  o f  i t  was conip lica ted .  At f i r s t  t h e r e  was s u r p r i s e  
and embarassment a t  the  s u g g e s t io n ,  s i n c e  ' h i g h - s t a t u s ' v i s i t o r s  ( l i k e  
government o f f i c i a l s )  would never  ask to  s t a y  in a peasan t  v i l l a g e .
I t  a l so  took some time f o r  a European to  be a c c e p te d ,  and f o r  a s e p a ra t e  
i d e n t i t y  from the  government to  be e s t a b l i s h e d .  I t  was a l s o  apparen t  
t h a t  I would have to  s t a y  in th e  Hindu community r a t h e r  than the  Muslim - 
th e  r i s k  o f  a l i e n a t i n g  the  l a t t e r  outweighing the  advantages  o f  acceptance
by t h e  much l a r g e r  Hindu community. But in  t h e  Hindu community,  and 
w i t h i n  t h e  main p e a s a n t  c a s t e  g roup ,  two ex tended  f a m i l i e s  were dominant .  
T h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  household  heads were l e a d e r s  in  t h e  v i l l a g e .  One was 
t h e  in fo rmal Mukhiya (headman) and t h e  o t h e r  a l s o  a r i c h  p e a s a n t  and 
t h e  l a r g e s t  e n t r e p r e n e u r .  Although th e y  were n o t  in  f a c t i o n a l  d i s p u t e ,  
t h e r e  were c o n f l i c t s  between them. To s t a y  w i th  one f a m i ly  p o s s i b l y  
would endanger  r e l a t i o n s  w i th  t h e  o t h e r .  The s i t u a t i o n  was r e s o lv e d  
f i r s t  by t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o  s t a y  i n i t i a l l y  e l sew h ere  in  t h e  Panchaya t  ( t h e r e  
were 8 v i l l a g e s  i n c l u d in g  Des ipur  in  th e  P anchaya t )  in  a d i s u s e d  mud 
in s p e c t i o n  bungalow; and second ly  by t h e  Mukhiya ' s  f a m i ly  e v e n t u a l l y  
a d m i t t i n g  t h a t  the y  had no s u i t a b l e  room s i n c e  t h e  v i l l a g e - l e v e l  worker 
(VLW) was l i v i n g  with  them, which was p robab ly  more im p o r ta n t  to  them 
in  th e  long term.
By l i v i n g  e l sew here  in t h e  Panchaya t  ( I J  m i le s  from Des ipur)  f o r  
th e  f i r s t  two months,  I was a b l e  t o  a c q u i r e  a n e u t r a l  i d e n t i t y  in th e  
v i l l a g e  and avo id  unduly p r e j u d i c i n g  t h e  s o u rc e s  and c o n t e n t  o f  th e  
in fo rm a t io n  dur ing  th e  s t a y .  T h e r e a f t e r  I s t a y e d  in  th e  household  o f  
th e  r i c h  p e a s a n t  and e n t r e p r e n e u r  d u r ing  t h e  f i e l d w o r k  in Des ipur .
In t h e  f i r s t  two months,  I c o l l e c t e d  land  r e c o r d s ,  e x t r a c t e d  t h e  
1971 census  d a ta  on Des ipur  which had been o b t a i n e d  th rough  th e  a s s i s ­
t a n ce  o f  t h e  Kosi Area Development Commissioner,  conducted  open-ended 
u n s t r u c t u r e d  in t e rv i e w s  and r eco rd ed  g e n e a l o g i e s .  A d i a r y  was main­
t a i n e d  th ro u g h o u t .  From t h i s  i n f o rm a t io n  an i n t e r v i e w  schedu le  was 
p repa red  f o r  use with  a random sample su rvey  o f  50 households  o u t  o f  
2-5 in  t h e  v i l l a g e .  The head ings  o f  t h e  s t r u c t u r e d  schedu le  were:  
com posi t ion  o f  household and o c c u p a t i o n s ;  d e t a i l s  o f  c a s t e ,  l i t e r a c y  
and membership o f  o r g a n i s a t i o n s ;  v o t in g  b e h a v i o u r ;  meetings  a t t e n d e d ;
re c o rd s  o f  d i s p u t e s  and i s s u e s  in  t h e  v i l l a g e  o r  r e g i o n ;  ownership 
on n o n -p ro d u c t iv e  p r o p e r t y  -  b u i l d i n g s ,  f u r n i t u r e ,  u t e n s i l s ,  j e w e l l e r y  
and o t h e r  non-food consumption i t e m s ;  r e l a t i o n s h i p  to  l a n d ,  s i z e ,  
i n h e r i t a n c e ,  p u rc h a s e s ,  s a l e s  and m o r tg ag es ,  te nancy  s t a t u s ,  s h a r e -  
c ropp ing  a r r an g em en ts ,  c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  land  by q u a l i t y ,  i r r i g a t i o n  
and i n t e n s i t y  o f  c r o p p in g ;  f o r  each c rop  -  d e t a i l s  o f  c u l t i v a t i o n  
p r a c t i c e s ,  a r e a ,  y i e l d s ,  c o s t s ,  i n p u t s ,  l a b o u r  a r r a n g e m e n ts ,  q u a n t i t i e s  
s o l d ,  consumed o r  s u r r e n d e r e d  i n  s h a r e ;  ownership  o f  p ro d u c t i v e  
p r o p e r t y  in  a d d i t i o n  t o  l and  -  e . g .  l i v e s t o c k  and m achinery ;  employ­
ment a c t i v i t y  o f  household  and h i r e d  l a b o u r e r s ,  employer/employee 
t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  w a g e - r a te s  and n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l  employment; use  o f  
v a r i a b l e  i n p u t s  -  s e e d ,  f e r t i l i s e r  -  and in fo rm a t io n  s o u r c e s ,  a c c e s s ,  
methods o f  payment; i n d e b te d n e s s  -  s o u rce  o f  c r e d i t ,  c o n d i t i o n s ,  
pu rpose ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  ; annual  e x p e n d i tu r e  on food ,  c l o t h e s ,  k e ro s en e ,  
m e d ic in e ,  r i t u a l  e v e n t s ,  f a m i ly  c e r e m o n ie s ,  g i f t s ,  t r a v e l ,  law s u i t s ,  
r e n t .  In a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  g e n e a lo g ie s  o f  each household  were reco rd ed .
I t  must be emphasised t h a t  the  d a t a  under  t h e s e  headings  was no t  only  
c o l l e c t e d  through i n t e r v i e w s ,  bu t  piecemeal  ove r  t ime through c o n v e r s a t i o n s  
under  d i f f e r e n t  headings  w i th  d i f f e r e n t  household  in fo rm an ts  and c r o s s ­
checks w i th  p a r t i e s  named in t h e  t r a n s a c t i o n s .  C ross-checks  were a l s o  
c a r r i e d  o u t  through p l o t  measurement ,  d i r e c t  o b s e r v a t i o n  and c o n s u l t i n g  
land  r e c o r d s .
The schedule  was m u l t i - p u r p o s e  and was p r e - t e s t e d  in  o t h e r  v i l l a g e s  
b e fo re  being  a p p l i e d  t o  D es ipur .  The random sample o f  households  was • 
p r e f e r r e d  t o . o b t a i n  random e n t r i e s  i n t o  50 d i f f e r e n t  networks o f  
p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l  and economic t r a n s a c t i o n s .  I f  th e  enqu i ry  had been 
r e s t r i c t e d  to  economic b eh av io u r  p e r  s e , a sample s t r a t i f i e d  by acc e s s  
to  land  would p ro b ab ly  have been more a p p r o p r i a t e .  And indeed th e
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e n e s s  o f  th e  sample was checked by comparing i t  w i th  
t h e  o v e r a l l  v i l l a g e  d a t a  on l a n d h o ld in g  and c a s t e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  s in c e  
t h i s  i n fo rm a t io n  was a v a i l a b l e  in  advance.  However s in c e  we wished 
to  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  acc es s  t o  land  
f o r  p a t t e r n s  o f  p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l  and economic b e h a v io u r ,  th e  i n c l u s i o n  
o f  t h i s  v a r i a b l e  as an a p r i o r i  assumption  in t h e  sample was avo ided .
The d a t a  o b t a i n e d  from t h i s  sample survey  has been used in  s e v e ra l  
ways.  Where a p p r o p r i a t e ,  i t  has been a r r a n g e d  i n t o  48 working t a b l e s  
and two s o c i o m e t r i c  d iagra ms.  But much o f  t h e  d a t a  from t h i s  sample,  
t o g e t h e r  w i th  t h e  more u n s t r u c t u r e d  m a t e r i a l  i s  n o t  amenable to  p r e s e n t ­
a t i o n  in  t a b u l a t e d  o r  diagrammatic  form. This r e f e r s  main ly  t o  d a ta  
which e x e m p l i f i e s  t h e  r u l e s  o f  p o l i t i c a l ,  s o c i a l  o r  economic behav iou r  
govern ing  t r a n s a c t i o n s  between i n d i v i d u a l s  and g roups ,  changes in  t h e s e  
r u l e s  o v e r  t i m e ,  and a t t i t u d e s  towards  them. For example,  a p a r t i c u l a r l y  
im p o r ta n t  c a t e g o r y  o f  t h e  in fo rm a t io n  from Des ipur  r e f e r s  to  th e  s t r u c t u r e  
o f  l and  t e n u re  d u r in g  t h e  p e r io d  o f  th e  Permanent S e t t l e m e n t  and Z am indar i , 
and t h e  way in  which a b s o l u t e  c o n t ro l  o f  the  land  was o b ta in e d  by 
p e a s a n t s  in  th e  v i l l a g e .
I t  was t h i s  s t o r y ,  o b t a in e d  from th e  v i l l a g e r s  and from th e  ex­
l a n d l o r d s  o f  th e  v i l l a g e  which encouraged  me t o  look f u r t h e r  a f i e l d  
a t  th e  a g r a r i a n  s t r u c t u r e  o f  Purnea du r ing  th e  p e r io d  o f  B r i t i s h  im per ia l  
r u l e  and th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  th e  breakdown o f  t h i s  ' f e u d a l '  s t r u c t u r e  
in de te rm in in g  th e  emergence o f  t h e  r i c h  p e a s a n t  and th e  p rocess  o f  
contemporary  c l a s s  fo rm a t ion  in  th e  c o u n t r y s i d e .  These e n q u i r i e s  -  
mainly from government secondary  s ou rces  -  l e d  to  an exam inat ion  n o t  
on ly  o f  la nd  t e n u re  under  B r i t i s h  im p er ia l i s m  b u t  a l s o  o f  th e  d i r e c t  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  im p e r ia l i s m  in  t h e  economy o f  Purnea D i s t r i c t ,  where
i n d i g o ,  j u t e  and to bacco  were c u l t i v a t e d .  And s i n c e  j u t e  remains 
t h e  ma jor  cash  c rop  in  th e  a r e a ,  th e  p e r s i s t e n c e  o f  t h e s e  l i n k a g e s  
th rough  th e  system o f  j u t e  m arke t ing  a l s o  demanded i n v e s t i g a t i o n .
When i t  became a p p a r e n t  t h a t  th e  new a g r i c u l t u r a l  t e chno logy  o f  the  
'Green R e v o lu t io n '  was o f  on ly  marginal  s i g n i f i c a n c e  in  D es ipu r ,  th e  
land  a c q u i s i t i o n  d a t a  and j u t e  a s  t h e  major cash c rop  assumed g r e a t e r  
im por tance  in  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  and economic b ehav iou r  between 
groups  in  t h e  v i l l a g e .  In t h i s  way, from th e  f i e l d  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s  
i n  D es ip u r ,  th e  im pres s ion  o f  c o n t i n u i t y ,  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by a h ig h ly  
unequal  de f a c t o  p o s s e s s io n  o f  land  in  t h e  v i l l a g e ,  began t o  c h a l l e n g e  
t h e  u t i l i t y  and v a l i d i t y  o f  th e  methodolog ica l  framework w i th  i t s  
emphasis  on dua l i sm in the  c o n t e x t  o f  an i n t e n s i v e  development p rog­
ramme. The e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  contemporary  p o l i t i c a l  b e h a v io u r  and s o c i o ­
economic fo rm a t io n  in  Des ipur  and e l sew here  in  Purnea r e q u i r e d  a 
l o n g e r  h i s t o r i c a l  dimension and a mode o f  a n a l y s i s  which would 
d i s t i n g u i s h  between u n d e r ly in g  c o n t i n u i t y  and new e x p r e s s io n s  o f  t h a t  
s t r u c t u r e .  The d i s c u s s i o n  in Paper  1 .2  a t tem p ted  to  s e t  o u t  a method­
o l o g i c a l  approach which e s t a b l i s h e d  a c c e p t a b l e  c r i t e r i a  o f  what 
c o n s t i t u t e d  s i g n i f i c a n t ,  lo n g - t e rm  change in a g r a r i a n  s t r u c t u r e .  The 
methodology t h e r e f o r e  had to  be capab le  o f  e x p l a in in g  p e r s i s t e n c e  
as well  a s  i d e n t i f y i n g  u n d e r ly in g  change ,  o r  the  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  such 
change and s p e c i f y i n g  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  under which i t  migh t  occu r .
1 5  2
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CHAPTER 6
THE PROCESS OF DIFFERENTIATION AMONG THE PEASANTRY 
IN DESIPUR VILLAGE*
- Geof Wood -
INTRODUCTION
• ; 7|
This case-study avoids the portrayal of a 'dual' society 
divided into backwaird and advanced sectors each one occurring 
coincidentally despite the other. Instead, it suggests that 
one sector is precisely the function of the other; that the 
continuous organizing principle is the exploitative 
relation between the different classes of countryside, 
city and metropolis: the system of expropriation and
appropriation of potential economic surplus.
The broad features of this system under imperial rule 
have been described in the previous chapter. The abolition 
of zamindari in 1950 did little to change the socio­
economic structure of the countryside. Land is now held 
by peasants who are direct tenants of the state, but some 
of the zamindare retained large amounts of land, much 
of which is still leased out (usually under a sharecropping 
arrangement). Legislation on land ceilings is ignored 
or by-passed, as are the laws for protecting or upgrading 
the tenancy status of sharecroppers. The big landlords 
have disappeared, but many smaller ones remain - combining 
the roles of landlord, rich peasant and small-town 
entrepreneur. The compensation for loss of zamindari 
rights has been invested in: transportation(haulage and 
garages); marketing (go-downs); private credit networks; 
private systems of agricultural input distribution; 
financing small-town and village shops, and peripatetic 
small traders; some small-scale manufacturing and processing 
enterprises; urban property; entertainment (cinemas); 
and private farms. In addition, some who were raiyate, or 
even substantial sharecroppers, before 1950 have become 
rich peasants and landlords, and now invest in similar 
ways. It appears, though, that these recent additions to 
the class of regional entrepreneurs have emerged from a 
privileged';ra-Lj/atuari class with substantial holdings, and 
often with superior caste status.
The formal revenue structure has changed, so that rent 
is no longer the major vehicle for the transmission of 
surplus upwards. But the distribution of access to 
property remains unequal, if less so than before. Households 
are differentiated through their ownership of productive 
assets, of which land is the most significant. The
Desipur is, of course, a pseudonym. Its approximate 
location is marked on the map. (See Frontispiece.)
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limited redistribution of secure rights to land after 1950 
has created an influential class of peasants who became 
rich through their superior access to land. They may 
always have had this but they are now stronger because they 
can keep more of their surplus. Previously, it was 
largely taken as rent. Now the raiyat has greater 
opportunities not only for increasing his agricultural 
productivity but also for diversifying into other economic 
activity (e.g. primary processing, trading and moneylending) 
as well as, of course, raising his standard of living.
However, the emerging rich peasant class is not autonomous 
but dependent on others. In agriculture, the benefits 
of machinery, fertilizer and new seeds are acquired by 
contributing to the profit of the sellers and producers 
of those commodities. Capital for investment (where 
assets are not liquid) is paid for by high rates of 
interest on loans. Credit for establishing a shop, 
buying a small milling plant, or even for local money- 
lending, is expensive and, where it is used, net returns 
can be low. Thus the rich peasant replaces the raiyat as 
the principal cumulator of surplus and, by his pattern of 
investment, supports the growth of an extended hierarchy 
of operations whose base is agricultural production.
With this critical role, the rich peasant occupies an 
important place in a discussion of political behaviour. 
Whether he is motivated by political party 'peasant ideology' 
caste associations or wider kinship and other forms of 
geo-political mobility, the security of his own economic 
position in the village is his main concern.
The class of rich peasants is frequently portrayed as 
hopelessly divided by village factionalism. This results - 
it is claimed - in vertical cleavages and inhibits the 
development of class solidarity among the poor and landless 
who are thus divided on a 'traditional' patron-client 
basis. But in Purnea District factionalism does not appear 
to be the explanation for disunity among the poor. If 
there were a shortage of labour, factions might emerge 
as the result of attempts by rich peasants to secure 
regular labour. But there is generally an abundance of 
labour which reduces the need for such competition and 
also maintains the insecurity of those dependent on 
selling their labour, and mitigates against class cohesion 
at their level. The landless labourers compete for the 
opportunity to work, and are consequently divided against 
themselves. On the other hand rich peasants have a common 
interest in defending their control over land, and are 
keen to unite against attempts by the landless to grab 
land and register it in their names. In conditions of 
extreme scarcity, land is rarely on the market, so the 
occasion for open competition does not arise and the rich 
peasants are not continually reminded of the possibility of 
internal conflicts, as are those dependent on selling labour.
wwaMfmwrjitti
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In the villages therefore, there is little evidence of 




There are 12 Hindu caste groups in Desipur as well as 
Muslim and Santhal communities.* The rich peasants come 
from the Khangar caste and the Sunati Muslims. The 
Khangars have been long established as the main Hindu 
cultivating group in the village, but not all Khangar 
households enjoy the same economic and political status.
The caste group and the village is dominated by two 
extended families, both owning tractors. At the other 
end of the scale there are some very poor Khangar families 
with small, insufficient holdings, who supplement their 
income by share-cropping arrangements and some wage labour. 
One of the tractor-owning families has recently divided 
into four households, headed by four elderly brothers.
The eldest - Abhi Lai - is acknowledged as the mukhiya 
(headman) of the village. He used to be the patwari for a 
small local zamindar and was also the Panchayat aarpanah** 
unopposed until his age recently compelled him to nominate 
a successor. The other tractor-owning family operates 
as one household, headed by Basudeb. This household owns 
a mill and a shop, and Basudeb is the Secretary of the 
Multi-Purpose Co-operative Society (the Co-op).
The Muslims are divided into two Sheikh subcastes. The 
Sunati is the richer, tracing its descent from two 
'brothers', one of whom was the servant of a big zamindar. 
(It is probably a mythological lineage uniting into one 
clan the two Sunati descent groups in the village.)
Both groups have subsequently been related several times 
by marriage. The Pathan Muslims do not claim a common 
ancestry of this type; they are generally poorer and often 
supplement small holdings with some wage labour.
The Mushars are the most numerous caste group in the 
village, living in three tolas (caste-hamlets). They are 
Scheduled Caste Hindus, previously regarded as untouchable. 
The majority of the households are without land, and work 
as agricultural labourers or as ploughmen for the peasant 
households in the village. As an agricultural labouring 
class, the Mushars are fairly widespread in Purnea, 
especially in the West of the District. Their numerical 
strength, however, is of little political significance, 
and their livelihood is a precarious one. They are 
invariably and inevitably illiterate, dropping out of 
education as soon as its opportunity cost becomes too high.
*For a detailed breakdown see the unabridged version of 
this paper, IDS, University of Sussex (211).
**See Chapter 7 Appendix II
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Apart from the Dusadhs, the other castes in the village 
are artisan, with special occupations - carpenter/blacksmith, 
leather worker, tailor, weaver and basket maker. The 
Dusadhs came from an adjacent village - to settle on and 
claim rights to land on the very edge of the^Desipur 
village boundary. They are a Scheduled Caste, led by 
Ram Prasad who is literate, a member of the Samyukta 
Socialist Party - SSP, and the Area Secretary of the 
Harijan Caste Organisation.
The Santhals came to Desipur during the 1950s. A 
group of them were persuaded to move to the village by 
the zamindar Sashi Mohan. Since independence, the 1950 
act abolishing zamindari and the Survey and Settlement 
Operation which came to Desipur in 1957, the peasant/share­
croppers in Desipur had made it increasingly difficult 
for Sashi Mohan to cultivate his own land or even lease 
it out for sharecropping. Crop shares were not surrendered, 
and servants were persuaded not to work for Sashi Mohan 
in an effort to induce him to surrender his land to them.
He responded by introducing 'blackleg' labour - the Santhals - 
promising that they would have raiyatwari rights over 
some of the land.
The Peasant Acquisition of Land and the Distribution of 
Land
In 1950, the richer residents in Desipur were sharecroppers 
and small raiyats - the largest proportion of their holdings 
being sharecropped. The zamindar was claiming most of the 
cultivable land to be under^ his personal cultivation, 
since the act abolishing zamindari would not give villagers 
permanent occupancy rights over land thus designated.
Records of occupancy for sharecroppers were difficult 
to acquire, and the villagers' problem was to convert 
their sharecropping status into raiyat status and to 
wrest control of the land in Sashi Monan's cultivating 
possession. They slowly persuaded the Santhals to 
discontinue sharecropping for Sashi Mohan and to join 
them in creating trouble by claiming rights to land.
Both labourers and sharecroppers also refused to hand over 
Sashi Mohan’s share of the jute harvest.
The land reform legislation of 1962* weakened his legal 
position since his holdings exceeded the new ceiling limit 
on land. Generally in Purnea District the Act has not 
been enforced through fears of agrarian disturbances, 
but it has prevented large landlords using a legal defence 
against agitators. Confronted with individual opposition, 
Sashi Mohan could have used force - probably successfully.
But, as an absentee landlord confronted with collective
&
* See Chapter 5.
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opposition from the village leaders he was vulnerable and 
decided to sell his land and sever all connection with 
the village. The Khangars and the Sunati Muslims, 
initially the more privileged in their relations with the 
previous 'raj' and the more wealthy, most rapidly acquired 
the better land. The Santhals had 40 acres settled on 
them by Sashi Mohan, but were unable to purchase additional 
amounts. They claim to be worse off since these trans­
actions, as the new raiyats cultivate more of the land 
directly instead of leasing it to sharecroppers. This 
shift of landownership to within the village has created 
sharp horizontal cleavages between classes there.
The total amount of land owned by peasants is 1130.4 
acres, about half of which lies outside the village 
boundary although, albeit, generally adjacent to it. It is 
distributed between 173 households covering 265 landholders.* 
A little less than half of the landowning population 
(83 households) have less than 2.5 acres, which have to 
be supplemented as a source of. income by sharecropping, 
agricultural labour or other rural works programmes 
and by trading activities. All the Santhals appear to 
own some land - much of it settled on them by the ex- 
zamindar. Excluding the Santhals, the Khangars and 
Muslims predominate in all categories above 2.5 acres.
The Indian Government labels the 1.01 - 2.5 acre peasant 
as a 'marginal farmer' and the 2.51 - 5.0 acre peasant 
as a 'small farmer'. If landholders in these categories 
were classified together as 'poor peasants', and those 
with less than 1.00 acre discounted, then 92 (or just over 
half) of the landowning households in Desipur fall into 
this category. Apart from two Banias and one artisan, 
the middle and rich peasant category is exclusively Khangar 
and Muslim.
The Khangars are particularly well-off, owning 55% of 
the village land. They and the Muslims represent about 
40% of the entire population of Desipur and together own 
73% of the land. But the distribution of land within these 
castes is highly uneven. Thirty-seven out of fifty-three 
Khangar households have holdings of less than ten acres, 
therefore owning 125.03 acres out of a caste total of 
613.37 acres. From 34 landowning Muslim households 24 
have less than ten acres, giving them a total of 75 acres 
out of the caste total of 204.49. Of the 29 households 
owning land in excess of ten acres, 16 are Khangars and 
ten are Muslims, Thus, of those who own land in Desipur,
16% - consisting mainly of Khangars and Muslims - have 
62% of the land. On the other hand, 84% of the landowning 
households have 38% of the land - 144 households owning 429.1
For distribution of land ownership by caste see 211.
  .
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acres. A further distinction between Khangars and Muslims 
owning more that ten acres is revealing: the 16 Khangar
households own 488.34 acres, which means that 9% of 
landowning households possess 43% of the land. The ten 
Muslim households own 129.9 acres - equivalent to 5.6% 
owning 11% of the total.
Sharecropping is an importcint additional source of land 
for the. poor peasant. Peasants (as landlords) are reluctant 
to admit to leasing out land for sharecropping since there 
are circumstances under which the sharecropper can claim 
a permanent right to it. Informal sharecropping arrangements 
therefore prevail, where the crop is divided 50:50, despite 
the legally decreed division of 7/20's to the landlord.
The sharecropper usually meets all the production costs, 
except in the case of high-yielding varieties of wheat, 
where the landlord may provide fertilizer, apply for 
irrigation and possibly seed to prevent any written 
evidence that someone else is cultivating his land. The 
landlord is now usually careful to shift his sharecroppers 
around so that they do not continuously cultivate any one 
plot.
Labour Relations
There are between 85 - 90 households in Desipur (out of 265) 
with no land registered in their names upon which a major 
cereal or cash crop might be grown. There are a further 83 
with less than 2.5 acres; some of the latter have access to 
other land through sharecropping, but many are dependent on 
selling their labour and thus add to the pool of labour 
from landless households. Approximately 250 persons (of 
which l o o  are female) depend mainly on agricultural labour 
for their livelihood. A further 100 -r 150 seek some 
agricultural work during the year, especially at harvest 
times. It must also be remembered that a labourer who is 
hired on a daily basis is unlikely to find more than six to 
eight months' work during the year. Very rarely do 
alternative occupations or sources of income exist - say 
in a relief programme of earthwork, or hand-outs of grain 
from the Block office. Most of the landless labourers 
are Mushars.
The relationships between peasant and labourer are diverse; 
ranging from patron-client situations of the ^'ajmani type 
(social division of labour based on caste distinctions) to 
a fluid market structure for wage labour. Previously a 
labourer would live on the land of his master in a feudal 
relationship, rarely working for anyone else, receiving 
payment in kind, including gifts of cloth, salt etc.
While this may have broken down, the control over labour 
by regular peasant employers has not diminished due to 




The most common relationship now (1972) is the daily 
hiring arrangement, with a wage-rate which is virtually 
constant at 50 np {h Rupee) equivalent to 750 grams of 
foodgrain. Payment of labour in kind has not increased 
and cash wages have only increased for some in the last 
two years, and then by only 12%. The appearance of a free 
market for labour is restricted by a notion of territory 
There are three tolas (hamlets) of Mushar labourers and 
these are divided among the rich peasant employers on a 
regular territorial basis.
A variation of the daily relationship is the Januriajan 
system, where a labourer works mainly for one person. He 
is paid daily, and is not a household servant so that he 
does not eat or sleep at his employer's house. Sometimes, 
he may receive an initial advance, usually grain, which 
effectively ties him to his en^loyer for the agricultural 
year. The advance is made in March just before the wheat 
harvest, when employment is scarce and many labourers are 
close to starvation with no foodgrain reserves. However, 
the most secure labourers are those in the sought-after 
positions of ploughmen and household/agricultural servants. 
Only rich peasants can afford these, thereby incidentally 
providing themselves with a small band of loyal retainers.
A further relationship is the contract arrangement. This 
occurs often when a poor or middle peasant at a period of 
peak demand for labour cannot offer sufficient work under 
a daily arrangement to attract labourers from a longer 
period of employment by a rich peasant. A labourer - often 
the mukhiya of a Mushar tola who functions sometimes as a 
labour broker - is approached, shown the plot (usually 
for weeding but sometimes for transplanting) and a price 
is fixed for the job. The labourer then recruits and pays 
labourers as he wishes, but he works them much harder, 
since the shorter the job time, the more the 'contractor' 
receives of the total price for the job, (and the shorter 
the job time, so the opportunity cost of other employment 
chances foregone is reduced). This arrangement is also 
spreading to rich peasants who see it as a more efficient 
way of getting work done. They claim that while they may 
pay the contractor as much (or even more) than on a daily
basis, the work is done within tight schedules.
The significant effects of the contract method are to reduce 
the overall number of labour days in the village agro- 
economic system and thereby increase the insecurity of 
employment; and to prevent any class unity among the
landless labourers by increasing the competition for employ­
ment between them. - —
The jajmani system, never a firm feature of village life 
in Kosi is disintegrating. The explanation lies in the 
transfer of land ownership to peasant employers, which 
renders the ritual, caste aspect of the hierarchical.
—
patron-client system superfluous. Differentiation is now 
more discreet euid found within the village political 
system: social and political control now flow from
economic power.
Additional Indices of Differentiation
It is unrealistic to insist on a strict, quantifiable 
classification of the peasantry, since perfect correlations 
are unlikely between income and, for example: the extent
of landowning, ownership of productive property, level of 
agricultural efficiency, level of consumption, other 
profitable activities (moneylending, trading, small 
processing), education, literacy, membership of organisations 
However, by briefly summarizing the sample data and some 
additional observations, a useful impression of the levels 
of inequality can emerge. The following generalized 
descriptions must be treated with extreme caution, since 
there is not the space here to include all the necessary 
qualifying remarks and reservations.
a) Income_from agricultural_activitY
Table 20 is a summary by total landholding category 
(i.e. owned + sharecropped land) of annual income derived 
from agricultural activity only - i.e. from cultivation 
and labouring. For any landholder:
Income = (Yield after payment of harvesting labour - 
/labour costs, excluding harvesting, + input 
co sts/)+ earnings from labour on another's 
land.
For a landless labouring household, income is that derived 
from agricultural labour alone by the working household 
members. There was no relief earthwork programme in the 
year to which the data refer. All income in kind has been 
converted to a cash equivalent. Income from trading, 
moneylending and crafts is not included, which explains 
the two anomalies (0.01 - .5 and 2.5 - 5.0 acre categories).
The general effect of including income derived from this 
source would be to increase the income of those households 
in the 20+ acre category.
The income per capita column reveals groupings, above five 
acres, above ten and above 20. It is also interesting that 
landless labourers compare favourably with poor peasants, 
although this figure is raised by one labouring household 
in which the seven members are all working, the youngest 
being 14 years old. The per capita income for this 
family is Rs. 336, and this was clearly temporary. This 
highlights the crudity of the index, for the demographic 
composition of each household may vary considerably between 
a high proportion of children under working age, a high 
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b) Value of Non-productive and Productive Property
When considering the distribution of the value of household 
living quarters by landholding category, a clear 
association emerges between larger landholdings and more 
expensive dwellings.* But the latter do not correlate 
as closely with agricultural income, probably because 
buildings are long-term elements of consumption and are 
therefore not likely to be immediately sensitive to 
rising fortunes. There is, however, a high correspondence 
between land held and cultivated and the productive assets 
required for cultivation : livestock and agricultural
machinery.
Other forms of productive property include shops and 
small businesses. One of the Khangar households has 
established a small grain milling plant - the only one 
in the area. The same family has a 'fair-price' shop selling 
kerosene, salt and sugar, as well as other commodities, 
and also a monopoly of selling cloth in the village.
Everyone in the village (especially the poor who do not 
have such easy access to other markets) has to deal with 
this family at some point during the year. It is now 
also mounting a substantial jute-trading business, at 
the same time putting other shopkeepers and small grain 
and jute traders in the village out of business by exchanging 
grain at low rates (during near famine conditions for the 
poor) for the jute. Some of the other shopkeepers - all 
Muslims - have been forced to sell grain at prices often 
lower than they paid for it. Of the three Muslim shopkeepers, 
two are middle peasants with small shops in Mushar tola and 
the other is owned by a rich Sunati Muslim peasant and 
supplies the Muslim tola. A rich Agrahari Bania trades in 
tobacco (and other commodities), with interests in a go- 
down in a town about 16 miles away. The Khangar family of 
the mukhiyaf Abhi Lai, is the principal moneylending family 
in the village, although some of the shopkeepers extend 
small amounts of credit, and some of the peasant employers 
give small advances as described above.
c) • ^i_tera_cj^‘
This is difficult to define, but there is no doubt that the 
ability to read and understand Government forms and to fill 
them in is an important asset. Claims to be literate in 
this sense, probably show a general bias towards immodesty. 
From the data on literacy and education the correlation is 
clearly with lândholding status rather than with caste 
status. The village middle school has few children of 
landless labouring households, or indeed of poor peasants.
The drop-out rate increases dramatically as soon as the 
children of the poor reach an age when they can work. In
For details see (211).
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addition to attending classes at the school, the children 
of the richer peasants among the Khangars receive private 
tuition from the schoolmaster who lives with one of the 
families, while the children of the richest Khangar and 
Muslim households are sent away to schools and colleges. 
Some of the Muslim children receive additional tuition, 
mainly religious teaching, in the small Mosque in the 
Muslim tola. But poor Khangar and Muslim households have 
low literacy and educational rates comparable to poor 
peasants and landless lêibourers from other castes. The 
three literate household heads who have no land are all 
Banias, depending on small trading for their livelihood.
d) Meml^i^l^g_ Or_ga^i^a_ti^r^
The three main types of organization are: political 
party, the Co-op, and caste association.* Membership of 
a political party consists of paying a small annual sub­
scription, attending local party meetings, and 'cam­
paigning ' (usually only in the village) for party candi­
dates at elections. Membership of the Co-op is strictly 
defined as having at least one share in the society.
Caste associations present a more difficult problem of 
definition. Often they are regional caste panchayata, 
particularly where castes are thinly distributed. The 
most active caste associations are those of small pea­
sant, craft, and trading castes.
From Desipur, the Dusadhs - poor peasant/Scheduled Caste - 
are very active in the Harijan Caste Organization for the 
local thana, which is mainly a protective society for 
defence against ritual discrimination. However, both of the 
Dusadh members are also members of the SSP. The other 
’socialists' in Desipur are all poor peasants - Muslim, 
Santhal, Bais Bania and Yadav. They try to mobilize the 
Mushars, but without much success. K  Lohar carpenter/ 
blacksmith is the leader of the subcaste group in the area 
around Desipur, though there is only one Lohar household 
in the village. The local Agrahari Bania Caste Association 
is confined to villages near Desipur and its elders meet 
to discuss ceremonies and breaches of subcaste discipline 
(especially inter-caste marriages). The Khangars also 
have a district caste association but only those villages 
in Purnea District, where large concentrations of Khangars 
live, are regularly involved. Meetings anyhow are rare - 
one was called in April 1970 to discuss ways of stopping 
the dowry system.
Apart from membership of the SSP by two Dusadhs and a 
Mushar, the politically active people in this sense are 
the two Khangar household heads and a Muslim. They were 
all active supporters of Congress, but, after the party 
split, the younger Khangar head and the Muslim supported 
the breakaway Congress R while the older Khangar head 
remained supporting Congress O. Most of the Khangars and
* For a more detailed analysis of these and other organi­
zations, and sociometric diagram, see 211.
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Muslims support Congress R, but there is something of a 
generation gap with one or two of the older ones (including 
the mukhiya) irreconciled to the split and supporting the 
familiar Congress 0 candidate, although no especial ties 
between themselves and the candidate seemed to exist.
Within the village, state or national elections appear to 
arouse little excitement. The Gram Panchayat election was 
more interesting. Landless leibourers complained of their 
votes being cast in their names before they arrived at the 
booth, but none reported threats or bribes to vote in a 
certain way. The example of caste heads and elders 
is frequently cited as the reason for voting in a particular 
way. There is some evidence to suggest that the Mushar/land- 
less labour group vote was split in the 1971 General 
Election between the Congress R and the SSP. In the 
Panchayat election for Sarpanch (the mukhiya was unopposed), 
the whole village seemed to be split, with only a slightly 
higher proportion of Khangars (60%) supporting Abhi Lai 
Mande1's nomination for his successor (who failed).
The successful candidate came from another village in the 
Gram Panchayat^ but in Desipur he was supported by a high 
proportion of the Muslims, the Santhals, the Mushars and 
the other socialist activists. This split reflected 
horizontal cleavages between classes rather than vertical 
cleavages between factions arranged by patron-client 
relationships. The division within the Khangars was not 
reflected within other caste groups of subordinate economic 
status. The rich Muslim peasants supported Abhi Lai's 
candidate, but the majority of the Muslims did not.
Membership of the Co-op - organized for credit and input
(fertilizer and seed) distribution - is clearly related to 
landholding. With two exceptions, all its members hold 
more than five acres. It is significant that in an area 
where the Small Farmers Development Scheme. (SFDA) has 
been introduced, the Co-op membership among the 'small 
farmer' category (2.5 - 5 acres) is about 22%. The VLW 
(village-level worker) actually lives in Desipur (with the 
mukhiya) and yet many of the poor peasants never see him 
and they are certainly not approached by him. Under the 
terms of the Scheme, small farmers have to be identified 
by the VLW and are then entitled to special credit facilities 
at the Co-op and at the Block office. Most of the 
'small farmers' in Desipur have not heard of the scheme. 
Furthermore the. Secretary of the Co-op - Basudeb - makes 
no attempt to recruit new members. Membership is restricted
to the richer Khangars, Muslims and other rich peasants.
The two 'small farmer'members are also a Khangar and a 
Muslim, and in the network of information and patronage.
e)
Desipur is in a Gram Panchayat which includes seven other 
villages and which, in 1971, had a total population of 
11,967. Since 1955 (when the present mukhiya of the
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Gram Panchayat was first elected), not one dispute requiring 
judgement has been forwarded from Desipur to the Gram 
Panchayat. Disputes are either settled within a tola (caste 
hamlet) by the leader or group of elders in that tola, or 
by the leading Khangar and Muslim feimilies who sic in 
•private panchayat', obtaining the facts of the case and 
passing judgement. This happens if the judgements or the 
sentences in the tolaa are not accepted, or if the dispute 
is between two or more tolae, or if the dispute concerns 
a point of wider principle (for example between a labourer 
and peasant employer) which might have implications for the 
rest of the village. Although nobody is specifically 
excluded from attending, those sitting in judgement are 
in fact the richest peasants. Apart from the parties to 
the case, only the rich peasants speak.
Plaintiffs and defendants usually ask these leaders to 
sit in judgement, which reinforces the power - otherwise 
displayed in economic superiority - of those leaders in 
the village. Judgement by anyone else could not enjoy 
legitimacy in the village and would be unenforceable.
Crimes are generally cases of minor theft: stealing
standing crops, for example. Disputes are usually over 
land, concerning the validity of ownership particularly on 
the boundaries between plots. The more serious disputes 
concerning registration of land or the validity of a sale 
are sometimes taken to the courts - usually with the intention 
of breaking the weaker person through legal costs and 
bribes. Some of these disputes then return to the village 
and are settled there by negotiation. Disputes over land 
registration have concerned the Santhals in particular, 
who are very aggressive in their search for land and 
astute in interpreting the law, and who are prepared to 
conflict with the rich peasants. In this situation, the 
legitimacy of the 'private panchayat' is not regarded by 
the Santhals as valid, thus forcing the rich peasants to 
defend their interests in the courts - where of course they 
usually succeed. The Mushars do not engage in this 
activity since they are much more dependent on the rich 
peasants for their livelihood and thus are controlled 
within the economic structure of the village. It is 
important to note that class disputes of this nature, 
which challenge the village rules of conflict resolution, 
are never taken to the Gram Panchayat - always to the 
Courts, where an alternative set of rules obtain.
With the exception of this one area of conflict, and with 
the possible exception of the Santhals in general, the 
political system in the village is regarded as legitimate 
by most of its members. This is not to say that it is 
perceived by all as morally legitimate, but as having 
incontrovertible strength, de facto. The Seinthals 
remain a potential challenge to this strength, although 
their attempts to obtain land when it was transferred to 
the peasants in Desipur failed. But since their current
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attempts constitute a threat to all levels of peasantry 
in the village (and to some extent the landless labourers 
must be included here), they are unlikely to find much 
support. For the other groups, the structure of power is 
hierarchical. For the village as a whole, political 
domination corresponds to economic superiority. Under 
conditions of a plentiful supply of labour, labourers - 
daily and tied - are controlled by virtue of sanctions on 
employment, and withdrawal of short-term credit facilities 
by peasant employers and shopkeepers. Middle and poor 
peasants are dominated more indirectly through moneylending 
with high rates of interest, through limited access to 
alternative sources of credit and to alternative market 
networks. They are additionally constrained since they 
are caste followers of the richer peasants, who also 
dominate caste and ritual affairs. This is often critical, 
since they are likely to be dependent on their wealthy 
caste elders for funds and facilities to perform acceptable 
ceremonies during festivals, marriages and funerals.
Their status within the caste group is at stake.
Furthermore, they are likely to depend upon the patronage 
and goodwill of the caste leaders for finding suitable 
brides and grooms, since their own mobility and status 
may be insufficient.
The hierarchical structure is also maintained by the 
rich peasants' economic strength, which is augmented in a 
situation of labour abundance. They do not need demonstrations 
of loyalty, or retainers to provide labour and moral 
support. Neither do they have the capacity to deny each 
other access to labour, since it is not scarce. And as 
there is no need to establish exclusive patron-client 
networks there is little possibility of vertical cleavages. 
Khangar and Muslim labour 'territories' were described 
earlier, but this reflects geographic complementarity 
rather than competition.
THE PROCESS OF DIFFERENTIATION
Differentiation will only be understood by examining the 
evolution of new socio-economic structures and recording 
changes in relationships through time. Our concern is with 
economic and political differentiation between people, 
and also with inequality and poverty. An explanation of 
the existence of inequality and poverty, the (relatively) 
rich and the poor, must include the study of the relationship 
between rich people and productive resources, and poor 
people and productive resources. The question is asked - 
how did some acquire these assets while others did not?
The main productive asset - land - was acquired by the 
villagers over a period of time, so that the initial fact 
of privileged tenancy status for some need not - a priori - 
have been a sufficient condition of future, faster rates of 
land acquisition by the same group. But in Desipur it was.
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Why? What effect does the possession of land by some have 
upon the access to land by others? In answering this 
question, something about the process of differentiation 
is discovered.
To buy land required capital - in the form of savings or 
credit. Those who could save were those who could produce 
with a surplus beyond immediate consumption requirements. 
Those who could expect land on credit, were those who 
were already meeting their consumption requirements without 
borrowing or labouring and who would therefore be able to 
allocate their income from the land acquired through credit 
to repay that credit. Each acquisition of land enhanced 
a peasant's ability to acquire more, provided that labour 
was not scarce and that he possessed, or had access to, 
draught power. Land could only be acquired by a household 
on credit at a rate consistent with appropriate draught 
power capacity. At the same time, those without the 
initial aibility to accumulate beyond consumption requirements 
constrained either by initial landholding or draught 
capacity - were not able to enter the market for land, 
or were obliged to purchase poorer, cheaper land or at 
slower rates. Meanwhile, the availability of land steadily 
diminished, and its price rose.
The effect of this initial tendency towards differentiation 
was cumulative. The quantity of land leased to sharecroppers 
dropped as peasants took it into personal cultivation.
More labourers and poorer peasants became dependent for 
employment on others. And as the landlord, ex-zamindar 
disengaged from the village he ceased to function as a 
source of loans as well as of employment, with the result 
that the landed peasants also began to advance various 
forms of credit at high rates of interest, thus establishing 
an additional route of descent for the poorer into 
labouring status and the creation of a greater surplus 
of land. The principle of accumulation as a function of 
another's stagnation or loss became more firmly established.
Into this emerging structure ceune irrigation and new 
technological opportunities in agriculture. Data from 
Desipur, in the author's possession but not presented here 
in detail, suggest that rich peasants, by virtue of the 
size of their holdings, have significantly added to their 
wealth, but that they crop less intensively, have lower 
proportions of irrigated land and have lower yields per 
acre than middle peasants. It also suggests that the 
middle peasants have significantly increased their level of 
consumption though not necessarily their savings. As 
implied earlier, poor peasants have to overcome the problem 
of access to these new opportunities, a problem which is 
to a large extent a function of their low status in the 
political and economic structures.
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Are the poor to become indefinitely poorer? Are the rich 
to become indefinitely richer? And how is the 'Green 
Revolution' affecting disparities in wealth and income?
The 'Green Revolution' in Desipur
The short-term effect of new crop opportunities on the 
labouring sector is usually regarded as beneficial, 
since it is only in the long run that the substitution of 
capital for labour (e.g. mechanized ploughing, threshing, 
harvesting etc.) might be afforded and organized. In the 
short-term, it is argued that the new technology increases 
the intensity of cultivation and therefore the intensity 
with which labour is required. The use of fertilizer and 
access to a more adequate water supply stimulates weed 
growth, thus generating an increased dëïtiand for weeding 
labour, both more labour for weeding and a greater number 
of weedings. It can also be argued, for the Kosi area 
especially, that it is the mere extension of cultivation 
which is important. The introduction of irrigated wheat 
as a new crop has turned the winter into a major 
cultivating period of the year, providing more employment 
for the landless labourers during that season. The same 
argument would apply to an irrigated bhadai paddy crop using 
high-yielding varieties(HYV) if only the water supply 
was reliable.
However, these possibilities have to be set against 
reality. The use of the new technological package is 
rarely complete. The savings from taking short-cuts are 
regarded as of greater value than that of the increased 
yield foregone. The ommissions are very often the labour 
intensive ones like weeding. Thus the logical possibilities 
for employment deriving from the use of new technology 
need not be realized. Some extra employment is inevitably 
created, but very often for specialist labour - the ploughman, 
the family servant, the carpenter, and even the trader.
The differential impacts of the new technology on rich 
and poor peasants is well illustrated by the experience 
of the 1970 - 71 wheat crop. Losses in the District 
have been difficult to calculate - between 30-40% is 
probable. Yet in Desipur all of the rich peasants sold a 
surplus of wheat in addition to the amount retained for 
household consumption. The costs of wheat production are 
high; and a peasant who grows wheat and consumes all of it, 
has to meet his production costs out of some other 
crop, like jute. But even in this bad year, the rich 
peasants covered their costs of wheat production from 
the crop itself, and some had more besides. Poorer 
peasants who grow wheat adopt only part of the package: 
incorrect and incomplete fertilizer doses; inadequate 
cross-ploughings; too few irrigations; no weedings (two 
are recommended). In this situation, the rich peasant is 
cropping his existing holdings with greater intensity,
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and with profit to himself. There are no technical reasons 
why the smaller landholder should not obtain high yields 
however he fails to do so for economic and political reasons; 
his poverty, difficult access to credit, lack of advice 
and information, lack of transport to bring seed and 
fertilizer, and so on. The productivity of labour is 
higher, though, and the margin of surplus is greater when 
the full package is applied. An imperfect packàge of 
inputs reduces the productivity of labour, even of the 
peasant household's own labour. Thus, in practice, the 
Green Revolution technology exacerbates an existing trend, 
and is likely to play a greater role in stimulating 
disparity.
In Desipur the effects of the Green Revolution are at 
present marginally associated with a cleavage in peasantry. 
The main explanatory variable is again the distribution 
of control over land. The cleavage is between a handful 
of rich peasants who have sufficient land to accumulate, 
save, invest and diversify; and the remainder who just 
manage to survive from year to year at their respective 
levels of consumption.
The increasing disparity between the richest households 
and the others is plain for all to see. But what scope 
is there for the rich class of peasant to prey upon the 
others - ultimately absorbing them? The two principal 
stabilizing factors appear to be the shortage of land and 
the abundance of labour. The shortage of land presents 
a severe constraint on the process of capital accumulation 
in agriculture, where the overriding motivation among the 
poor peasants is subsistence and survival within the 
framework of current social mores. The fact that the 
poorer peasant is commercially non-competitive is not 
reason enough for him to sell up when the alternative 
situation in which he would then find himself would be 
even less viable and more hazardous. The decline in 
significance and incidence of sharecropping is an indicator 
of the scarcity of land: sharecroppers have been removed
when other land was no longer available.
The rich peasant can acquire the land of the poorer 
peasant only if it becomes impossible for him to continue 
cultivating his land to derive a subsistence living from 
it for his family; the only way that is apart from guns 
and burning - and there is no lack of evidence of such 
overt coercion in Purnea. When labour was scarce, the 
mill-owning Khangar family did put its daily wage rates 
up from Rs.0.50 to Rs. 0.62, and some of the other 
peasants pay at this rate, but the general rate is still 
Rs.0.50 even during the heavy transplanting season. Labour 
is generally abundant, and its price low. It is a price 
which 95% of the peasants in Desipur can afford, and so they 
can hold on to their land, and they will do so despite the 
high prices offered for it.
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Rural Development and the 
Post-Colonial State: Administration 
and the Peasantry in the Kosi Region 
of  North-East Bihar, India
G eo f W ood
T h is  paper  fo cu ss es  on  the  d y n a m ic  re lationship  b e t w e e n  th e  pract ice  
o f  a d m in is tra t ion  and an agrarian system  in tran s i t ion  b e tw e e n  
d o m in a n t  m o d e s  o f  p r o d u c t io n  involving n e w  f o r m s  o f  class  
d i f f e r e n t ia t io n  and a corresp on d ing  art icu lation  o f  p o w e r .  It argues  
tha t  ad m in is tra t ive  beh av iou r  in th e  p o s t -c o lo n ia l  s ta te  o f  India 
b e c o m e s  increasingly  bureaucratic  and in stru m e n ta l ,  and stead i ly  
discards the  f lex ib le  and pragmatic s ty le  o f  imperial  rural 
ad m in is tra t io n .  Th is  m o v e m e n t  can b e  d e te c t e d  as a res p o n s e  to  the  
e m e r g e n c e  o f  legislatures, political parties,  and n e w  fo r m s  o f  class  
d if fe r e n t ia t io n  w h ich  t o g e th e r  have fu n c t io n e d  to  u n d e r m in e  the  
a u t o n o m y  o f  the  state  ad m in  strative apparatus .  In part icular the  
e m e r g e n c e  o f  classes o f  capitalist farmers in rural India has d e term in ed  
th e  s t a t e ’s agrarian policies .  The p ro b lem  is th a t  the ir  in terests  can  
b e  m e t  w ith in  the  fram ew ork  o f  bureaucratic  ra t io n a l i ty  m u c h  m o re  
eas i ly  than  t h o s e  o f  the small and p o o r  p easant  w h o  is vu lnerably  
s i tua ted  in a m u c h  m ore  subtle  set o f  re la t ionsh ips .  T h e  p o o r  peasant  
is th u s  p en a l ized  in t w o  w ays:  lack o f  c o n tr o l  over  s ta te  p o l i c y ;  and  
a s ty le  o f  administrative behaviour w h ic h  is t o o  b u reau crat ic  to  
in te rv en e  su cc ess fu l ly  in th e  c o m p le x i t i e s  o f  peasant  l ife .
It is o b v io u s ly  d iff icu lt  to  pursue the arg u m en t  b y  m a kin g  em pirical  
g en era l iza t io n s  a b o u t  India, or even N o rth  India, as a w h o le .  T he  
in te n t io n  is to  m a ke  the ore t ic a l  g enera l iza t ions  o n  t h e  basis o f  case  
m ater ia l  f r o m  stu d ies  in the  Kosi  D e v e lo p m e n t  R e g io n  o f  N orth -E ast  
Bihar. A n d  th e  con cern  is to  p o in t  out  their im p l ic a t io n s  fo r  rural 
d e v e lo p m e n t  p lanning  in term s o f  the  evolv ing re la t io n sh ip s  b e t w e e n
T h e f ie ld w o r k  fro m  w h ich  th is  p ap er is d erived  w as fin a n c e d  b y  a research  grant 
fro m  th e  U K  S o c ia l S c ie n c e  R esearch  C o u n c il.
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the agrarian social formation and the state. (Wood 1974). Although 
the Kosi region^ provides a good opportunity for concretizing the 
discussion, it was exceptional even for India in the extent o f its 
administrative com plexity. With the Kosi irrigation project and the 
concom m itant introduction o f  the Intensive Agriculture Area 
Programme (lA A P) to  the com m unity developm ent blocks in the 
command area, a special structure o f developm ent administration 
was in effect superimposed upon the existing administrative structure 
which already had its developm ent responsibilities.
The special structure involved a programme-oriented staff network, 
headed by an officer of Commissioner rank — the Kosi Area 
D evelopm ent Commissioner (KADC) — supported by tw o Special 
D eputy Directors o f  Agriculture (SD D A ), one for each district, and 
additional agricultural extension staff at the block level in the lAAP 
(‘package’) blocks headed by a Project Executive Officer. With 
irrigation, a further autonom ous network o f  specialist irrigation field  
staff was introduced, to  be coordinated with the other activities by 
the KADC but mainly responsible to  departm ental headquarters in 
Patna.
THE POST COLONIAL  
ADMINISTRATIVE ENVIRONMENT
Under the Raj, the state was superimposed over civil society  with  
the result that the administration was politically dom inant over all 
indigenous social classes, even though it may have represented the 
interests o f  som e o f  those classes more than others. Alavi argues that;
the superstructure in the colony is . . . overdeveloped in relation to the structure 
in the colony, for its basis lies in the metropolitan structure itself, from which 
it is later separated at the time o f  independence. . . . The post-colonial society 
inherits that overdeveloped apparatus o f state. . . . (Alavi 1972, 61).
The administration was ‘overdeveloped’ in relation to other political 
and econom ic institutions not only on account o f  the prominence 
o f  administration as a structure. It must be remembered that the 
Indian Civil Service (ICS) had long been recruiting Indian personnel, 
so that individuals as well as the institution had to adjust to the formal 
curtailment o f  their power, authority and status. This alteration of 
the administrator’s status and authority also affected those w ho were 
being recruited to the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) (successor
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to  ICS) in th e  late 1 9 4 0 s  and early f i f t ie s .  T h e y  aspired to  th e  IAS  
o n  th e  basis o f  its ICS im age, and have s u b s e q u e n t ly  f e l t  b e trayed  
b y  the  s te a d y  d im in u t io n  o f  respect  for their  p o s i t io n .  T h is  is im por tan t  
for it is th e se  ‘b a tc h e s ’  ̂ w h o  are n o w  C o m m is s io n e r s  e i th er  o c c u p y in g  
senior  f ie ld p o s i t io n s ,  or  serving as secretaries o f  state-level  d e p a r tm e n ts  
and j o in t  secretaries  o f  ministr ies  in New Delhi.
T he  image p resen ted  b y  the  ICS w a s  o n e  o f  c o n tr o l  over its 
‘e n v ir o n m e n t ’. This is n o t  t o  say  that  it c o n tr o l le d  all soc ia l  processes  
in the  s o c i e ty ,  but  it d o m in a te d  th o s e  a sp ec ts  o f  the  s o c i e t y  w h ic h  
d e f in e d  its area o f  resp o n s ib i l i ty  — for  e x a m p le ,  th e  s y s t e m  o f  revenue  
c o l le c t io n  and the  in s t i tu t io n s  o f  law and order .  F u r th erm o re  it had  
a c o m p le x  id e o lo g y  leg it im at ing  this c o n tr o l  and d o m in a t io n ,  
c o m b in in g  th e m e s  o f  racial su p er ior ity  and paternalism  w ith  a to leran ce  
o f  in st i tu t io n s  and p ract ices  w h ic h ,  a l thou gh  s o m e t im e s  at o d d s  w ith  
its o w n  cu ltur e ,  did not  subvert  the  imperial p r e o c c u p a t io n  w ith  
ensuring a stab le  e n v ir o n m e n t  for  trade,  c o m m o d i t y  p r o d u c t io n  and  
revenue  c o l l e c t io n .  ( S to k e s  1 9 5 9 ,  W o o d r u f f  1 9 5  3). T he  fram ew ork^  
o f  field ad m in is tra t io n ,  itself  th e  es sen ce  o f  the  imperial adm in is trat ive  
p resence ,  es tab l ished  su f f ic ien t  a u th o r i ty  and status fo r  its f ie ld  
p ersonnel  to  perm it  con s id erab le  f l e x ib i l i ty  and sc o p e  for  the  w a y  
th e y  a c tu a l ly  p e r fo r m e d  their duties .  D ec is io n  m aking  involved  m o re  
personal  d iscr e t ion  and indeed d e p e n d e d  m o re  heav i ly  u p o n  a personal  
assessm en t  o f  th e  loca l  s i tu a t io n .  And m o st  im p o r ta n t ly  t h e  ob je c t ives  
o f  a d m in is tra t ive  beh av iou r  w^ere to  a greater e x t e n t  in ternally  d erived ,  
and did n o t  e m a n a te  d irect ly  f r o m  pol i t ica l  pressure in the  e n v ir o n m e n t  
i tself .
With in d e p e n d e n c e ,  the  a d m in is tr a t io n ’s c o n tr o l  o f  its e n v ir o n m e n t  
d ec l in es  and in d eed  th e  nature o f  that  e n v ir o n m e n t  alters. It n o w  
in c lu d es  fo rm a l  d e m o c r a t ic  in s t i tu t io n s ,  thr o ug h  w hich  in part icular  
th e  in terests  o f  th e  various f a c t io n s  o f  th e  in d ig e n o u s  b o u r g e o is ie  
are art icu lated . C ontro l  over th e  p o s t -c o lo n ia l  s ta te  d o e s  not  lie 
a u t o n o m o u s l y  in th e  hands o f  its apparatuses  — e.g. b u rea u cra cy ,  
m ilitary  and p o l ic e .  T h e  a d m in is tra t io n  is ob l ig ed  to  declare an 
in strum enta l  role for itself  and to re linquish c o n tr o l  o ver  p o l ic y .  
T his sacrifice  o f  a u t o n o m y  enta i ls  a loss o f  a u th o r i ty ,  p o w e r  and  
s tatus  for  the  ad m in is tra t io n ,  and v u ln erab il it ) ’ to  its e n v ir o n m e n t  
is su b s t i tu te d  for  the  prev ious c o n tr o l  over  it. T h e  p o s t -c o lo n ia l  so c ie ty  
m ay inherit an o v e r - d e \ e lo p e d  apparatus  o f  s ta te  , hut not  for long.  
Under th e se  c o n d i t io n s  the  b u reau crat iza t ion  o l  adm in is trat ive  
b ehaviour  is an inev itab le  s o lu t io n  s ince  it represents  the  o n ly  form  
o f  p r o te c t io n  from  other  groups.  This  b u rea u cra t iza t io n  involves
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a r e d e f in i t io n  o f  areas o f  c o m p e t e n c e  and a p r o fe s s io n a l i z a t io n  o f  
t h e  n e w  se rv ice  ( i .e .  tra in ing ,  q u a l i f i c a t io n s ,  and  a n e w  i d e o l o g y  based  
o n  c la im s  t o  r a t io n a l i ty ) .
The essence o f this redefinition was expressed succinctly by the 
Kosi Commissioner in a private conversation^ when he compared 
the role o f  administration with that o f  a nurse. Politicians, like 
doctors, make diagnoses (o f the body politic!), and it is the task o f  
the administrator to  im plem ent the cure or preventive measure. This 
clinical m etaphor sums up an entire philosophical tradition about 
the role o f  public administration in a dem ocracy: nam ely, the 
separation o f  powers into legislative, judicial and executive functions 
o f  the state. This view o f  administration is strictly instrumental, and 
assumes also that the discretion o f  even senior officials is tightly  
constrained. The role o f  the official is formally characterized by  three 
types o f  loyalty: to  the Constitution; to  principles o f  bureaucracy; 
and to his ow n neutrality as an agent o f  authority.
The problem  with this normative description o f  the administrator’s 
role is that the diagnoses are not clear and unambiguous. Instead 
they  are confused, often  contradictory, diffuse and vague. This is a 
generalized feature o f post-colonial situations because this is a period 
o f  great upheaval and transformation in the social form ation when 
the political direction o f policy is ill-defined and often rhetorical. 
Thus the clinical metaphor breaks down as a description o f reality. 
The environm ent o f  administrative behaviour is not only more out 
o f administrative control, it is also more intangible precisely at a 
tim e o f  greater explicit concern with issues o f  developm ent and change. 
The problem is whether failures o f  administrative performance should 
be attributed to the intangibility o f  policy , or to the bureaucratic 
style o f  administrative behaviour? Certainly in their new situation  
o f  reduced autonom y, administrators are criticized. As Mars put it:
One feature o f this process has been intense normative conflict. The 
administrator’s attitudes, values, standards, ethos, approach, way o f dealing 
with the common man, have been attacked; their distinctive role, skills and 
resources downgraded and ridiculed. (Mars 1974, 336).
However it is the relation between  administrative practice and its 
environm ent (i.e. aspects o f the social form ation) which creates the 
paradox o f  the adm inistrator’s normative attachm ent to bureaucratic 
and instrumental behaviour at an inappropriate tim e. Bureaucratic 
behaviour requires a stable, tangible environm ent where the 
differentiation o f  function betw een official and non-official is
M
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well-defined and acknowledged. But the notion o f  such a clear 
distinction betw een official and non-official in post-colonial India 
is itself normative, a prescription rather than a description, 
sim ultaneously inspiring the metaphor and destroying it.
The intangible features o f  the post-colonial administrator’s 
environment must be specified further, although this is not the occasion  
to  discuss them  in detail. These features emanate from  the rapidly 
changing agrarian structure, involving a transition from a dominant 
feudal m ode o f  production to a dominant capitalist m ode. Structurally 
we consider the process to be characterized by several m odes o f  
production (involving varying relations o f expropriation and 
appropriation which enable us to  distinguish betw een the simple and 
extended reproduction o f  a m ode) which together constitute the 
social form ation at any one tim e. (See Chattopadhyay 1972 and 
Omvedt 1975. For an attempt to establish the concept o f a specific 
colonial m ode o f  production, see Alavi 1975).
This abstract form ulation is important for the analysis, since it 
permits the assertion that the m ode which is in dom inance at any 
one tim e is the one which is primarily responsible for determining 
the political and social institutions o f  the society  — in particular the 
distribution o f power, national ideology, and so on. The dynamic 
in this situation is provided by the form ation and dissolution o f classes 
associated with these various m odes o f  production, which thus alters 
the structures o f  pow er, accum ulation, dom inant values and ideologies, 
labour relationships — i.e. the balance o f social forces in a society. 
In the Kosi region, sharecroppers are declining as a class as land 
becom es concentrated in the hands o f  rich farmers (i.e. ex landlords) 
w ho are steadily substituting wage labour and capital (tractors, 
tube-wells, variable inputs). While the capitalist m ode may be in 
ascendance, sharecroppers have not yet disappeared and therefore 
neither have landlords. The contradiction betw een relations o f  
expropriation and appropriation^ in the quasi-feudal m ode render 
disputes over land a central aspect of class struggle generated by  the 
m ode. Here, therefore, the issue o f land reform (including tenancy  
rights and not just redistribution) is prom inent, and must form the 
basis o f any political parties’ platform, if on ly a cynical form. But 
for those operating primarily in the capitalist m ode, the issue o f land 
reform is an anachronism. The rich farmers are concerned with the 
availability o f  inputs, credit and subsidies; high prices for their 
products; and political order and stability for the protection o f private 
property. The landless labourers are concerned with minimum wages. 1
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low prices for essential com m odities, and possibly (depending on 
their consciousness) with a radical overturn o f the m ode o f production  
and the establishment o f socialist ownership o f the means o f  
production.
However, such a description is schem atic and artificial, since these 
system s o f  stratification (which in one aspect is what m odes o f  
production are in effect) are only conceptually distinct. Empirically 
they overlap. The landlord is also a rich farmer. The sharecropper 
may also be a wage labourer. The poor peasant w ith rights over a 
sm allholding may be a sharecropper and a wage labourer. This is the  
concrete form o f  class differentiation in the social form ation, and 
explains w hy major national political parties have to make broad-based 
popular appeals for mass support resulting in diffuse ideologies and 
volatile political loyalties. In this way the environm ent o f  
administrative behaviour is intangible.
Furthermore, despite the vocabulary o f developm ent among 
politicians and p etty  bourgeois intellectuals, policies are continually  
subjected to the fluctuating fortunes o f  international capitalism — the  
com m odity markets, futures, shadow pricing policy for foodgrain 
products in the U.S., Arab oil, etc. Under these conditions o f  
uncertainty, it is not difficult to appreciate that while there were high 
initial expectations of change, the prescriptions for the content o f  
that change would never be clearly specified.
However, while one can identify the structural causes o f diffuse 
ideologies and the resulting conditions o f intangibility for 
administrative performance, nevertheless our view o f  the transition  
in the social formation clearly indicates the direction o f change towards 
the assertion o f capitalist ownership (either indigenous or m etropolitan) 
over other forms o f  property. If this is so , then the relative autonom y  
o f  the state apparatuses which Alavi identifies (Alavi 1972) not only  
declines in the normative sense outlined above, there must also occur 
the increasing subjection o f the state apparatuses to these emerging 
capitalist classes. A concern o f this paper is to exam ine the effects 
o f this general proposition upon the relationship betw een field 
administration and the agrarian social form ation. To do this, w e must 
criticize and disagree with one aspect o f A lavi’s thesis.
Alavi argues that the state in post-colonial society  continues to 
occupy a relatively autonom ous position in relation to  the indigenous 
propertied classes by virtue o f its overdeveloped apparatuses 
(bureaucratic-military oligarchy); m ediation betw een different classes 
o f property ; and the ongoing influence o f  the m etropolitan bourgeoisie.
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We are here dealing with the second aspect. The argument is distinct 
from  the Bonapartist thesis proper which contains the notion  o f the  
state transcending the fractions o f capital in order to  defend its 
interests as a w hole, rather than mediating between  d ifferent propertied 
classes. The principle o f mediation acknowledges an exposure and 
sensitivity on the part of the state apparatus to  the articulation o f the 
interests o f  property. The implication o f this is that this relative 
autonom y depends upon a conjuncture in the social form ation when  
dom inant classes (i.e. dom inant in their respective m odes o f  
production) are in equilibrium. But if capitalist form s o f property 
are increasingly dominant over others, then the role o f  mediation  
betw een propertied classes must disappear. Therefore the relative 
autonom y relationship in this aspect o f  m ediation must be a temporary  
characteristic o f the post-colonial state, along with the significance 
o f the inherited overdeveloped apparatus.
Put in another w ay, part o f  Alavi’s thesis depends upon an analysis 
o f the relationship (dependency or dom inance) betw een administrative 
office  and other leaders in the society. The operation o f  field  
administration in the context o f the agrarian social form ation ought 
to constitute an important test o f Alavi’s propositions. Field  
administration and therefore rural developm ent administration is much 
more exposed and sensitive to its im mediate environm ent than other 
more central parts o f the state apparatus. In the post-colonial era, 
it lacks the support o f the ‘fram ework’ to  defend its overdeveloped  
inheritance against the organized interests o f  rural capital. A t the 
same tim e, its normative instrumental stance is criticized for its 
obsession with procedure and the related preoccupation with making 
safe, non-critical decisions; for failing to  com e to terms w ith an 
intangible environment; and for failing to m eet the challenge o f  rural 
poverty. To the field administrator, conscious o f the ICS legacy, 
imbibed w ith a sense of order and respect for the constitution , and 
aware o f  the superiority and essential coherence o f  the apparatus 
w hich he represents, the gap betw een the potential strength o f  his 
powerful inheritance and his contem porary legitim ate use o f  that 
strength is the worst o f  all worlds and a deeply frustrating experience.
The issue here is what form the declining autonom y o f the 
administrative apparatus takes in the field , and the consequences for 
rural developm ent. This occurs in tw o interrelated ways. Firstly, 
there is the passing o f legislation beyond the capacity o f the 
administration to im plement, as in the case o f land reform; and, 
secondly, where the response to land reform ‘failures’ consists of
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programmes o f bureaucratic allocation o f  inputs to agriculture. This 
tends to be a system o f allocation which reflects and reinforces the 
structure o f  rural capitalist accumulation since bureaucratic behaviour 
applies criteria of rationality which do not encom pass the subtleties 
o f  the peasant situation (i.e. where there arises a problem o f  access).
POPULIST IDEOLOGY A ND  LAND REFORM
The m ost difficult aspect o f field administration for the administrator 
is the discrepancy betw een public pronouncem ents o f policy and 
the com m itm ent to  its im plem entation. The origin o f  this discrepancy 
can be traced to the evolution o f the agrarian structure in Bihar 
reflecting an increasingly significant ‘alliance’ betw een ex-landlord, 
rural entrepreneur and the rich peasant. (See Wood 1973 and 1974). 
This alliance is not necessarily expressed explicitly  in unified political 
organization (although the Congress Party represents a fair attem pt 
at this), but it is objective in the com plem entarity and mutual 
reinforcem ent o f their respective econom ic roles. This alliance cannot 
dom inate the rural social form ation solely on the basis o f econonic  
strength and coercion. In a formal dem ocracy, it has to  be represented  
in the political process, maintaining for itself a power base through 
ideological activity. In this way a contrast is frequently manifested  
betw een the interests o f the rural propertied class and the populist 
ideology which the maintenance o f a w ide support-base demands. 
This constitutes a specific exam ple o f  the w ay in which an intangible 
environm ent is created for administrative performance, arising from  
the concrete class form ation in the region.
Nowhere is this contradiction between populist ideology and a 
sincere com m itm ent to im plementing the policies derived from  it 
clearer than in the case o f  land reform legislation. The differentiation  
in land ownership is an acute problem for North Bihar and for the 
Kosi region in particular. It is an issue which goes to the heart o f  
the social form ation and which therefore pervades all other them es 
o f  rural developm ent. The legislation is passed in the know ledge that 
its im plem entation requires the subordination o f those w ho now  
dom inate the agrarian political structure — i.e. the legislators and 
the dom inant rural alliance represented for the m ost part by them . 
The administrators cannot hope to  manipulate such a situation. A ny  
attem pt to  do so would constitute an untim ely reassertion o f  their 
imperial inheritance w ithout the power o f coercion or the legitim acy
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to see the issue through. Administrators are powerless when confronted  
by such cynicism , and may in terms o f  personal class interest be passive 
accessories to it. Under these conditions it is difficult for them to  
occupy with any credibility the instrumental role which they had 
designed for themselves.
The outcom e is a deep frustration at the continued undermining 
o f administrative authority, both through a decline in its status and 
its claim to  a transcending rationality, and through an increasing 
incapacity to  form ulate (let alone im pose) an order when it sees chaos. 
This process seems to  reinforce the search for a secure instrumental 
role. This is ironic since — by thus retreating — the way is left still 
clearer for further differentiation in the agrarian structure and the 
form ation o f a dom inant class powerful enough to  challenge the relative 
autonom y o f the state apparatus. There is incidentally a further 
response on the part o f senior administrative officials which also 
contributes to  the subversion o f the relative autonom y o f the state 
apparatus: their direct involvement in class form ation. Their decline 
in independent status per se stimulates them  to  maintain and reassert 
their status in forms o f class and caste origins. Caste remains an 
im portant reference group within class in Bihar; in particular at this 
level the com petition between Kayasthas and Bhumihar Brahmins. 
This involvem ent takes the form o f property investments (often urban); 
corrupt relations with politicians and members o f the urban or rural 
propertied classes ; strategic extensions and withdrawals o f  patronage; 
arranging business, em ploym ent or educational opportunities for kin 
and fellow  caste members; partisan ideological positions held discretely.
It fo llow s pessimistically from this that developm ent objectives 
w hich contain powerful assaults on the interests o f  dom inant, 
propertied classes are likely neither to  be genuinely form ulated, nor 
susceptible to  im plem entation through the offices o f state 
administration. Furthermore, even where the C onstitution provides 
for form al dem ocratic elections to legislatures, this is clearly unable 
to  re-adjust the dom inant features o f the social form ation characterized 
both  by a highly unequal pattern o f  ownership o f  the means o f 
production and the unrestrained private accumulation o f property 
and wealth according to capitalist principles (as distinct from , e.g. 
feudal or state acquisition). Finally, the formal power o f oppressed 
classes through the ballot box to support developm ent objectives 
aimed at incom e redistribution remains weakened by other 
pre-capitalist features of the social form ation. For exam ple the 
solidarity o f poor peasant, sharecropper and landless labour classes
ii
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is broken up by the diverse relationships o f dependence betw een  
them selves and those who control the means o f  subsistence through 
their ownership o f land and other forms o f  productive property. 
As Barrington Moore observed: ‘To dem ocratize the villages w ithout 
altering property relationships is sim ply absurd.’ (Barrington Moore 
1969 , 394).
The relationships betw een the social form ation and the  
administration, which exists within it, are particularly important in 
post-colonial poor country situations. Here the state is attem pting  
to appropriate a large part o f  the econom ic surplus and deploy it in 
bureaucratically-directed econom ic activity. The land reform problem  
illustrates the state’s difficulties in acquiring rural econom ic surplus 
for redistribution and reinvestment either in the agricultural sector 
or elsewhere. Where the means o f production remain in the hands 
o f  a class which is either dominant over the state apparatus or 
independent o f  it, the product cannot easily be expropriated. In North 
Bihar land has not been redistributed to  any significant extent, 
although tenancy status for som e groups has altered sufficiently to  
allow for the developm ent o f a rich peasant/farmer class over which 
the state is losing its power. (Wood 1973 and 1974).
STATE INTERVENTION  
IN RURAL PRODUCTION 
AND THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS
But if the state apparatus lacks the power to equalize the pattern 
o f control over rural productive assets through transfer distribution, 
its only alternative is to provide other public resources which might 
ultim ately have the same result. From the impasse o f  land reform, 
both the Indian government and our discussion turn towards those  
other forms o f public resources, and their allocation. We are referring 
primarily to the various items in the agricultural developm ent 
programmes — water, seed, fertiliser, inform ation, credit and so on, 
although other services like health and education should n ot be 
forgotten. In this type of allocation activity, the critical relationship  
betw een administration and the surrounding agrarian social structure 
is one o f access. (See Schaffer and Huang 1975 , and Lamb 1975).
But even this type o f  state-interventionist strategy, revolving around 
the notion o f  the access relationship betw een administration and 
client, does not solve the problem o f  applying bureaucratic rationality
1̂1
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to  rural d e v e lo p m e n t .  S ta te -ad m in is tere d ,  form al sy s t e m s  o f  a l lo ca t io n  
have to interact  and c o m p e te  w ith  o n g o in g  sy s t e m s  o f  a l lo ca t io n  
g er m a n e  to  t h e  soc ia l  fo r m a t io n .  In th e  Kosi reg ion ,  th e  lA A F  and  
ancil lary  s c h e m e s  (like th e  Small  Farmers D e v e lo p m e n t  A g e n c y )  
are th e  m ajor  s ta te - in terven t ion is t  s trategies a long  w ith  t h e  irrigation  
project .  T h e y  seek  to  disturb th e  im p a c t  n o t  o n l y  o f  e c o lo g ic a l  variables  
b u t  also e c o n o m i c  o n e s  co n cern ed  w ith  t h e  su p p ly  o f  in p u ts  gen era t io n  
o f  d e m a n d ,  t h e  o p p o r tu n i t y  c o s t s  o f  fa c to r s  o f  p r o d u c t io n ,  t h e  pattern  
o f  savings and in v es tm en t  — in short ,  th e  e c o n o m i c  and soc ia l  structure  
o f  a c c u m u la t io n  from  agriculture.
T h e  central  fea tu re  o f  these  strateg ies  is a d is tr ib u t io n  sy s t e m  for  
g o o d s  and services w h ic h  is not  based o n  th e  m arket ,  w h e r e  th e  k ey  
req u irem en t  is d isp o sa b le  in c o m e .  A cce ss  b e c o m e s  im p o r ta n t  w here  
th e  s ta te  in tervenes  to  a f fec t  th e  su p p ly  and d e m a n d  for  resources  
so that  the ir  a l lo ca t io n  d e p e n d s  less, or n o t  at all, o n  m arket  or  
trad itional  a l lo c a t io n  m e c h a n ism s .  T h e  resources  c h o s e n  for  
red is tr ib u t ion  are necessarily  scarce. T h e  p u rp o se  o f  t h e  bureaucrat ic  
a l lo c a t io n  is t o  reduce  th e  s ign if icance  o f  th e  d isp o s a b le  in c o m e  factor  
(and o th e r  m o r e  ascriptive bases o f  d i s tr ib u t io n )  in ga in ing  access  to  
resources .  T h is  is a t te m p te d  b y  estab l ish ing  rules o f  in c lu s io n  and  
e x c lu s io n ,  and b y  m ainta in ing  a f ix e d  price fo r  th o s e  w ith  t h e  n ecessary  
q u a l i f ica t io n s .  T he  form al criteria o f  access  are o f  co u r se  norm ally  
derived f r o m  egalitarian id eo lo g y .
A n  e x a m p le  o f  this strategy in K osi  is th e  Small  Farmers  
D e v e lo p m e n t  A g e n c y  ( S F D A ) ,  w h ic h  m a ke s  variable in p uts  and credit  
fac i l it ies  available  in principle at r e d u ced  rates  fo r  ‘fa rm e rs’ w h o  o w n  
b e t w e e n  2 .5  and 5 .0  acres. T h e  o b je c t  is t o  m a k e  this  c a te g o r y  o f  
peasant  e c o n o m ic a l ly  viable b y  provid ing, o n  fa v o u r a b le  term s,  
n ecessary  resou rces  w h ich  w o u ld  b e  d en ied  h im  thr o ug h  t h e  m ark et .  
But in a b eh av iou ra l  sense  the  p r o b le m  for t h e  peasant  d o e s  n o t  end  
the re ,  for  b u reau crat ic  s y s te m s  o f  a l lo c a t io n  are th e m s e lv e s  im p e rfec t  
in tha t  th e  ‘sm all  fa rm e r’ has to  o b ta in  in fo r m a t io n  a b o u t  t h e  s c h e m e ,  
c o n v in c e  o f f i c ia l s  th a t  he  is a qual i f ied  c l ien t  o f  th e  s c h e m e ,  and  the n  
w o r k  hard at  ac tu a l ly  o b ta in in g  and us in g  th e  resou rces  to  w h ich  
he is n o w  e n t i t l e d .  In this w a y ,  th e  peasant  has p r o b le m s  in m aking  
c o n n e c t io n  w ith  th e  o rgan iza t ion .  T h es e  are p r o b le m s  w h ic h  are u sual ly  
b e y o n d  th e  s c o p e  o f  adm inis trat ive  s o lu t io n ,  and w h ic h  have their  
origin in the  in eq u a lit ies  o f  th e  agrarian social  sy s te m .  T h u s  the  
s i tu a t io n  w h ic h  g ives rise to  th e  trea tm en t  in the  first p lace ,  also 
f u n c t io n s  to  hinder th e  bureaucrat ic  ad m in is tra t io n  o f  tha t  t r e a tm e n t .  
T his  is the  p r o b le m  o f  access.
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CLASH BETWEEN BUREAUCRATIC  
AND PEASANT RATIONALITY:
THE CASE OF CREDIT
The picture is more com plicated than th is' however. First, new access 
situations involving state administered services never operate in vacuo.
They are an incremental addition to other distribution system s w hich  
already exist and which envelop the potential client o f  bureaucratic 
allocation. A  small farmer will have obligations in other structures Î |
which are indicative o f  the social form ation — e.g. free draught power  
in exchange for ploughing a richer peasant’s land at peak periods; 
or advance o f  seed to  repay as grain ; or space for his jute on his patron’s 
bullock cart in return for loyalty or som e past services w hich can 
still be cashed. Such relationships continue through tim e, they  are 
com plex and other relationships depend upon them . They represent 
the social order, and as such they im ply a greater security than that 
offered by the outside institution on  th e  one dim ension only.
It fo llow s from this, secondly, that the offic ia l’s concept o f  
rationality m ay not be shared by the peasant. The official, o ften  
because the service on offer is highly specific, is unable to extend  
the effect o f  his work across the peasant’s total situation. Thus the  
administrators o f the Crop Guarantee Scheme, which was attem pted  
on a pilot basis in the Kosi area, should not have been surprised when  
they learnt that som e o f  the cultivators had sold the special allocation  
o f  seed, and had sowed an inferior variety instead. These men had debts 
in other structures, so that their selection to the schem e was good  
fortune for their creditors. Fertiliser often  suffered a similar fate.
And both seed and fertiliser were often  used on  sharecropped land, 
although this was forbidden in the conditions o f  entry to  the schem e, 
thus indirectly subsidizing the owners o f  those plots. In this w ay, 
there is a discontinuity o f  values betw een official and client because 
one is seeking the security o f  compartmentalized bureaucratic 
behaviour and the other the familiar safety o f  low status in a known  
system . Bureaucratic administration can only deal with ‘farmers’ 
not peasants, which is perhaps w hy the docum ents o f  Indian 
administration always refer to  peasants as farmers. (On the d istinction  
betw een peasants and farmers, see Shanin 1973).
Thirdly, there is also the situation where alternative points o f  
supply exist. The conditions o f access to  these alternative points 
vary, although they are likely to  be situated firmly in the logic o f  
the social form ation. The example o f  credit is interesting in this respect.
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With the administration essentially in a single-stranded relationship  
to  the client, the assessment o f  a peasant’s propensity to  repay is based 
on the crudest, uni-dimensional, econom ic considerations erhploying 
the m etaphor o f  the ‘farmer’. Thus loans for consum ption are anathema 
to a governm ent agency. Wherever possible, loans are restricted tightly  
to  the financing o f  productive activity — variable inputs, land 
im provement (though never the purchase o f  land, significantly), bullock  
purchase and irrigation.
The im portance o f credit in rural and agricultural developm ent 
cannot be overestim ated. From the experience o f  the village in which 
I lived in the Kosi region o f  North Bihar, it seemed clear that access 
to  the new technological resources associated with the ‘Green 
R evolution’ is essentially a problem of access to credit. The lAAP  
consists o f  a public supply system  for seeds and fertilizer, alongside 
o f which are institutions for the extension o f  credit from public 
sources. To obtain m aximum effect from the use o f  new seeds (HYV  
and Improved), the cultivator must simultaneously use fertilizer; 
have an ensured and regular water supply; perform extra weeding 
operations; and prepare the plot more carefully with cross ploughings. 
Som e new form s o f m echanization are regarded as part o f  this process, 
although on ly  som e are indispensable (e.g. tube-well borings and 
pump sets in areas w ithout canal irrigation) and others are substitutes 
for labour, especially on larger holdings, such as tractors. Costs o f  
production are increased as a result o f  these innovations, but there 
is o f  course the expectation  o f  higher yields to  com pensate for the 
increased level o f  investment.
It is explicitly  recognized that the majority o f  peasants do not 
have sufficient savings from their previous agricultural activity, or 
econom ic status, to  make the required investments. It is also 
appreciated in the lAAP that if peasants were solely dependent on 
private sources o f  credit, the high interest rates charged w ould make 
the innovations very unattractive. The lender would literally reap 
the increased harvest as repaym ent o f exorbitant interest rates, and 
in the event o f  failure to obtain an enhanced yield  the peasant would 
be set on a rapid downward spiral. Thus an im portant corollary o f 
the public supply system  for seed and fertilizer is the extension o f 
governm ent credit, where the rates o f  interest are betw een 6-8% 
annually instead o f 20-36% (or higher).
Where governm ent credit is relatively so cheap, it is difficult to see 
why peasants might prefer alternative sources o f credit, yet they  
frequently do. The major advantage o f governm ent loans seems to
I
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be the inefficient procedure o f insisting on repayments. Otherwise 
they are criticized for their inflexib ility . The loans which emanate 
from the logic o f the social form ation — m oneylenders, landlords, 
rich peasants, shopkeepers — reflect one important feature o f  that 
logic; the unpredictable environm ent o f  agricultural production. A 
credit system  has to  be sufficiently flexib le to cope with crop failures 
due to droughts, floods, freak hail storm s, and input bottlenecks. 
Such flex ib ility  depends either upon trust or upon the certainty that 
the obligation to  repay can be sustained through sanctions. Both 
o f  these conditions clearly exist w ithin the rural socio-econom ic  
structure where relationships are multi-stranded. It is these sorts o f  
conditions which have to  be fulfilled rather than simple estimates 
o f  return on investm ent before credit transactions can occur in such 
an erratic climate for production. Before credit transactions with  
the governm ent can be given a satisfactory basis, similar allowances 
w ill have to  be made.
Furthermore it is quite clear that m any government loans intended  
for productive purposes end up financing som e form  o f  consum ption  
expenditure: often  the repayment o f  outstanding debts incurred in 
other structures, but also underwriting urgent food requirements, 
or doctor's fees, court expenses, or necessary ritual observations. 
The single-stranded transactional relationship betw een official and 
client, an alien relationship to  the socio-econom ic environm ent o f  
the peasant, cannot cope with these sorts o f needs. Their 
multi-dimensional characteristics are at odds with the bureaucratic 
criteria o f  rationality, even though a failure to  extend a loan for 
consum ption is likely to maintain a peasant in a network o f obligations 
from which the productive loan is intended to extract him. In practice, 
o f  course, governm ent loans for production and private sources o f  
credit for consum ption tend to be comparable because the procedures 
for the repaym ent o f  governm ent loans are so inefficient. The peasant 
has to  calculate whether to take a private loan for consum ption, or 
whether to run the risk o f  taking a governm ent loan and using it for 
an im mediate need with the intention o f  defaulting. Alongside this, 
there is the more normal calculation — whether the effort o f  gaining 
access to the administrative services is w orthwhile in the first place.
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THE CIRCULARITY OF REFORMIST ANALYSIS
This analysis o f  access to  credit and new agricultural resources and 
technology brings us to  a similar conclusion as for the administration 
o f  land reform measures. The characteristics o f  the agrarian social 
system , both in terms o f  its undifferentiated structures and in the 
em ergence o f  a dom inant class with increasing power over the state 
apparatus, inhibit the application o f bureaucratic rationality and 
egalitarian ideology. In this context, it is interesting to ponder on  
the circularity o f reformist analysis and solutions to  this impasse. 
Thus Ladejinsky, after a field trip to the Kosi region, wrote:
It is not the fault o f  the new technology that the credit service does not serve 
those for whom it was originally intended; that the extension services are not 
living up to expectations; that the panchayats are political rather than 
developmental bodies; that security of tenure is the luxury of the few; that 
rents are exorbitant; that ceilings on agricultural land are notional; that for 
the greater part tencurial legislation is deliberately miscarried; or that wage 
scales are hardly sufficient to keep body and soul together. These are man-made 
institutional inequities. (Ladejinsky 1969).
The analysis here is correct, but it is precisely because this system  
consists o f man-made institutional inequities that they are not 
susceptible to  removal by sleight o f  hand. Thus it is not legitimate 
for Ladejinsky to  proceed to a conclusion in which he argues that ‘even 
if on ly  som e o f  them  are dealt w ith — security o f  tenure, reasonable 
rent and credit to  sustain production needs — a measure o f  econom ic 
and social justice could be fused with econom ic necessity. . . .’ Such 
a conclusion is a pathetic hope and cannot be logically related to 
his foregoing analysis. In trying to  defend the neutrality o f  the new  
technology, the structural problem is denied where the inequities 
them selves constitute both the problem o f  transfer distribution  
strategies through land reform and the problem o f  access.
CONCLUSION
We have been pursuing the relationship betw een the formal 
administrative process and the characteristics o f the region’s social 
form ation, identifying the decline o f the administrator’s authority 
and status and the diminishing autonom y o f  the post-colonial state. 
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rich peasant-cum-landlord establishes itself in the countryside and 
finds its political expression through populist ideologies and reformist 
agrarian strategies, the m ost radical features o f  which cannot be 
im plemented by virtue o f the econom ic and social strength o f  that 
class. We have further pointed out that this strength is partly situated  
within a multi dim ensional agrarian logic (quasi-feudal, if a label is 
required) to  which the principles o f  bureaucratic rationality are barely 
relevant. Administration has no im m unity from social processes, but 
it is ironic that the post-colonial adm inistration o f  rural developm ent 
increasingly lacks even the relative autonom y to  adjust to these 
processes as its imperial predecessor had done. The administration's 
retreat into bureaucratic instrum entality is a dialectical response 
to the assertion o f  a new  rural gentry over the state, and the egalitarian 
objectives o f  rural developm ent recede even further. This administrative 
contradiction reinforces those in the social form ation itself, and must 
then turn our attention m ore and more to  the role o f  peasant 
movem ents in rural developm ent rather than that o f  the state.
NOTES
1. The ‘region’ refers to the command area for canal irrigation which 
includes only part o f the two districts of Purnea and Saharsa. However, there 
are additional special development schemes (e.g. Small Farmers Development 
Agency) which include areas outside the water command area.
2. Cohorts of trainees are referred to as ‘batch-mates’.
3. The framework was hierarchical, with different levels encompassing 
increasingly large geographical units, composed of core roles at each level from 
village through thana (or block or circle) to District, Division and Province. 
The dominant image was o f area administration, characterized by ‘line’ as 
opposed to ‘sta ff, dealing with the stable and the known. (See Mars 1974, 
321-336, and Schaffer 1969, 190).
4. It is worth noting that this conversation took place after we had both 
attended a lengthy, open-air meeting of a Block Development Committee which 
had really been a gathering o f local political leaders and their followers with 
the main officials o f  the area.
5. The contradiction takes the following form. Surplus is extracted from 
sharecroppers by virtue o f the quasi-feudal mode. However, that surplus is now 
used to bring land directly under cultivation o f  the landlord, who thus becomes 
a rich farmer, and the sharecropper is removed from the land. Thus the relations 
of appropriation function not to reproduce the relations o f expropriation but
Rural Developm ent and the Post-Colonial State 
to undermine and transform them.
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Bureaucracy and the Post-Colonial 
State in South Asia: a Reply
Geof Wood
Moore’s reading of my article ‘Rural Development and the Post- 
Colonial State’ (hereafter RD&PCS) is evidence that some further 
clarification is required on several interrelated issues: the use o f  the 
term ‘relative autonomy’ when describing the post-colonial state in 
South Asia and my criticisms; assumptions made about the signi­
ficance of  the transition from a colonial to post-colonial 
bureaucracy; and the paradox of an increasing bureaucratization of  
service alongside the ideological imperative to work with precisely 
those groups of  rural people whose rationality was at variance with 
that of the bureaucracy. In the space available for a reply, I will 
concentrate upon the issues raised by Moore; and will seek another 
occasion to extend the discussion on the problems of  conceptualiz­
ing the poor-country state — that is, relating a discussion of  institu­
tional processes to the analysis o f  post-colonial social formations.
A simple objection to the notion of ‘relative autonomy’ does not 
remove the problem of characterizing the state. Most expressions 
are inadequate as concepts especially when the dictionary is 
resorted to! And a failure on my part to adopt the controversial 
epistomological position of  ‘opposing concepts with concepts’ does
! not imply the uncritical acceptance of  the formulation of a problem chosen as the point of departure; otherwise Moore would be guilty |i o f  the same since he has offered no solutions to the terminological
I problems which he identifies.
Development and Change (SAGE, London and Beverly Hills), Vol. 11 (1980), 149-156
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\  general  senirce o f  con tu s i on  is that  d i f fe r en t  explanation,-,  o f  
' the  relat ive a u t o n o m y  o f  the s t ate '  a r e  p r e sent ed  in the l i te ra ture  
und e rm in in g  the credibi l i ty o f  the no t i on  as a consi s ten t  theoret i ca l  
objec t .  A par t icu l ar  di f f icul ty  is .Alavi’s h i j a cked  use o f  the t e rm to 
reveal the specit ' icity o f  the  post -coloni a l  s t ate  in Pak i s t an  ( and  by 
impl i ca t i on  e lsewhere in ex-Bri t i sh S ou t h  .Asia) d r awing  eclect ical ly 
u pon  f r agm en ta ry  e lements  which  on ly  a p p ro x i m a t e d  co he rence  in 
thei r  or iginal  context .  The  E ig h te e n th  B ru m a ire  o f  L o u is  
B o n a p a r te  is used to highl ight  ‘relat ive a u t o n o m y ’ as a specific 
charact er i s t i c  o f  the pos t -coloni al  s t ate  (in con t r a s t  to  the  so-cal led 
p r ima ry  .Marxist \ iew o f  the  s tate as an i n s t rumen t  o f  the rul ing 
cldSj in adva nc ed  capital ist  societies) by subs t i t u t i ng  ‘c om pe t i ng  
but  not  conf l ic t ing p rope r t ied  c las ses ’ for  f r a c t i o n s  o f  the 
bourgeoi sie ;  and  by comb in in g  Fred R iggs ’s worr i es  a b o u t  an  over-  
ins t i tu t ional i zed  ex-colonial  bu rea uc r acy  (Riggs 1961, 1964) with 
M a r x ' s  ’host  o f  off icia ls .  . . th i s  appa l l i ng  paras i t i c  body  which 
enmeshes  the body o f  F r ench  society l ike a net  and  chokes  all its 
p o re s ’ ( .MESW 1970; 169) to p ro du ce  the ove rdeve loped  s t ate  a p ­
pa ra tus .
The  ‘. M i h u s s e n a n ’ Marxis t s ,  howeve r ,  P ou l a n i z a s  in pa r t icu la r ,  
have  presen ted  an  accoun t  o f  the  ‘relat ive a u t o n o m y  o f  the s t a t e ’ as 
a general  cond i t i on  o f  societies d o m i n a t e d  by the  capi ta l i s t  m o d e  o f  
p rodu c t i on  (P ou l a n t z a s  1973). The  basis o f  this p ropos i t i on  is 
M a r x ’s discuss ion o f  capi ta l i s t  g r ou nd - r e n t ,  a n d  l abou r  rent  in p a r ­
t icular  {Capita l  Vol.  I l l :  790-91).  In pre-capi t al i s t  mo d es  o f  p ro ­
duct i on  surp lu s - l abou r  has to  be ex to r t ed  f ro m the l ab ou re r  ' by  
o the r  t han  economic  p r e s su re ’ (i.e. t h ro u g h  t he  poli t ical  re l at i ons  
o f  p roper ty)  since the r e l at i on  o f  real  ap p ro p r i a t i o n  is essent ial ly 
char ac t er i zed by the  un ion  o f  the di rect  p r o du ce r  and  the mean s  o f  
p rod uc t i on ,  a l t hough  va r i a t i ons  o f  this un ion  were set out  in Pre- 
Capita lis t  E c o n o m ic  F o rm a t io n s .  The  d is t i nguish ing  f ea tu re  o f  
capi tal i s t  re l at i ons  o f  p ro du c t i o n  is tha t  t he  direct  p r od uc e r  is 
s epa r a t ed  f rom the p roduc t  by vi r tue  o f  his s epa r a t i o n  f r om the 
means  o f  p roduc t i on  in the  re l at i on o f  real a p p ro p r i a t i o n .  Surplus-  
value is p roduc ed  via this s epa ra t i on  an d  in the  proces s  l abou r  is 
conver t ed  into a c o m m o d i ty ,  con t ro l l ed  by  the  ma rk e t  and  ‘p r o ­
t e c t e d ’ by  bou rgeo i s  f r eedoms.  T hus  in pre-capi t al i s t  m od es  o f  p ro ­
duc t i on .  while ther e  is an incons is t ency  be tween  s epa ra t i on  in re l a­
t ions  o f  proper tv and  un ion  in re la t i ons  o f  real ap p ro p r i a t i o n ,  a 
co r r e sp ond enc e  exists in the capi ta l i s t  m o d e  o f  p r o du c t i o n  (i.e. 
s epar a t i on  in bo th  relat ions)  which cons t i t u te s  t he  logical  u n d e r p i n ­
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n ing  fo r  an  ab s t r ac t  s ep a r a t i on  o f  the  e c o n o m i c  an d  pol i t ical  ( and  
o th e r )  i ns tance s.  Since a Ma rx i s t  ana lys is  ins is t s  u p o n  the d o m i n a n t  
role  o f  t he  ec o n o m i c  i ns t ance ,  the  act ivi ty  o f  the  pol i t i ca l  i n s t ance  
(or  p roce sses )  c a n n o t  be ent i re l y a u t o n o m o u s .  But  pol i t i cal  p r o ­
cesses,  a n d  t h e  s ta te  in pa r t i cu l a r ,  in the cap i ta l i s t  m o d e  o f  p r o d u c ­
t ion  possess  t he  logical  s t a t u s  o f  a  s e p a r a t e  i n s t ance  (i .e.  o f  
speci f ic i ty)  w h ich  — in t he  real  w o r l d  o f  c lass  r e l a t i ons ,  class s t r u g ­
gles,  the  i nc ohe re nce  o f  c ap i t a l ,  a n d  b u r e a u c r a t i z a t i o n  — p revent s  
the i r  a p p e a r a n c e  as an  e p i p h e n o m e n o n .  T h i s  is bo th  t he  d e n o t a t i o n  
a n d  c o n n o t a t i o n  o f  t he  ‘re l at i ve  a u t o n o m y  o f  t he  s t a t e ’ to  the  
A l thus se r i a n s .
Th i s  f o r m  o f  t heor i z ing  a b o u t  t he  r e l a t i on  be tween  t he  social  f o r ­
m a t i o n  a n d  t h e  ch a r a c t e r  o f  t he  s t a t e  has  i m p o r t a n t  im p l i ca t i ons  
for  t he  analys is  o f  the p o o r  c o u n t r y  s t a t e ,  b u t  it s hou ld  n o w  be clear  
t ha t  Alavi  d id  not  m a k e  u se ’ o f  th is  c o nc e p t  o f  ‘relat ive 
a u t o n o m y ’ , an obse rv a t i on  m a d e  less c lear ly  by me  in R D & P C S  
(312-13).  .Alavi ' s use  o f  the  t e rm  d e pe n ds  u p o n  a c o n j u n c t u r e  in the 
social  f o r m a t i o n  when  the  r e l a t i ons  be t we en  d i f f e r en t  p ro p e r t i e d  
classes a r e  in equ i l i b r i um an d  c rea t e  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  f or  an  
ov e rd eve lo ped  s t a te  a p p a r a t u s  to  m ed i a t e  be tw ee n  t hem .  Th is  is no t  
the  ‘ 18th B r u m a i r e ’ no t i on  o f  t r an sc en d en ce  ove r  f r a c t i ons  o f  
c ap i t a l ,  a n d  ca rr i es  wi th it the  imp l i ca t i on  (p a r a d o x i c a l  in the  c o n ­
text o f  P o u l a n t z a s ’s scheme)  t ha t ,  i f  in po s t - co lon i a l  societ ies  
capi t a l i s t  f o r ms  o f  p ro pe r t y  b e c o m e  inc r ea s ing ly  d o m i n a n t  ove r  
o the r s ,  the  ‘re la t ive a u t o n o m y ’ o f  t he  s t a te  w o u l d  d i s ap pe a r  
because  t he  s cop e  fo r  m ed i a t i o n  be twee n  p r op e r t i e d  classes in 
equ i l i b r i um  n o  l onge r  exis ted.  In A l a v i ’s use o f  t he  t e r m ,  ‘re la t ive 
a u t o n o m y ’ was  no t  on l y  a pecu l i a r  cha r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  the  p o s t ­
co lon i a l  s t a t e  b u t  has t o  be a t e m p o r a r y  f ea t u r e  — dec l i ning  
precisely as capi t al i s t  f o r m s  o f  p ro p e r ty  r ise t o  p r o m in e n c e .
In R D & P C S  the  paral le l  p ro po s i t i on  co n ce rn i n g  t he  post -  
co lon i a l  e m a s cu l a t i o n  o f  the  o v e r de ve lo p ed  c ha ra c t e r  o f  t he  i n ­
he r i ted co lon i a l  s t a te  a p p a r a t u s  was  de v e lo p e d  t o  r e i n fo r ce  this 
analys is  o f  the  p a r ad o x i ca l  im p l i ca t i ons  o f  A l a v i ’s use o f  ‘relat ive 
a u t o n o m y ’; to p rov i de  an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  the  i ncr eas ing  
b u re a u c r a t i z a t i o n  o f  service;  an d  t h e r eb y  t o  f ocus  u p o n  t h e  i n a p ­
p ro p r i a t e ne s s  o f  ad min i s t r a t i ve  style for  c lasses  o f  the ru r a l  p oo r .
T h u s  f a r  f r om  ad o p t i n g  A lav i ’s co nce p t  o f  ‘re l a t i ve  a u t o n o m y ’, 
it was i n v o k e d  in R D & P C S  to p o i n t  o u t  its l i m i t a t i ons  a n d  in p a r ­
t i cular  t o  cha l l enge his a s s u m p t i o n  o f  co n t i n u i t y  in the  s t a t e ’s 
d o m i n a t i o n  ove r  i nd igenous  classes a f t e r  i nd ep en de nc e .  .Moore is
152 G e o f  ^^'ood
especially wrong in his Note 15, therefore, to suggest that Alavi and 
I share the view that ‘independence resulted in a sudden change in 
the relationship of  the state apparatus to society’. Alavi emphasizes 
that the state continues to exercise dominance over indigenous 
social classes through its inherited overdeveloped apparatus and its 
peculiar opportunity to employ this capacity to mediate between 
different propertied classes. W hat changes for Alavi, o f  course, is 
the partial liberation o f  the post-colonial state from its position 
solely as an instrument of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. Where I 
differ from Alavi is to attribute greater significance to the institu­
tionalization of  political processes after independence, thus con­
cluding tha t ‘the post-colonial society may inherit an 
“ overdeveloped apparatus o f  s tate” , but not for long’ (RD&PCS: 
309).
With his criticism o f  my characterization o f  the colonial state ap­
paratus, Moore misconstrues my use o f  autonomy which was in­
tended to refer to the relation between the colonial state and in­
digenous classes and not just to ‘society’ as Moore suggests 
(Moore: 142). In the colonial period even more than now, if the 
term ‘society’ is to be used it would have to include metropolitan 
classes, and no-one is suggesting that the colonial state was 
autonomous of the metropolitan bourgeoisie! Thus while I refer to 
the political domination of  the colonial administration over all in­
digenous classes (RD&PCS: 308) Moore (141) should have com­
pleted my sentence: ‘ . . .  even though it may have represented the 
interests of some of those classes more than others’ (RD&PCS: 
308). So 1 have not heuristically simplified the account, but have 
allowed for the successful articulation of  some indigenous class in­
terests prior to independence (as any student of inter-war Indian 
history must). Of course it was precisely my contention that col­
onial administration compromised with local social processes 
(RD&PCS: 309); and I further observed that ‘the Indian Civil Ser­
vice (ICS) had long been recruiting Indian personnel, so that in­
dividuals as well as the institution had to adjust to the formal cur­
tailment o f  their power, authority  and status’ (Ibidem: 308).
In developing his remarks concerning the colonial s ta te’s rela­
tionship to ‘society’ (Moore: 141-45), Moore cites the work of 
Washbrook on the Madras Presidency to refute the notion o f  the 
dominance of the colonial state apparatus over society with the 
conclusion that the connections between state and society were few, 
with revenue as the major one (Ibidem: 142). There are several p ro­
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blems with this part o f  the discussion. First my position is being 
vulgarized for the purposes of  attack by a misrepresentation of my 
own remarks. In RD&PCS (309) I argued that:
The image presented by the ICS was one o f  control over its ‘environment’. This is 
not to say that it controlled all social processes in the society, but it dominated those 
aspects o f the society which defined its area o f  responsibility — for example, the 
system o f  revenue collection and the institutions o f law and order. Furthermore it 
had a complex ideology legitimating this control and dom ination, combining themes 
o f  racial superiority and paternalism with a tolerance o f institutions and practices 
which, although sometimes at odds with its own culture, did not subvert the imperial 
preoccupation with ensuring a stable environment for trade, commodity production 
and revenue collection.
I cited Stokes (1959) and W oodruff  (1953), but even W ashbrook 
and I do not seem that far apart even though, secondly, his conclu­
sions were based on the Madras Presidency rather than the Bengal 
Presidency where the colonial intrusion was longer though less 
direct, but not less dominant and pervasive for that. The difference 
between colonial practices was of  course particularly evident over 
the regularization of  land records. It is difficult, thirdly, to know 
what meaning Moore attributes to Seal’s conclusion o f  the colonial 
s ta te’s dependence  on locally-dominant groups. ‘Dependence’ here 
should clearly refer to the pragmatic and flexible capacity o f  col­
onial administrators to compromise with and tolerate non-critical 
behaviour (in the sense of  not having the potential to challenge the 
imperial presence) o f  locally powerful groups, thus avoiding the 
enormous administrative and military costs of suppression. Any 
stronger meaning of dependence seems to deny the existence of  the 
Raj altogether. Fourthly, it is not the number of  connections bet­
ween state and society which matters (and this form of description 
is anyway too mechanistic and undialectical) but their significance, 
and an equation between ‘few visible connections’ between state 
and society and my use o f  the term ‘au tonom y’ seems to be blatant 
solecism. Finally, the discussion (Moore: 144) about the absence of 
regular resort to coercion as evidence o f  the circumscribed power of 
the colonial state not only ignores my points about ideology and 
pragmatic tolerance o f  local practices, but also fails to refer to the 
substantial literature on the role of ideological state apparatuses.
In pointing out that the power o f  the colonial state was not ab­
solute, there still seems to be some commonsense virtue in referring
I ' i  f V f ' . ' ü o f W
îc> its dominance .  By ack now ledg ing  the p r e - i ndepcndencc  l imi t a­
t ions both to it's author i t y and  mo re  impor t an t l y  its a t t em p t s  to 
esiabli.sh a perva.sive sys tem o f  West ern  l iberal  values ,  no - one  is 
p r ec luded f rom a rgu ing  tha t  increas ing poli t ical  pressure  on  a 
former ly d o m i n a n t  but  not  ab so lu t e  publ ic  bu rea uc r acy  occur r ed  
a f t e r  i ndependence .  It is a s t a nd a rd  ove r - r eac t ion  o f  the d e p e n d e n ­
cy school  o f  t hough t  to r egard the a t t a i nm en t  o f  i ndepend en ce  in 
former ly colonial  societies as an ins igni f icant  event .
At  issue, howeve r ,  is the  effect  o f  this p res sure  (or  a l te rnat ive ly 
exposure)  u pon  the  p e r f o rm a n c e  o f  the s tate  app a r a t u se s .  By 
present ing  m y  p rob l ema t i c  as one  o f  eff ic iency .Moore has  ser iously 
mi sun de r s t oo d  my  concerns .  T h e  p rob l e m with ‘ef t ' iciency’ is that  
it is not  a neut r al  concep t  an d  ca nn o t  easi ly be used for c o m ­
parat i ve  purposes ,  since it h as  to be used in specific con t ex t s  o f  p a r ­
t i cular  object ives ,  f unc t i ons ,  re sources ,  c apac i ty ,  an d  so on.
The  con tr as t  is no t  be tween  a coloni a l  bu reauc ra t i c  eff iciency 
which decl ines a f t e r  i ndependence;  I have  a l r eady  po in t ed  out  that  
the ICS was concerned  to  p ro du ce  an im age  o f  con t ro l  over  its en ­
v i ronment  — an a p pe a r an c e  o f  r a t i onal  m an a g e m e n t  as p a n  o f  the 
colonial  s tate ideology.  So I do  not  agree  yvith Mi s ra  that  the 
bu rea uc racy  was m or e  eff icient  in the coloni al  per i od because  the 
no t i on  o f  eff iciency i tself is an aspect  o f  bu reauc ra t i c  ideology . 
Mi sra  presents  the co nve n t i ona l  view o f  a bu rea uc racy  t ha t  moves 
away f rom an  adhe rence  to  the bu reauc ra t i c  style o f  adm in i s t r a t i on  
a f t e r  i ndependence .  I have  op p o se d  this viecv precisely because  o f  
the  evidence o f  coloni al  ad mi n i s t r a t o r s  like W o o d r u f f  that  with 
respect  bo th  to overal l  coloni a l  admin i s t r a t i ve  pol icy as well as the 
prac t ice  o f  provincia l  an d  dis tr ict  ad mi n i s t r a t i on ,  the  style o f  a d ­
min is t ra t ion  was p r a gm a t i c  a nd  flexible,  dep en d in g  highly up on  the 
discret ion o f  the local  of f icer .  A  read ing  o f  coloni al  of f ic ers '  t our  
r epor t s  wou ld  d em ons t r a t e  this.
It is t rue,  as M o o r e  suggests ,  t ha t  pub li c  servants ,  especial ly 
senior  ones in India ,  b e m o a n  the  decl ine in thei r  s t a tu s  and  a u th o r i ­
ty and  look back fondly  to  t he  pos i t ion  o f  thei r  predecessor^  — but 
it is more  a ref erence  to  an  au tho r i t y  which a l l owed t hem to exer­
cise discret ion,  f o r mu l a t e  local  pol icy and  m a ke  decis ions ,  ra ther  
t ha n  envy t ha t  thei r  p redecesso rs  were  able  to  fol low bu reauc ra t i c  
p rocedures  w i thout  pol i t ical  in te r fe rence.  1 am  cer ta inly a rguing 
tha t  the decl ine in a field a d m i n i s t r a t o r ’s au tho r i t y  requi re^ ' h a t  he 
regulates  his rela t ions  wi th his i nt angibl e,  volat i le  en v i r onm en t  o f  
popul i s t  ideolomes via a r ecou rse  to  bu reauc ra t i c  p roce dm since
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the claim to the earlier form of authority is no longer axaiiahie t o  
him. If the term efficiency was to be employed in the analysis, one 
would then argue that its basis had changed from performance bas­
ed on authority and discretion to performance based on greater 
adherence to standardized procedures of  action and case-law. This 
is clearly not a question of  more or less, but a reflection of the 
change in administrative ideology.
My principal argument which need not be repeated at length here 
was that this involuntary shift of administrative ideology, changing 
the style of  interaction between official and rural class, constituted 
a bias against those rural classes whose position in the relations of 
production prevented them from experiencing and interacting with 
the rationality implied in this process of bureaucratization. Access 
problems may be highly inconvenient to classes of  the rural poor 
who are excluded from a service, but highly desirable for other 
classes and the survival both of  the regime and the state ap­
paratuses. Any discussion which employs the notion of efficiency 
must always include the question — for whom?
As for contemporary evidence, my thinking was based upon the 
observation of these processes by residing in a village of  different 
classes of  peasants; witnessing their interactions with different 
categories of  officials; attendance at meetings involving peasants, 
administrators and politicians together as well as separately; long 
discussions with senior field administrators in North Bihar (and 
elsewhere); as well as being a privileged witness to their daily round 
of meetings, tours, career aspirations and family ambitions. There 
is an important issue of methodology — how else do you obtain 
and interpret primary data on the real behaviour of  officials which 
will at the same time facilitate generalization?
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ABSTRACT
The theme of this paper is that access has to be discussed along a number 
of dimensions simultaneously, and that the language of discussion must 
discard the 'David and Goliath’ metaphor of the individual versus the 
large organisation. Access is a relationship which occurs systematically 
not by chance. Its structural forms are determined by the formation and 
dissolution of social classes. The precise transitional conjuncture in 
India involves a high level of state intervention in the rural economy, 
politicising the diffusion of technology and its bureaucratic management.
The ascendance of the capitalist mode of production (albeit distorted) in 
Indian agriculture does not merely establish a clash of rationalities between 
government and peasant, it is a process of state discrimination against 
poorer classes of peasantry articulated both through the content of the 
service and the style of its delivery. Although access is more about power 
than rationality, to be examined more by reference to class struggle than 
culture, certain groups and classes are structurally unable through both 
processes to connect with alien criteria of resource allocation. At the same 
time the development of the bourgeois state and the transformation of rich 
peasants into rural capitalists cannot be completed without the incorporation 
of petty owners, tenants and labourers for the appropriation of their surplus 
value. This is maintained through the ideology of inclusion (populism) which 
presents access as an opportunity rather than a problem, and operates through 
the language of community, target groups, special programmes, extension and • 
decentralisation. The inadequacy of these responses is suggested by the 
paradox that too little or too much administrative control can have a similar 
result: too little permits locally dominant classes to captured goods and
services, too much strengthens the interests of classes represented in the 
state apparatuses. Since the paper avoids an unhelpful call to arms, readers 
might enjoy the irony of a concluding note on the classical preoccupation with 
accountability even though the suggested means for securing it are more 
radically grounded in the assumption that autonomous productive activity (for 
the poor) is a precondition for an autonomous (therefore meaningful) political 
presence in the society. The entire discussion is pursued in the context of 
material collected during fieldwork in the North-East of Bihar State, India 
where land reform, irrigation and intensive agricultural programmes have been 
undertaken since the early sixties.
The K o si r e g io n  l i k e  an i n c r e a s i n g  number o f  o th e r  a r e a s  in  I n d ia
s in c e  t h e  m i d - f i f t i e s  
h a s  b een  / t h e s e t t i n g  f o r  m ajo r s t a t e - i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t r a t e g i e s  in
th e  e c o lo g y  and in  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  w ith  r a m i f i c a t i o n s  th ro u g h o u t  th e
s o c i a l  s t r u c t u r e  . T hose s t r a t e g i e s  s e e k  to  d i s t u r b  th e  im p a c t n o t  o n ly
o f  e c o lo g i c a l  v a r i a b l e s  ( th ro u g h  th e  em bankm ent, b a r r a g e  and  c a n a l
sy stem ) , b u t  a l s o  econom ic ones c o n c e rn e d  w ith  th e  s u p p ly  o f  i n p u t s ,
g e n e r a t io n  o f  dem and, th e  o p p o r tu n i ty  c o s t s  o f  f a c t o r s  o f  p r o d u c t io n ,
t h e  p a t t e r n  o f  s a v in g s  and in v e s tm e n t  -  i n  s h o r t  t h e  econom ic and  s o c i a l
s t r u c t u r e  o f  a c c u m u la t io n  from  a g r i c u l t u r e .
The c e n t r a l  f e a t u r e  o f  th o s e  s t r a t e g i e s  h a s  b e e n  a d i s t r i b u t i o n  
sy s te m  f o r  goods and s e r v i c e s  w hich  i s  n o t  b a s e d  on th e  m a rk e t, w here 
th e  key  r e q u ir e m e n t  i s  d i s p o s a b le  in co m e , o r  a s s e t s  w hich  can  e a s i l y  
be c o n v e r te d  f o r  t r a n s a c t i o n s . A ccess becom es im p o r ta n t  w here, 
th e  s t a t e  i n te r v e n e s  t o  a f f e c t  th e  s u p p ly  and demand f o r  r e s o u r c e s  so  t h a t  
t h e i r  a l l o c a t i o n  depends l e s s ,  o r  n o t  a t  a l l  on m a rk e t o r t r a d i t i o n a l  
a l l o c a t i o n  m echanism s . The r e s o u r c e s  c h o se n  f o r  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  a r e  
n e c e s s a r i l y  v e ry  s c a r c e  b u t  c r i t i c a l  t o  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  
i n  a g r i c u l t u r e .  W ith  s t a t e - i n t e r v e n t i o n , t h e  mode o f  a l l o c a t i o n  becom es 
b u r e a u c r a t i c . The p u rp o se  o f  th e  b u r e a u c r a t  i c  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  t o  
re d u c e  th e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  th e  d i s p o s a b le  incom e f a c t o r  (and o th e r  
m ore t r a d i t i o n a l  and a s c r i p t i v e  b a s e s  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n )  i n  g a in in g  
a c c e s s  t o  r e s o u r c e s  . T h is  i s  a t te m p te d  by e s t a b l i s h i n g  r u l e s  o f  
i n c l u s io n  and e x c lu s io n ,  and by m a in ta in in g  a f ix e d  p r i c e  f o r  th o s e  
w ith  th e  n e c e s s a ry  q u a l i f i c a t i o n s .  The r u l e s  f o r  i n c l u s i o n ,  th e  
c r i t e r i a  o f  a c c e s s ,  v a ry  a c c o rd in g  t o  o b j e c t iv e s  and in  p r a c t i c e  o f te n  
d iv e rg e  from  th e  fo rm a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  th em .
The p r e o c c u p a t io n  w ith  a c c e s s  r e f e r s  t o  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and th e  d i f f e r e n t  r u r a l  c l a s s e s  r e p r e s e n te d  in  th e  
K o si d ev e lo p m en t r e g i o n .  And w here th e  s u c c e s s  o f  th e  K o s i - ty p e ,  
m u l t i - p u rp o s e  d ev e lo p m en t programme dep en d s s o  c r i t i c a l l y  upon th e  
p r o v is io n  th ro u g h  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n s  o f  ( d i f f e r e n t )  b u n d le s  
o f  r e s o u r c e s  t o  d i f f e r e n t  ' t a r g e t *  g ro u p s , i t  i s  a x io m a tic  t h a t  su ch  
s u c c e s s  i s  d e te rm in e d  by th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e en  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  
and th e  a g r a r i a n  s o c i a l  f o r m a t io n .  The p u rp o se  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  i s  t o  
s u rv e y  th e  v a ry in g  a s p e c t s  o f  t h i s  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  i t  i s  c e r t a i n  t h a t  
p a r t s  o f  th e  d i s c u s s io n  w i l l  be f a m i l i a r ,  b u t  p e rh a p s  th e  c o m b in a tio n  
o f  a rg u m en ts  w i l l  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  a  f u r t h e r  a p p r e c i a t i o n  o f  th e  
w id e r  s o c i a l  p r o c e s s e s  in v o lv e d  in  th e  d e v e lo p m en t a c t i v i t y .
O b je c t iv e s  and h i s t o r i c a l  s p e c i f i c i t y
S t a r t i n g  w ith  a  d i s c u s s io n  o f  o b j e c t iv e s  may a p p e a r  p r o s a ic  b u t  t h e i r  
f o rm u la t io n  and r e f o r m u la t io n  f o r  K o si h a s  c o n s t i t u t e d  an im p o r ta n t  
p a r t  o f  th e  p ro b le m . However i t  i s  c e r t a i n l y  n o t  in te n d e d  to  
e s t a b l i s h  a c o n se n su s  on g o a ls  f o r  s u b s e q u e n t  e v a lu a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  
f u l f i l m e n t .  R a th e r  th e  p ro b lem  h a s  b een  t h a t  th e  g o a ls  o f  th e  K o si 
programme have  b een  d e r iv e d  from  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  w i th o u t  s u f f i c i e n t  
r e g a r d  f o r  th e  s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t io n s  o f  th e  r e g i o n .  T here  a r e  s e v e r a l  
i s s u e s  h e re  . The o r i g i n  o f  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  h a s  t o  be re g a rd e d  a s  
th e  p o l i t i c a l  outcom e o f  s o c i a l  p r o c e s s e s  u n d e rg o in g  a c o n fu se d  
p a t t e r n  o f  c h a n g e . I n  g e n e r a l  te rm s  a t r a n s f o r m a t io n  be tw een  form s 
o f  p r o p e r ty  i s  o c c u r r in g  -  th e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  u rb a n  and r u r a l  
b u r g e o i s i e s  and th e  d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  l a n d l o r d - t e n a n t  
r e l a t i o n s  -  a l th o u g h  s t i l l  i n  t r a n s i t i o n  and m a n if e s te d  by: some
r e t e n t i o n  o f  a g r a r i a n  p r e - c a p i t a l i s t  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s ;  th e  a c t i v i t y
o f  'a n te d i lu v i a n *  c a p i t a l ;  and ( c r i t i c a l l y  ) a  s t r a t e g i c  a l l i a n c e  
b e tw een  u rb a n  and r u r a l  b o u r g e o i s i e s ,  s t r u c t u r e d  a ro u n d  th e  c e n t r a l  
i s s u e  o f  th e  m a rk e ta b le  s u r p lu s  (B y res 1 9 7 4 ) .
T h e o r e t i c a l l y  t h i s  t r a n s f o r m a t io n  c o n s i s t s  o f  s e v e r a l  modes o f  
p r o d u c t io n  ( in  a  d i a l e t i c  o f  a s c e n d a n c e /d e s c e n d a n c e ) w hich  
to g e t h e r  c o n s t i t u t e  th e  s o c i a l  fo rm a tio n  a t  any  one tim e  
( A l th u s s e r  1969) . The dynam ic i n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  i s  p ro v id e d  b y  th e  
f o rm a tio n  and d i s s o l u t i o n  o f  c l a s s e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w ith  t h e s e  v a r io u s  modes 
o f  p r o d u c t io n ,  w hich  th u s  a l t e r s  th e  s t r u c t u r e s  o f  p o w er, p a t t e r n  o f  
a c c u m u la t io n , d o m inan t v a lu e s  and i d e o l o g i e s ,  la b o u r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  -  
i . e .  t h e  b a la n c e  o f  s o c i a l  f o r c e s  i n  t h e  s o c i e t y .  I n  th e  m a in ly  
d e m o c ra tic  e n v iro n m e n t o f  p o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i t y  i n  I n d i a ,  t h i s  t r a n s f o r m a t io n  
i s  r e s p o n s i b le  f o r  a  b ro a d  s e t  o f  p o l i c y  o b j e c t iv e s  -  o f t e n  d i f f u s e ,  
i n t a n g i b l e  and m u tu a l ly  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  -  r e f l e c t i n g  th e  need  f o r  
s u c c e s s f u l  n a t i o n a l  l e a d e r s h ip s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  when i n  c o a l i t i o n )  t o  
c o n s t r u c t  a  w ide  s u p p o r t  b a s e  th ro u g h  p o p u l i s t  id e o lo g y .
As a r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  p r o c e s s ,  n a t i o n a l  p o l ic y  f o r  r u r a l  and 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  d eve lopm en t com bines a  number o f  o b j e c t i v e s  -  m a rk e ta b le  
s u r p l u s ,  o u t p u t ,  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  e q u a l i t y ,  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  v i a b i l i t y  
o f  s m a l lh o ld in g s ,  r u r a l  em ploym ent, p o l i t i c a l  q u ie s e n c e  and  in c o r p o r a t io n ,  
b a s ic  n eed s  p r o v i s i o n ,  r e d u c t io n  i n  f lo w  o f  o u t - m ig r a t io n  from  r u r a l  
a r e a s , and so  o n . N ot a l l  o f  th o s e  o b j e c t i v e s  s h a re  th e  same 
cornâtm ent on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  governm en t and i t s  o f f i c i a l s . The 
q u e s t io n  m ust a lw ay s be a sk ed  -  w hich  c l a s s  i n t e r e s t s  a r e  r e p r e s e n te d  
by th e  s t a t e  i n  I n d ia ?  S h o u ld  we d i s t i n g u i s h  b e tw e en  p o l i c i e s  w hich  
a r e  g e n u in e  i n  th e  s e n se  t h a t  r e a l  p o l i t i c a l  and f i n a n c i a l  r e s o u r c e s  a r e
a l l o c a t e d  f o r  t h e i r  im p le m e n ta tio n  ( e . g .  c e r t a i n  fo rm s o f  
i r r i g a t i o n ,  v a r i a b l e  i n p u ts  and m e c h a n is a t io n ) , and th o s e  f o r  p o p u l i s t  
c o n su m p tio n  w here th e  r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  n o m in a l t o  le n d  c re d e n c e  
t o  th e  r h e t o r i c  ( e . g .  s m a ll  and m a rg in a l  fa rm e r  sc h em e s , r u r a l  p u b l ic  
w orks t o  p ro v id e  o f f - s e a s o n  em ploym ent o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,  a p p r o p r i a t e  
te c h n o lo g y  R and  D, la n d  r e f o r m , a p p r o p r i a t e  c r e d i t  d i s b u r s e m e n t ) ? 
w h i le  i n  p r i n c i p l e  m ost o f  th e s e  program m es w ere i n  o p e r a t io n  in  th e  
K o si r e g io n  s im u l ta n e o u s ly ,  t h e y  d id  n o t  a l l  e n jo y  t h e  same s t a t u s  
f o r  b o th  o f f i c i a l s  and t h e  r u r a l  l e a d e r s h i p .  F u r th e rm o re  th e  v a r io u s  
a g e n c ie s  and d e p a r tm e n ts  w ere p e rfo rm in g  on a b ro a d  f r o n t ,  t h e i r  own 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c a p a c i ty  s t r e t c h e d  t o  th e  p o i n t  o f  becom ing 
i n e f f e c t u a l  and c o n t in u o u s ly  o b l ig e d  t o  re sp o n d  e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y  t o  th e  
l a t e s t  i n i t i a t i v e s  from  D e lh i  u s u a l l y  th ro u g h  th e  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  
program m es and th e  p r o v is io n  o f  more e v a lu a t iv e  s t a t i s t i c s .
T h is  i m p r e s s i o n i s t i c  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  th e  i n t e g r a t e d  a r e a  programme 
a p p ro a c h  t o  r u r a l  d ev e lo p m en t i n  th e  K o si r e g io n  s h o u ld  n o t be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  a s  a c r i t i c i s m  o f  th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  a r e a  d e v e lo p m en t 
p l a n n in g .  On th e  c o n t r a r y  th e  a rg u m en t h e re  i s  t h a t  th e  a t te m p t  
a t  a r e a  d ev e lo p m en t i n  t h e  K o si r e g io n  was c o n t i n u a l l y  underm ined  by  
i t s  dep en d en ce  upon c e n t r a l  p o l i c y  f o rm u la t io n  ( c l a s s - b i a s e d  and 
p o p u l i s t ) , and  i t s  o c c a s io n a l  s t a t u s  a s  a sh o w p iece  f o r  I n d ia n  a r u r a l  
d ev e lo p m en t p la n n in g .  A lth o u g h  th e  im p le m e n ta tio n  ( p e r s o n n e l  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s )  was lo c a te d  in  t h e  r e g io n ,  th e  a n a ly s i s  and d ia g n o s e s  o f 
th e  K o s i r e g io n  w ere r a r e l y  c o n d u c te d  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  r s a a r c h  in  th e  
r e g io n  s o  t h a t  th e  p r e s c r i p t i o n s  f o r  K osi w ere b a s e d  on c r i t e r i a  w hich 
w ere e x t e r n a l l y  d e r iv e d .  The K o si D evelopm ent program me h a s  been  
an  e x e r c i s e  i n  a r e a  im p le m e n ta tio n  r a t h e r  th a n  a r e a  p l a n n in g .
In  a  s o c i e t y  a s  r i c h l y  d iv e r s e  a s  I n d i a ,  no r e g io n  c a n  s im p ly  
be r e g a r d e d  a s  a m icrocosm  o f  th e  w hole and th e r e b y  s u i t a b l e  f o r  
an e n t i r e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  th e  u n i v e r s a l  s o l u t i o n . The p r e o c c u p a tio n  
w ith  th e  m a rk e ta b le  s u r p lu s  i s  m ore l i k e l y  t o  b e  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  
P u n ja b /H a ry a n a , w h ile  N o r th -E a s t  B ih a r  s t i l l  n eed s  t o  be c o n c e rn e d  
w ith  b a s i c  n eed s  p r o v is io n  and r e d i s t r i b u t i o n .  B u t th e  i s s u e  o f  
h i s t o r i c a l  s p e c i f i c i t y  i s  more a c u te  th a n  t h i s  . U n le ss  th e  n a tu r e  
o f  a g rau rian  c l a s s  fo rm a tio n  f o r  a  p a r t i c u l a r  r e g io n  i s  u n d e rs to o d  
th e n  th e  e f f e c t  o f  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s t  s t r a t e g i e s  c a n n o t  
be p r e d i c t e d .  The programme im p lem en ted  i n  P u n ja b  may hav e  v e ry  
d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s  from  th e  same program me i n  N o r th -E a s t  B ih a r  .
S t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  c a n n o t  r e p l a c e  th e  e n t i r e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  a c c u m u la tio n  
from  a g r i c u l t u r e  ( a f t e r  a l l ) , i t  c a n  o n ly  a t  b e s t  c o n s t i t u t e  an  
in c r e m e n ta l  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  e x i s t i n g  p a t t e r n  o f  p r e s e n t  a l l o c a t i o n  
and th u s  i t s  im p a c t w i l l  be d e te rm in e d  by  th e  s o c i a l  f o r c e s  w hich 
a l r e a d y  e x i s t  i n  th e  r e g i o n .  I t  i s  a  f a m i l i a r  p o i n t ,  b u t  th e  
c o n c e p t  o f  p la n n in g  m ust c o n ta in  t h i s  d im e n s io n  o f  a p p r o p r i a t e  
know ledge and a n a ly s i s  .
The K o si 'e q u a t i o n * .
The r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e en  th e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  b a r r a g e  and
em bankm ents f o r  th e  K o si r i v e r ,  th e  c a n a l - i r r i g a t i o n
sy s te m  f o r  p a r t  o f  S ah a isa  and P u rn e a  d i s t r i c t s ,  t h e i r  d e s ig n a t io n
a s  a  d ev e lo p m en t r e g io n  and th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  th e  I n te n s iv e
c o m b in a tio n .
A g r i c u l tu r e  A rea Programme i s  now a  f a m i l i a r /  B u t t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
e q u a t io n ,  i f  n o t  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  a t  l e a s t  c o n ta in s  a  d i f f i c u l t  mix 
o f  c i r c u m s ta n c e s .
The perennial activity of the Kosi river had constituted one of 
the initial causes of the extreme poverty in the region through its 
capacity to flood and shift its course, but the river's movement westwards 
to its present position also created opportunities for the reclamation of 
land left at a low price during the century preceding the Kosi project.
An e x a m in a tio n  o f  th e  p o p u la t io n  d a ta  f o r  th e  r e g io n  i n d i c a t e s  a r a p id  
i n c r e a s e  b e tw een  1872 ( th e  f i r s t  fo rm a l c e n su s )  and  1891 i n  t h e  W e ste rn  
h a l f  o f  P u rn ea  D i s t r i c t  - Dhamdaha ràiî3i F o rb e s g a n j  a n c h a ls  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  
b u t  a l s o R u p a u lü , S a h a r a , B haw anipur and  B anm ankhi, (Wood 197g c h .5 ) .
D e s p i te  th e  young j in g le  l e f t  b e h in d  b y  th e  w estw ard  r i v e r ,  th e  low p r i c e  
o f  th e s e  l a r g e  t r a c t s  o f  th e  D harbang ja  R âj  e n c o u ra g e d  m ig r a t io n  from  
n e ig h b o u r in g  a r e a s  o f  B ih a r  -  v i z  .B h a g a lp u r , M onghyr, Dharba:ngia and P a tn a  
D i s t r i c t  -  w here la n d  was more e x p e n s iv e .  S m a ll la n d h o ld e r s  c o u ld  t r a n s f o r m  
th e m s e lv e s  i n t o  r e l a t i v e l y  leurge o n es  i f  th e y  w ere p re p a re d  t o  u n d e r ta k e  th e  
r i s k .  The e x t e n t  o f  Bhum ihar B rahm in la n d lo r d is m , t o g e th e r  w ith  
R a jp u ts ,  B e n ia s ,  B rahm ins and S h e ik h s , i n  th o s e  w e s te rn  a n c h a ls  
o r i g i n a t e s  from  th o s e  d e v e lo p m e n ts . However th e  n a tu r e  o f  t h e  t e r r a i n  
r e q u i r e d  e x te n s iv e  c l e a r i n g  a c t i v i t y  -  so  t h a t  th e  m ig r a t io n  a l s o  c o n s i s t e d  
o f  th e  r e c r u i tm e n t  o f  t r i b a l  g ro u p s l i k e  t h e  S a n th a l s  by t h i s  new c l a s s  
o f  r a i y a t s  and t e n u r e - h o ld e r s - .  As a r e s u l t  th e  in c id e n c e  o f  s h a re c ro p p in g  
was much h ig h e r  i n  th o s e  a r e a s  and th e  r a i y a t / k h a s  h o ld in g s  w ere (and 
rem ain ) th e  lao rg e s t i n  th e  r e g io n  (H osk ins 1976 c h a p t . 4 ) . I t  i s  a l s o  
i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  n o te  t h a t  i n  th e  37% r i s e  i n  p o p u la t io n  f o r  P u rn e a  
D i s t r i c t  be tw een  1951 and 1961 , th e  m ost d r a m a tic  i n c r e a s e  was i n  th e  
A r a r ia  S u b d iv is io n  (45%) w hich in c lu d e s  th e  th a n a s  o f  Ranigarg and 
Batrgama (59.6%) w here much la n d  was made s e c u re  from  th e  r i s k  o f  f lo o d in g  
by th e  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  em bankm ents a lo n g  th e  K o s i .  A lthough  im proved
m e d ic a l  c a r e  and a d e c l in e  in  t h e  m o r t a l i t y  r a t e  was r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  
some o f  t h i s  i n c r e a s e ,  th e  d i s a g g r e g a te d  r e g i o n a l  d a ta  s u g g e s ts  
c o n c e n t r a te d  a r e a s  o f  im m ig ra tio n  c o n n e c te d  w ith  th e  f o r tu n e s  o f  th e  
r i v e r . However t h i s  l a t e r  p h a se  o f  im m ig ra tio n  d id  n o t  in v o lv e  
landow n ing  c l a s s e s  t o  th e  same c o n te x t ,  and a f f e c t e d  m ore th e  i n c r e a s e d  
em ploym ent o p p o r tu n i t i e s  d i r e c t l y  o r  i n d i r e c t l y  p ro v id e d  by  th e  K osi 
p r o j e c t .  A t th e  same tim e  i t  in c r e a s e d  p r e s s u r e  upon th e  la n d  t o  
m a in ta in  a sy s te m  o f  p e t t y  l e a s i n g  and s h a re c ro p p in g  e v e n  i n  a r e a s  w here 
e s t a t e s  w ere n o t  so  l a r g e  (Ranigan j  and Beurgama) .
Those a s p e c t s  o f  th e  a g r a r i a n  h i s t o r y  i n  W e ste rn  p u rn e a  h av e  b e e n  
m en tio n ed  b r i e f l y  h e r e ,  s in c e  th e y  c o n s t i t u t e  b o th  an  exam ple  o f  th e  
k in d  o f  a n a ly s i s  w hich  n eed s  t o  be in c o r p o r a te d  i n t o  r e a l  a r e a  p la n n in g ,  
and b e c a u s e  th e y  p ro v id e  a b a s i s  f o r  u n d e r s ta n d in g  th e  la n d h o ld in g  
s t r u c t u r e  in  th e  a r e a , F u r th e rm o re  we have  p u r p o s e ly  r e f e r r e d  t o  d a ta  
w hich e m p h a s ise s  th e  c a u s a l  r o l e  o f  th e  r i v e r ,  s in c e  i t s  m anagem ent 
h a s  b e e n  th e  key v a r i a b l e  o f  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  th e  r e g i o n .  I t  i s ,  
f i n a l l y ,  r e l e v a n t  t o  n o te  th e  g e o g ra p h ic a l  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  H indus and 
M uslim s (38% o f  p o p u la t io n  in  1961) i n  th e  d i s t r i c t ;  i n  t h e  e a s t  o f  th e  
d i s t r i c t  ian th e  K ishanga  nrjj s u b d iv i s io n ,  M uslim s a r e  i n  a  m a j o r i t y ,  l i i i l e  
th e  w e s t  i s  c l e a r l y  d o m in a ted  by  H indus -  and th o s e  h av e  b een  th e  cureas 
o f  g r e a t e s t  im m ig ra tio n  and s e t t l e m e n t  th e  in c id e n c e  and  fo rm  o f  w hich 
h a s  b e e n  in f lu e n c e d  by  e v e n ts  o f  th e  r i v e r . To r e t u r n  t o  th e  e q u a t io n  
o u t l i n e d  a b o v e , t h i s  h i s t o r i c a l  d ev e lo p m en t h a s  im p o r ta n t  c o n te m p o ra ry  
im p l ic a t io n s  s in c e  i t  i s  o n ly  th e  w e s te rn  p o r t i o n  w hich  h a s  b een  in  th e  
command o f  th e  c a n a l  i r r i g a t i o n  and t h e r e f o r e  w i th in  t h e  sco p e  o f  th e  lAAp
T h is  d ev e lo p m en t o f  th e  la n d h o ld in g  p a t t e r n  in  W e ste rn P u m e a  and
S a h a rs a  d i s t r i c t s ,  w i th  la r g e  e s t a t e s  h e ld  e i t h e r  by s u b s t a n t i a l
im m ig ra n t r a i y a t s  o r  t e n u r e h o ld e r s  w ith  l a r g e  khas h o l d in g s ,  re d u c e d
th e  im p ac t o f  z a m in cb ri a b o l i t i o n  l e g i s l a t i o n  on th e  r e g i o n  s in c e
b o th  o f  th e s e  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  la n d h o ld e r s  w ere th e  m ain  b e n e f i c i a r i e s  o f
t h e  la n d  r e f o r m . The i n i t i a l  e f f e c t  o f  th e  a b o l i t i o n  was t o  e n s u re
a g r e a t e r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  s u r p lu s  b y  th e  d i r e c t  p ro d u c e rs
th e m s e lv e s  th u s  f a c i l i t a t i n g  a c c u m u la t io n  and  in v e s tm e n t  b y  th e s e  c l a s s e s .
(Wood 1973 J a n u z z i  1974) . I t  i s  now generaH y r e c o g n is e d  t h a t  la n d  was
n o t  r e d i s t r i b u t e d  t o  any  g r e a t  e x te n t  i n  th e  a f t e r m a th  o f  Z em indar i
a b o l i t i o n ,  n o r in d e e d  a f t e r  th e  s u b s e q u e n t  l e g i s l a t i o n  o f  th e  1 9 6 0 ' s .
T h is  was e s p e c i a l l y  s o  f o r  t h e i ^ io n  i n  th e  command o f  K o s i i r r i g a t i o n .
In d e e d  o u r  own d a ta  from  th e  R a n ig a n j a r e a  s u g g e s te d  a r e v e r s e  p ro c e s s
o f  c o n c e n t r a t io n  o f  la n d  i n t o  few er h an d s  a s  th e  e a r l y  r a i y a t
b e n e f i c i a r i e s  o f  zam indazi a b o l i t i o n  d i s p o s s e s s e d  some c a t e g o r i e s  o f
( s h a re c ro p p e r )
u n d e r - r a i y a t  and b a ta id a i / ,  and d o m in a ted  th e  l o c a l  la n d  m a rk e ts  w here 
th e  d i s t r e s s  o f  s m a l le r  and p o o re r  l a n d h o ld e r s  p ro v id e d  a  t r i c k l e  o f  
la n d  f o r  p u r c h a s e . In d e b te d n e s s  was o f t e n  th e  m echanism  by  w hich 
la n d  was t r a n s f e r r e d  from  poo r t o  r i c h e r  c l a s s e s  o f  r a i y a t .  A t th e  
same tim e  i t  i s  im p o r ta n t  n o t  t o  o v e re m p h a s ise  t h e  r a t e  o f  p o l a r i s a t i o n  
o f  la n d h o ld in g s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  t o  la n d  s a l e s  -  d i s p o s s e s s i o n  o f  s h a re c ro p p e r s  
h a s  b e e n  much more s i g n i f i c a n t .  (Wood 1976 C h a p t.6 )  .
T h is  s e l e c t e d  summary o f  a  much l a r g e r  d i s c u s s io n  r e v e a l s  a  
p ro c e s s  o f  c l a s s  fo rm a tio n  in  th e  r e g io n  w hich e x i s t e d  p r i o r  t o  
th e  p r o v is io n  o f  i r r i g a t i o n  th ro u g h  t h e  c a n a l  sy s te m  and t h e r e f o r e  a l s o  
p re c e d e d  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  lAAp and th e  'G re e n  R e v o lu t io n ' p ackage
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program m e. F u rth e rm o re  i t  i s  a  g r e a t  h i s t o r i c a l  i r o n y  t h a t  a 
h ig h ly  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  r u r a l  c l a s s  s t r u c t u r e  em erged p a r t l y  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  
a r e c a l c i t r a n t  r i v e r ,  th e  c o n t r o l  o f  w hich ( to g e th e r  w ith  r e l a t e d  
program m es) e x a c c e rb a te d  th e  p ro b lem  o f  r u r a l  i n e q u a l i t y ,  by f u r t h e r  
c o n t r i b u t i n g  t o  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f  a  r i c h  p e a s a n t / f a r m e r  c l a s s  in  
th e  r e g i o n . T h is  outcom e may be c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  some o b j e c t iv e s  such  
a s  m ax im is in g  th e  m a rk e ta b le  s u r p lu s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t s ,  b u t  
th e  i n t e n t i o n s  o f  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  p la n n e r s  and a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  have  to  
be b ro a d e r  th a n  t h i s . Even th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  an  u rb a n  b o u rg e d s ie  a r e  
n o t  u l t i m a t e l y  s e rv e d  by a s in g le -m in d e d  c o n c e n t r a t io n  u p o n 'th e  
p r o v is io n  o f  c h e ap  food  t o  i n d u s t r y ,  s in c e  a q u i e s c e n t  r u r a l  p o p u la t io n  
i s  a p r e c o n d i t io n  f o r  c a p i t a l i s t  e x p a n s io n  be  i t  p r i v a t e  o r p u b l i c ,  
u rb a n  o r  r u r a l . B u t t o  be l e s s  c y n i c a l ,  how c o u ld  o th e r  o b j e c t iv e s  
such  a s  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  p r o v is io n  o f  b a s ic  n e e d s ,  i n c r e a s e  i n  o u tp u t  
f o r  a l l  c u l t i v a t i n g  c l a s s e s ,  and an  in c r e a s e d  s h a re  i n  th e  p ro d u c t  o f  
a l l  l a b o u r in g  c l a s s e s  be a c h ie v e d  th ro u g h  th e  c a n a l  i r r i g a t io n / p a c k a g e  
programme mix p r e c i s e l y  i n  a  r e g io n  w hich was n o t  j u s t  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by  
i n e q u a l i t y  ( t h a t  i s  th e  same f o r  th e  e n t i r e  s u b - c o n t in e n t )  b u t  w hich 
a l r e a d y  d is p la y e d  th o s e  p o l a r i s i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  i n  an  e x trem e  form ? 
R u ra l  C la s s  F o rm a tio n  and th e  E v o lu t io n  o f  T ech n o lo g y
T h ere  i s  a  f u r t h e r  p o in t  t o  be made h e re  w hich  i s  o f  g e n e ra l  
t h e o r e t i c a l  im p o rta n c e  t o  th e  a n a l y s i s  o f  r u r a l  c l a s s  fo rm a tio n  in  
I n d i a ,  a s  \e 3L a s i l lu m in a t in g  th e  K osi s i t u a t i o n .  P a r t  o f  th e  o p tim ism  
o f  l i b e r a l  r e f o r m e r s ,  a s  r e v e a le d  in  t h e i r  p e r c e p t io n  o f  th e  c a p a c i ty  o f  
'G reen  R e v o lu t io n ' package  program m es t o  t r a n s f o r m  n o t  o n ly  th e  s c a le  
o f  p ro d u c t io n  b u t  th e  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t io n  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  
stemmed from  t h e i r  a n a ly s i s  o f  r u r a l  s o c i e t y  i n  I n d ia  a s  b e in g  in  th e
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f i n a l  s ta g e s  o f  a  ' f e u d a l '  e r a .  w here  a h ig h  in c id e n c e  o f  
s h a re c ro p p in g  and bonded la b o u r  r e m a in s ,  t h i s  i s  r e g a r d e d  a s  
e v id e n c e  o f  a t  l e a s t  's e m i - f e u d a l ' r e l a t i o n s  w i th o u t  r e f e r e n c e  t o  
th e  w id er c o n te x t  w i th in  w hich th e s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  e x i s t .  The K o si 
r e g io n  h a s  p e r i o d i c a l l y  b een  a v i c t im  o f  t h i s  a p p ro a c h , a l th o u g h  t h e r e  
i s  a  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw e en  th e  f a i t h  i n  th e  c a p a c i ty  o f  th e  new 
te c h n o lo g y  t o  t r a n s f o r m  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  (Lade j in s k y  1969) and th e  
r a d i c a l  p essim ism  w hich s e e s  t h i s  t r a d i t i o n a l  a g r a r i a n  s t r u c t u r e  
a s  an  o b s ta c l e  t o  th e  e f f i c i e n c y  o f  new te c h n o lo g y  and  dim p r o s p e c t s  
f o r  a l t e r n a t i v e  r a d i c a l  s o lu t i o n s  (H iP .P ra s a d  1973) . B u t p e rh a p s  t h e  
r e fo rm in g  o p t im i s t s  and th e  r a d i c a l  p e s s i m is t s  w ould do w e l l  t o  c o n s id e r  
an  a l t e r n a t i v e  a n a ly s i s  w hich d epends n o t  so  much opon i d e n t i f y i n g  
w h e th e r  c a p i t a l i s t  r e l a t i o n s  e x i s t  o r n o t  (p ax -R u d ra  1978) b u t  
w h e th e r  i t  i s  r e a s o n a b le  t o  i d e n t i f y  t r e n d s  to w a rd  th e  d e v e lo p m en t 
o f  c a p i t a l i s t  r e l a t i o n s  i n  I n d ia n  a g r i c u l t u r e  (C h a tto  padhyay  1972) . 
W ith o u t d w e l l in g  on th e  e v e r l a s t in g  d e b a te  a ro u n d  t h i s  i s s u e ,  (A la v i 1975 
i n t e r  a l i a ) ,  th e  p o in t  i s  n o t m e re ly  academ ic  f o r  th e  'p a c k a g e ' 
r e g io n s  o f  t h e  K osi a r e a  w hich a lo n g  w ith  N .B ih a r  i n  g e n e r a l  a r e  
u s u a i iy  d e s c r ib e d  a s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  backw ard  and f e u d a l .  I f  we can  
i d e n t i f y  an  u n d e r ly in g  t r e n d  to w a rd s  c a p i t a l i s t ; : ,  fo rm s o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
a c t i v i t y  on th e  p a r t  o f  th e  l a r g e r  l a n d h o ld e r s  (d e f in e d  in  te rm s  o f  
r e in v e s tm e n t  o f  s u r p l u s , r e d u c t io n  o f  te n a n c y  on good l a n d ,  w id e r  
b u t  s e l e c t e d  u se  o f  c a s u a l  and c o n tra c t l a b o u r ,  h ig h e r  p r o p o r t io n  o f  
o p e r a t io n  d e v o te d  c a sh  c ro p p in g  ( in c lu d in g  c e r e a l s ,)  m e c h a n is a t io n  
(Wood 1 9 7 3 ,C la y  1 9 7 2 ,B iggs and B urns c h a p t  .1 0 ,1 9 7 6  Wood c h a p t  .6  .1 9 7 6 ) ,  and
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f u r t h e r  r e c o g n is e  t h a t  su ch  a t r e n d  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  s u r v i v a l  
o f  v a r io u s  p r e - c a p i t a l i s t  r e l a t i o n s  ( s h a r e c r o p p in g ,  bonded  la b o u r )  
and  may in d e e d  be  s u p p o r te d  by  su ch  r e l a t i o n s  on c e r t a i n  c a t e g o r i e s  
o f  l a n d ,  th e n  h i s t o r i c a l l y  th e  a r r i v a l  and p e rfo rm a n c e  o f  th e  new 
t e c h n o l o g ic a l  in p u ts  i n t o  a g r i c u l t u r e  h a s  t o  be s e e n  b o th  a s  an  
outcom e and  c o n s t i t u e n t  p a r t  o f  t h i s  t r e n d  r a t h e r  th a n  a s  an  ex o g en o u s  
v a r i a b l e  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  i n i t i a t i o n  o f  t h i s  t r e n d . To sum m arise  
a much lo n g e r  a rg u m e n t, th e  p r o p o s i t i o n  h e re  i s  t h a t  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  
n o rm al v iew  th e  'G re e n  R e v o lu t io n ' te c h n o lo g y  was a  p ro d u c t  o f  
ch a n g es  i n  th e  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t io n  ( i . e .  c l a s s  f o r m a t io n ) ,  
a s  w e l l  a s  an a g e n t  i n  th e  f u r t h e r  change o f  p r o d u c t io n  r e l a t i o n s .
To p u t  i t  a n o th e r  way, th e  r i c h  w ere g e t t i n g  r i c h e r  b e f o r e  th e  
'G re e n  R e v o l u t i o n ',  and t h e r e f o r e  c o n tin u e d  t o  become r i c h e r  a f t e r .  
H i s t o r i c a l l y  t h i s  i s  th e  c a u s a l  c o n n e c t io n  and we c e r t a i n l y  a g re e  
w ith  H o s k in s ' (C h a p te r  4 1976) when h e  w r i t e s  t h a t  z a m in d a r L a b o l i t io n  
and th e  c o n s e q u e n t r e t e n t i o n  o f  a  g r e a t e r  p r o p o r t io n  o f  t h e  s u r p lu s  
by  r a i y a t s  and l a r g e  h o ld e r s  o f  kh as  la n d  i n  t h e  K osi r e g io n  was 
an  e s s e n t i a l  s t e p  " i f  in v e s tm e n t  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  b y  p r i v a t e  c a p i t a l  
a c c u m u la t io n , on w hich th e  'G re e n  R e v o lu t io n ' i s  b a s e d ,  was t o  be  
s u c c e s s f u l " .  ( p 8 9 ) . And f i n a l l y  t o  r e i n f o r c e  t h i s  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e r e  i s  
T h ( t r ^ r 's  g e n e r a l  c o n n e c t io n  b e tw éen  th e  r i s e  o f  a  r u r a l  c a p i t a l i s t  
c l a s s  and th e  la p id  i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n  (W arren 1973) w hich h a s  o c c u r r e d  
in  I n d ia  s in c e  In d ep en d en ce  w hich  in c r e a s e d  th e  d o m e s tic  demand 
f o r  raw  m a t e r i a l s  and f o o d s t u f f s ,  r e s u l t e d  in  a  r a p i d  i n c r e a s e  i n  th e  
p r i c e  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c ts  d u r in g  th e  1 9 6 0 's  and  w hich th u s  made 
in v e s tm e n t  in  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t io n  u n p r e c e d e n t ly  p r o f i t a b l e  .
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I t  i s  im p o r ta n t  a lw ays t o  c o n s id e r  th e  c o n te x t  w i th in  w hich even
a p p a r e n t ly  rem o te  a r e a s  l i k e  K o s i, w ere d e v e lo p in g .  To q u o te  T horner :
"To th e  l u r e  o f  g r e a t  g a in  from  a c t u a l  f a r m in g ( r a th e r  th a n  from  
r u r a l  r e n t s  o r  u su ry )  h a s  re sp o n d e d  th e  r i s e  o f  a c l a s s  o f  
e n t e r p r i s i n g  a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s .  They a r e  p r e p a r e d  t o  s in k  money 
and  e f f o r t  i n t o  th e  s o i l  and  t o  make u se  o f  th e  l a t e s t  s c i e n t i f i c  
a id s  i n  o r d e r  t o  e x t r a c t  r e t u r n s  o f  a  m ag n itu d e  n o t  p r e v io u s ly  
dream ed p o s s i b l e . "  (Thocne.r 1969)
A ccess  n o t  a d o p tio n  a s  th e  p ro b lem  o f  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n
I t  i s  t h i s  c o n n e c t io n  b e tw een  r u r a l  c l a s s  f o rm a tio n  and  te c h n o lo g y
i n  I n d ia  g e n e r a l l y  and i n  t h e  K osi d ev e lo p m en t r e g i o n  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  w hich
s u g g e s t s  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  t h a t  w h ile  many o f  th e  v a r io u s  new te c h n o lo g ie s
i n  a g r i c u l t u r e  m ig h t be t e c h n i c a l l y  n e u t r a l ,  t h e y  c a n  n e v e r  be s o c i a l l y
n e u t r a l  b e c a u se  th e y  a ro s e  o u t  o f  s o c i a l  i n e q u a l i t y .  The e x p e r ie n c e
o f  d i s t r i b u t i n g  in p u ts  i n  th e  K o si r e g io n  w ould  seem  t o  c o n firm  t h i s .
I t  i s  th e  f a i l u r e  t o  a p p r e c ia t e  t h i s  h i s t o r i c a l  l o c a t i o n  o f  th e
te c h n o lo g y  and th e  d i a l e c t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  th e  l e v e l  o f
th e  fo rm s o f  p ro d u c t io n  and  th e  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t io n  w hich
h a s  g e n e r a l l y  le d  t o  a  m is c o n c e p tio n  o f  t h e  p ro b lem  o f  r e s o u r c e
d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  th e  package  p rogram m es. The p ro b le m  h a s  g e n e r a l ly
been  fo rm u la te d  a s  one o f  a d o p t io n ,  a  p ro b lem  o f  p e r s u a s io n  -  a
p ro b lem  o f  e x te n s i o n .  W ith  t h i s  f o r m u la t io n  t h e r e  i s  an  a s su m p tio n
t h a t  a  d ic h o to n y  e x i s t s  b e tw een  th e  ' t r a d i t i o n a l '  (sem i-fe .'u d a l? )
a g r a r i a n  s o c i a l  sy s tem  and t h e  s o c i a l  i m p l ic a t i o n s  o f  a  'm o d e rn '
te c h n o lo g y  -  h en ce  th e  p ro b lem  is  c o n c e iv e d  a s  one o f  r u r a l  r e s i s t a n c e
w hich h a s  t o  be overcom e by  c e r t a i n  't e c h n i q u e s '  o f  e x te n s i o n .  I t  i s
o u r s u g g e s t io n  t h a t  by r e g a r d in g  th e  a g r a r i a n  s o c i a l  sy s te m  a s  b e in g
a l r e a d y  dynam ic -  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  a  t r e n d  to w a rd  c a p i t a l i s t  r e l a t i o n s
o f  p r o d u c t io n  and an  i n c r e a s i n g ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  ' a l l i a n c e ' i n
N o rth  B ih a r  b e tw een  e x - l a n d lo r d ,  r u r a l  e n t r e p r e n e u r  and r i c h
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p e a s a n t  (Wood 1973, and 1974) -  th e  demand f o r  s c i e n t i f i c  a id s  t o  
a g r i c u l t u r e  a l r e a d y  e x i s t e d  among th o s e  c l a s s e s  f o r  u s e  on 
a p p r o p r i a t e  p a r t s  o f  t h e i r  h o l d in g s .  The p ro b lem  o f  d i s t r i b u t i o n  was 
n o t  so  much one o f  a d o p t io n  b u t  o f  a c c e s s  -  s in c e  c u l t i v a t i n g  c l a s s e s  
w ere more d i f f e r e n t i a t e d !  by  t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  s e c u r e  r e s o u r c e s  and 
s e r v i c e s  from  th e  b u r e a u c r a t i c a l l y  a d m in is te r e d  p ack ag e  program m es th a n  
t h e i r  w i l l i n g n e s s  t o  a d o p t new te c h n o lo g y  (ev en  th o u g h  i t  m ig h t n o t  
hav e  b e e n  e n t i r e l y  r a t i o n a l  t o  do s o  f o r  th e  p o o re r  c l a s s e s  o f  
p r o p r i e t o r  w here a  h i ^ e r  p r o p o r t io n  o f  t h e i r  l a d  was m ore l i k e l y  t o  
b e  i n v o lv e d ) .
T h ree  d im e n s io n s  o f  B ia s
The p ro b lem  o f  a c c e s s  t o  th e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  i n p u t s  and s e r v i c e s  
c a n n o t i n  th e  f i r s t  in s t a n c e  be  s e p a r a te d  from  th e  e a r l i e r  rem ark s  
a b o u t p o l i c y  and o b j e c t i v e s .  I f ,  f o r  e x a m p le , t h e  p r i n c i p a l  fo c u s  
o f  p o l i c y  i s  upon m ax im is in g  th e  m a rk e ta b le  s u r p l u s , th e n  i n  te rm s  
o f  t h a t  p o l ic y  th e  p ro b lem  o f  a c c e s s  r e f e r s  t o  th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  
i n p u ts  and s e r v i c e s  t o  c e r t a i n  c l a s s e s  o f  c u l t i v a t o r s  o n ly  -  th o s e  
who o r i e n t  t h e i r  p r o d u c t io n  t o  t h e  m a rk e t and who a r e  u n l ik e ly  t o  
consume th e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e i r  o u t p u t ,  i . e .  th e  c l a s s e s  o f  em erg ing  
c a p i t a l i s t  f a r m e r s .  B u t w h e re , f o r  r e a s o n s  o f  p o p u l i s t  co n su m p tio n  
i f  no o t h e r ,  e g a l i t a r i a n  id e o lo g y  d o m in a te s  th e  p o l ic y  i n t e n t i o n s ,  
th e n  th e  p rob lem  o f  a c c e s s  i s  b ro a d e r  and r e f e r s  t o  th e  p rob lem s t h a t  
d i f f e r e n t  c l a s s e s  hav e  o f  t r y i n g  t o  s e c u r e  goods and  s e r v i c e s  from  
governm en t and i t s  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  The re m a in d e r  o f  th e  p a p e r  i s  
t h e r e f o r e  c o n c e rn e d  to  e x p lo r e  some i s s u e s  o f  b i a s  a g a in s t  th e  p o o re r
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rural classes in the development programme and its administration, 
in the context of our description of certain specific features of 
the Kosi agrarian social structure.
We a r e  s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  t h r e e  i n t e r r e l a t e d  d im e n s io n s  o f  b i a s  
e x i s t ,  and t h a t  th e y  c a n  be g e n e r a l i s e d  t o  some e x t e n t  f o r  m o st p a r t s  
o f  r u r a l  I n d i a .  F i r s t  th e  s t r u c t u r a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p ,  r e f e r r e d  t o  a b o v e , 
b e tw een  th e  em ergence o f  c l a s s e s  o f  c a p i t a l i s t  f a rm e rs  i n  r u r a l  
I n d ia  and s t a t e  p o l i c y  to w a rd  a g r i c u l t u r e  a s  r e v e a le d  i n  th e  
s u b s id i e s  t o  m e c h a n is a t io n ,  H y v 's  w i th  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  and e x p e n s iv e  
i n p u t  r e g im e s ,  f e r t i l i s e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n ,  c r e d i t  d is b u r s e m e n t ,  lumpy 
i r r i g a t i o n  te c h n o lo g y  ( a t  d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l s  -  c a n a l s  and p u m p -s e ts /  
b o y i n g s ) . Thus th e  f i r s t  " a l l e g e d "  fo rm  o f  b i a s  i s  s u p e r f i c i a l l y ,  ène 
o f  i n t e n t i o n  b u t  more fu n d a m e n ta l ly  th e  i n e v i t a b l e  c o n n e c t io n  be tw een  th e  
i n t e r e s t s  o f  em erg in g  r u r a l  c a p i t a l i s t  c l a s s e s  and  th e  c l a s s e s  
d o m in a tin g  th e  d ta te  and i t s  a p p a r a tu s e s  in  I n d i a . To add  a l i t t l e  
f u r t h e r  e m b e ll is h m e n t , th e s e  d om inan t r u r a l  c l a s s e s  a r e  v i t a l  f o r  
th e  p o l i t i c a l  s t a b i l i t y  o f  any  governm en t i n  I n d i a . T hrough t h e i r  
econom ic d o m in a tio n  o f  r u r a l  l o c a l i t i e s  th e y  f u n c t io n  p o l i t i c a l l y  
b o th  t o  m a in ta in  law  and  o r d e r  b u t  a l s o  c r u c i a l l y  t o  d e l i v e r  p o l i t i c a l  
s u p p o r t  ( v o te s ,  r a l l i e s  o r  ev en  a p a th y  and q u ie s e n c e ) .  The names may 
change (C ongress  t o  J a n a ta  c o a l i t i o n )  b u t  th e  same i n t e r e s t s  a r e  
r e p r e s e n t e d .  The q u e s t io n  i s  n e i t h e r  'u r b a n  b i a s '  (L ip to n  1977) 
no r ' r u r a l  b i a s '  (B yres 1974) b u t  an  a l l i a n c e  b e tw e en  u rb a n  and 
r u r a l  b o u r g e o i s ie s  w hich p a r t i a l l y  e x p la in s  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  governm ent 
r e s o u r c e  a l l o c a t i o n  in  r u r a l  I n d i a .
The second dimension of bias follows closely from the first, but 
refers especially to the way power and influence is exercised by 
those dominant classes in the locality. The phenomenon of rural 
power structures affecting the allocation of resources is of course
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f a m i l i a r  . B u t th e  s i t u a t i o n  i s  u s u a l l y  p r e s e n te d  i n  th e  fo rm  o f
a r e s p o n s e  t o  exogenous s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  ( th e  e x t e r n a l  'm o d e rn '
s t im u lu s )  in v o lv in g  w i l f u l ,  c o r r u p t  b e h a v io u r  on th e  p a r t  o f  l o c a l
e l i t e s  -  b e h a v io u r  w hich  som etim es in v o lv e s  l o c a l  o f f i c i a l s . Thus
L a d e i in s k y ,  a f t e r  a  f i e l d  t r i p  t o  t h e  K o si r e g io n  w ro te  :
" I t  i s  n o t  th e  f a u l t  o f  th e  new te c h n o lo g y  t h a t  th e  c r e d i t  
s e r v i c e  do es  n o t s e rv e  th o s e  f o r  whom i t  was o r i g i n a l l y  
in te n d e d  ; t h a t  t h e  e x te n s io n  s e r v i c e s  a r e  n o t  l i v i n g  up t o  
e x p e c t a t i o n s ;  t h a t  th e  p a n c h a y a ts  a r e  p o l i t i c a l  r a t h e r  th a n  
d e v e lo p m e n ta l  b o d ie s ;  t h a t  s e c u r i t y  o f  t e n u r e  i s  th e  lu x u ry  
o f  th e  few ; t h a t  r e n t s  a r e  e x o r b i t a n t ;  t h a t  c e i l i n g s  on 
a g r i c u l t u r a l  la n d  a r e  n o t io n a l ;  t h a t  f o r  th e  g r e a t e r  p a r t  
t e n e u r i a l  l e g i s l a t i o n  i s  d e l i b e r a t e l y  m is c a r r i e d ;  o r  t h a t  
wage s c a l e s  a r e  h a r d ly  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  keep  body  and s o u l  
t o g e t h e r .  T hose a r e  man-made i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n e q u i t i e s " .
(L a d e iin s k y  1969) .
Now w h ile  i t  i s  e a sy  t o  a g re e  w ith  much o f  w h a t Lade j  in s k y  was
s a y in g  h e r e ,  a s  a ' l i b e r a l  r e f o r m e r ' he^ was a l s o  a ssu m in g  b o th
t h a t  th e  p o l i c y  i n t e n t i o n  was u n r e l a te d  t o  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e
d o m in an t r u r a l  c la s s e s  and t h a t  t h e i r  b e h a v io u r  was v o l u n t a r i s t i c
and t h a t  th e y  w ere c a p a b le  o f  u n d e rg o in g  a p e r s o n a l  t r a n s f o r m a t io n  o f  t h e i r
è t h i c s  ; (w ith o u t  r e g a r d  t o  t h e i r  s t r u c t u r a l  p o s i t i o n )  . I t  i s
p r e c i s e l y  b e c a u se  t h i s  a g r a r i a n  sy s te m  c o n s i s t s  o f  ' man-made
i n s t i t u t i o n a l  i n e q u i t i e s ' w hich  a r e  r e f l e c t e d  i n  th e  c o m p o s itio n  o f
th e  s t a t e  t h a t  one c a n n o t e n v is a g e  t h e i r  re m o v a l by  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n .
Thus i t  i s  n o t  l e g i t i m a t e ,  i n  ou r v ie w , when L a d e jin s k y  c o n tin u e d
by s u g g e s t in g  t h a t :
"ev en  i f  o n ly  some o f  them  a re  d e a l t  w ith  -  s e c u r i t y  o f  t e n u r e ,  
r e a s o n a b le  r e n t  and c r e d i t  t o  s u s t a i n  p r o d u c t io n  needs -  a 
m easu re  o f  econom ic and s o c i a l  j u s t i c e  c o u ld  be  fu s e d  w ith  
econom ic n e c e s s i t y " .
D e a l t  w ith  b y  whom? We m ust a s k .
The e x e r c i s e  o f  power and in f lu e n c e  in  th e  l o c a l i t y  i s  t h e r e f o r e  
b o th  d e te rm in e d  and r e i n f o r c e d  by th e  c l a s s  c o n n e c t io n s  b e tw een  th e  
l o c a l i t y  and th e  s t a t e .  E v ery  a s p e c t  o f  th e  K o si p o l i t i c a l
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economy and  th e  c o n tin u o u s  s t r u g g l e s  b e tw een  g ro u p s  and c l a s s e s  
seem ed t o  c o n firm  t h i s . The u se  o f  law  c o u r t s  i n  d i s p u t e s  and in  
r e s i s t i n g  la n d  re fo rm  m e a s u re s , th e  in v o lv e m e n t o f  p o l i c e  and o th e r  
o f f i c i a l s  (even  p o l i t i c i a n s )  i n  th e  rem o v a l o f  t e n a n t s  and 
's q u a t t e r s ' ,  th e  im m unity  f o r  th e  l a n d lo r d s  i n  th e  R upeshpur i n c i d e n t ,  
t h e  f a i l u r e  t o  im p lem en t la n d  r e f o r m , t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  p a tro n a g e  
th ro u g h  r e l i e f  schem es and p u b l ic  w orks c o n t r a c t s  -  t h e s e  a r e  
a l l  exam p les  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  t h e  o p e r a t io n  o f  th e  p ack ag e  p rogram m es, 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  i r r i g a t i o n  b e n e f i t s ,  and th e  c a p tu r e  p f . th e  
c o o p e r a t iv e  s y s te m . T h is  s e c o n d  d im e n s io n  o f  b i a s  i s  p e rh a p s  th e  
m ost f a m i l i a r  t o  u s  and r e q u i r e s  no f u r t h e r  g e n e r a l  d i s c u s s io n  a t  
t h i s  s t a g e .
The t h i r d  d im en sio n  o f  b i a s  r e f e r s  c l o s e l y  t o  th e  p ro b lem  o f  
a c c e s s  s in c e  i t  c o n c e rn s  th e  a p p r o p r i a t e n e s s  o f  m ethods o f  
a d m in is t e r in g  th e  d e l i v e r y  o f  s e r v i c e s  i n  an  a g r a r i a n  sy s te m  su ch  
a s  K o s i .  A l l e g a t io n s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  b i a s  a r e  bound t o  o f fe n d  
th o s e  who hav e  b e e n  in v o lv e d  i n  t h e  p rogram m es, b u t  o u r p r e o c c u p a tio n  
i s  n o t  w ith  c o r r u p t io n  b u t  w ith  a  c o n f r o n t a t i o n  b e tw een  two 
r a t i o n a l i t i e s  -  t h a t  o f  b u re a u c ra c y  and t h a t  o f  p e a s a n t  s o c i e t y .  
'A p p r o p r ia t e ' a d m in i s t r a t io n
P e rh a p s  we m ig h t p ro c e e d  by  d raw in g  an  a n a lo g y  w ith  th e  more 
f a m i l i a r  i s s u e  o f  a p p r o p r ia t e  te c h n o lo g y  w here  i t  i s  a g re e d  t h a t  th e  
r a t i o n a l i t y  o f  th e  te c h n o lo g y  sh o u ld  confo rm  t o  th e  r a t i o n a l i t y  
o f  th e  p e o p le  u s in g  i t  ( t h e i r  l e v e l s  o f  kn o w led g e , e x i s t i n g  a v a i l ­
a b i l i t y '  o f /  r e s o u r c e s  and m a t e r i a l s ,  v a lu e s  and b e l i e f - s y s te m s  
e t c . )  T hen , th e  co n fo rm in g  te c h n o lo g y  becom es a p p r o p r i a t e .  The 
same th in k in g  s h o u ld  a p p ly  t o  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  i n s t i t u t i o n s . The
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p ro p o .m tio n  h e re  i s  t h a t  th e  s t y l e  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  b e h a v io u r  i s  
to o  b u r e a u c r a t i c  t o  in te r v e n e  s u c c e s s f u l l y  i n  t h e  c o m p le x i t ie s  o f  
p e a s a n t  l i f e ,  e s p e c i a l l y  a t  th e  p o o re r  l e v e l s .  Any c o n c e p t io n  o f  
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  m ust in c lu d e  a n  u n d e r s ta n d in g  b o th  o f  th e  o r g a n i s in g  
p r i n c i p l e s  and v a lu e s  o f  th e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  and th e  m odel o f  th e  
c l i e n t / r e c i p i e n t  w ith  w hich th e  o r g a n i s a t i o n  d e a l s , W ith o u t 
d e v e lo p in g  th e  a rg u m en ts  f u l l y  h e r e  (se e  Wood 1 9 7 7 ) , f i e l d  
a d m i n i s t r a t io n  i n  I n d ia  a f t e r  in d ep e n d e n c e  em p h a s ise d  th e  fo rm a l ,  
b u r e a u c r a t i c  a s p e c t  o f  i t s  i n h e r i t a n c e ,  and  moved away from  th e  
n o n - b u r e a u c r a t i c ,  d i s c r e t i o n a r y ,  p ra g m a tic  and p a t e r n a l i s t i c  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  im p e r ia l  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . As a r e s u l t  a 
c o n t r a d ic t io n n  e x i s t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  w here th e  s t a t e  h a s  become h e a v i l y  
in v o lv e d  i n  a g r i c u l t u r a l  program m es d i r e c t e d  a t  th e  rem o v a l o f  
r u r a l  p o v e r ty ,  s in c e  t h e r e  i s  a te n d e n c y  f o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  t o  become 
more b u r e a u c r a t i c  w h ile  a t  th e  same tim e  n e e d in g  t o  b e  more in v o lv e d  
i n  i n t e r a c t i o n  w ith  poo r c l a s s e s  o f  p e a s a n t  w here t h e  b u r e a u c r a t i c  
s t y l e  i s  m ost i n a p p r o p r i a t e .
W hat i s  b u r e a u c r a t i c  r a t i o n a l i t y ?  At th e  r i s k  o f  o v e r s im p l i f y in g  
i t  d e s c r ib e s  a d m i n i s t r a t iv e  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  w hich  a r e  h ig h ly  
c o m p a r tm e n ta l is e d , w ith  a s t r i c t  d i v i s i o n  o f  f u n c t io n s  w hich depends 
upon a b s t r a c t i n g  th e  d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  a s p e c t s  o f  a  c l i e n t ' s  l i f e  so  t h a t  
h e  r e p r e s e n t s  a  s e r i e s  o f  c a s e s  r a t h e r  th a n  a  c o m p le te , human 
p i c t u r e . As a r e s u l t ,  b u r e a u c r a t i c  a d m i n i s t r a t io n  i s  im p e rso n a l 
( s in c e  i t  i s  th e  c a s e  r a t h e r  th a n  th e  i n d iv i d u a l  w hich  i s  b e in g  
a d m i n i s t e r e d ) , and c a s e s  a r e  d e f in e d  by p r e c e d e n ts  ( o f t e n  r e c o rd e d  
in  r u le - b o o k s  and l e g i s l a t i o n )  t o  e n s u re  s t a n d a r d i s a t i o n  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  
d e c is io n s  and outcom es f o r  th e  s a k e  o f  f a i r n e s s  and j u s t i c e .
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D i f f i c u l t  c a s e s  w hich a r e  n o t  r o u t i n e  o r  n o rm a l, and  whose 
c o n fo rm ity  t o  p r e c e d e n t  and p r a c t i c e  r e q u i r e s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a r e  
r e f e r r e d  upwetrds i n  th e  h i e r a r c h y  o f  s e n i o r i t y  and o f f i c e . F i n a l l y  
t h e r e  i s  th e  a s su m p tio n  t h a t  th e  c l i e n t  o r  r e c i p i e n t  m ust be p re p a re d  
t o  i n t e r a c t  w ith  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  a c c o rd in g  t o  th o s e  p r i n c i p l e s  -  t h a t  
i s  t o  s a y ,  t h e  a s su m p tio n  t h a t  h i s  own b e h a v io u r  and  s o c i a l  
s t r u c t u r e  d i s p l a y  th o s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . Thus t h e  m odel o f  c l i e n t  
i s  t h a t  o f  'fa rm e r*  r a t h e r  th a n  'p e a s a n t '  (on th e  d i s t i n c t i o n s  
b e tw een  p e a s a n ts  and f a r m e r s ,  s e e  S h a n in  1 9 7 3 ) , o f  r a t i o n a l  
econom ic (and l i t e r a t e )  man who c a n  a p p r e c ia t e  t h a t  h i s  p ro b lem s a r e  
n o t  t o  be  s o lv e d  by  one p a t r o n  o r  p r o t e c to r  (or la n d lo rd /m o n e y le n d e r )  
b u t  by a m u l t i tu d e  o f  s e p a r a te  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  and  p ro c e d u re s  ( th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  s in g l e - s t r a n d e d )  -  w a te r  from  one a g e n c y , c r e d i t  
v i a  a n o th e r , c ro p  and f e r t i l i z e r  a d v ic e  v i a  a n o th e r , and  s o  o n .
The ' f a r m e r ' k eeps a c c o u n ts ,  c a n  c a l c u l a t e  p r o f i t  and  l o s s ,  c a n  
t a l k  th e  ' la n g u a g e ' o f  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r ,  i s  r e s p o n s iv e  t o  th e  
f i n e l y  c a l c u l a t e d  i n c e n t iv e s  o f  th e  p la n n e r s  and e c o n o m is ts  b e c a u se  
he  i s  o r i e n t e d  t o  th e  m ark e t i n  h i s  p r o d u c t io n .  F u r th e rm o re , 
b e a r in g  i n  mind th e  e a r l i e r  two d im e n s io n s  o f  b i a s ,  ' f a r m e r s '  
te n d  t o  b e  th e  l a r g e r  la n d o w n e rs .
B ut th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  r u r a l  c u l t i v a t o r s  i n  th e  K o si r e g io n  a r e  c lo s e r  
t o  th e  m odel o f  'p e a s a n t '  p o s s e s s in g  a  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  d e r iv in g  from  t h e i r  
p o v e r ty ,  w hich i s  a t  v a r ia n c e  w ith  th e  m odel o f  them  h e ld  by 
b u r e a u c r a t i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n .  L ip to n  p u t  i t  m ost s u c c i n c t l y  when he 
rem ark ed  t h a t  f o r  t h e  poor p e a s a n t  ( th e  I n d ia n  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n 's  
s m a ll  ' fa rm er ' '.) " th e  s u r v i v a l  a lg o r i th u m  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  th e  
m ax im isin g  o n e " . (L ip to n  1968) . H ie  la n d h o ld in g  i s  s a a l l ,  and he i s
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more l i k e l y  t o  be a t e n a n t  o r  s h a re c ro p p e r  on a h ig h e r  p r o p o r t io n
o f  i t ;  he i s  c r ip p l e d  by th e  b u rd en  o f  u n p ro d u c tiv e  d e b t ;  h a s  a low
l e v e l  o f  c o n t r o l  over h i s  p h y s ic a l  e n v iro n m e n t; d i v e r s i f i e s  la n d  u se
t o  m in im ise  r i s k ;  h a s  t o  re p ro d u c e  h i s  own la b o u r  s u p p ly  w h ich  means
so n s  and s u b s e q u e n t f r a g m e n ta t io n  o f  h o ld in g s  ( r a t h e r  th a n
c o n s o l i d a t i o n ) ;  t h e r e  a r e  im p o r ta n t ,  a p p a r e n t ly  u n p r o d u c t iv e ,
demands upon h i s  c a p i t a l  i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  r e n t  and i n t e r e s t  p a y m en ts ;
and h i s  a t t i t u d e  t o  r i s k  ( th e  p rob lem  o f  in v e s tm e n t  and  u n c e r t a i n t y )
i s  s t r u c t u r e d  by t h i s  s c a r c i t y  o f  c a p i t a l ,  m a rg in a l  s u r p lu s e s  and
low l e v e l  o f  t e c h n o lo g y . P oor p e a s a n ts  have  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  b e e n
d e p e n d e n t ,  a s  c l i e n t s ,  upon p a t r o n s  w ith  whom th e y  hav e  m u l t i - s t r a n d e d
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  -  p r o t e c t o r ,  l a n d lo r d ,  b r o k e r ,  m e d ia to r ,  c r e d i t o r ,  r i c h e r
k i n .  T h e ir  p rob lem s hav e  b e e n  s o lv e d  (and c r e a te d ',  ) w i th in  t h i s
fram ew ork  on th e  b a s i s  o f  p e r s o n a l  kno w led g e , t r u s t  and  th e  t h r e a t
o f  p e r s o n a l  s a n c t i o n s . I n  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n  t h e r e  i s  a d i s c o n t i n u i t y  o f
v a lu e s  b e tw een  o f f i c i a l  and c l i e n t ,  b e c a u se  th e  fo rm e r i s  s e e k in g  th e
s e c u r i t y  o f  c o m p a r tm e n ta lis e d  b u r e a u c r a t i c  b e h a v io u r  and th e  o th e r  th e
f a m i l i a r  s a f e t y  o f  low s t a t u s  i n  a known s y s te m . T h is  d i s t i n c t i o n
b e tw een  a  ' f a r m e r ' and a 'p e a s a n t '  i s  o f  c o u rs e  an  i d e a l  ty p e  d i s t i n c t i o n ,
b u t  i t  fo l lo w s  from  t h i s  a rg u m en t t h a t  th e  more c a p i t a l i s t i c  and 'p r o g r e s s i v e '
th e  p e a s a n t  ( i . e .  n e a re r  t o  th e  m odel o f  'f a r m e r ')  th e  more th e
b u r e a u c r a t i c a l l y  a d m in is te re d  program m es w i l l  f a v o u r  h im .
I n  p u r s u in g  some o f  th e s e  i s s u e s  i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  th e  K o si 
e x p e r ie n c e ,  i t  i s  w orth  in t r o d u c in g  a d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  'h i n g e d ' and 
' l i n e a r ' f i e l d s  o f  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  made by  H a rt (1971) who was 
com m enting on v a r io u s  a t te m p ts  t o  r e c o n c i l e  t h i s  c l a s h  b e tw e en
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b u r e a u c r a t i e  and p e a s a n t  r a t i o n a l i t y  i n  d i f f e r e n t  r u r a l  and
a g r i c u l t u r a l  d eve lopm en t sc h em e s . The 'h in g e d *  f i e l d  i s  w here v a lu e s
a re  n o t  s h a re d  be tw een  p a r t i e s  t o  th e  t r a n s a c t i o n ,  w here th e y  a r e  n o t
members o f  th e  same r e f e r e n c e  g ro u p  ( ' the^n and  u s '  r a t h e r  th a n  'w e ' ) .
In  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  such  a s  th e  lAAp, a s e r i e s  o f  b r o k e r s  i s  r e q u i r e d
b e tw een  governm ent and th e  p o o re r  c l a s s e s  o f  c u l t i v a t o r  (and o f  c o u rs e
l a n d l e s s  p e o p le  i f  th e  i n t e n t i o n  i s  t o  in c lu d e  them  i n  t h e  d e v e lo p m en t
e f f o r t )  . T hese 'b r o k e r s '  o r  'm e d ia to r s *  w ould h av e  a f o o t  i n  b o th
w o rld s  and a c t  a s  th e  'h in g e  ' b e tw een  th e  tw o c u l t u r e s .  T h is  i s  one
way o f  u n d e rs ta n d in g  th e  r o l e  o f  th e  V=.L.W., a l th o u g h  he  u s u a l l y  a c t s  a s
a b ro k e r  ( in  th e  more f a m i l i a r  s e n s e  o f  th e  w ord '.) f o r  t h e  r i c h
p e a s a n ts  -  cum -farm ers  i n  h i s  a r e a  o f  o p e r a t i o n .  The ' l i n e a r ' f i e l d ,
by c o n t r a s t ,  d e s c r ib e s  a s i t u a t i o n  w here v a lu e s  and i d e n t i t i e s  a r e  s h a re d
The exam ple o f  t h i s  o f f e r e d  by H a r t  was th e  C o m illa  a p p ro a c h  w h ich
u sed  'm o d e l ' f a rm e rs  t o  t r a n s m i t  in f o r m a t io n  and id e a s  b e tw e en  th e
a d m i n i s t r a t io n  and th e  p e a s a n t  p o jp u la t io n . H a r t  gave o th e r  ex am p les
o f  s im i l a r  s t r a t e g i e s  i n  th e  C o m illa  p r o j e c t :  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f
c o n t r a c e p t iv e s  th ro u g h  e x i s t i n g  r e t a i l  m e rc h a n ts  i n  t h e  v i l l a g e s ;  and
th e  u se  o f  imams t o  te a c h  b o th  p r e - p r im a r y  c h i l d r e n  and  i l l i t e r a t e
a d u l t s .  On th e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n .  H a r t  p ro p o se d  t h a t :
"D evelopm ent w i l l  be  f a c i l i t a t e d ,  o th e r  t h i n g s  b e in g  
e q u a l ,  by  c h a n n e l l in g  a  t r a n s a c t i o n  th ro u g h  a  l i n e a r  
r a t h e r  th a n  a h in g e d  f i e l d "  .
U n f o r tu n a te ly  t h i s  k in d  o f  s o l u t i o n  t o  th e  p ro b le m  o f  c la s h i n g  
r a t i o n a l i t i e s  c r e a t e s  o th e r  p ro b lem s . The w hole p u rp o se  o f  b u r e a u c r a t i c  
in v o lv e m e n t in  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  t o  re d u c e  th e  d i s p o s a b le  incom e f a c t o r  i n  
g a in in g  a c c e s s  t o  r e s o u r c e s ,  and t o  weaken th e  m a rk e t m echanism  i n  o r d e r  
t o  a c h ie v e  c e r t a i n  o b j e c t iv e s  ( i . e .  e f f i c i e n t  p r o d u c t io n  and  h ig h  
m a rk e ta b le  o u tp u t ,  o r  more r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  incom e and  o p p o r t u n i t i e s .
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o r b o t h ) . Thus th e  r e t e n t i o n  o f  adm inis t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l  i s  c e n t r a l  
t o  th e  e x e r c i s e  (and o f  c o u rs e  e s p e c i a l l y  so  when c l a s s  o b j e c t iv e s  
a r e  r e a l l y  b e in g  p u rsu e d ) . The dilem m a i s  b e tw een  th e  d e s i r e  t o  
m a in ta in  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l  o v e r  th e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  s c a r c e  
r e s o u r c e s  ( i n p u t s ,  c r e d i t  e t c . )  w h ile  a t  th e  same tim e  r e s o l v in g  th e  
c o n t r a d i c t i o n  be tw een  b u r e a u c r a t i c  and p e a s a n t  r a t i o n a l i t y .  B u t 
t h e  ' l i n e a r ' f i e l d  o n ly  r e s o l v e s  th e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  a t  th e  e x p en se  
o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l ,  s in c e  th e  t e r m in a l  (and c r i t i c a l )  p o i n t  
o f  a l l o c a t i o n  i s  i n  e f f e c t  l e f t  i n  c o n t r o l  o f  l o c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  ( e . g .  
c o - o p e r a t i v e s ,  p a n c h a y a ts ,  in fo r m a l  n e tw o rk s , f a c t i o n s )  . H a r t  
f a i l s  t o  r e c o g n is e  t h a t  h i s  ' l i n e a r ' f i e l d  c o n s i s t s  o f  c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s ,  
w here l o c a l l y  dom inan t c l a s s e s  p r e v a i l  i n  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  
a d m i n i s t r a t iv e  c o n t r o l .  The e x p e r ie n c e  o f  c o - o p e r a t iv e s  in  th e  K o s i 
r e g io n  (and in  C o m illa  t o o l )  i s  te s t im o n y  t o  t h i s .  On th e  o th e r  hand 
•h in g e d ' f i e l d s  m ig h t e n s u re  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l ,  b u t  in  th e  p r o c e s s  
th e y  c r e a t e  p ro b lem s o f  a c c e s s  t o  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y  c o n t r o l l e d  
r e s o u r c e  b o th  i n  th e  s e n s e  t h a t  b u r e a u c r a t i c  r a t i o n a l i t y  i s  more 
a p p r o p r i a t e  t o  some c l a s s e s  th a n  o t h e r s ,  and on a c c o u n t o f  th e  
c la s s - b a s e d  'q u e u e s ' f o r  th e  s e r v i c e  ( th e  seco n d  d im e n s io n  o f  b i a s ) .
The c a s e  o f  th e  v i l l a g e  l e v e l  W orker (VLW)
W ith  t h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  b e tw een  'h in g e d ' and ' l i n e a r '  f i e l d s  o f  
s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  com m un ica tions  and t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  
t o  r e t u r n  t o  th e  exam ple o f  th e  VLW. I n  th e  fo rm a l  s e n s e , th e  VLW 
i s  an  exam ple o f  th e  'h in g e d ' a p p ro a c h  (a s  s u g g e s te d  above) . He i s  
a governm en t o f f i c i a l ,  a p p o in te d  and re m u n e ra te d  by a u t h o r i t i e s  e x t e r n a l  
t o  th e  r u r a l  l o c a l i t y .  I n  s h o r t  he  i s  an  o u t s i d e r .  B u t c lo s e r  
e x a m in a tio n  o f  th e  b e h a v io u r  o f  th e  VLW r e v e a l s  a d i f f e r e n t  p i c t u r e  .
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He may b e g in  h i s  to u r  o f  d u ty  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  l o c a l i t y  a s  an  
o u t s i d e r ,  b u t  i t  i s  b o th  in  h i s  i n t e r e s t s  and th o s e  o f  h i s  h o s t s  to  
i n c o r p o r a te  him  i n t o  th e  r u r a l  com m unity .
The id e o lo g y  b e h in d  th e  p o s t  o f  VLW i s  w e ll-m e a n in g  enough -  he
s h o u ld  i n t e g r a t e  a s  c l o s e l y  a s  p o s s ib l e  w ith  v i l l a g e  l i f e  and
v i l l a g e  p ro b lem s i n  o r d e r  t o  g u id e ,  t o  s e c u r e  a n  e f f i c i e n t  a l l o c a t i o n
o f  r e s o u r c e s ,  and t o  r e p o r t  t o  h i s  s e n io r s  i n  th e  A g r i c u l t u r a l
d e p a r tm e n ts  upon p r o g r e s s  and p ro b lem s . As a  r e s u l t  th e  VIM i s
e x p e c te d  t o  r e s i d e  i n  one o f  th e  v i l l a g e s  i n  h i s  'd o m a in '.  ( In
a p ack ag e  b lo c k  t h e r e  a r e  a p p ro x im a te ly  20 VLW 's, 2 f o r  e a ch  H a lk a ) .
I n  th e  p a r t s  o f  th e  K osi package  r e g io n  th e  VLW h a s  d u t i e s
' ers Development Agency 
connected with the SFDA(gmaLl Parm/andother special programmes )
i n  a d d i t i o n  t o  h i s  no rm al d u t i e s :  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  s u p p ly  o f
a g r i c u l t u r a l  i n p u t s ; g u id a n c e  on p r o d u c t io n  p l a n s ,  c r e d i t
f a c i l i t i e s ,  c o - o p e r a t i v e s ,  a n im a l h u s b a n d ry , h e a l t h  and s a n i t a t i o n ,
a g r i c u l t u r a l  in n o v a t io n ;  e n c o u ra g in g  th e  a d o p tio n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l
i n n o v a t io n s ;  and th e  r e g u l a r  c o l l e c t i o n  o f  s t a t i s t i c s  a b o u t c ro p p in g
p a t t e r n s  and th e  u se  o f  new i n p u t s .  T h is  i s  a  d a u n tin g  l i s t ,  t o  be
u n d e r ta k e n  i n  s e v e r a l  v i l l a g e s  .
T o g e th e r  w ith  t h i s  b u rd e n  o f  d u t i e s ,  th e  VLW fa c e d  d e m o ra l is in g  
c a r e e r  p r o s p e c t s  -  p e rh a p s  a f t e r  12 y e a r s  o f  s e r v i c e  he m ig h t be 
p rom oted  t o  S e n io r  VLW, sp e n d in g  m ost o f  h i s  t im e  i n  th e  B lo c k  o f f i c e  
s u p e r v i s in g  th e  w ork o f  th e  VLW 's. He can  e n t e r t a i n  l i t t l e  hope o f  
e v e r  r i s i n g  f u r t h e r  i n  A g r i c u l t u r a l  d e p a r tm e n t h i e r a r c h y ,  o r  t h e r e f o r e  
o f  e n h a n c in g  h i s  incom e l e t  a lo n e  s t a t u s  .
I t  i s  n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h e r e f o r e  t h a t  th e  VIW becom es d e p e n d e n t upon 
some o f  h i s  h o s t s  a s  th e y  a r e  on him  -  a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  m u tu a l 
a d v a n ta g e  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d ,  i n  w hich th e  'h in g e d ' c a te g o r y  b l u r s  i n t o
24
th e  ' l i n e a r '  w ith  u n f o r tu n a te  c o n se q u e n c e s  f o r  a c c e s s  and  so  o n .
The VIW n a t u r a l l y  te n d s  to  r e s i d e  in  th e  h o u se  o f  a l e a d in g  f a m ily  
i n  t h e  v i l l a g e ,  u s u a l ly  o f  th e  d o m in an t c u l t i v a t i n g  c a s t e .  H is  
l i v i n g  c o s t s  a r e  h e a v i ly  s u b s id i s e d  by h i s  h o s t s  and  i n  r e t u r n  th e  
VIW o f f e r s  s p e c i a l  t r e a tm e n t  i n  o b ta in in g  c r e d i t ,  o b t a in in g  f e r t i l i s e r  
and o th e r  i n p u t s ,  p ro v id in g  ad v an ce  in f o r m a t io n  on ; a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  
p r i c i n g ,  p o l i c i e s ,  p o t e n t i a l l y  t h r e a t e n i n g  l e g i s l a t i o n  (o r 
im p le m e n ta tio n  o f  i t ' . )  v i s i t s  o f  s e n io r  o f f i c e r s ,  and so  o n .
In  a d d i t i o n  he may do o th e r  f a v o u r s  in v o lv in g  o th e r  d e p a r tm e n ts ,  f o r  
exam ple w ith  th e  p o l ic e  and th e  c o u r t s .  F u r th e rm o re  th e  VIW w i l l  
be u n d e r p r e s s u r e  t o  e x te n d  su c h  s p e c i a l i s e d  s e r v i c e  t o  o th e r  f a m i l i e s ,  
e s p e c i a l l y  o f  th e  same c a s t e ,  w hich  a r e  c lo s e  ( k in ,  w e a l th ,  s p a t i a l l y )  
t o  h i s  h o s t s ;  and o f  c o u rs e  th e  a p p r o p r i a t e  f a m i l i e s  o f  th e  o th e r  
v i l l a g e s  i n  h i s  'd o m a in '.  The VIW becom es an  e r r a n d  b o y , a  b r o k e r ,  
f o r  c e r t a i n  f a m i l i e s ,  c o m m ittin g  h im s e l f  t o  t h e i r  a s p i r a t i o n s ,  and 
i n t e g r a t e d  i n to  th e  v a lu e - s y s te m  o f  th e  l o c a l i t y  ( h is  own b ackg round  
p ro b a b ly  from  a n o th e r  v i l l a g e  a lth o u g h  e ls e w h e re  i n  th e  s t a t e  a l s o  
p r e - d i s p o s e s  th e  VIW t o  i d e n t i f y  h im s e l f  i n  t h i s  way) . B ut he  a l s o  
o c c u p ie s  a p o s i t i o n  in  th e  em erg in g  c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  o f  th e  r e g io n  -  
t i e d  t o  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  th e  r i c h  p e a s a n t /e m e r g e n t  c a p i t a l i s t  fa rm er 
c l a s s e s  . W ith  no a l t e r n a t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  e n h a n c in g  h i s  l i f e -  
c h a n c e s , i t  i s  i n e v i t a b l e  t h a t  t h i s  p a t t e r n  o f  b e h a v io u r  d e v e lo p s  -  
a l th o u g h  i t  i s  o n ly  e v e r  l i k e l y  t o  be u n c o v e re d  by  s tu d y in g  
p a r t i c u l a r  l o c a l i t i e s  a t  l e n g t h ,  so  t h a t  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s  hav e  t o  be 
re g a rd e d  w ith  some c a u t i o n .  However t h i s  exam ple o f  th e  VIW 
c e r t a i n l y  i l l u s t r a t e s  th e  d a n g e rs  o f  m oving from  'h in g e d ' t o  ' l i n e a r ' 
e x te n s io n  s t r a t e g i e s ,  ev en  u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y  a s  i n  t h i s  c a s e .
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p e rh a p s  th e  m ost im p o r ta n t  c o n seq u en ce  o f  t h i s  p r o c e s s  in  th e
v i l l a g e  t h a t  I  s tu d ie d  was upon th e  's m a l l  f a r m e r s ' d ev e lo p m en t
schem e (SFDA) a s  w e l l  a s  th e  o th e r  c l a s s e s  o f  p o o r p e a s a n t
( r a i y a t / s h a r e c r o p p e r ) who d id  n o t  ev en  q u a l i f y  f o r  i n c l u s io n  in
th e  schem e. A t th e  tim e  o f  my f ie ld w o r k ,  t h r e e  y e a r s  a f t e r  th e
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  th e  schem e, « o n ly  tw o o f  th e  's m a l l  f a r m e r s ' w ere
members o f  th e  C o -o p e ra t iv e  i n  th e  v i l l a g e . The VLW a c t u a l l y  l iv e d
(headman)
i n  th e  v i l l a g e  w ith  th e  M ukhiya /  and y e t  many o f  th e  poo r p e a s a n ts
i n  th e  v i l l a g e  h ad  n e v e r  s e e n  h im  and c e r t a i n l y  h ad  n o t  been
a p p ro a c h e d  by  h im . W ithou t th e  SFDA t o  m anage, an  e x p la n a t io n  o f  t h i s  
m ig h t be t h a t  poo r p e a s a n ts  w ould n o t  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  h i s  t a r g e t s . But 
u n d e r th e  te rm s  o f  th e  schem e s m a l l  fa rm e rs  had  t o  be i d e n t i f i e d  by 
th e  VLW, a r e g i s t e r  c o m p ile d , and  th o s e  l i s t e d  w ere  th e n  t o  be 
e n t i t l e d  t o  th e  s p e c i a l  c r e d i t  f a c i l i t i e s , w hich  w ere a c e n t r a l  
f e a t u r e  o f  th e  schem e, b o th  th ro u g h  th e  C o -o p e ra t iv e  and a t  
t h e  B lock  o f f i c e  . T h ree  y e a r s  a f t e r  th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  th e  
schem e in  t h i s  v i l l a g e ,  m ost o f  th e  e l i g i b l e  c a te g o r y  o f  
c u l t i v a t o r s  had  n o t h e a rd  o f  th e  schem e -  i n  f a c t  I  was th e  m ain  
beaurer o f  th e  in fo rm a t io n '.  The S e c re ta ry  o f  th e  C o -o p e ra t iv e  was 
one o f  th e  r i c h e s t  h o u se h o ld  h e a d s  i n  t h e  v i l l a g e , from  th e  le a d in g  
c u l t i v a t i n g  c a s t e .  H is  c a s t e  and a few  r i c h  p e a s a n ts  from  th e  M uslim  
com m unitÿiiy c o n s t i t u t e d  th e  m em bersh ip  o f  th e  C o -o p e ra t iv e  -  apaurt 
from  th e  2 s m a ll  fa rm e rs  who w ere c o n n e c te d  th ro u g h  c a s t e  ( in  one
c a s e )  and a s  a  M uslim  ( in  th e  o th e r )  t o  th e  le a d in g  f a m i l i e s . The
C o -o p e ra t iv e  s e c r e t a r y  made no a t te m p t  t o  r e c r u i t  o th e r  members and 
th e  VLW in fo rm ed  me t h a t  h e  h ad  no c h o ic e  b u t  t o  a c c e p t  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n .
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B e fo re  le a v in g  th e  VIW, i t  i s  w o rth  p u r s u in g  th e  e a r l i e r  c y n ic a l
r e f e r e n c e  t o  t a r g e t s  by q u o t in g  from  B ig g s  and B urns (C hap t .1 0 .1 9 7 6 )
" . .  . e x te n s io n  a d v ic e  i s  g e a re d  e x c lu s i v e l y  t o  o p t im a l  
c o n d i t io n s  w here th e  fa rm er h a s  a l l  t h e  n e c e s s a ry  i n p u ts  
r e a d i l y  a v a i l a b l e .  VIW 's a r e  n o t  e q u ip p e d  t o  a d v is e  
fa rm e rs  whose c o n d i t io n s  a r e  su b —o p t im a l ,  n o r c a n  th e y  
a s s u r e  th e  s u p p ly  o f  b a s ic  i n p u t s . I n  p r a c t i c e  th e  
a d v ic e  o f  th e  VIW and h i s  a s s i s t a n c e  i n  g a in in g  a c c e s s
t o  i n p u ts  i s  m o n o p o lised  b y  th e  r i c h e s t  fa rm e rs  o f
th e  v i l l a g e ,
T h is  te n d e n c y  i s  e n c o u ra g e d  b y  one o f  th e  c r i t e r i a  
f o r  e v a lu a t i n g  th e  s u c c e s s  o f  th e  Hyv programme w h ic h is  
t h e  number o f  a c r e s  u n d er HyVs . S in c e  r i c h  fa rm e rs  
own th e  m ost l a n d ,  i t  i s  h a r d l y  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  f o r  
t h i s  r e a s o n  a lo n e ,  V IW 's g iv e  them  t h e i r  m ost 
e x c lu s iv e  a t t e n t i o n . "
I t  may be t h a t  i n  th e  l a s t  few  y e a r s  t h e r e  h a s  b e e n  some r e s p o n s e  t o  
t h i s  p ro b le m . B u t much w ould c e r t a i n l y  be  s o lv e d  i f  VIWs c o u ld  
e x p e c t  a  more a t t r a c t i v e  c a r e e r  p a th  i n  th e  s e r v i c e  -  p e rh a p s  a l l  
new r e c r u i t s  t o  th e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  d e p a r tm e n t s h o u ld  b e g in  a s  
VIWs'. S e c o n d ly , t o  a v o id  th e  w o r s t  d a n g e rs  o f  th e  ' l i n e a r  ' 
s i t u a t i o n  w i th o u t  r e v e r t i n g  t o  th e  'h in g e d ' s o l u t i o n ,  p e rh a p s  a l l  
l o c a l  o f f i c i a l s  in  th e  b lo c k  ( s in c e  a l l  a r e  ex p o sed  t o  p r e s s u r e ,  
t h r e a t s  and  b r i b e s ) ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  VIWs s h o u ld  be  t r a n s f e r r e d  to  
d i f f e r e n t  a r e a s  a f t e r  3 y e a r s .  Such a p e r io d  i s  lo n g  enough t o  
g a in  f a m i l i a r i t y ,  b u t  s h o r t  enough it) fen d  o f f  p r e s s u r e .  However th e  
t r a n s f e r  d e v ic e  depends upon th e  p r o v is io n  o f  a  lo n g e r  c a r e e r  
s t r u c t u r e  f o r  s u c c e s s .
The C la s s  P rob lem  o f  A ccess
The SFDA schem e r e p r e s e n t s  a n  im p o r ta n t  i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  th e  
them e o f  a c c e s s  and c l a s s  s t r u c t u r e  i n  t h i s  p a p e r  . The o b j e c t  
o f  th e  schem e was to  make t h i s  c a te g o r y  o f  p o o r p e a s a n t  
e c o n o m ic a lly  v i a b l e  by p r o v id in g ,  on f a v o u r aüole te r m s ,  n e c e s s a ry
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r e s o u r c e s  w hich w ould be  d e n ie d  him  th ro u g h  th e  m a rk e t -  
p r e c i s e l y  on a c c o u n t o f  h i s  d e p e n d e n c e , p o v e r ty ,  low c o l l a t e r a l ,  
i l l i t e r a c y ,  p r e o c c u p a tio n  w ith  s u r v i v a l  (w h ich  d o es  n o t  in c lu d e  
ta k in g  r i s k s )  and so  o n . B u t i t  i s  t h e s e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  w h ic h , 
a s  we have s e e n ,  p re v e n te d  th e  poor p e a s a n t  m aking c o n n e c t io n  w ith  
th e  a g e n c y . He had  t o  o b t a i n  in f o r m a t io n  a b o u t  th e  schem e, 
c o n v in c e  o f f i c i a l s  t h a t  he  i s  a  q u a l i f i e d  c l i e n t  o f  t h e  schem e, 
and th e n  w ork h a rd  a t  a c t u a l l y  o b t a in in g  t h e  r e s o u r c e s  t o  w h ich  he 
became e n t i t l e d .  T hese a r e  p ro b lem s w hich  h a v e  t h e i r  o r i g i n  i n  
th e  i n e q u a l i t i e s  o f  th e  a g r a r i a n  s o c i a l  f o r m a t io n ,  and  w hich  t o  a  
g r e a t  e x te n t  l i e  beyond th e  sc o p e  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  s o l u t i o n .
Thus th e  s i t u a t i o n  which gave r i s e  t o  t h e  t r e a tm e n t  i n  th e
f i r s t  p l a c e ,  a l s o  f u n c t io n s  t o  h in d e r  t h e  b u r e a u c r a t i c  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n
o f  t h a t  t r e a tm e n t .  T h is  i s  th e  p ro b lem  o f  a c c e s s .
The p i c t u r e  i s  more c o m p lic a te d  th a n  t h i s ,  h o w e v e r . F i r s t ,  new 
a c c e s s  s i t u a t i o n s  in v o lv in g  s t a t e  a d m in is te r e d  s e r v i c e s  n e v e r  o p e r a te  
in  v a c u o . They a r e  an  in c r e m e n ta l  a d d i t i o n  t o  o th e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
sy s te m s  w hich a l r e a d y  e x i s t  and w hich  e n v e lo p  th e  p o t e n t i a l  c l i e n t  
o f  b u r e a u c r a t i c  a l l o c a t i o n . A s m a l l  fa rm e r  w i l l  h av e  o b l i g a t i o n s  
i n  o th e r  s t r u c t u r e s  w hich  a r e  i n d i c a t i v e  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  f o rm a t io n  -  
e . g .  f r e e  d ra u g h t  power i n  ex ch an g e  f o r  p lo u g h in g  a r i c h e r  
p e a s a n t 's  la n d  a t  p eak  p e r io d s ;  o r  ad v an ce  o f  s e e d  t o  r e p a y  a s  
g r a in ;  o r sp a ce  f o r  h i s  j u t e  on h i s  p a t r o n 's  b u l lo c k  c a r t  i n  r e t u r n  
f o r  l o y a l t y  o r  some p a s t  s e r v i c e s  w h ich  c a n  s t i l l  be  c a s h e d . Such 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  c o n tin u e  th ro u g h  t im e ,  th e y  a r e  com plex  and o th e r  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  depend upon th e m . They r e p r e s e n t  th e  s o c i a l  o r d e r ,  
and a s  su ch  th e y  im ply  a  g r e a t e r  s e c u r i t y  t h a n  t h a t  o f f e r e d  by
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th e  o u ts id e  i n s t i t u t i o n  on th e  one d im e n s io n  o n ly .
I t  f o llo w s  from  t h i s ,  s e c o n d ly ,  t h a t  th e  o f f i c i a l ' s  c o n c e p t  o f  
r a t i o n a l i t y  may n o t  be shëired  by th e  p e a s a n t .  The o f f i c i a l ,  o f t e n  
b e c a u se  th e  s e r v i c e  on o f f e r  i s  h ig h ly  s p e c i f i c ,  i s  u n a b le  t o  
e x te n d  th e  e f f e c t  o f  h i s  w ork a c r o s s  th e  p e a s a n t 's  t o t a l  s i t u a t i o n .  
Thus th e  a d m i n i s t r a t o r s  o f  t h e  C rop  G u a ra n te e  Schem e, w hich  was 
a tte m p te d  on a  p i l o t  b a s i s  i n  th e  K o si a r e a ,  s h o u ld  n o t  h a v e  b e e n  
s u r p r i s e d  when th e y  l e a r n t  t h a t  some o f  th e  c u l t i v a t o r s  had  s o ld  
t h e  s p e c i a l  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  s e e d ,  and had  sowed an  i n f e r i o r  v a r i e t y  
i n s t e a d .  T hese  men had  d e b ts  i n  o th e r  s t r u c t u r e s , so  t h a t  t h e i r  
s e l e c t i o n  t o  t h e  scheme was good f o r tu n e  f o r  t h e i r  c r e d i t o r s . 
F e r t i l i s e r  o f t e n  suffeosa  a s i m i l a r  f a t e .  And b o th  se e d  and  
f e r t i l i s e r  w ere o f t e n  u se d  on s h a re c ro p p e d  la n d ,  a l th o u g h  t h i s  was 
fo rb id d e n  in  t h e  c o n d i t io n s  o f  e n t r y  t o  th e  schem e, th u s  i n d i r e c t l y  
s u b s id i z in g  th e  ow ners o f  th o s e  p l o t s .
T h i r d ly ,  t h e r e  i s  a l s o  th e  s i t u a t i o n  w here a l t e r n a t i v e  p o i n t s  o f  
s u p p ly  e x i s t . The c o n d i t io n s  o f  a c c e s s  t o  th e s e  a l t e r n a t i v e  p o in t s  
v a r y ,  a lth o u g h  th e y  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  be s i t u a t e d  f i r m ly  in  th e  lo g ic  
o f  th e  s o c i a l  f o r m a t io n .  The exam ple o f  c r e d i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  
i n  th d s e  r e s p e c t tS .
The C ase o f  C r e d i t
The im p o rta n c e  o f  c r e d i t  c a n n o t be o v e r e s t im a te d . A ccess  t o  th e  
new t e c h n o lo g ic a l  r e s o u r c e s  i s  d e p e n d e n t on c r e d i t . I t  i s  
e x p l i c i t l y  r e c o g n iz e d  t h a t  th e  m a jo r i ty  o f  p e a s a n ts  do n o t  hav e  
s u f f i c i e n t  s a v in g s  from  t h e i r  p r e v io u s  a g r i c u l t u r a l  a c t i v i t y ,  o r  
econom ic s t a t u s ,  t o  make th e  r e q u i r e d  in v e s tm e n t s .  I t  i s  a l s o
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a p p r e c ia te d  i n  th e  lAAp t h a t  i f  p e a s a n ts  w ere s o l e l y  d e p e n d e n t on 
p r i v a t e  s o u rc e s  o f  c r e d i t ,  th e  h ig h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  c h a rg e d  w ould 
make th e  in n o v a t io n s  v e ry  u n a t t r a c t i v e . The le n d e r  w ould l i t e r a l l y  
r e a p  th e  in c r e a s e d  h a r v e s t  a s  rep a y m en t o f  e x o r b i t a n t  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s .
w here  governm en t c r e d i t  i s  r e l a t i v e l y  so  cleap i t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  
t o  se e  why p e a s a n ts  m i ^ t  p r e f e r  a l t e r n a t i v e  s o u rc e s  o f  c r e d i t ,  
y e t  th e y  f r e q u e n t l y  d o . The m ajo r a d v a n ta g e  o f  governm en t lo a n s  
seem ed t o  be th e  i n e f f i c i e n t  p ro c e d u re  o f  i n s i s t i n g  on  r e p a y m e n ts .  
O th e rw ise  th e y  w ere c r i t i c i z e d  f o r  t h e i r  i n f l e x i b i l i t y .  The lo a n s  
w hich  em anate  from  th e  l o g ic  o f  th e  s o c i a l  fo rm a tio n  -  m o n e y le n d e rs , 
l a n d l o r d s , r i c h  p e a s a n t s , sh o p k e e p e rs  -  r e f l e c t  one im p o r ta n t  
f e a t u r e  o f  t h a t  l o g i c :  th e  u n p r e d ic ta b le  e n v iro n m e n t o f
a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t io n .  A c r e d i t  sy s te m  h a s  t o  be s u f f i c i e n t l y  
f l e x i b l e  t o  cope w i th  c ro p  f a i l u r e s  due t o  d r o u g h ts ,  f l o o d s ,  f r e a k  
h a i l  s tb r m s , and in p u t  b o t t l e n e c k s .  Such f l e x i b i l i t y  d epends 
e i t h e r  upon t r u s t  o r  upon th e  c e r t a i n t y  t h a t  th e  o b l i g a t i o n  t o  
r e p a y  c a n  be s u s ta i n e d  th ro u g h  s a n c t io n s  . B o th  o f  th e s e  c o n d i t io n s  
c l e a r l y  e x i s t  w i th in  th e  r u r a l  s o c io -e c o n o m ic  s t r u c t u r e  w here 
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a r e  m u l t i - s t r a n d e d .  I t  i s  t h e s e  s o r t s  o f  c o n d i t io n s  
w hich  h av e  t o  b e  f u l f i l l e d  r a t h e r  th a n  s im p le  e s t i m a t e s  o f  r e t u r n  
on in v e s tm e n t  b e fo r e  c r e d i t  t r a n s a c t i o n s  c a n  o c c u r  i n  su ch  an  
e r r a t i c  c l im a te  f o r  p r o d u c t io n .  B e fo re  c r e d i t  t r a n s a c t i o n s  w ith  th e  
governm ent c a n  be g iv e n  a s a t i s f a c t o r y  b a s i s ,  s im i l a r  a llo w a n c e s  
w i l l  have  t o  be  m ade.
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W ith  th e  a d m i n i s t r a t io n  e s e n t i a l l y  i n  a  s i n g l e - s t r a n d e d  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
t o  th e  c l i e n t ,  th e  a s se s s m e n t o f  a .p e a s a n t 's  p r o p e n s i ty  t o  r e p a y  i s  b a se d  
on th e  c r u d e s t ,  u n i  - d im e n s io n a l ,  econom ic c o n s id e r a t i o n s  em p lo y in g  
th e  m etap h o r o f  th e  ' fa rm er ' . Thus lo a n s  f o r  c o n su m p tio n  a r e  anathem a 
t o  a governm en t a g e n c y . W herever p o s s i b l e ,  lo a n s  a r e  r e s t r i c t e d  t i g h t l y  
t o  th e  f in a n c in g  o f  p r o d u c t iv e  a c t i v i t y  -  v a r i a b l e  i n p u t s ,  la n d  
im provem ent ( th o u g h  n e v e r  th e  p u rc h a s e  o f  l a n d ,  s i g n i f i c a n t l y ) , b u l lo c k  
p u rc h a s e  and i r r i g a t i o n .
However i t  was q u i t e  c l e a r  t h a t  many g overnm en t lo a n s  in te n d e d  f o r  
p r o d u c t iv e  p u rp o se s  ended  up f in a n c in g  some fo rm  o f  co n su m p tio n  
e x p e n d i tu r e ;  o f t e n  th e  rep ay m en t o f  o u t s t a n d in g  d e b ts  i n c u r r e d  in  
o th e r  s t r u c t u r e s ,  b u t  a l s o  u n d e r w r i t in g  u r g e n t  fo o d  r e q u i r e m e n ts ,  o r 
d o c t o r 's  f e e s ,  c o u r t  e x p e n s e s , o r  n e c e s s a r y  r i t u a l  o b s e r v a t i o n s .  The 
s in g l e - s t r a n d e d  t r a n s a c t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e en  o fSL cial and c l i e n t ,  an  
a l i e n  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t o  th e  so c io -e c o n o m ic  e n v iro n m e n t o f  th e  p e a s a n t ,  
c a n n o t cope w ith  t h e s e  s o r t s  o f  n e e d s .  T h e ir  m u l t i - d im e n s io n a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  
a r e  a t  odds w ith  th e  b u r e a u c r a t i c  c r i t e r i a  o f  r a t i o n a l i t y ,  ev en  th o u g h  a 
f a i l u r e  t o  e x te n d  a lo a n  f o r  co n su m p tio n  i s  l i k e l y  t o  m a in ta in  a  p e a s a n t  
i n  a  n e tw o rk  o f  o b l ig a t i o n s  from  w hich  th e  p r o d u c t iv e  lo a n  i s  in te n d e d  
t o  e x t r a c t  h im . In  p r a c t i c e ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  g overnm en t lo a n s  f o r  p r o d u c t io n  
and p r i v a t e  s o u rc e s  o f  c r e d i t  f o r  c o n su m p tio n  te n d e d  t o  be co m p arab le  
b e c a u s e  th e  p ro c e d u re s  f o r  th e  rep ay m en t o f  governm en t lo a n s  w ere so  
i n e f f i c i e n t .  The p e a s a n t  had  t o  c a l c u l a t e  w h e th e r  t o  t a k e  a p r i v a t e  lo a n  
f o r  c o n su m p tio n , o r  w h e th er t o  ru n  th e  r i s k  o f  t a k in g  a g overnm en t lo a n  
and u s e  : i t  f o r  an  im m ediate  need  ' w ith  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  d e f a u l t i n g .
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C o n c lu s io n ;  I s s u e  o f  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .
The r e s e a r c h  e x p e r ie n c e  i n  th e  K osi r e g i o n  h a s  draw n my 
a t t e n t i o n  b o th  t o  th e  g e n e ra l  d i a l e c t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw een  
te c h n o lo g y  and th e  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t io n ,  and t o  th e  r e g i o n 's  
s p e c i f i c  c o n d i t io n s  o f  m ig r a t io n  and  s e t t l e m e n t  w h ich  h a s  s t r u c t u r e d  
th e  r e s p o n s e  o f  v a r io u s  c l a s s e s  t o  th e  K o si p r o j e c t . By c o n n e c t in g  
t h e s e  them es t o  p r o p o s i t io n s  a b o u t  th e  c l a s s  n a tu r e  o f  th e  s t a t e  in  
I n d i a ,  t h e  p o l i t i c a l  economy o f  th e  K osi p r o j e c t  c a n  be  u n d e rs to o d  and 
th e  n a tu r e  o f  b ia s  a g a in s t  th e  p o o re r  c l a s s e s  o f  p e a s a n t  and l a n d le s s  
l a b o u r e r  i d e n t i f i e d .  However t h i s  b i a s  o f  o b j e c t i v e s  i s  f u r t h e r  
r e i n f o r c e d  by  th e  a c t u a l  fo rm  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  by  State a p p a r a tu s e s  i n  th e  
r u r a l  economy -  r a i s i n g  th e  i s s u e s  o f  a p p r o p r i a t e  a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  and 
a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l .
In  th e  c o n te x t  o f  a r e g io n  l i k e  K o s i ,  t h e  p a ra d o x  i s  t h a t  to o  l i t t l e  
o r  to o  much a d m i n i s t r a t iv e  c o n t r o l  c a n  hav e  a s i m i l a r  r e s u l t . A h ig h  
d e g re e  o f  a d m in i s t r a t iv e  c o n t r o l  m e re ly  s t r e n g th e n s  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  
do m in an t c l a s s e s  w hich a r e  r e p r e s e n te d  by  th e  s t a t e  and  i t s  a p p a r a tu s e s . 
B u t to o  l i t t l e  a d m i n i s t r a t iv e  c o n t r o l  ( th e  ' l i n e a r '  s i t u a t i o n )  
s im p ly  means t h a t  l o c a l  d o m in an t c l a s s e s  a r e  a b le  t o  c a p tu r e  th e  
r e s o u r c e s  w hich th e y  sh o u ld  be d i s t r i b u t i n g  more w id e ly .  The d i f f e r e n c e  
be tw een  th e s e  two s i t u a t i o n s  i s  d e te rm in e d  by th e  g r e a t e r  in f lu e n c e  o f  
u rb a n  b o u r g e o is ie s  i n  s i t u a t i o n s  o f  g r e a t e r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l  -
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an  in f lu e n c e  w hich  can  a l s o  a p p r e c ia t e  th e  b e n e f i t s  o f  a  q u i e s c e n t ,  
in c o r p o r a te d  and s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t  poor p e a s a n t r y  w hich  does n o t  
c o n s t i t u t e  a  d r a i n  on th e  m a rk e ta b le  s u r p lu s  w h ile  a t  th e  same tim e  
s u b s id i s in g  th e  c o s t  o f  la b o u r  t o  more c a p i t a l i s t  o r i e n t e d  f a r m e r s .
The outcom e o f  su ch  in f lu e n c e  i s  th e  f o r m u la t io n  o f  program m es f o r  
s m a l l  and m a rg in a l  fa rm e rs  a s  a  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  th e  rem o v a l o f  
r u r a l  p o v e r t y . B u t how much a r e  t h e s e  program m es an  e x e r c i s e  i n  
p o p u l i s t  id e o lo g y ,  and w hat i s  th e  s c a l e  o f  r e s o u r c e s  a c t u a l l y  
com m itted  t o  t h e s e  program m es? Would i t  be  to o  c y n ic a l  t o  s u g g e s t  
a  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw een  p ro b lem s o f  a c c e s s  and  p o p u l i s t  id e o lo g y ,  
w here th e  id e o lo g y  o n ly  s u r v iv e s  b e c a u s e  p rob lem s o f  a c c e s s  p r e v e n t  
th e  s e r v i c e  from  b e in g  in u n d a te d  w ith  c l i e n t s ?
The i s s u e s  o f  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  c o n t r o l  and a c c e s s  r a i s e  th e  
f a m i l i a r  p ro b lem  o f  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y .  I f ,  w ith  th e  v a r i a t i o n  n o te d  
a b o v e , th e  ou tcom es a r e  s im i l a r  w h e th e r  th e  p r o v i s io n  o f  s e r v i c e  
i s  d e c e n t r a l i s e d  o r  n o t  ( l i n e a r  o r  h in g e d ,  e t c . )  b e c a u se  th e  power o f  
c e r t a i n  c l a s s e s  i s  a r t i c u l a t e d  s u c c e s s f u l l y  i n  b o th  ways ( a l b e i t  th ro u g h  
d i f f e r e n t  i n s t i t u t i o n s ) , t h e n  th e  p ro b lem s f o r  th e  poo r a re  u l t i m a t e l y  
s im i l a r  a s  w e l l .  I n  n e i t h e r  s t r a t e g y  o f  p r o v is io n  a r e  th e  p ro c e d u re s  
and ou tcom es a c c o u n ta b le  t o  th e  poor -  th e y  do n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a  s o c i a l  
f o r c e  o f  any  p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  a s  th e y  a r e  f ra g m en te d  and 
u n o rg a n is e d  by  v i r t u e  o f  t h e i r  s t r u c t u r a l  p o s i t i o n  i n  th e  s o c i a l  
r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t io n .  U n le ss  th e s e  c l a s s e s  c a n  d e v e lo p  an  autonom ous 
and o r g a n is e d  e x i s t e n c e  w hich  w ould p ro v id e  th e  b a s i s  o f  p o l i t i c a l  
in f lu e n c e  o v e r  th e  p r o v is io n  o f  s e r v i c e s ,  th e n  th e  a c c e s s  p rob lem  
w i l l  re m a in  an  i s s u e  o f  p o l i t i c a l  economy a s  w e l l  a s  a c la s h  o f  
r a t i o n a l i t i e s .
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The p ro b lem  o f  m o b i l is in g  th e  p oo r s tem s from  t h e i r  i n c r e a s in g  
a l i e n a t i o n  from  th e  p ro d u c t  a s  b o th  s h a re c ro p p in g  and c u s to m a ry  
la b o u r  r i g h t s  d is a p p e a r  i n  th e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  c a p i t a l i s t  a g r i c u l t u r e .  
T h is  m a t e r i a l  a l i e n a t i o n  p r e v e n ts  any  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  an  au tonom ous, 
n o n -d e p e n d e n t econom ic e x i s t e n c e  ( l e t  a lo n e  a c t u a l  a c c u m u la t io n ) , 
w hich i n  i t s  t u r n  i n h i b i t s  b o th  t h e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  a  c o n s c io u s n e s s  
and th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  an  o r g a n i s a t i o n  ( e . g .  a  t e n a n t  o r  l a b o u r e r s '  
u n io n ) w hich w ould c h a l le n g e  th e  sy s te m  o f  d ep en d en ce  and th e  c l a s s  
o f  p a tr o n s  ( r i c h  p e a s a n ts  cum c a p i t a l i s t  f a rm e rs )  op p o sed  t o  th e  p o o r .
I f  t h i s  r e a s o n in g  i s  a c c e p te d ,  and th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  mon e g a l i t a r i a n  
s o c i e t y  i s  an  o b j e c t  o f  p o l i c y ,  th e n  we s h o u ld  be s e r i o u s  i n  
c o n te m p la t in g  th e  g r e a t e r  in v o lv e m e n t o f  p o o re r  c l a s s e s  au to n o m o u sly  
i n  p r o d u c t iv e  a c t i v i t y  a s  a p r e c o n d i t i o n  f o r  an  au tonom ous p o l i t i c a l  
p re s e n c e  in  th e  s o c i e t y .  P o l i t i c a l  freedom  i s  m e a n in g le s s  w i th o u t  some 
econom ic in d ep en d en ce  from  o p p r e s s iv e  c l a s s e s  . Why n o t  o r g a n is e  
t h e  po o r t o  p ro v id e  th e  new in p u t s  and s e r v i c e s  t o  a g r i c u l t u r e ?
Why n o t  d e le g a te  th e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t e r m in a l  w a te r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
t o  th e  p o o r?  why n o t  b a se  th e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  l o c a l  a g r o - i n d u s t r i e s  
upon th e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  and e v e n tu a l  m anagem ent o f  t h e  p o o r?  Why n o t 
a s s i s t  th e  po o r t o  e s t a b l i s h  and  manage go-dow n, r u r a l  h a u la g e  and 
m a rk e tin g  t r a n s a c t i o n s ?  Land r e fo rm s  (w hich f a i l  anyway) a r e  n o t 
th e  o n ly  ways o f  c r e a t i n g  au tonom ous p r o d u c t io n  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  f o r  th e  
p o o r .  The p o l i t i c a l  o b s ta c l e s  t o  r e d i s t r i b u t i n g  la n d  a r e  v e r y  s t r o n g ,  
b u t  a r e  th e  o b s ta c l e s  so  s t r o n g  i n  th e  o th e r  s p h e re s  o f  r u r a l  
p ro d u c t io n  and exchange?  The w eaker p o in t s  o f  th e  sy s te m  s h o u ld  be
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a t t a c k e d  f i r s t .  I t  c e r t a i n l y  makes no s e n s e  t o  p r e te n d  t h a t  
r u r a l  l a b o u r e r s  and poo r c u l t i v a t o r s  w i l l  b e n e f i t  from  th e  in c r e a s e d  
la b o u r  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  a t  peak  p e r io d s  o r i n c r e a s e d  y i e l d s  p ro v id e d  
by th e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  HyV 's^;to p r e te n d  t h a t  th e y  a r e  p a r t i c i p a t i n g  
s u f f i c i e n t l y  i n  th e  r e v i s e d  a g r a r i a n  sy s te m  t o  o b v ia te  th e  need  f o r  an 
autonom ous p o l i t i c a l  e x i s t e n c e .
T h e re  a r e  no p a n a c e a s  h e re  f o r  o n ly  a  s m a l l  p r o p o r t io n  th e  
r u r a l  p o o r i n  any  r e g io n  c o u ld  be in v o lv e d  i n  su ch  econom ic a c t i v i t y ,  
and th e  e x i s t i n g  c o n c e n t r a t io n  o f  th o s e  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  th e  h a n d s  o f  
e x - l a n d lo r d s  and r i c h  p e a s a n ts  w ould s t i l l  c o n s t i t u t e  a  m ajo r 
o b s t a c l e . However p o l ic y  i n i t i a t i v e s  o f  t h i s  ty p e  m ig h t h av e  i n d i r e c t  
r e s u l t s  o f  w id e r s i g n i f i c a n c e  b y  p r o v id in g  th e  c o n d i t io n s  w hich 
n u r tu r e d  th e  g row th  o f  g en u in e  l e a d e r s  among th e  p o o r .
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GLOSSARY of Indian words used in the text:
The 8th month in the Hindu calendar, 
approximately mid-November to mid- 
December.
The cropping season ending in month of 
Agahan usually mid-September to mid- 
December.
The name given to the main paddy harvest; 
can be used instead of Aghani.
Unit of revenue administration belcw a 
subdivision and above a Halka,
The name given to the paddy har­
vesting seaison before Aman; can be 
used instead of Bhadai,
A type of millet (pennisetum  
typhoideum).
A sharecropper without recorded rights; 
tenant-at-will.
The cropping season ending in month of 
Bhado y mid-June to mid-September.
A month in the Hindu calendar; approxi­
mately mid-August to mid-September.
A local unit of measuring areas of land. 
The exact acre equivalence varies fran 
village to village but the average 
given in the Agricultural Survey is 
1.35 bigha = 1 acre with a range of 
1.10 - 2.39. There are 20 kathas to 
the bigha.
Deep-water paddy transplanted in March 
and harvested before the monsoon.






Chandi A very coarse fibre, iriesta.
Cheena A type of millet (panicum miliaceum)^ also
called panivaragh,
Crore Indian unit of counting, 1 crore = 10 million.
Dal Pulses.
Dhanhar Lowlands used for paddy cultivation.
Dhur A unit of measuring area; 20 dhur = 1 katha,
400 dhur -  1 bigha.
Diara Sandy stretches thrown out along the river­
bed.





Halka A unit of administration ccnprising 10-12
villages.
Harijan A member of a Scheduled Caste,
J a i Oats.
Jagmani Social division of labour based on caste
distinctions.
Jan Barley
J a t i Endogamous caste groups
Jowar Sorghum •
Jinswar Form used for collecting information on
crop acreages from the villages, kept by 
Kaminchari,
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Village level revenue worker; keeper 
of village land registers.
A unit of measuring area (20 katha =
1 b ig h a ). There are 20 dhur to the 
katha.
The monsoon growing season (June to 
Septanber),
A pulse (ta th yru s s a t iv u s ) .
A political organisation of the 
peasants.
A pulse (d o lich os b if lo r u s).
Indian unit of counting; 1 lakh = 
loo thousand, 100 lakh -  1 crore ,
A type of millet (eleusim e coracana),
Lentil, a pulse (len s e sc u la n ta ),
Peas; a pulse.
A measure of grain: 40 se e r s ,
A pulse, sanetimes called green gram.
Village Panchayat headman.
Elected Local Government Body (see pp.148- 
150).
The largest division- of land in a 
zamindari (historical); now a fiscal 
unit consisting of a number of villages.
Jute.





R aiya t , Cultivator who holds land direct frcm
the government and pays land tax.
S a tta Agreement between cultivator and canal
authority for provision of irrigation.
Seev A measure: approximately 933 grams.
S ih n ider A sharecropper vhose rights as a tenant
are recorded in writing.
Thana An area administered by one police
station.
Tola A quarter or particular area of a town
or village.
Zamindar Tax farmer. The system was maintained
by the British and abolished in the 
early 1950's.
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1. Background of the Study
The papers on rural power structure represent an 
early stage in our thinking. They are centred primarily 
around preliminary studies of two village areas in the 
Kotwali Thana of Comilla district, although earlier stu- 
3 dies have also been incorporated in the two other sections
 ̂ of this volume. There will be further scope for analysis
] of the data beyond that presented in these initial papers.
Nevertheless the pressure of time governed by the need 
: to address perhaps the most urgent contemporary issue
of development in Bangladesh, demands that we subordi­
nate academic refinement in order to contribute to the 
ideological debates about the socialist path for rural deve­
lopment.
It is recognized that this is a sensitive area in which 
to be working at this time, and that positions of academic 
pseudo-neutrality are not tenable where the subject mattar 
addresses the central ideological issue in a rural society 
of this type—namely the relationships between different 
classes of the peasantry and the state. This issue has 
preoccupied national leaders from countries far apart in 
space and history—the Parliamentarians of 17th Century 
England ; revolutionaries of 19th Century France ; 
the reform period in Japan ; the NEP and the Stali­
nist eras of the USSR ; the Chinese revolution ; the 
wars of South-East Asia ; the ‘Liberated’ republics in 
North and Sub-Saharan Africa ; Mexico ; more recently
Cuba and ChiM ; riot to mention some of the movements 
in the Indian sub-continent. The solutions found for the 
peasantry—the poorer sections at least—have rarely been 
satisfactory ; and then only at the expense of great human 
suffering.
The problem has been paramount of generating and 
extracting a marketable surplus of food produce from the 
peasantry at. an exchange value which is low enough to 
facilitate industrial development without at the same time 
stimulating a mass exodus of rural poor into urban cen­
tres where the capacity to absorb their labour has been 
surpassed. Thus the problem of rural poverty cannot be 
separated conceptually from the issue of growth. Simul­
taneously, attention has to be concentrated upon rural 
employment and distribution, as well as the productivity 
both of labour and of land.
But a vital characteristic of the rural society is that 
these objectives cannot be achieved simply through pricing 
and taxation devices ( the common management strategies 
of neo-classical economics ). Many of the transactions 
between classes cannot be reduced to the single dimension 
of price. Other relationships are critical—those involving 
trust, kinshipi personal knowledge, barter, patron-client 
dependence, and so on. Thus solutions have to be reached 
which affect the underlying social and economic structure 
of the rural society. In this way, ideological debates 
about the socialist path for rural development depend 
critically upon anjl analysis of the contemporary social 
formation involving the detailed interactions between 
lich and poor, leaders and followers in the village.
that
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These papers will therefore highlight specific rural 
features of the social formation in Bangladesh, derived 
from our understanding of villages in the area of Comilla 
and which we consider are of relevance to contemporary 
thinking about the socialist path for rural development. 
It will come as little surprise that these studies attribute 
overdetermining significance to the ownership or control 
of land as the source of inequality. But there is a connec­
tion between the issues of rural inequality, poverty and 
growth. Part of the connection involves the state ; the 
way in which it favours the classes on whose support it is 
dependent for its survival in its present form.
The nature of the state cannot be left out of the 
equation. I'j It is structurally biased towards classes which 
are responsible for inequality, poverty and lack of growth, 
then it is silly to exclude it from our efforts to explain 
the problems of achieving socialist rural development. 
Likewise if present problems produce consciousness and 
discontent among the ru ral poor and dispossessed, we 
cannot ignore the pressure which they may bring to bear 
on government nor the possibility that they unite to 
overturn the present structure of political and economic 
power and reconstitute thé  state m their own favour. 
Indeed there are many of us who are convinced that this 
is the only socialist path for rural development.
Thus our analysis of rural power structure must be 
considered in the wider context of the interconnections 
between classes in the countryside and the social base of 
the state in Bangladesh. We ourselveshave not had the
time to develop our analysis to this extent, but we accept 
the significance of this wider dimension. No amount of 
well-intentioned pronouncements about socialism and 
equality in the countryside will suffice  ̂if the authors of 
those pronouncements are too exclusively dependent for 
support upon classes which themselves exploit the poor, 
and thereby constitute the class enemy of progressive 
socialist forces in the country. And solutions will never 
come froni elite intellectuals who tamper with the issues 
of distribution, employment and prqductiyity of land 
(and  sometimes labour). .The problem is much more 
fundamental. Attention has to be focused on the under­
lying social and economic structure of rural society. And 
the logic of these structures has to be made consistent 
with the egalitarian, socialist objectives of rural develop­
ment. However, no class can represent the interests 
of the rural poor, better than the class of rural poor 
itself. Therefore, the logic of rural social and economic 
structures has to be one in which the rural poor are 
dominant. Our analysis, and, those of others, present a 
picture in which the rural pqoy are subordinated and. 
exploited.
There is therefore a ■ great problem of transformation 
for which contemporary rural leaders ,( who have been 
regarded as legitimate by the government and given 
resources to distribute ) are unsuited. By our analysis, at 
least, these leaders come from and «(present richer classes 
in the countryside, and their class allies, in the town. 
Furthermore, they are. invariably the agents, of corruption 
and favoured patronage. The rural ; ppor do not regard
them as their leaders but as their oppressors. Thus the 
great social transformation—the sine qua non for the 
survival of the nation—cannot depend on the participation 
of these contemporary leaders, but must indeed by pass 
them and reduce their influence. If the state wishes to 
be more than a-by-stander in this transformation, then it 
probably has no alternative but to assist in the develop­
ment of the class consciousness of the rural poor, since 
therein lies the greatest and only weapon for achieving 
a socialist path for development.
These papers are addressed,to those who are prepa­
red to think in this way, and are prepared to explore the 
ways in which the resources of the state can be deployed 
to shift its class base towards the rural poor and thereby 
through the assertion of that class, to reconstitute the 
nature of the state in Bangladesh. Any suppression of 
the consciousness of the rural poor (and those who are 
trying to create that consciousness) belies that sincerity 
of those who publicly claim association with the attempts 
to transform the society. At worst, then, we are ignored. 
A t best, we help to convince the true friends of Bangla­
desh that the Way to national dignity is through the 
liberation of its rural poor from humiliating oppression 
which is unproductive and undermines every principle of 
Islamic brotherhood.
2. Personnel, Tim e and Proposal
The papers presented in this volume arise out of a 
research commitment undertaken by a small team at the 
Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development (BARD) in
two phases, during the period August 1974 to September 
1975. The project title was ‘Rural Power Structure and 
Leadership Project’. The personnel were as follows : 
Mr. M. Ameerul Huq, Project Leader and Instructor at 
BARD ; Mr. A Mannan Majumder, Associate Instructor 
at BARD ; Mr. Manjurul Alam, Assistant Instructor 
at BARD ; and Mr Geoffrey D. Wood Research Consul­
tant at BARD ( August 1974 to January 1975, and July- 
September 1975), and Lecturer in Sociology at: the 
University of Bath, UK. The team was asked ta  present 
an initial set of findings to thé International Seminar on 
the Socio-Econoniic Implications of Introducing H Y Vs in 
Bangladesh, which was held at BARD in April 1975. 
The team became respdnsible for convening that con­
ference, with Geoffrey Wood attending from the UK. 
Thus a tight time constraint was imposed upon the team, 
with the second period ( July-September 1975 ) allocated 
to writing up more detailed reports of the Seminar as a 
whole, this volume of papers, and applying our know­
ledge to the Total Village Development Action Pro­
gramme of the Academy. '
W ith such a time constraint, and given the state of 
knowledge in Bangladesh on these issues, the team 
regards this work as preliminary to more long term and 
thorough research to be undertaken in the future both at 
the Academy and at other institutions in Bangladesh. The 
team therefore proceeded through a series of theoretical 
discussions, alongside of which the first paper ih this 
volume was written by i Geoffrey Wood ; ‘The Political 
Process in Rural Banglad^hJ—a research noteJ This 
is a theoretical paper based mainly on a survey* of rele-
vanf jliterature on the political sociology of the peasantry, 
with only a few references specifically to Bangladesh; 
Through its argument, the paper identifies a series of 
hypotheses which were to guide the subsequent field­
work. The paper intended to continue into a wider 
discussion, the time was not available to do this.
By the beginning of October 1975, the team submi­
tted a research proposal which involved the study of two 
village areas in Kotwali Thana, Comilla—which came 
to be known as Bondokgram and Mohajanpur. It was 
recognized, that this , short of research requires a more 
detailed, comprehensive and cautious research design than 
was allowed by the period which had been allocated for 
the presentation of an initial report. At the same time 
it was also appreciated that the need is urgent for some 
analytic insight into the relationship between rural power 
structure and development prpgaammes. Our approach 
was guidedrby what we considered to be a realistic appre­
ciation of these çonstraints. The project was further cons­
trained in that at least two of the four staff involved were 
also busy with other duties and were therefore unable to 
participate in the fieldwork. However, their guidance 
and participation in the formulation of the design, prepa­
ration of bibliography, gathering of appropriate secon­
dary data and in the writing of drafts gives them critical 
role in the project.
3. Objectives
This proposal set out the following list of objectives 
for the research. They have not all been achieved by
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our preliminary studies, but it is worth recording them 
here as a checklist for others intending to pursue this sort 
of research.
1. A description of the structures and networks of domi­
nation in the rural social formation. In addition to 
overt political institutions like the sardar, rèyai, 
samaj, Union Parishad and political parties, an exami­
nation of other institutions and relationships, through 
which power is exercised, fo r example : tenancy, 
labour, moneylending, the iharket, lineage status, 
patron-clients dyads, the co-operative, the system of
access to public resources and justice, and straight 
forward coersion.
2. The impact of the introduction of HYV and associa­
ted technology upon both the structure of political 
action and the process of group formation. In parti­
cular the pattern of recruitment to political groups 
and a hypothesised shift towards groups based on 
shared economic interest and ideological cohesion. 
That is, the process of class differentiation. Further­
more, the Ïnature—if any-of-rural-urban alliances
through respective classes with complementary inte­
rests.
3. The socio-political constraints for a co-operative stra­
tegy to be identified. A description of alternative 
forms of co-operation—both historical and contempp 
rary—and discussion of their significance fo r HYV 
programme, especially those which involve the  provi­
sion of large scale indivisible inputs ( lumpy j  and 
relationships of mutual dependence between house­
holds, lineages and reyais.
L
4. The organizational capacities of different classes : 
The respective position of different classes in the 
mode of production is of great significance in enabling 
a class to develop a viable consciousness. To what 
extent can the poor peasantry and landless labourers 
sustain relationships which are spatially adequate 
e. g. through geographical mobility, kinship and 
marriage, market interaction, freedom from physical 
labour etc. to compete with richer peasants ? Assu­
ming desirability, can a detailed behavioural analysis 
of relationships produce possible strategies which 
would assist the ruraT ppor. to co-operate with one 
another ? If co-operation is good for the powerful 
( the de facto situation fo r many co-operatives ), then 
it is certainly beneficial to the weak.
5. The relationships of access between the peasantry 
and administration : Where the development of a 
country depends heavily on the bureaucratic alloca­
tion of critical investment resources, then the institu­
tions through which these resources are channelled 
have to be examined for the extent of intrusion by the 
rural power structure. In particular, à contrast .has 
to be drawn between the institutions through which 
peasants traditionally obtain resources ( e. g. patrons, 
kin, moneylender, transactions with urban-based 
entrepreneurs ) and bureaucratic institutions which 
operate by different rules, procedures, criteria and
objectives which are not familiar to the peasant, 
cannot be trusted and whose outcomes cannot be 
safely predicted.
1 0
6.; While the study intends:to:progress beyond the fami­
liar conclusions of HYV programmes and polarisa- 
tionf it is necessary to:; describe such tendencies, 
particularly in terms of diversification by richer 
peasants ( as opposed tO: landlords ) into non agricul­
tural activity—moneydehdingv; primary processing, 
shopkeeping, market?:manipulationi (hoarding, go- 
down, transportation ) etcj
7. W ith the above concerns thé study should also be in 
a position to pass some comnient on additional possi­
ble strategies : a more thoroughgoing 1 and-reform, 
collectivisation, communes; and the way^thé nature 
of the state can assist or inhibit both existing and 
alternative strategies. It is unrealistic to exclude 
from the analysis, the relationship between the rural 
power structure and the sta te ..
4. Some Hyppthpiaes > ^
More specifically, the village case-studies were 
guided by the following, hypotheses which appear in the 
text of the theoretical paper : ‘The Political Process 
■ Our own tests and conclusions about these
hypotheses are very tentative at this preliminary stage, 
but th^  case studies will . indicate that we have identified 
many of the behavioural patterns suggested by this list,
1 . ‘‘Theiprevalence of factional politicsi in the villages 
. (characterised h y  verticaLçJeayegea) hinders the emer­
gence c o f . class,-solidarity ampng. poor peasants and 
landless labourers, and thereby contributes^ to the
11
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; strength and ioîidarïty of the i dominant classes both 
■ in the countryside and among thé entrepreneuriaI and 
commercial groups in thé^towns.^
2. “The co-operative adopts the ihtemal structural cha­
racteristics of the faction and competes with other 
factions outside the co-operative ; or the co^-operative 
itself becomes divided into factions, probably reflect­
ing the factional alignments which exist in other 
spheres outside the co-operative ; or the co-operative 
is simply, by-passed as a relevant institution in which 
to compete for resources.”
3. “Where group formations emerge on the basis of a 
single principle of recruitment, we may be forced to 
the conclusion that it is the programmes of change 
themselves which are producing not a factional mode 
of interaction but a class struggle involving horizon­
tal cleavages in the Village”.
4. “In the co-operative, the poor peasantry might * remàîn 
weak, even if rich peasants are excluded, precisely 
because of their subordinate position in other struc­
ture of dependence which constitute the greater part 
of their lives”.
5. “The tendency.for status (especially sardari) and land- 
ownership to coincide will increase and the extent of 
circular mobility decrease under conditions of new 
opportunities for increasing agricultural productivity 
which thereby also provided greater scope for invest­
ment in rton-agricultural activity like money-lending, 
manipulation of the market and primary processing 
plants” .
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6. “Higher lineages who are als.o richer peasants will be 
able to sustain kinship links at a greater distance than 
the poorer families of their village, thus facilitating 
their class identity”.
7. “Where the procesa of class differentiation is stimu­
lated by new opportunities for the accumulation of 
wealth, rich peasants who come neither from titled 
lineages nor from sardari lineages can be incorpora­
ted into the traditionaT institutions of local power by 
acquiring status through intér-marriage with lineages 
of traditionally high status. In this way the dimen­
sions of class and status will become mutually rein­
forcing”.
5. Methodology
The methodology of fieldwork for the two case 
studies was the same. It was decided early on that the 
type of data in which we were interested required that 
the fieldworker must also be the author of his village 
monograph This is of course normal practice for most 
anthropological research. Secondly, although there was 
insufficient time for proper anthropological fieldwbfk, we 
attempted to maintain as much of the anthropological 
method as was possible by participating in unstructured 
conversations, recording, genealogies, cross-checking 
iifformation, establishing close contact with strategic 
information and so on. :
But thirdly, since we had to generate data quickly, 
we used a two stage sampling of informants from whom 
we obtained structured items of data. T he first stage
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was a 40% random sample of the village households—for 
these households we recorded census and land characte­
ristics, marriage patterns, occupations, and some estimate 
of the subsistence rating. Normally, this information 
would be obtained for all of the households, but preven­
ted us. The second stage was a 20% purposive sample 
of village household stratified by the ‘para* distribution 
of the population and the distribution of effective land- 
holding. This was a very detailed checklist, and appears 
with the first-stage census proforma in the appendix to 
this volume.
In each stage especially the second, the selected 
households were regarded as informants rather than as 
one—off interviews. Contact was maintained with them 
thrôughoüt the period of fieldwork. Thus information was 
obtained on different occasions, often stimulated by the 
observation of behaviour and ongoing events, Since the 
data-was mainly preoccupied with relationships, descrip­
tions of actual pieces of interaction were collected and 
recorded. The participants to the interaction outside the 
informant household were contacted where possible and 
asked to give their version of the relationship. Where 
other villages were involved e. g. through marriage, then 
names, distances and characteristics of that village or town 
were recorded to establish the spatial and structural 
nature of the network. The strategy, in short, was to 
construct a network of relationships within the village 
and outside it via a proportional number of random entry 
points into the system.
I ;
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Since the total fieldwork time allowed to us was 2^ 
months from; mid-October until the end of December 1974, 
it was decided ; that the field workers should not attempt 
to reside in their villages. The problem of maintaining 
neutrality was inconsistent with opting 4o stay with one 
family during such a short period. Both fieldworkers 
have lived previously in villages and this was regarded as 
an important qualification ; however for this fieldwork 
the two villages -were visited-idaily. This factor was one 
of the cripteria of village selection, but both are on the 
periphery of Kotwali Thana. Neither village had been 
extensively studied previously ; both had co-operatives ; 
both cultivated irrigated boro to some extent ; and both 
villages were untypically large. The issue of typicality 
had been resolved conceptually in our theoretical and 
methodological discussions of Septémber 1974. Since we 
were not exclusively concerned With village level analysis, 
it was not necessary for us - to assert that the villages we 
selected were typical. rrBut since we were concerned to 
obtain a picture of the rural power structure for the 
regionj :rthen we needed villages which themselves reflec­
ted a fu ll range of relationships which are expected in 
principle to be found in the region. Typical villages 
might not i have a full range of relationships. T h e ‘full 
range of relationships’ refer to the issues raised above in 
the list of objectives.
With the constraint of time on the one hand, and the 
requirement of detail on the other, the main emphasis had 
to be village level methodology. However, the analysis 
by no means had to be exclusively confined to the village.
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It was intended to obtain a detailed profile of the interac­
tion between village institutions and the region. The 
strategy was to produce â picture of the extended nature 
of the rural political system by inventif y ing the network 
and ‘fields^ of relationships in which different classes and 
groups of villagers are involved—both in the village and 
outside it. At this stage, the study was not concerned 
with the quantitative measurement of transactions and 
exchanges, but rather with their description and a qualita­
tive interpretation of them. Nevertheless data on land- 
holding, income, expenditure, debts, inputs, investment 
patterns, wages, prices etc. were collected to provide an 
illustration of the intensity of the relationship. -
T he first drafts of these case study; monographs were 
written ; during January land LTebruary 1975. A small 
workshop was held at BARD at the end of January; 1975 
to_ discuss one of them. The case of Bondokgram was 
presented in a separate paper to the April HYV Seminar. 
On the basis of botlr these case studies and three previous 
studies undertaken at BARD, Manjurul Alain presented 
a comparative paper a t the same occasion, entitled : Rural 
Power Structure, and Co-operatives in relation to Moder­
nization of Agriculture :* A comparative case study of 
5 villages. This ; paper by Manjurul Alam appears in a 
revised, form in this volume, after the two revised mono­
graphs of Bondokgram and Mohajanpur.
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C H A P T E R  II
The Political P ro c es s  in Bangladesh  
— A Research N o t e .
G. D. Wood
1. Objectives in Studying Rural Power Structure
At this time in Bangladesh it is right to guard against 
the luxurious research proposals drafted by enthusiastic 
Western scholars in their personal search for academic 
truth. It is, therefore, a duty to preface a proposal for 
research with a clear explanation of its purpose. Firstly, 
it is apparent that the planning process in Bangladesh is 
severely hampered by the absence of detailed and documen­
ted descriptions of the social formation which it proposes 
to transform. But the problem is more subtle than this, 
since there is also the question of how willing are those 
who dominate the planning process to alter a social forma­
tion which is responsible for their own positions of power 
and eminence. Therefore, secondly, it is natural that the 
public discussion of appropriate socialist ideology for the 
transformation of Bangladesh is constrained by the very 
structures which are to be transformed. The generation 
of ‘acceptable’ ideas still flows from top to bottom, so 
that the feedback upwards through the institutionalised 
structures of authority is predictable—the worst form of 
logical positivism.
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At the outset, then this research proposal intends 
quite publicly to establish its own brief—derived from the 
problematics raised in the general theoretical literature 
concerning the analysis of the peasantry in the disciplines 
of political sociology, Marxist political economy, and the 
transition to socialism. It is asserted, in effect, that these 
problematics are of high relevance to the development of 
Bangladesh, and that their analysis should be pursued in 
a public manner. In this way, even where our conclusions 
are critical of the role of certain classes and are unpala­
table to the ni, they should play some part in the debate 
about the radical path for Bangladesh.
More specifically the research focus discussed in this 
paper is addressed to the sheer lack of knowledge about 
the rural social formation.^ It starts from the assump­
tion that :
“ there will be no long-term economic growth, 
no general increase in the well-being of the peo­
ple, and no movement towards a just and equal 
society in Bangladesh, without a great deal of 
objective study of its people, society and econo­
my. At present our ignorance is profound.”*
It is in this sense that this proposal for research is 
not luxurious, for an understanding of the rural power 
structure is specially relevant to any plan about rural 
development. This is especially the case in Bangladesh 
where the scarcity of administrative capacity excludes 
from consideration an authoritarian, well-centralised alter­
native such as that adopted by Stalin in the post-NEP
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period. Therefore the specialist professionals and poli­
tical leaders have no alterriative but to devise a strategy 
which recognizes the strength and weaknesses of the 
rural social formation, regardless of whether the objec­
tives of growth or equality are uppermost. However, 
planners are further constrained, for no strategy will 
progress beyond the drawing board unless it is one which 
strikes the majority of the^ peasantry as legitimate.- and 
worthwhile. Legitimate, in the sense that it commands 
their support and is seen as being consistent with their 
culture. Worthwhile in the sense that there is a realistic 
prospect of any plans and targets not being subverted by 
a minority of the peasantry which sees the possibility of 
private accumulation at the expense of the public. A 
genuine socialistic content to the rural development pro­
gramme is therefore not only .desirable, biit a prerequisite 
for success. Genuine in the sense of identifying the 
loopholes which leak public funds to private pockets and 
stern sanctions against those who persist in obstructing 
the transition by employing the traditional methods of 
domination—in the market^ usufructuary loans, manipula­
ting the relationships of access to public resources and 
to justice, and terror. But there will be no genuine 
programmes until these dominant features of the contem­
porary social formation are understood : understood not 
just in general terms supported by flimsy estimates and 
projection, but in detail—in terms of behavioural rela­
tionships between different classes and groups relation­
ships which can rarely be articulated vin the form of 
quantities, but which nevertheless pervade the social 
structure of the countryside and constitute a real cons­
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traint ( or possibly a resource ) to the overturning of its 
exploitative characteristics.
If, as everyone seems to agree, the co-operative 
strategy and other programmes are being sabotaged for 
reasons in addition to administrative inefficiency and 
corruption, then it seems obvious that the social context 
into which the co-operatives were introduced has to be 
examined in depth. Why is it that co-operation between 
individuals and groups even within the same objective 
class is difficult to sustain ? Was it ever realistic to 
assume that small-scale co-operation is a state of nature 
in conditions of adversity ? Should we con/isider in this 
context the propositions derived from studies of peasant 
socities elsewhere about ‘amoral familism,’ ‘zero-sum 
games,* and ‘the image of the limited Good* We 
certainly need to know where the boundaries of co-opera­
tion have been traditionally set:—at the *paribar* ( ‘chula* ) 
the ‘bari’, the ‘reyai*, or the ‘samaj* ? And under what 
conditions and for what purposes do these different social 
units become operative units of cohesion and solidarity ? 
There are possibilities enough for division and conflict by 
just referring to these institutions, but interwoven among 
them are other relationships and transactions based on 
class distinctions ; the need for credit ; differential access 
to bureaucratic institutions ; relation to the market ; and 
a range of other variables. With such a collection of 
structures competing for loyalty, programmes based on 
formal institutions for co-operation must be treated w ith 
great caution. Other dimensions to the concept of co-ope­
ration might be required—a greater ideological commitment
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for example might function to transcend the other sets of 
values which compete for attachment, or government 
loans extended initially solely for joint capital projects^to 
compel a structure”̂  interdependence ; or perhaps the 
central issue is being avoided and co-operation should be 
overtly political from the outset—the creation of a social 
class of the poor peasantry.
It would be misleading through to focus the research 
specifically around the co-operatives, since it is tempting 
to frame one’s conclusions in terms of shortfalls from the 
objective, a failure of goals which anyhow may have been 
unrealistic or inappropriate in the first place. Thus the 
analysis constitutes an exercise in judgement of behaviour 
against a set of criteria introduced from outside the culture 
of the community. This is evaluation, and occupies a 
justifiably important place in the work at BARD. How­
ever this proposaT is concerned with system, and its des­
cription in a manner which both reflects the reality of the 
peasant’s daily existence, and is at the same time sugges­
tive of strategies for institutional experimentation. In this 
way it has to be more comprehensive than a piece of eva­
luation, and essentially exploratory where the rules for 
inclusion of categories of data are less strict than those 
for exclusion. For if the programme at BARD, and with 
the IRDP in Dacca is to proceed beyond the perspective 
of its own past experiments, then it must be stimulated by 
a renewed search of the structures of the contemporary 
rural social formation. Only by this method can it deter­
mine which features have been responsible for low rate 
of investm ent and capital formation; the preference for
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money lending at high rates of interest rather than produc­
tive investment ; the enduring pattern of differential 
access to bureaucratically allocated resources etc. as well 
as the problems of the co-operatives. And as a corollary, 
it may also establish which aspects are conducive to fu r­
ther experimentation perhaps involving different types of 
resources or organizations, and perhaps directed at this 
time towards different categories of the rural population 
instead of the principle of a universal formula for all 
classes. ' - - . ■
There is finally the issue of whether this research-:- 
which initially has to be more pure than applied—should 
be undertaken at BARD or at some other institution in 
Bangladesh; There are those who will argue that this is 
an essentially academic project and as such, it is not an 
appropriate part of BARD’s programme. In particular it 
has been suggested that pure research will create tensions 
between different sections of faculty on account of the 
prestige ( sometime international ) that accrues to  those 
who are publishing findings, attending international 
conferences, and so on. This reasoning is fallacious in 
several ways. First, there is not much evidence that other 
institutions in Bangladesh are willing or able to undertake 
this type of work. BARD is the least urban biased of the 
intititutions concentrating on development issues, and its 
very identity depends upon retaining that reputation. In 
terms of accumulated experience in rural research and 
experimentation and in its library collection, it has a good 
start. Bangladesh cannot afford to ignore such resources. 
Secondly, the distinction made between research and other 
functions such as training and extension experiments fails
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to see the importance of their interdependence, a dialec­
tical interaction which is provocative of ideas and insights 
for the individual as every researcher and teacher knows. 
Remove one of those factors and the capacities of staff in 
other directions goes into decline. Indeed, it has perhaps 
been a récent weakness of BARD that research (a s  oppo­
sed to  evaluation ) activities have not been encouraged, 
at th6 expense of sustaining an atmosphere of creative 
enthusiasm. Thirdly, to divide staff into research and 
action men is rather crude. It is true that some are better 
at action and teaching than others, and"vice-versa : but 
this is a question of balance for the i individual in allbca- 
ting his time; rather than an exclusive involvement in one 
or the other function. F ourthly, related to the previous 
point, each discipline at BARD needs to be engaged 
in ongoing research—with regular subjèct^based seminars, 
and long-term rotating arrangements for staff so that 
pieces of research can be completed without too many 
competing demands. In this way a separate research 
‘elite? is avoided ; the discipline itself acquires a reputa­
tion and individuals publish articles etc. after their 
research reports have been submitted, while they are 
teaching and experimenting.
It is important to include these observations on the 
place of research at BARD, since there exists among some 
of its well-wishers the unfortunate impression that the 
distinction between academic and practical pursuits is an 
absolute one, and so they prescribe a ^practical’ role for 
BARD. This is an argument that both fails to under­
stand the process by which ideas are generated and tested, 
andw hich leads ultimately to a form, of mindless action (for
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its own sake, thereby acquiring merit for the ‘practi­
tioners’ ). It is within the context of these remarks that 
this research proposal on the structure of-rural politics is 
conceived, thus adding the important objective of staff 
development for those in the politics and sociology 
disciplines at BARD, other disciplines represented at 
BARD should be engaged in corresponding projects. 
The al ternative strategy of sending staff abroad for train­
ing is more expensive/ often Irfelevant, and does not at 
the same time prod uce any môré knowledge onddaUji^adesh 
Furthermbre, overseas^ traThing eTDçbüîàges à one-off a tti­
tude towards staff development which of course should be 
regarded as a continuous prôcëSs—of which research is a 
vital ingredient.
2. The Question of In teg ra tion  : A Discussion on P re ­
vailing Theory
There is an important theoretical and therefore 
methodological issue which ihust be confronted at the 
outset of this project. Much of the con^éiitipnal analysis 
of the rural political process treats the rural community 
as a set of isolated social structures, traditionally inde­
pendent of other rural * communities^ and of other national 
level institutions; This has encouraged a Concepttialisàtibn 
of the development and hatiOn-building process which 
assumes a dichotomy rbetwèeh tlrctraditional ànd  modern 
sectors in the society. It therefore views the process'%s 
one of incorporating the traditional structures and institu­
tions ' into modem ones/ ̂ thereby destroying the * discrete 
social entities that characterise ̂ he^rùtal 'Social fb rte tiô n .
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As a corollary of this perspective, rural institutions 
represent ‘obstacles* in the path of development. In the 
literature bn political development this corresponds to 
re’s ‘crisis of integration’.*
Underlying this approach is an elite-mass formulation, 
with the elite ( or part of it ) as a modernising force, enga­
ged in the building of a new nation which demands the 
integration of the society to the point where national 
institutions ( the political party, the bureaucracy, the 
judicial process the Planning Commission etc. ) become 
the primary focus= of loyalty ( instead of the family, the 
caste, the region, a religious community, linguistic group 
etc. ), and which become therefore legitimate. It is a 
stimulus-response model of political and social change, 
where the ‘modernising* elite both sets the goals and 
evaluates the extent of their achievement. But the goals 
and the evaluation derive from the assumption that rural 
political and social structures, are discrete and encapsula­
ted  ̂of*"the village as the most significant. Thus for ‘rural 
political structure* substitute ‘the traditional village*. 
This is the language both of the national elites and the 
social scientists who have indulged them in this fantasy.
Project does not propose to adopt this theoretical 
perspective since it is considered to be misguided in seve­
ral respects. Firstly, since it represents an ethnocentric 
western ideological formulation of the political system 
it may be countered by an alternative ideology of greater 
relevance to Bangladesh today which allows the 
possibility of rural class organization and peasant initiative 
in? their transformation to soçialisin. W ith the fragile
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nature of the State, the inability of the elite to command 
independent resources and the limitations of administra­
tive capacity, no development programmes can be 
envisaged which do not depend upon the organizational 
resources of the peasants themselves. Indeed it has been 
BARD’s privilege to articulate this ideology , over many 
years. The elite-mass models which have pervaded 
descriptions of Bengali political life must go. They 
contain no relevant solutions and they are inaccurate.
Secondly, the basis of this inaccuracy isJ<historica1 
approach to social analysis, which has instead depended 
upon imported concepts. For example, the structure 
known as the political party system performs, according 
to Almond®, the function of interest articulation and 
aggregation in the political system of Western pluralist- 
democracies.' Thus when institutions, labelled as pôlitf- 
cal parties, are identified in other societies, it is assumed 
that because of the label similar functions to that of their 
western counterparts are being performed, or should be 
performed by them. There is the assumption that the 
political system itself is essentially the same, despite some 
imperfections ( or ‘crises’ ) which have to be overcome. 
Such analysis is ahistorical since it totally ignores the 
evolution of particular groups and class formations in 
the society, their relationships to the imperial power and 
later on their position in the nation-state. The picture of 
the political ipfbcess which thus emerges reveals a het- 
w6rk of relationships which has traditionally placed the 
peasantry in a mode of production of wider significance 
than thé village : the quasi-feudal system of zamindafï,
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the relationship between subsistence and cash crops, the 
market institutions of distribution and exchange, a 
hierarchical structure of money lending and credit, and 
only finally the manipulation of this network by the
classes which dominate it to obtain a formalistic legitimi- 
sation of their class power through the establishment of 
political parties.
Thirdly, it follows^ from this that -the peasantry 
cannot be treated as an undifferentiated mass with no ins­
titutions of political, economic and social organization 
beyond the boundary of the village. Therefore the elite 
concept is seriously weakened in favour of a class one,® 
and it is the interplay of these class forces rather 
than elite-rmass confrontations which is the focus of this 
research. To underline this point, the peasantry is not 
composed of discrete~social units, which are co-terminous 
with the village, but is composed of sets of institutions 
which extend critically ,beyond the village to include the 
cities and ultimately the nature of the state. Now*diere 
is this more true than in Bangladesh. A study of i the 
rural political process cannot ignore these dimensions, 
and nor can strategies for development and transforma­
tion which recognize the historical role of the peasantry 
in the agrarian societies of the twentieth Centllry.'^ It 
is in this way, for example, that village based schemes 
for development may be inappropriate—especially in 
South Asia where ‘baris’ and ‘caste-toias* may under 
certain conditions ( e, g. low incidence of hired labour ) 
be very independent of the ‘village’ but closely interrela­
ted t o ‘baris’ of other villages (through kin relations ).
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and to classes of rich peasants/Iandowners/landlords/ 
moneylenders who dwell outside the village, perhaps 
in small market towns or larger cities. Co-operatives invol­
ving co-operation between 'baris* in the same village 
would appear very strange with such an analysis.
Before considering these extended features of the 
peasant social formation, it is nevertheless important to 
refer to the treatment of. village social structure in the 
tradition of political anthropology; This work is rele­
vant to our purpose in two respects particularly : the 
notion of encapsulation : and the analysis of factional 
systems of political interaction. Both of these approaches 
are derived from the theoretical tradition of which we are 
critical—the first explicitly, the second implicitly. Never­
theless they represent important part-truths and should 
be harnessed to the perspective followed here, and there­
by enrich it.
The model of encapsulation was presented by the 
British social anthropologist, F. G. Bailey, based upon 
the analysis of village social structure and the wider
political process in Orissa State, India.® It postulates 
a significant cleavage in the contemporary peasant socie­
ties of modernising nations at the boundary of the 
village. The diffuse, undifferentiated structure of social 
relations at the village level is contrasted with the struc­
ture of social interaction existing at other levels else­
where in the society. The process of modernisation is 
expressed as the blurring of the cleavage. Bailey distin­
guished between encapsulating political structures (B) 
aiid encapsulated political structures (A) thus :
I
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“Structure B disposes of greater political resources *
than structure A, ( structure B  ) is large scale w h e r e  
structure A is small scale, and ( structure 6 ) tends 
to be made up of specialised roles while the roles
of Structure A tend to be undifferentiated................”
( Strategems and Spoils P. 147 )
Broadly stated, the central hypothesis in this model 
maintains that structural tension between A and B (village 
institution and those of the modernising elite ) would be 
resolved in the dissolution of the encapsulated struc­
ture (A) (that of the village ) into the encapsulating 
structure (B) (that of the nation-state ), and that this 
process would reflect à highef~dègree of overall structural 
differentiation consistent with the political and economic 
systems of an integrated nation-state. This formulation 
respresents the cornerstones of modernisation theory : 
peasant communities are regarded as discrete social enti­
ties responding to an interference in their value-system 
by State and( institutions in a manner which inevitably 
leads to an overall pattern of increased role differentiation.
The general theory from which this model derives 
has been crititised above, but one specific comment should 
be added here. The model assumes the existence at one 
end of the tradition-modernity contim^n ofc\ differentia­
ted set of encapsulating structures which are the institu­
tional characteristics of the modern state. These are the 
structures—it is argued—which disturb the ( structural- 
functional ) equilibrium of the encapsulated structures by 
absorbing them into the new equilibrium of the modern 
state. However this approach begs the question of how
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the encapsulating structures came into existence in the 
first place. It adheres to a stimulus-response mechanism 
of change without explaining the process whereby the 
dichotombus situation emerged.
in a country numerically dominated by its peasantry, 
the State cannot be regarded as a fixed or even prior 
entity in the process of agrarian change. Structural change^ 
among the peasantry must inevitably alter the complexion 
of the state.. If _ resaurces._are . distributed among:, .jthe 
peasantry as part of the process of ‘intervention* or 
‘penetration* by ̂  State, then it is important to under­
stand not only the impact of the distribution but also why 
the State was associated with one pattern of distribution 
and not another.
The institutions, of the State are themselves the 
result of political and economic forces, so the rulers of the 
State are likely to defer to those forces in their allocative 
decisions. In this way the institutions of the State cannot 
be opposed to the forces from which they derive, and 
these forces exist in the village as well as elsewhere. It 
is therefore im p la n t  analytically to distinguish between 
the State opposed to sections of people in a village or 
society, and the State as a reflection of the forces which 
differentiate the village into sections or classes. Seen in 
this way the stimulus-response dichotomy betweai State 
and village confuses the conflicts of interest between the 
regime ( representatives of the class which dominates^ 
state apparatus ) and large sections of the weaker peasan­
try with the fallacious notion of the State as being concept 
tually independent of the political and economic forces 
which constitute it. . ’
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However although Bailey does not include this vital 
dimension to his analysis, his treatment of the relationships 
between the village and the outside world through, this 
model of encapsulation does provide us with a useful 
tool of analysis with which to examine these wider exten­
sions of the rural social formation. His notion of the 
‘broker’ is a particularly good example.® To the extent 
that a formalistic contrast exists between the normative 
characteristics of the ' nation-state institutions and some 
of the features of the rural social structure, then the 
precise nature of the interaction between them is very 
important to those involved in the frontline of extension 
activities for rural development. If one discovers for 
example that the internal structure of the effective unit 
for co-operation ( whether it be a b a ri’, ‘reyai’, ‘samaj’, 
or groups of ‘baris’ from different villages but related to 
one another by kinship ) consists for the most part of 
diffuse rather than specific role-sets, while the structure 
of the rural administration is formally made up of specific, 
compartmentalised role-sets,^® 'Then what is the struc­
ture of communication between them ? The ‘broker’ 
role refers to institutions, or personalities, which have 
credibility in each of these contradictory structures^ The 
market is a good example, where traders have traditionally 
mediated between the physically isolated community and 
the outside world. But with the peasant society of 
Bangladesh the situation is complex, where the variables 
are those referring to values and social structure rather 
than the simple ones of proximity. Perhaps the broker 
function is performed by educated sons, or by wage- 
labourers who seek employment in urban areas, - or by
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people who have been in one of the national services, or 
groups of migrants and peddlers, or by the local landlord 
who has always ‘fixed things’ with the authorities, or 
shopkeepers, or moneylanders, and so on. The problem 
is essentially one of access, communication, understanding 
and trust. And where the rich act as brokers for the poor, 
then there are the additional dimensions of patronage and 
dependence.
The point about mteracfing w ith  strange^ * institu­
tions is : can they be trpsfed ? If he is not familiar with 
their roles how can Ihe peasant predict the likelihood of 
one outcome or another? How can he trust promises 
made to him if he has no personal knowledge of the 
official’s reliability, nor any sanctions at his command if 
things go wrong ? Thus the peasant must have a mecha­
nism of interaction which he caiiH trust—a procedure or 
person who is both credible and legitimate for him and 
for the rural administration.
 ̂ H. Hart in his excellent paper ‘‘The Village and
Development administration”  ̂* pursues a similar theme 
taking up a distinction between ‘hinged’ and ‘linear 
fields’ ®̂ as a way of conceptualising the interrelations 
between peasant social institutions and government. Ba­
sing his discussion on Redfield’s notion of ‘fields’ of social 
relations,** Hart suggests that a hinged field is where 
values are not shared between parties to the transaction, 
where they are not ̂ iemben of the same reference group 
( *th,em and us’, rather than '‘we’ ) and where thére is mo 
“continuum of cognitive meanings expressing and main­
tain communication tipoii jibe subject matter of the
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transactions.” In this situation there is a need for a bro­
ker, or a series of brokers in the field. By contrast, the 
linear field is where values, identities and communications 
are shared. With these concepts. Hart suggests the follo­
wing proposition# : “Development will be facilitated, 
other things being equal, by channelling a transaction 
through a linear rather than a hinged field.”
This is obviously a very important proposition for us 
to consider, and indeed Hart offers as an example of this 
two experiments undertaken at Comilla : the distribution 
of contraceptives through existing retail merchants in the 
villages ; and the use of ‘imams’ to teach both pre-primary 
children and illiterate adults. However it is the premise 
of this research that we cannot simply rest content at that 
proposition, since we have to understand the nature of 
the lin ea r field’ and identify precisely which social rela­
tions and social units represent ‘linear fields’ and which 
do not. To do this we have to weigh the significance of 
other variables like power, class differentiation, access, 
factional structures of political competition and kinship. 
In this way the concept of the ‘linear field’ can be made 
more empirically precise,^ operational conclusions drawn 
about appropriate ‘brokerage’ experiments.
At this poin t we turn to the second pervasive theme 
in the political anthropological literature on South Asia— 
the analysis of village political structure in terms of fac­
tions. Ralph Nicholas’ work in West Bengal has been 
pioneering in this respect. In his paper on the role of 
social;scieace^research in Bangladesh, he concludes ;
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“Villages, which appear to be the most ‘natural’ 
of human communities and the most obvious basis 
for co-operative development organization, frequently 
prove to be cockpits of bitter struggle, factionalism, 
and the very opposite of co-operation : no-one has an 
effective remedy, but it is clear that rural develop­
ment is severely hampered by the prevalence of such 
conflict. Social scientific research cannot solve any 
of these problems but by identifying them and dis­
pelling some pi the general ignorance^ that prevails 
about them, it may provide policy makers with an 
initial W s  for action ” 1® :  1 ;  T
Furthermore since the problem of factionalism is 
often regarded as. an ongoing dynamic one, in which 
divisions in the village are actually created as the result 
of development programmes ( the introduction pf new 
institutions such as co-operatives, and% the influx: ofmew 
resources such as seed, fertilizer, tubewells etc.), it is vital 
to review some aspects of theory and extract an appropriate 
tool of analysis for ourselves.
The term ‘faction’ is used to describe a pervasive 
form of peasant political interaction, and detailed accounts 
of peasant societies ( especially in India ) are replete with 
examples of ‘factionalism’.̂ ® The central point about 
this mode of politics is that factional alignments cmt 
across class alignments. Thus the analysis of factions to 
à large extent constitutes an examination of the manner 
in which factions are recruited and led.^’ The politi­
cal cleavages in peasant societies are often vertical cleava­
ges which run across class lines, rather than horizontal
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ones of class conflict. Faction leaders then are typically 
landlords or rich peasants, or more rarely just manipula­
ting political entreprenurs ( ‘broker’ in effect), who 
organize political groups out of followers who are either 
economically dependent labourers, sharecroppers or 
through debt ) or who are obligated as a result of past 
favours ( perhaps the ‘broker’ has arranged a government 
licence or a loan ). The relationships between leader and 
followers may be diverse, i.e. different principles of recruit­
ment being applied, and transactional in the sense that a 
smgle interest constitutes the bond, Bailpy dls^nguishes 
betw een‘core’ and ‘following^, in that the ‘core? repre­
sents an inner circle : of ullies^ w ith m ultiple relation­
ships to the leader,: usually invdlwng close kinship 
links’.-* * Only the core represents auff permanent, cdfpofate 
group, while the rest of thé faction is’ ëssehtiàily imper­
manent. Alavi summarises the significance of this internal 
structure I
“An important aspect of factiohaV conflict is 
that rival factions are, in general,, structurally similar, 
namely, that they represent similar configurations 
of social groups, although that is by no means 
always the case. Where th a t is so  ̂ the faction model 
describes a segmental rather than class conflict. Such 
conflicts, therefore do not have an ideological expres­
sion, because rival factions or faction leaders fight 
for control over resources, power and status as ayailar 
hie within the existing framework of society rather 
than for changes in the social structure. ’ .
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It is important for our purposes to distinguish between 
the concept of faction as an organizing concept which we 
can employ as a tool of analysis, and the theoretical pro­
positions and generalizations about the factional mode of 
politics in peasant societiefs. The latter tend to be part of 
the general tradition ( of which we are critical ) which 
treats villages as discrete* social entities, arid riften they 
ignore : the s^nificancp of th e  extended na ture of these 
vertical cleavages throughout the rural social formation 
by confining; theit analysis to ;the village, But we a re  
interested in the concept as a method of identifying precise 
aspects of the rural political process. It should be useful 
in describing actual political alignments—a necessary step 
before proceeding to the explanation of the alignments 
which we observe. In this way, the concept in certain 
circumstances will provide us with a procedure for stating 
the initial problem—a map of political and social interac­
tion, which must then be analysed in terms of wider 
regularities in the exercise of power, deriving from the 
mode of production.
Thus even where a preponderance of factional align­
ments characterised by vertical cleavages existed in the 
villages, such a pattern may be successfully incorporated 
into a class arialysis of the rural society. For example the 
themes not drily of exploitation but also of class solidarity 
and horizontal àiliÿfances may be pUirsuèd so that the divi- 
siveness of factional politics in the villages constitutes the 
counterpart of class formation elsewhere in the system 
( e. g. rich peasants, petty landlords arid rural entrepre­
neurs ). A hypothesis on these lines might then be stated
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in the form ; The prevalence of jactional politics in the 
villages- (characterised by vertical cleavages ) hinders 
the. emergence of class solidarity among poor peasants 
and landless labourers and thereby contributes to the 
strength and solidarity o f the dominant classes both in 
the countryside and among the entrepreneurial and 
commercial groups in the tow ns.. '
Two further interrelated points about factions are 
germane to our purpose. First, the relationship between 
factional patterns of political interaction and change ; 
and secondly, the significande of changes in recruitment 
patterns to political groups.
It is.often argued that development activities them­
selves stimulate factional divisions within the village as 
different *patrons* compete with each other for new resour­
ces in order to retain the loyalty of their followers and 
rem ain , as a credible leader in their eyes. Factions 
are therefore often regarded as disruptive of a prior 
social order which was ( ideally ) characterised by consen­
sus and unity. Much of the thinking about co-opetatives 
is based ou this premise. However factions are typically 
found in peasant societies which have not really been 
subjected to rapid social change, for example in South 
Asia most of, which, despite the claims, has not yet been 
touched by the ‘Green Revolution*. On the contrary 
therefore, factional patterns of competition have long 
been expressive of the political order of peasant societies 
where patron-client relationships have prevailed (e .g . 
jajmani in Hindu caste society, or some relationships 
between peasant and  labourer in Bangladesh ) and where
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resources have been essentially static. Under these condi­
tions life is a zero-sum game where it is more appropriate 
to compete for control over existing, known resources and 
organize to protect one’s possession ( e. g/exclusive rights 
to the labour and service of certain groups at fixed, 
traditional prices ),: then to organize for the generation 
and secure possession of new resources ( i. e. productive 
investment in high-yield producing tecbmology ). However 
under conditions of indueedr change (e.T -g;- _the ‘Green 
Revolution* ), the incieased concentration on productive 
investment by those peasants w ho initially have àdéquàte 
resources^ leads to considerations of efficiency, cost, profi­
tability-as well as a secure environment for accumulation. 
T he tendency here then is to sacrifice the patromclient 
relationships inherent in the prior mode of production# 
where fixed pro^nttions of the harvest were distributed 
between landlord, peasant and dependents; relationships 
which were often the basis of factional, recruitment. For 
the peasant innovator, the concern is to enter into? new 
alliances which will jointly provide a secure, environment 
for his productive investments, a social order characterised 
no longer by assy metrical relationships of interdependence 
but by class dominadon and exclusion from the benefits 
of change « if not outright expl oitation. And this has to be 
a class’alliance which extends into the towns and adminis^ 
tratipn, for although the rich peasant may; be subordinate 
in such a n e tw o r k th a t  is the location of the objective 
interest of his class. , If or: example, if the labourera of j the 
village (under these conditions o f  rapid change) perceived; 
thehjrplatiye, disadvantage, and organized to deniand. an 
increase im the wage ratê  ̂than the rich peasant mustfhave
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the contcuüs to obtain a tractor, or other forms of labour 
substituting mechanization. With these considerations, it 
will be extremely interesting to compare the organization 
of political interaction in Kotwali Than a with an area as 
yet relatively untouched by development activity to obtain 
an idea of the conditions in which factional conflict give 
way to cleavages of class. The analytical tools provided 
by the factional model will enable us to contrast the 
respective structure of relationships with some precision-- 
but only if the researchers work u t  thé level o f empirical 
depth indicated in the scenario just outlined. :
* The second issue ̂ recruitm ent is  à m ethodo lo^a l 
refinement of the first. As has now been emphasised 
several, times, the political and social structures of those 
who reside in the countryside are complex in that they 
cannot simply be treated as discrete entities and placed 
somewhere on the tradition-modemity continiÇm and sent 
on predictable path of change. It is likely then that one 
observes a variety of political groupings from the *reyai’ 
( or factions within it as m one case which I have already 
come across ) to membership of political parties. However, 
regardless of thé formal labels o f  these groups ( e. g; a. 
political party which claims certain ideological leanings), 
the significance of a group and explanations of its forma­
tion are to be found by identifying thè principles of 
recruitment to the group. W here the principles of rec­
ruitment within one group are diverse, transactional and 
based on single interest relationships with the leader, 
then this groMp is probably small-scale, nonddedloÿ^l^ 
with a fluctuating mem;bership and therefore is unlikely 
to constitute ah enduring force for structural change^
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In addition, and very importantly for any programme of 
institutional experimentation^ is difficult to harness 
such groups to development programmes and convert 
them into co-operative units since no single incentive to 
co-operate will appeal to all members of the  group. And 
yet for the same reaspn-r-this diversity of allegiance— 
these groups cannot easily be broken down. They are 
difficult to compete against.: A s  n  corollary where the 
co-operative as formally constituted does not have the 
sanM internal structurerrjpfi d iv e r t  relationship between 
leader and follower, i t  cannot ; then  peffprni the patron? 
client functions for jits m en i^  p i  this situation one
of three possibilities, might fo llow .\ either th e  co-operativp 
adopts the internal stTructural characteristics of the faicr 
tion and competes with other factions, outside thê  co-oper 
rative ; or the co-operative itse lf becotnes divided inio 
factionst probably, reflecting the factional alignment 
which exist in other spheres outside the co-operative or 
the co-operative is simply byrpassed as 4 relevant institu­
tion in which to compete fo r  resources. The third possi­
bility is an extreme version of the second. We might 
consider these possibilities in the nature of alternative 
hypotheses abpiit the ) relationship ;betweeh ; co-opera tives 
and factions.
Alternatively, where alignments are based on,a single 
principle of recruitmenti^eplogy, lineage ( thegenealogy 
of a lineage is of ten fîdepîpgic^’ where solidarity between 
families, is explained by^referr^ ancestors
who are often in fact npt related J^^ecpnonuc status-these 
groups a;e more e^clus^e #  their mçtnbership, sinperthe
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rules for inclusion are more rigid, and so the commitment 
to the precise purpose of their membership is high. Gene­
rally there is also the recognition that the individual 
and the group interests are intimately connected, so the 
groups are more stable and permanent in their member­
ship. This may be the ideal t^ ic a l  model of a political 
party, but few parties in South Asia àctually recruit and 
maintain their membership in this way. But where one 
observes such alighments^^ d r  Their emerge m the 
countryside, then significant changes are occurring in the 
organizational and structural characteristics' of the politi- 
cal process. It is indicative of horizontal cleavages in 
which the dominant mode of production is purposively 
either being attacked or defended, rather than simply 
being expressed and thereby reinforced. ' It represents a 
shift in the structure of power, aUd will itself be the 
outcdnie of change in the mode of production in which 
vertical relationships of mterdependence are giving way 
to polarisation, structural antagonism, and relatioUships 
of exploitation and dependence ( as opposed to interdepen­
dence ). " ' '  ̂ '
Thus while the identification of recruitment patterns 
opens us into a pandora’s box, at least it does allow us 
to look inside and speculate on the dialectical interrela­
tionship between programmes of change and the rural 
political process. Thus wAeré g r emerge 
oh the basis of a  single priiiéipté i f  réçrüitm^ 'we may
be forced to the conclusion that i t  is the programmes of 
change themselves which: dre producing not à  factional 
Wode f ' hut^a btass struggle involving
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horizontal cleavages within the village. Such a struggle 
involves those with a better start to accumulate, organi­
zing over à wide area to protect themselves against those 
who are progressively excluded from reaping the benefits 
of the hew technology. And where the weaker peasantry 
by virtue of their position in the mode of production ®® 
a re. unable, to organize, and _develop_4heir_ class, sol idarity 
on a complementary scale to the rich peasantry, how will 
a co-operative help theni J In  the co-operative they might 
remain weaky. even i f  rich peasants are exeludedy precisely 
because of their subordinate position in other structures 
of dependence which constitute the greater part of their 
lives.
We have heen trying to illustrate here that this sort 
of analysis will enable us to grapple with the problem : to 
what extent can political and social structures of inequa­
lity ih the Couhtfÿsidé be manipulated through the insti­
tution of the co-operative within the overall strategy of 
IRDP ? Or alternatively, are we expecting too much of 
the co-operative ; in  what ways Can it be reinforced to 
defend it against subversion ? Or finally is the co-opera­
tive top feeble an institution with which to contain the 
class struggle, or at least to provide the poor with a figh­
ting chance ?
3. Class. Characteristics of the Rural Social Formation
Having discussed aspects of theory which might enrich 
our methodology, we proceed by referring to some recent 
analyses of the political economy of the peasantry in
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Bangladesh to be found for example in the detailed vill­
age-level empirical work of Bertocci^^, and in the general- 
sometimes speculative—paper by Abdullah and Nation**®. 
This will help us to define more precisely the empirical 
concentration of our work, and the significance of the 
hypothesis which are to be pursued.
Perhaps it should be emphasized here that an exami­
nation of the rural power structure in the context of new 
agricultural technology has to be concerned not only with 
the impact of the technology and new resources on the p»*" 
political dominance^upon the policy formulation .process 
about development itself. That is, we have to relate a 
study of the rural power structure to the total system, so 
that its conclusions contribute to an understanding of the 
process of development both in the making of decisions 
and the effect of their implementation. Only thus can it 
realistically guide a programme of institutional experi­
mentation.
A critical element in such an analysis must then be 
to trace the interconnections between the national institu­
tions of power and the way power is excercised imthe 
countryside. It seems to be generally acknowledged for 
example that the richer peasants of rural East Bengal 
were crucial in mobilizing the large electoral majority 
obtained by the Awami League in December 1970**. 
Ayub argued that this class of peasants had direct lin­
kages to urban areas, as many of its members had become 
part of the newly-urbanized intelligentsia, small business­
men and student groups, which provided the political base 
of Bengali nationalism and therefore the most important
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social base of the Awami League. Naturally these links 
would remain two-way for this class between town and 
country. In the absence of further evidence this analysis 
cannot be pushed much further, but it does establish an 
important hypothesis concerning the relationship between 
the party and the dominant surplus farmer in the country­
side ( i. e. the relatively rich peasants ). Where this re la ­
tionship is intimate and strong, then it highlights the kinds 
of constraints which surround the policy-making activities 
of thé ruling party in the area of agricultural and ru ra l 
development, or which will modify good intentions a t the 
implementation stage. The research methodology o f this 
study must be constructed in a manner which allows these 
issues to be included.
At the same time such hypothesis have to pursued 
in a specific manner so that detailed behavioural relation­
ships are understood. We must go beyond the generaliza­
tions and platitudes of radical : social f scientists and 
pessimistic officials and if necessary beyond the obsession 
fpr data which is statistically respectable ( e. g. counting 
heads of; those who occupy official positions h but often 
meaningless and unreliable ; to the point where the 
process of power is observed and its structures identified. 
It is in this sense that Bertocci’s work is invaluable and 
perhaps unique for Bangladesh.
We must begin by discussing the social and political 
significance of possession of the principal means of prb- 
dudtion f Land. Immediately the picture is complicated 
for Bangladesh in that the extent of a family*s landholding 
^Ves ho  ̂clear universal indicatiop of that famify-s sodial
44
and political status as it might do in the Gangetic Plain 
of India, for example. A nd yet ownership of land 
constitutes an important variable in the determination of 
a family’s status in any. particular community. It is evident 
even allowing for landholding data which fails to aggre­
gate to the level of the cultivating hpusehold unit ( chula* 
or ‘pawbar’ ), that variation in landholding size is very 
narrow in Bangladesh ( compared with North India ). 
It would seem though that there are important regional 
variations in Bangladesh'Tyith “the Centre ? Dacca- Comil la 
belt displaying much rbore homogeneity than elsewhere. 
Perhaps, areas Hke Dinajpur- and K hulnn are a t the other 
extreme. However this_ narrow range of landholding 
size is often cited as evidence of the classless nature of 
the Bengali peasantry and is of course a particularly 
important theme in thé ideology o f  thé hew state.
Bertocci’s research suggests that w e  need to be much 
more cautious in the interpretation of this low variation 
in size of holding, Abdullah and Nations point out that 
policy-makers may have been misled in not attributing 
enough power to weathier Sections of thé peasantry 
itself.-* The emphasis-istJhat the ru ral economy of 
Bangladesh is characterised principally by a peasant 
mode of production rather than- f  or ekample a feudal of 
quasi-feudal mode. Thus family farms are operated pre­
dominantly by family labour with a low incidence of 
sharecropping ; and ̂ use of landless agricultura 1 labour. 
Therefore Tit is ^surplus., farmera uwh^ the rural
economy with the help of large landowners” ,̂ ® rather 
than exclusively landlord classes  ̂relying? solely on. rent-
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or interest, or manipulation of the market. Rich peasants 
— the surplus farmers—are in a position to diversify into 
these activities, especially moneylending, but importantly 
they remain as cultivators and are therefore included in 
the subsidized programmes of agricultural development. 
Abdullah and Nations conclude this section# : “...w h ile  
the large owners of land are exploitative and non-produc­
tive their position in the ru ial economy is secondary to 
That _oi the rich peasants-whose^influence liée principally 
in the Relative control of land.” ®T ( my emphasis ). Such 
a conclusion might well have to be modified when regional 
variations are considered, but there Seems little  doubt th a t . 
it remains broadly true for Bangladesh at this time.
Bertocci, continuing this theme, concluded from his 
close observations of Hajipur and Tinpara ( pseudonyms 
for two ‘villages’ studied in Kotwali Thânà of Comilla 
District) that : Absolute smallness in farm  size should 
not obscure the importance of small diff^erences in land­
owner ship and associated economic activities associated 
with them as these reflect clear variations in class, 
status, life style and power.” * ̂  This conclusion should be 
regarded as a central text for our study : the key hypo­
thesis to be explored and examined in detail.
It is worthwhile summarizing the analysis which led 
Bertocci to this conclusion.; In this population, about two 
thirds of the farms (the landholding of a  cultivating family 
unit—chula or paribar) are less than two acres in size, and 
2 acres is regarded as the amount of land needed by an
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average Bangladesh rural fairily of 5-5 to maintain a con­
sistent subsistence level of income.®® “Those with subs­
tantially more than 2 acres are on the edge of surplus, and 
peasants with 4 acres and above are, in this overall mini- 
fundist context, surplus farmers.” *̂  Half of the subsis­
tence farmers in his population were deeply in debt and 
faced certain downward economic mobility. “By contrast, 
the surplus farmer, who is likely to own upwards of 4 
acres, is well able to withstand the vicissitudes of most 
years and to be able in fact to count regularly oh a small 
crop surplus od which is ;̂ t̂he lending of money or rice to 
his less fortunate neighbours. Thus, a surplus farm hold* 
ding allows its owner typically to augment his income by 
lending activities, taking the land of his creditors in mor­
tgage (which is by custom usufructuary). In the literature 
on Bangladesh agriculture and rural society, the term 
•mahajan’ ( moneylender) refers more often than not to the 
surplus farmers The broader conclusion of Abdullah 
and Nations is certainly underlined in this case study. 
However, a flexible analysis of any particular situation 
and the significance*]^the precise variation in landholding 
size is required since a 6 acre family may be dominant in 
one village but not in another where 10 acre families 
exist. In this way landholding size constitutes a variable 
but not a precise indicator of status and political strength. 
But the overall message is clear enough.
Furthermore competition for land will itself generate 
important empirical data for our research. Since land is 
such a vital but scarce resource in Bangladesh, with prices 
r#cketing;.'its possession constitutes an important objective
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of economic and political activity. Firstly, there are the 
economic and social processes by which families gain and 
lose land (purchasing, mortgaging, and multiple inheri- 
tence ) ;  secondly, the way in which families and groups 
obtain and defend titles to plots—e. g. through inheri­
tance and bribery ; and thirdly, the inevitable disputes 
which arise over boundaries, and the structure of their 
resolution; This ‘absolute- smallness in farm size’ will 
render relative differences of even a minute scale, quite 
significant—both as a source of-disputes and as a political 
variable in theif resolution.*^ Although these disputes 
may occur between individuals of groups in the village, 
often their pursuit will cfitically involve the patrons of 
the respective parties to the quarfei, access relationships 
to politicians, administration and the Courts, and a vafiety 
of methods designed to ruin the opponent without simul­
taneously ruining oneself. Clues to the operation of the 
political structure obtained in this wav can than be tested 
for their significance in the Overall social formation.
The relationship between landholding, status and 
class is complex and should be pursued in our work with 
precision and caution. Although Bertocci’s data confiijed 
“an oyerall? association of land ownership with relative 
social rank” **, he nevertheless considered that it was 
important to maintain a conceptual and emphical distinc­
tion between status and- class.** The villagers themselves 
discriminate between :Ucho-bangsho’ (high status lineage) *■ 
‘madhya bangsho’ (middle status lineage) and *nichu-bang,- 
sho’ ( lo w sta tu s  lineage) families.?* However not all 
those families;with traditionally• high status titles are
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wealthy peasant households, since within the same ‘bari’
( patrilineal extended family ) there can be considerable 
variation in landholding between the households ( the 
‘paribar’ or ‘chula’ ). It is likely that there will be a con­
tinually changing balance of strength between paribars in 
a bari, and perhaps sometimes between baris as families 
divide holdings amongst sons and the demographic balance 
of thefiinclear family shifts.*® In this respect Bertocci has 
distinguished in his thesis between sardari lineages (having 
traditional high status) and non-sardari lineages which 
have acquired some econamic^trength and have thereby 
become politically important and in some cases dominant 
through moneylending activities and other forms of patro­
nage. From this he attributes a great deal of fluidity to 
the system in which different lineages rise to power as rich 
peasants, and where they are not sardari then sometimes 
acquiring status by marrying into sardari lineages. He 
refers to this process as a ‘cyclical kulakism’. However 
he seems to overstate this circular mobility (marginal/sub­
sistence peasant lineages are anyhow virtually excluded) 
and he certainly recognizes the tendency for property and 
status to coincide.
It will b^very important focus to take up this analysis 
especially to contrast a situation which has been heavily 
involved in the new technology with an area which has 
been relatively untouched. The hypothesis here would 
be that the tendency for status ( especially sardari ) and 
landownership to coincide would increase, and the extent 
of circular mobility decrease under conditions of new 
opportunities for increasing agricultural productivity
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which thereby also provided greater scope fo r  investment 
in 71011-agricultural activity like moneylending, manipula­
tion of the market, primary processing plants. In other 
words, the hypothesis suggests that a stable rich peasant 
class will emerge under conditions which reduce the vul­
nerability of families in that class to the weakening process 
of fragmentation through inheritance as other non-agri- 
cultural sources of income come available as a result of 
initial higher productivity of holdings. This hypothesis 
is in contrast tb BértoccTrbwirsÿééulati^^^^ does
not seem to take account of either the possibility for richer 
peasants to prey on the misfortunes of other by acquiring 
their land, or the role o f the new technology in stimula­
ting other forms of rural ( but non -agricul t ural ) economic 
activity like moneylending itself which hitherto plays a 
prominent part in his analysis, f o r  does he take account 
of the enhanced capacity to establish sons in other forms 
of employment. Furthermore he appears over-optimistic 
about the potentiality for subsistence-holding families to 
improve economically “especially if they are able to engage 
successfully in lending activities, in particular the taking 
of land in mortgage.” Surely subsistance level households 
could not compete with families already well-established 
in these activities ? And the economic interrelation charac­
terised by exploitation between, the two classes in the 
village would prevent such competition in the first place.
The dimension of status becomes important to such 
an analysis of class formation since it can function to 
legitimise and reinforce class differentiation by providing 
familiar and socially acceptable institutions through which
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it can be represented and the internal cohesion of classes 
maintained. But the function of status is complex. Bertocci 
found that “the titled lineages married others of like sta­
tus at an average rate of 42*3% of their total marriages 
recorded. By contrast, non-titled--lineages show evidence 
of marriage into titled lineages at an average rate of 13.4% 
of their total recorded marriages.” *® Furthermore 50% 
of the surplus farmers in his population are members of 
titled lineages. From this data one can point to a definite 
tendency for status ( in the form of membership of a titled 
lineage ) to be cotërmihôüs “wifhT class, although it is hot 
yet exclusively so. And interestingly there seems to be a 
tendency for “the assignment of status to follow the rise 
and fall of various families” *® where a distinction is made 
between ‘ashol* ( original or real ) and *dak* ( so-called ) 
status. This seems to correspond to the process of 
‘Sanskritisation’ which has been identified in many of the 
studies in India.
This data also points to the function of marriage in 
uniting families along horizontally stratified lines. But 
for the analysis of the relationship between marriage 
patterns and class formation in the countryside a further 
refinement is required—the identification of spatial varia­
tions between differing economic categories. We might 
hypothesise for example that higher lineages who were 
also richer peasants would be able to sustain kinship links 
at a greater distance than the poorer fam ilies of their 
village, although, ofcourse, local strategic marriages would 
also be made for alliance purposes. The importance of 
such extended kinship links for class consciousness and
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solidarity is self-evident—a familiar network of relation­
ships through which specific, particular interests can be 
related to universal sets of interests which can be per­
ceived to be held in common. In Hindu society where 
village exogamy is practised quite strictly along with caste 
endogamy, such a proposition is relatively easy to handle, 
but in a Muslim society where the rules are less overtly 
institutionalised, and therefore less clear ( to  me, at any 
rate ) the research must be done carefully.
However this horizontal solidarity function has to be 
qualified. In his discussion of the dominant sardari 
lineages, to which other lineages ( baris ) in the para give 
allegiance, Bertocci identifies a Vertical solidarity function 
for some of the marriages between sardari lineages and 
other lineages. By trying to establish the extent of inter­
marriage between sardari lineages within the samaj 
Bertocci was concerned to identify the role of kinship in 
maintaining the social and political order of the area 
covered by the samaj through increasing the solidarity of 
the sardari lineages which dominated the samaj. He 
found that the rate of intermarriage between the 5 sardari 
lineages in the same samaj was 11*4% of all their marria­
ges. But he also found that the rate of intermarriage 
between the 16 non-sardari lineages and the sardari linea- 
/  ges in the samaj was 8.7% of all recorded marriages over
several generations.*^ Thus the samaj was to some 
extent unified both horizontally and vertically through 
intermarriage, functioning presuc^ly  to constrain con­
flict between sardari lineages while also strengthening the 
vertical ties of dominance between sardari lineages and
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those of lower status (and  usually of poorer c lass), 
providing sardars with an additional lever to keep their 
own followers from disturbing the balance of power 
through their own conflicts. This principle of access of 
non-sardari lineages to sardari families by marriage can 
also function as a device by which the economic strength 
of a non-sardari lineage can be socially recognized and 
corresponding status (dak) acquired. Thus we can supple­
ment the earlier hypothesis : Where the process of class 
differentiation is stimulated by hew opportunities fo r  the 
-accumulation of wealth-,-yrich peasants who.come- neither 
from  titled lineages nor from  sardari lineages, can be 
incorporated ifito the traditional institutions of local power 
by acquiring stattfs through intermarriage with lineages 
o f trjadiiionally high status. In this w ay the dimension 
(?/ class and status will became mutually reinforcing.
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The following descriptionXahd analysis of Bondok­
gram represents an early stage in our understanding of 
political and economic power in the villages of Bangla­
desh. The description and analysis presented here is 
itself incomplete in two senses. First, the fieldwork period 
allowed to us was very short, so that we could not reaso­
nably expect to obtain a full picture of the village. Second, 
we have generated much more data than can be presented 
or analysed here in this volume. Subsequent analysis 
will be published in Bangladesh over the next few years. 
In the meantime, since the interest in rural power struc­
ture has increased rapidly in the last few years, this prelimi­
nary monograph is released in order to provide some initial 
reference material for other students in Bangladesh.
In particular, the omissions in this text are : a detailed 
class and kinship analysis of K. S. S. membership : a more 
extended analysis of mortgage and lending transactions, 
involving a typology of arrangements ; and class and 
kinship analysis of capital flows through lending and 
land transfers ; greater examination of the class differen­
tiation and domestic cycle issue ; a closer analysis of the
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structural significance of the disputes in the village and 
the way in which they were resolved. For all of these 
issues, the data is available to us, and indeed many of the 
general conclusions which appear in the text are based 
upou an initial examination 6f this material. But since 
for this work our concern is more with qualitative analy­
sis, it will be necessary to set put in as much detail as 
possible the qualitative" nature of the structures ( and the 
variations ) which we have identified.
' ; u;Ï <1 T here  afe many further omissions which ought not 
• : tbïbccur in a monograph of this sort—e. g. a more thoro- 
uugh anal ysis. of actual Water " distribution ; morer accurate 
data;bn yields, costs "of production ; etc. This sort of 
dat^ :;is required for a rigorous conclusion about the 
social relations of production in the village. However 
the short period of fieldwork compelled us to depend 
upon : recall memory and opinions of different people in 
the village rather than on our own observations and mea­
surements. Furthermore, we have not dwelt upon the 
linkages through Union, Thana and District-level political 
institutions and activities. -In the tiine available to us, we 
considered that the emphasis should be placed on the 
sort of data which would provide us with a qualitative 
picture of the class structure in the countryside rather 
than the operations of these higher levels in the political 
system as such. These levels are an expression of class 
forces,, but their subtleties will have to await the more 
leisurely attention of University sponsored research. We 
haveigone to the people first, as a basis for understanding 
the superstructure.
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The field work for the study was conducted over 
months during October to December 1974. The short 
fieldwork period compelled the use of some short-cuts in 
field methodology. Our initial census and land survey 
consisted of a 35% random sample of households ( 76 out 
of a total of 228 ), and the household list was compiled by 
conducting interviews with different baris in each para. 
Under ideal research conditions, this survey would have 
been 100%. Moreover we had wished to study a large 
village in order to identify as full a range of relationships 
as possible. From this initial random sample, We drew a 
second stratified sample of households based on the distri­
bution of, household population by para, and the overall 
distribution, of land ownership. For this stratified sample 
we used a detailed checklist of questions which can be 
found in the appendix to this volume. Each household 
in this stratified sample (30) became a key informant, 
giving us information about -the relationships between 
themselves and other families and institutions. Since we 
invariably obtained the indentity of other parties to 
transactions, we were able to cross check this data through 
conversations with these other parties. We also referred 
to some secondary data, although we found that the land 
and census statistics were very unreliable. The secondary 
data on the co-operatives and the Union Parishad elections 
was more reliable.
The inhabitants of the village were assured on many 
occasions that a fictitious name would be used when we 
came to write up our analysis. And although it was 
essential for our work to obtain the precise identity of 
participants to a relationship, the co-operation of our
friends in the village was understandably based on the 
assumption that names of individuals would also be ficti­
tious when they appeared in the text. The choice of a 
name for this village was not difficult, contaihmg as it 
does the idea of mortgage as a pervasive phenomenon. 
Names of individuals are more difficult since thé range of 
choice is not large, however we have adopted a formula 
of nomenclature which gives each actor naméd a false 
but consistent identity. It will be-evident froAà the text 
why some of our informants desired such protebtion from
self-incrimination and from The- accusations ̂ ahd allega­
tions of their fellow villagers.
At this point, I must gratefully acknowledge the 
contribution to the fieldwork and data processing which 
was made by my wife—Mrs. Angela Wood, and Our two 
Bengali colleagues--Md. Yahya and Miss Aroma Datta. 
The four of us visited the village each day, working 
separately in two teams. Although I take full respon­
sibility for the contents of this preliminary study,it is the 
result of our joint efforts, and has been discussed amongst 
us. In addition to learning from each other, we all of 
us acknowledge our great debt to those in thé  village 
( poor and rich, male and female ) who spared so much 
of their time in order to teach us. If we remain inade­
quate students, it is because we spared so little of our 
own time. The four of us promised to dedicate this study 
to the family of the late Rusmat Ali of East Para. He 
was an old and poor man, who insisted oh giving us his 
most valuable moment—-the last afternoon of his life. 




Location : Since the Kotwali Thana of Comilla Dis­
trict has been so intensively researched and is so easily 
and readily accessible to visits by academics and official­
dom, the inhabitants of Bondokgram are also entitled to 
some vagueness about the location of their village. It lies 
at some distance north of the Gumti river^ and on the 
northern side of the river in this area no four-wheel 
mechan^ed forms of transport-are-available; -The village 
is therefore reached on foot. Bullock carts are a rare 
sight, but. rickshaws can occassional ly be seen carryings the 
women of richer peasant families o r visitors from the 
town. Bicycles are frequ|iently used by minor officials, 
and some of the service-holders commuting daily from 
the village to the town. Sons of richer peasants attending 
schools or college in the town also regularly use bicycles, 
while others have to walk thus losing a few hours poten­
tial studying time every day. Two motor bikes are often 
seen, one belonging to the Chairman of the UnionTari- 
shad who lives in the village adjacent to Bondokgram, the . 
other belonging to the member of the -Union Parishad, 
who resides in the East .Para: of Bondokgram.
The relative proximity of the village to the town 
affects its economic life in several ways. The richer pea­
sant families are able to diversify their economic activity 
in ways which include the resources and employment 
opportunities of the tow n Thus several families haye 
business interests in the town—medicine, stationery and 
electrical stores,; and some family members are employed
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in minor government positions as clerks, typists etc. F ur­
thermore this relative proximity has facilitated the educa­
tion of sons from the richer families especially so that 
employment further afield lies within their grasp for 
example in the police service, but the army, air-force and 
the teaching profession are also represented. This accessi­
bility to the town has also extended some opportuni­
ties to the poorer peasants for engaging themselves in 
petty trading activity ( usually of rice, and vegetables in 
season ), where the produc# Is'pÛrchasëd^^êithër ffdm the 
village itself, or from other villages and nearby bazars, 
and ' then carried on shoulders tp 4he towns. The return 
on such a day's work rarely  exceeds Tk.TO^O and often 
falls below that being equivalent therefore to little over a 
seer of rice at current prices: Despite its prevalence, petty 
trading is generally regarded by the poor as a last resort 
when other opportunities for an income are unavailable.
The village was described to us by one of our richer 
informants—̂Boshrat Ali-^as “Mujib^s Paradise’*, and in­
deed our analysis must at times appear Unreasonable as 
Bondokgram must be one of the most fortunate villages 
in Bangladesh. Apart from this accessibility to the town, 
the village is distinguished by the absence of flooding 
during and after the monsodn. And yet there are low 
land areas, particularly in the North-East of the village 
which are regularly inundated but which allow a late 
Amon .crop, and which eveh retain sufficient moisture in 
some of the lowest stretches hs the water recedes to allow 
a natural boro rice crop to be cultivated. Of course infor­
mation about yields was rëgulàrlÿ prefaced by tales of
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unprece/idented flood damage, but our indiscreet friend 
assured us that fortunes were being made out of the Aus 
and Amon crops as the yields were as high as ever, and 
the prices even higher. Most of the ‘nal’ land is double 
j| cropped — Aus and Amon, a small proportion in the N orth-
'i East is naturally irrigated during boro, and areas of the
i village in the North lie within the command of two deep
I' water tube-wells—including land owned by some 6f the
ji residents from West and North Paras. At present the
- Southern half of the village and the East Para have little
scope for boro rice cultivatiOnX, A lthough East Para with 
its own K. S. S. expects to receive a tube-well shortly. 
Thus although there is scope for improvement in irriga­
tion facilities, the village itself must be among the most 
favoured in Bangladesh with respect to climate, topo­
graphy^ irrigation facilities, accessibility, and of coiifse 
its general situation of being in the ‘command area’ of the 
Comilla Academy for Rural Development.
These characteristics become an important feature of 
the methodology for this preliminary study, since this 
village-to some extent represents the outcome of a apply­
ing ‘Comilla approach’, which has remained,( perhapis by 
default ) the inspiration for contemporary rural develop­
ment strategy in Bangladesh. By selecting such a village 
we have purposively chosen a community which exists 
under conditions whose replication has been pursued else­
where in the country. For the purposes of radical criticism 
we have taken a village where our arguments—according 
to the ideals and objectives of thé ‘Cbmilla appfoach^— " 
ought to be the weakest. But if we can show behaviour- 
1
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and a structure of the political economy which is unpala­
table and inconsistent with the socialist objectives of 
leaders and critics alike in Bangladesh, then the implica­
tions for present institutional solutions for rural develop­
ment are far reaching.
Population :
Our figures for the population of the village are 
apporximations since our fieldwork time did not allow us 
to do a complete census. The national census—itself an 
approximation unfortunately—nlsaJncluded . the adjacent 
village, although such an aggregation does not represent 
the social reality of an integrated cpnamunity consisting 
of both villages. In this area atleast, the national census 
appears to have been based on the memory of one or two 
informants in each village rather than on a through- 
going household survey. As a result, we have found the 
census tale to be unreliable ; jeven the number of paribars 
identified is inaccurate. From our own incomplete investi­
gations we are able to present the follwing picture.
Table—I : The village «consist of 228 paribars, distri­
buted between 33 baris and 5 paras.





1. East 16 49 89 39 623
2. Middle 5 15 36 16 252
3. North 3 9 37 16 259
4. South 3 9 21 9 147
5, West 6 18 45 20 315
Total 33 100 228 100 1596
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* We completed a prelirriinary random survey of 76
out of 228 paribars, with a total population of 544.
Thus the average size of each paribar from this
sample is 7. 1. For computing the overall population
estimate we have therefore employed a multiple, of 7.
By this calculation, the census has undercounted for
Bondokgram and the adjacent village by a factor of
about 15%. We know that the number of paribars
for the two villages is greater than- that shown
in the census—̂ 303 -as g a in s t  290r--so -that our
total estimated figures for- the two villages is 2121, 
compared with the census figure of 1835.
The village is thus one of the largest in this area, 
reflecting our concern to work in a village which is large 
enough to contain a fuller range of relationships than 
might be found in a ‘typical’, smaller village—a true 
miscrocosm in effect.
Landho^ng :
From the initial random survey, the following dis­
tribution of the paribars by land owned and effective 
landholding is found. Land owned by a paribar is not 
necessarily all cultivated by that paribar, so that we have 
adopted.a more complex indicator of a peasant’s real land- 
holding position by calculating for each paribar the land 
from which an effective and regular income through cul­
tivation is obtained. Thus for example, an acre of land 
sharecropped in by a family where the crop is divided 
50/50 between owner and sharecropper has been included 
in the overall effective landholding figure as 50 dechpals. 
Similar adjustments have been made for mortgagipg 
arrangements.
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The complete formula for ‘effective landholding’ is 
therefore :
—land owned and cultivated-f-j land sharecropped 
out
-t-i land mortgaged out but cultivated by the 
household
— land mortgaged out and not cultivated by the 
household
4-i land sharecropped in by the household 
+ land received in mortgagee and cultivated 
4- ! land received in mortgage but not cultivated by 
the recipient household.
Table—II : Landholding by sizes and %
Acres Land owned I No. %
Effective Landholding 
No. %
0 14 18.4 12 15.8
0.01—0.99 18 23.7 18 23.7
1.00—2.49 25 32.8 31 40.9
2.5 + 19 25.1 15 19.6
Total 76 100.00 76 100.00
With the aggregated figures, the comparison does not 
reveal a great Variation between the two columns, with a 
tendency to reduce the frequency of the extremes and 
enlarge the middle range. Individually however there 
are some interesting movements of certain paribars from 
one land size to another. Throughout the discussion 
which follows, the effective landholding column is used 
in most of the tabulations, except where the identification
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of land transactions demands otherwise, and in the follo­
wing table. Here the implications for inheritance patterns, 
division of holdings and fragmentation is shown by pre­
senting the distribution of sons.




IN umber of sons 




0 1 3 4 | 5 j 6 eons son per paribar
0 4 3 5 1 1 ■ --- --- — 20 14 1.4
0.01-0.99 1 5 5 3 2 2 — — 42 18 2.3
1.00-2.49 4 3 8 8 2 51 25 2.0
2.5 + 3 5 3 4 2 1 43 19 5.3
Total




Perhaps the main conclusion to be drawn from these 
figures is that of those who own some land (62 out of 76 ), 
41 paribars ( or 66% ) will have to divide their holdings 
between 2 or more sons. The distribution of the average 
only warns us that richer families are not yet controlling 
the size of their families, as a way of maintaining their 
economic position through generations, although evidence 
shown below indicates that they are certainly responding 
to this problem by diversifying. This factor of size of 
household is repeated in the following table, when all the 
paribar members are included; ' : -
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Table IV : Household Size by Effective Landholding
Effective Number of Paribar Members No. of 
Paribars
Size Acres 0-2 3-5 6-8 '9 -12!i ' 13-16 17-21
Total
0 1 4 7 — ■ — ' —  ' 12
0 0 1 -0 .9 9 2 6 9 1 — — 18
1.00—2.49 1 6 15 9 — 31
2.5 + — - — 6̂  -  15 3 1 15
Total
Paribars 4 16 37 15 3 _ 1 76
3. The Paras—A Description of Kinship, Landholding,
Economic and Political Activity.
South Para
As the village is approached on foot from the south, 
there is a ‘crossroad’ of the kacha tracks .Left and West 
leads to the southern and of West Para. Right and East 
encircles the southern side of South Para and leads to the 
southern tip of East Para. The straight direction leads 
into South Para.
This is the smallest para, consisting of 21 paribars 
distributed between three baris. Two of these baris are 
closely related, dominated by two groups of cousin bro­
thers—the head of one bari is Sardar Askar Ahmed and 
Tiku Mia is the head of the other. These two baris have 
had a turbulent past, with Tiku Mia killing one of 
Askar Ahmed’s elder brothers Asmat Ali during a quarrel 
over rights to a tank in 1949. The family was ostracised
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from the rest of the village even before this incident, 
having a reputation for quarrelling, fighting and generally 
being very pugnacious and aggressive. The women too 
were included in this general opinion and were either 
married into families outside the village, or exchanged 
between cousins. The expression used for this ostracism 
was ‘hookah, pan’—implying that neither were shared 
with this family. In 1959 the family was rehabilitated, 
particularly at the insistence of one Reajuddin from East 
Para. The ostensible reason for this was that Askar 
Ahmed especially had worked very hard at cultivation 
and had steadily been exitertding his landholding. In 
this way he had obtained a strong economic position in 
the village, and his de facto  influence in the village was 
high.. The social status of this bari had also been enha­
nced by the strategic inclusion of women through marriage 
from higher status lineages outside the village. They 
were able to accomplish this by virtue of their increasing 
economic status. This strength was recognized and made 
legitimate by the rehabilitation of the family, and later 
Askar Ahmed came to be accepted as a Sardar in the 
village. He remains at the head of one of the richest and 
strongest baris in the village.
However there are further dimensions of the story 
which are germane to this analysis. The Tiku Mia branch 
of the family has not entirely lost its desperado character. 
This Reajuddin, refered to above as being responsible 
. for the lehabilitation of this family, came from the hew 
Ha ji: Bari which now resides on the northern edge of East 
Para^ -(See below, description of East Para. Reajuddin
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was the uncle of Dr. Abdus Samad ). Reajuddin had 
been a member of the Union Council for 36 years, and 
Vice-President for 22 years. He was therefore recognized 
as a respected leader in the village, and was able to influe­
nce the thinking and opinions of other leaders around 
him. It is also probable that Reajuddin’s paternal grand­
father was Sardar Askar Ahmed’s and Tiku Mia’s paternal 
great-grandfather, although the new Haji Bari and the 
South Para Bari were decended from differentjnothers. 
So a weak kinship relationship existed. This was impor­
tant since there had obviously been a close relationship 
between Tiku Mia’s bari and the new Haji Bari. Although 
Tiku Mia is regarded as the head of his bari, there were 
four brothers of whom Tiku Mia was the third. The 
eldest brother now dead had served in police force. The 
next brother, Ghani Mia, had joined the police force at 
independence in 1947 and now serves in Chittagong, al­
though retaining a paribar in the village. He is reputed 
to be engaged in border smuggling. Tiku Mia, the vio­
lent third son, used to work as a servant and labourer in 
Reajuddin’s bari—the new Haji Bari. The fourth; son, 
Siru Mia, had been a successful businessman, owning a 
grocery shop, and building a ‘pucca house’ into which Tiku 
Mia was able to move when Siru Mia died. Now Siru Mia’s 
death was linked to that of Nazir Ahmed—Reajuddin’s 
younger brother’s son, and elder brother of Abdul Hamid 
of new Haji Bari. Nazir Ahmed had adopted Reajuddin’s 
mantle of office by becoming a member of the Union Coun­
cil—at first nominated, then later elected. In that election, 
Siru Mia and one Latif from the adjacent village had cam­
paigned vigorously together on Nazir’s behalf. However
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later on, in 1961, {i . e.  after the two South Para baris 
had been rehabilitated by Reajuddin ) there was a dacoity 
at LatiPs house, and he accused Siru Mia of carrying out. 
Siru Mia was ' convinced^ thaf ‘Nazir waa • assisting and 
encburagin^ Latif to du thiaf' In A ugust' of that year, 
Nâzrr was inufdered and'ftWeenis that there waA proof that 
Sifu Mia was guilty. Sîru^Mia' '̂wâ's arrested, detained and 
over a period of three 'môtiths "was brutal ly beaten by The 
police. He died id hospital as a result of these injuries. 
Nal^ir’s - murder^was Thefefore heVef' proved conclusively.
We had wondered why South Para retained a distinct 
identity in the village, despite its small size. By virtue 
of its geographical location, it could easily have been 
incorporated into, the larger East Para^ between which 
k insînplinlâ existed. This incident perhaps explains why 
the process of rehabilitation did not lead to complete in­
corporation into the East Para, while at the same time not 
undermining i*Ukar Ahmed’s emerging, leadership position 
in the village, as his hari became distinguished from the 
T iK M ia  bfahch. "
The position of the other parts of these two baris and 
the third'bari i in ther pararis ! moire easily explained. But 
the explanation is critical, and of great structural signi­
ficance to us’. Briefly they are depéridënt upon the heads 
of the Two baris, and are especially dominated by Sardar 
AskarrAhmèd ahd his brother Siddiqur Rahman. From 
the-third; hafTM ono Miâ and his halfffirothef Badsha Mia 
have beeh3‘ruined’ by Them-^obligedto fake loans at high 
rates of interest;^:unable to 'repay them, and then bound to 
surrendèf'Thëîr lands rn  iieU ̂  ' repayme ht. Ghirag Ali
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and Abdul Hamid, two brothers from Tiku roia bari, are 
in the same position, with the additional hazard of being 
helplessly in debt to their eldest brother. It seems evident 
that Sardar Askar Ahmed and his brother have extended 
their domination over most of this southern part of the 
village; having been systematically acquiring land through 
direct purchase and their moneylending activities which 
are invariably tied to mortgage arrangements. Ironically 
one of the explanations for the vulnerability of Mono Mia;......................  *  • — —- --------- -- ----------- ---  « r       .
and his half-brother Badsha =Mia has been expensive 
dispute over land between themselves. Mono Mia was 
the third son of Mansur Ali, by the first wife. T he second 
wife had two sons Badsa Mia and Chand Mia. This 
second wife was very beautiful and persuaded MansUr Ali 
to leave all his land to her sons. When this was realized 
after Mansur Ali’s death, the el dest son Ansar Ali hung 
himself. The second son, Sayed Ali, had already died, 
so it was left to Mono Mia to try and obtain some of his 
inheritence from his half-brother, Badsha Mia. A case was 
filed in the court, and Mono Mia was eventually unsucc­
essful. However Mono Mia had to sell some land which 
he had already acquired before his father’s death to pay for 
the case. He sold 38 decimals to Sardar Askar Ahmed’s 
eldest brother Hassan Ali ( now dead ), 40 decimals to 
Sardar Askar Ahmed himself, and 10 decimals to one of 
Tiku Mia’s brothers. In addition to these transactions There 
is for Mono Mia à further imminent loss of land to Sardar 
Askar Ahmed’s younger brother, Siddiqur/Râ hman,'who 
is threatening'to foreclose a mortgage Because of failure 
to main tan interest payments on a loan. Thus the process 
of acquisition and accumulation relentlessly continues,,^
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Table V : Landholding by paribars
Size of landholding in Acres Number of Paribars %
I 0 ^  ' 4 333
0.0T0 99 3 25
1.00-2.49 3 25
2.5 + 2 16.7
TOTAL 12 100
Total Number of Paribars in Para = 21 
Note : ‘Effective landholding’== land owned.and cultiva­
t e d l a n d  sharecropped out + i  land mortgaged 
out but cultivated by the household—land mort­
gaged out and hot cultivated by the household+ ̂  
land sharecropped in by the household4- land 
received in mortgage and cultivated+ JIand recei­
ved in mortgage but not cultivated by the reci­
pient household.
The high proportion of landless underlines the pro­
cess described above, to which must be added the ‘less 
than 1 acre* peasant who will regularly be in need of off- 
holding employment. We could assume from this table 
that at least 60% of the paribars are economically very 
insecure, and are in regular relationships of dependence 
on the rich peasants in the para—either for employment 
or for loans for consumption and petty trading.
East Para :
Within Bondokgram, East Para has the largest popu­
lation. This is a densely settled para which has had to
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extend its residential territorÿ.aa^ons growuip and estab­
lish their own families. In the last 15 years as its member­
ship expanded, oenlarge bari has had to mqye .away,from 
cramped, pucca quarters in the centre of the para, 
eltii5)ugh conveniently close to its own paddy lands. The 
para has three large tanks and numerous smallef ones. 
One of these tanks is owned in one bari, whose paribar
heads aresufficiently distrustful of each other and other
 -  - - . . .
neighbours to prevent them from maintaining the stock 
offish. The other tapk in tfie south eastern corner is 
interesting since its joint owners- have all leased their 
shares to a youth club in the  pâfà whiéh has cleared it, 
restocked it with fish, and is how realizing a profit from 
the investment; ‘ / .- -u  .'U
Most of the cultivable, land pwn,ed hy the para-resi- 
dents lies outside the residential, area tp,the .North, East 
and South. However since, there .are Twp; barjs at some 
distance from the others to ward the ^spyth-eastern corner 
of the para, some paddy land as well as vegetable plots 
separate these baris fronr the bthérs. One of these baris, 
has several paribar heads serving with the police. The 
village co-operative accountant Comes from the other bari.
As far as we can deduce from patchy genealogical 
data, 12 of the 16 baris in East Para,can trace their des- 
cent back 4-5 generations to five brothers, and by,going 
back to 7-8 generations-r-a further 3 Baris would be inclu- 
ded. 1 his lineal descent pattern gives the para a sense 
of cohesiveness and solidarity in its relations with.other 
pa^as, lends authority to thp^arajeader& m  t^^yi|lage as 
a ;\yhole, and probably fonctions,ip.xeduce. confiiet within
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the j)ara to its present level. ' The core of This, kinship 
;gTpup is a'Haji lineage which is now divided into two 
Haji baris—old and new. The new Haji bari had to move 
4Wày from its ancestral site.becanse . of pressure , on?jspace 
and accommodation an& establish itself ini the North? of 
The para, although it still reteins its ownership oyer its 
previous pucca house using it as a;shop: and for its 'ferti­
lizer.dealership. The entire lineage.is regarded as tiicho- 
bangsho*, and these two baris have the highest i social 
atatus in-the lineage. It is interesting That these fwolbaris 
■ are perhaps the most conscious of theif bangsho* ranking, 
and are eager to refer to their origins. The youngest of 
the five brothers, Mirza Khan, had been a tax collector 
in  the court of the Tipperah Maharajah and; had the title 
of Choudhury conferred upon him. Mirza Khan’s grand­
father had originated from Sarail in Brahmanbaria, in the 
North of Comilla District. The H aji’ connection weakens 
according to the kin-distance measured in dhrectness of 
descent and the number o f interyening^geherations. \B  
this criterion the new Haji Bari with Dr, Abdus 5amfid at 
its head is the most respected as his .grandfather,: Basfeir- 
uddin, had been to Mecca. To quote Dr. Abdus Bamad’s 
son : “We are ucho-bangsho, we do not sit on benches ; 
and nichobangsho people should not sit on chairs. We 
should not submit to their judgements about us”. This 
bari endeavoured to maintain this lineage status by regu­
larly-marrying with other well-known Choudhury, and 
Mazumdar families in the area.
However the significance of this lineage status is 
placéddn perspective by the observation th a t 'th e  -sardars 
of the para come f rom̂  ̂nehbe^r of the Haji Bar is, although
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they belongjithe main lineal descent group tracing their 
agnatic connection back to one of the five brothers. Three 
sardars are recognized—Ansar Ali, Riasat Ali and 
Siddiqur Rahman—all of whom are rich peasants, Siddi­
qur Rahman is from thëT*polîcëman’s bari’. Riasat Ali is 
a retired teacher, who lends money and has influence 
among dependents and relations. Their support appears 
to be thé basis of his power, rather than any widespread 
feelings of respect. Ansar Ali is probably most.respected 
in the para. He is the j eldest of four elderly brothers, 
who constitute the core of one of the strongest baris in 
the para. The Manager of the East Bondokgrarn K. S. S. 
comes from this barL Ansar Ali himself has no spns,  ̂and
so as an old man he lets most of his land out ,to share­
croppers. Our indiscreet informant, Bashat Ali, who is 
also one of the wealthier members of the para, is well 
respected and trusted by the poorer people of the para. 
However he is a service-holder and commutes daily to the 
town so that his influence is not affected. In any case 
he is wary o f ‘village-pblitics*.
T ab lesV I : From our preliminary sample survey, the 
distribution of effective landholding by paribar for the 
para is :
Size of Landholding Acres Number of Paribars %




TOTAL * 30 ; 100
Total Number of Paribars in Pafa=  89
1
I The minifundist character of the landholding pattern
I is very clear from this table, with almost half of the
f population drawing an income by cultivation from
y 1.0—2.49 acres. In addition to this group, a third of thé
j population have effective access to less than one acre of
I cultivable land—and this proportion niust represent The
1 minimum possible number of household heads and other
male adult members who are seeking employment beyond 
that required for the family holding. Added to this prb^ 
portion will be same from 1.0—2.49 acre category who 
(depending precisely on family size-and adult composition 
of the paribar) will certainly be infrasubsistence, also in ' 
the market for employment, and vulnerable td the èxpîbita-^ 
tion of wealthier predators. The iâsue of f râginentâtibn 
was pointed out to us very clearly during bur work in this 
para. The new Haji Bari, lâsiding on the northern tip 
of the para, owns much of the land on this northern and 
north-eastern side of the para. Before 1949, Bashiruddih 
Haji had himself owned 30 acresi in this area. In  1949 
this was divided among his four sons. W 1955; there was 
a further division amongst Bashiruddin*s grandsons—i.b. 
Dr. Abdus Samad’s generation. Since Dr; Abdus Samad 
is himself close to 80 years old, a further division is 
imminent. Approximately frbm this example, in a period 
of thirty years a holding of 30 acres will be divided into 
13 separate holdings—the number of cousin brother^, 
second cousins etc. with comparable ages who will a ll  
simultaneously be paribar heads. '
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M îdaiëPàëa
The main path througb the village leads northwards 
from Sonth Para into Middle Para. This para is probably 
best distinguished from the others by its lack of internal 
cohesion and solidarity—the-five baris represent four quite 
disparate groups.H Coming from South Para, the first bari 
straddles the main path and is known as Mia Bari. By a 
religious criterion this is the most ‘uchobangsho’ descent 
group in the -village—having the title of Syed. The bari 
consists of 8 paribars+rbrothers; cousin brothers and un­
cles. r T^Two of the older men : of the bari Manu Mia and 
Syed Bazlur Rabman are - recognized as Mullahs, and al-' 
th o u ghbo tbare  in their seventies they stil 1 occasionally 
officiate at religious functions. The bari is recognized as 
being descended from a long line of pious ancestors, and 
some of the younger members of the bari are maintaining 
this tradition.! However by an economic criterion, the 
barids also one of the poorest in the village—owning a; 
small amount of < land and dependent on other forms of 
enaploymenhn Two ’ brothers^ .fo r  example, both paribar 
heada,' ^work din a 'nearby  textile mill and re ly  on this; as 
their major source of income. This bari has further social 
problems, since a ‘mad streak* is being ‘passed through 
thefgenerations*! Majnu Miad( ‘Majnu- mèans^crazy ) Was 
recognized to be insane; inheriting the disorder from his ■ 
mother; ( His father was a Mullah. ). His elder brother 
had committed suicide. But he was married after • this 
insanity manifested itself but it was hoped that marriage 
would ‘cure’ him. It did not and his wife is now respon­
sible for the paribar. According to her, the eldest son of
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the marriage “will also be mad”. This paribar is now 
entering a desparate economic position. Majnu Mia’s 
father died leaving substantial debts unpaid althpugh 
Majnu inherited 2 acres from him. Some of this land had 
already been sold to settle these debts, and more will have 
to be released. Majnm Mia’s younger brother has also had 
to sell land for the same purpose. The buyer oii these 
occasions has been their cousin brother Hameed Ali. F u r­
thermore, since Majnu Mia is no longer capable of work­
ing, his wife has had to take loans from this Hameed-Ali 
with vicious repayment conditions attached. She borrowed 
Tk. I;0b0 in November, 1973. For each Tk. 100 loan# she 
has to pay 30 seers of rice a year. If the accumulated 
interest and the principal Cannot be repaid by 'January 
1975, he will take 8 decimals of her land into his own 
cultivation. Including loans from her own father’s village 
she has loans amounting to Tk. 4,000 principal. The 
overall poverty of the bari has undermined the social and 
political value of its ‘ucho-bangsho’ status, so that marri­
ages cannot be sustained with other lineages of equivalent 
status either inside or outside the village. And-this repu­
ted ‘mad streak’ has confined the choice of marriage part­
ners to families of similar economic status.
Continuing bn the main path through this bari, there 
is an uninhabited stretch of about 200 yards.' Thehron 
the left, to the; West of the path, is one bari with 12 pari­
bars cbnsistmg of poor, service-holdérs* casual# labourers 
and petty traders. : On the other side of the path; across 
a shallow tank which . becomes a boro plot in December, 
are two’baris which are closely related by kin and are phy-
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sîcally adjacent. The largest of these baris with 7 pari­
bars, descended from three brothers, is dominated by the 
recently elected Member of the Union Parishad, Abdul 
Rahim. The other bari has four paribars.
This ‘Member* Bari with Abdul Rahim at the head 
represents a complete contrast to the Mira Bari, described 
above. It is given ‘nicho-bangsho’ ( low } status by others 
in the village, but the Member*s paribar is also popularly 
believed to be the richest in the village. He is described 
as a ‘millionaire* although there are other paribars in 
the bari which are quite poor and in the grip of money­
lenders—:Muklesur Rahman is one example. Member 
Abdul Rahim has a cloth business in Comilla town, and 
he cultivates land in the village jointly with his two bro­
thers—one elder and one younger. One of the two motor 
bikes in the area is owned by this paribar. Despite its 
‘nicho-bangsha* status, the Member’s elder brother Shiru 
Mia was able to marry a girl from the Haji Bari of East 
Para by virtue of their wealth—a good example of econo­
mic strength being converted into social status. The geo­
political position of these two baris has the effect of 
blurring the boundary between Middle and East Para at 
this point. Member Abdul Rahim and his kinsmen re­
gard Middle Para as being their immediate ‘territory of 
influence*, regulating the affairs and disputes of Mira Bafi 
and the poor peasant bari; and dominating the Hindu 
Bari f  the fifth bari in this para ) through moneylending, 
mortgage and sharecropping relationships. However the 
Member Bari itself, and more especially its poorer mem­
bers, also think of themselves as being part of the same
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‘reyai’ and ‘samaj’ ( both terms were used, although ‘reyai’
seems to refer to the ceremonial group, while ‘samaj’
refers to the arena within which disputes are settled ) as
East Para. They acknowledged the three sardars of East
Para—Ansar Ali, Riasat Ali and Siddiqur Rahman—and 
also included within the same ‘reyai’, Sardar Askar Ahmed 
from South Para.
Certainly the members of Middle Para were too des­
perate a group to form  a K.S.S., having their landholdings 
in opposite directions from one another towards the surr­
ounding paras to which they were closest. Thus co­
operative members from Middle Para were members of 
the East Bondokgram K. S. S. and would naturally have 
their land on that side of the village. In effect these came
from Member Abdul Rahim’s and the related bari. Thus 
boundaries can ‘shift’ according to which precise institu­
tion of solidarity—para, reyai, samaj or co-op—is defining 
behaviour or attitudes about membership and participation 
at any particular point in time. Generally these institu­
tions seem to overlap in their membership, and it is per­
haps only at the geographical margin that the conceptual 
distinctions between them are brought into sharp focus.
The Hindu or Mistri Bari is an extended family of 
cousin brothers and one uncle divided into five separate 
paribars. They are all carpenters who also cultivate small 
holdings. Their craft expertise is passed down from 
father to son, and their work is largely in the village : 
marketing and repairing ploughs ; house construction— 
roofs especially ; and making furniture. Their capital 
base is low, using materials supplied by their customers. 
And for cultivation, they tend to hire bullocks for
ploughing or lease their land out for sharecropping. The
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tools cost each of them about Tk. 500 a year. The pay­
ment for ploughs is in kind—i maund of paddy per plough 
per year. Otherwise they are paid at a daily rate of 
Tk. 10-12 a day plus one meal, Qcasionally they under­
take contract work ( e. g. for constructing a roof ); Most 
of them are in some dependent relationship' with the 
Member Bari—and especially with the Member and his 
paribar. The carpenters are either heavily indebtec^ or 
have land mortgaged to them, or have had to sell land to 
them to meet one crisis or another, and where they cannot 
cultivate their own land through lack of finance they have 
leased out their land to them for sharecroping. However 
the Member and his family does n o t, have a predatory
monopoly, since the - carpenters have: transactions with 
most of the peasants in the village-^so that alternative 
sources of advances and support are available. It is also 
worth pointing out that many of the peasants fire techni­
cally in debt to the carpenters as they are paid in arrears 
at the harvest times, although this means that the carpen­
ters have to purchase foodgrain at other times of the year 
at high prices.
Table—VII : The description of Middle Para may be 
summarised by the following effective landholding table 
drawn from our sample.
Size of Landholding Acres Number of Paribars %
0 4 ■ 33,3
0.01—0.99 6 50
1.00—2.49 2 16.7
2.5 + 0 . Q
TOTAL 12 100,
Total Number of Paribars in Para—36;
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The conclusions from the sample have to be modified 
in this case, since the richer paribars from the Member 
Bari were not included in the random sample although 
several of them would come into the 2.5 acre +  category. 
However the high proportion of landless and peasants 
with less than one acre is evident. This reflects the gene­
ral condition of the para which is economically dominated 
by several rich families from one bari. It is interesting 
that while the Member has a formal political status; with 
great scope for patronage (to be described later), and also 
informally exercises much power in the para; he is not a t 
the same time recognised as a village leader or sardar. 
His power is resented rather than respected, and his 
formal position is derived mainly from his economic abi­
lity to purchase support or otherwise demand it from 
those who are dependent on him.
North Para :
Between Middle Para and North Para are some vegcr 
tab)q plots, a large sugar cane plot, and than an area of 
non-cultivated ground at the Northern end of which stands 
the Bondokgram Primary school. In front of the school, 
which faces South, the boys and youths of the village 
play volley ball and badminton. The story of how the 
school came to be established is interesting for our purposes 
and will be discussed later. Beyond the school is N orth 
Para. One bari, Sardar Bari lies East North-East of the 
■school, containing 14 paribars. The other two barisi—Dr. 
Sadu Mia Bari and Sadar Sirajul Islam Bari—have settled 
alongside the main path going North, on its western side, 
containing: 13 and 10 paribars respectively.
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The Sardar Bari was so named after the late Kala 
Mia who had been a well-respected leader in the village. 
No-one in the Bari had clearly emerged as a successor 
to him even as head of the bari. The paribars are descen­
ded from two brothers, three generations back (or four, 
according to the age of the informant ), Raju and Sibdar 
Gazi. While not having ‘ucho-bangsho’ status itself, the 
lineage has made some socially strategic marriages by 
taking girls from Haji Bari in East Para, acquiring 
status for their dependents through the mothers. If girls 
are now m arried/row  this bari, the status of their mater­
nal uncles is determined to discover vjether an ‘ucho- 
bangsho’ connection exists through the girl’s mother. 
However our informant from this bari—Ali Akbar added 
that economic status was now considered before the 
ritual status of the lineage.
There seemed to be a pattern of ‘Haji’ boys marrying 
girl of equivalent status, and therefore most frequently 
having to search for suitable families outside the village, 
while the ‘Haji’ girls are now regularly married to families 
with lower ritual status but secure economic prospects. 
In this process, the quality of ritual status acquired 
matrilineally is weakened as it is dispersed to families 
‘prepared to pay for it’.
Thé members of the bari are mainly cultivators, in 
general having subsistence holdings, although a few of 
the paribars are regularly in surplus^are therefore econo­
mically secure for this generation at least. But there 
appear to be no rich peasants here accumulating land on 
the basis of profit from cultivation. However'one of
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, them, Sikander Ali, also has a cloth business—buying
sarrees and lunghis from a go-down near Dacca, and 
i selling either in the market or by visiting houses. People
I also come to buy from him, but he has not established a
j regular shop. The participation in the co-op is low,
1 although they have a choice of two—Bondokgram K.SB.
I and the joint K.S.S. with Bondokgram and the adjacent
I village to the North, which we shall call Dhaninagar.
Part of the explanation for this is that Bondokgram K.S.S. 
j was a high-defaulting society and had been closed by the
S A.C.F., and much of their land is not within the command
j of the Bondokgrâm-Dhàninagâr K.S.S. tube-well. ■
Often during our work in the village, the thin stooped 
figure of Dr. Sadu Mia could be seen visiting different 
houses mainly in North, Middle and West Paras. He is 
the head of a large, quite wealthy bari comprising 13 
paribars. Our information about this bari not extensive 
since it did not appear directly in our intitial random 
sample survey. However the names of Bar,irmembers 
appeared frequently in other statements as lenders of 
money, receivers of land in mortgage, and purchasers of 
land. The Doctor himself, of course, provides others with 
many opportunities to approach him for borrowing during 
his visits—and indeed he will often administer his treat­
ment and medicine to families who are unable immediately 
to pay for his services. The Bari has a Haji connection, 
and enjoys a qualified‘ucho-bangsho* status.
The third bari in this para is known as Peshkar Bari 
(Peshkar means a clerk in a government office). There are
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10 paribars» nine of which are headed by first cousin bro» 
thers descended from four brothers. The bari has neither 
high lineage status nor a strong economic position, but 
there are marriage relations between this bari and the 
Sardar Bari of North Para and the Member Barr of Middle 
Para. The head of the Bari is Sardar Sirajul Islam, 
whose mother was a paternal aunt to the Member and 
his ; brothers. Sirajul Islam is recognized as a Sardar 
throughout the village, although he is not as active as he 
used to be when he ; was younger. His younger brother, 
Bazlur Rahman,’ now eeems to be substituting for him. 
The landholdings of the bari members are not large. 
Akku Mia owns the most with 4 acres, but of the cousin 
brothers he alone had no brothers. The Sardar’s father 
(the third of the four brothers) appears to have been the 
larger landowner of his generation, which explains to 
some extent how his first son Sirajul Islam became a 
Sardar. However the Sardar has three younger brothers, 
so the holding was fragmented. The brothers were there­
fore left in a poorer position, owning  ̂about 2  acres each. 
However Sirajul Islam acquired much respect in the 
village, despite low bangsho status and the small amount 
of land owned by him. Two o f his sons have gained 
Mi A. qualifications, and one of them is lecturing in Haji- 
ganj College, in Chandpur Sub-Division. Another two of 
his sons are minor servicè-holders as a clerk and a peon. 
This achievement has reflected well on the; father, adding 
to his own reputation as a fair and ■ thoughtful person. 
With these attributes, he has been acknowledged as a 
sardar in the village.
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Table VIII. From our sample, the distribution of 
effective landholding by paribar for 
this para is as follows :
Size of Landholding 




2.5 + 5 41.7
TOTAL 12 100.00
Total Number of Paribars in Para-37
Although, from this table, the peasants in this para 
appear to be in a more favourable position when compared 
to some of those discussed above nevertheless our data 
shows that even in this situation many of them have 
substantial loans ; have land mortgaged to others ; and 
have been selling land. This is perhaps an occasion to 
emphasise that with such a narrow range of landholding 
and with such small amounts of land involved, most 
peasants are either in critically week positions or will 
enter this vulnerable category at the incidence of any 
abnormal expenditure. The prospect is bleak for sons 
on divided holdings and who have no alternative employ­
ment opportunities. In this situation, it is interesting to 
note the extent of transactions involving sales of land, 
loans and mortgages between close kinsmen within the 
same lineage, as well as between peasants of different 
bar is where the kinship relationship is weaker and often 
forgotten for the purposes of economic transactions.
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Within Peshkar Bari, there are sevèral examples of mort­
gages and land transfers between cousin brothers.
West Para :
Separated from the other paras by paddy plots. West 
Para is distinct and sections of it hostile towards the rest 
of the village. There are 45 paribars distributed between 
6 Baris, 3 of which are small. The strongest Bari with 
13 paribars used to be called Bhuiya Bari, after the pre­
sent head’s uncle Chirag Ali who had been a substantial 
landowner and also owned a bus which was operated on 
the Comilla-Daudkandi route. The name of the bari is 
now changing in the village as the head’s son, Gedu Mia, 
was elected as a Member of the Union Parishad in April 
1974. Most of the bari-members can trace their agnatic 
decent back 3 or 4 generations, according to the age 
of the informant. One exception known to us is Maksud 
Ali, whose mother was from the bari. He had been 
brought up here with his maternal uncles rather than in 
his father’s house. This bari remained hostile to us 
throughout our work so that we are not impressed with 
the reliability of the data which did emerge from our 
conversations. Some of our information about the bari 
has been obtained indirectly from other sources. Despite 
their protestations it is clear to us that some of the pari­
bars own substantial amounts of land. The head of the 
bari, Minnat Ali has six sons—one is a Member of the 
Union Parishad, two are electricians with WAPDA, and 
one has an electrical goods shop in Comilla. The Member, 
Gedu Mia, also lives for much of the time in Comilla. 
And yet Minnat Ali was more descriptive of his ‘poverty’
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than anyone else in the village—despite the brass hookah 
and the new lunghis. ( His son even wore a nylon one. ) 
There are others in the bari who are poor—for example 
Riasat Ali who works as a labourer for Nawab Ali, who 
has been ill recently. Minnat Ali’s cousin Ramizuddin, 
son of Chirag Ali, owned a medical store in Comilla. As 
a ‘doctor’ he had been involved in the Academy’s experi­
mental family planning programme. This association 
had incidentally enabled him to obtain a fertilizer permit 
from the A. C. F. although his kinsmen have not shared 
this advantage. Other sources of fertilizer are available 
to many of them. Another second cousin brother, Panjat 
Ali, also had an electrical business in Comilla. This elec­
trical connection will be explained below.
The hostility of this bari towards us and the rest of 
the village appears not to be repeated in the rest of the 
para. Another large bari is Munshi Bari, after one of three 
I brothers from which the bari is descended. The bari with 
13 paribars consists of brothers, cousin brothers and 
second cousin brothers, as a core of 9 paribars descended 
from these three brothers. The additional four paribars 
are more distantly related. The range of economic status 
between paribars within the bari is quite marked. The 
father and uncle of Manahar Ali, a young paribar head, 
had a large electrical business in Calcutta, which they had 
retained and managed ever after Partition. When the 
father and uncle died much of the capital was lost as it 
could not be repatriated from India, but during their life­
time there had been scope for some reinvestment in land 
and education for the sons. Four paribars have thus
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benefit ted in this way, although since three of the paribar 
heads are quite young (one still at college) they have not 
been engaged in other business activity, or moneylending 
within the village. Two of the paribar heads are service- 
holders, one of them in Noakhali with WAPDA. The 
extraordinary predominance of electricians in this bari and 
the one discussed above derives from Manahar Ali’s father 
and uncle. They recruited interested people from this 
para to work in their business, and as these electricians 
became relatively rich others were encouraged to follow 
them into the trade. However the other two branches of 
the lineage have not been so fortunate, with holdings of 
less than one acre. Since these paribars are small in size 
the subsistence requirements are correspondingly less. 
These informants maintained that West Para as a whole 
was not being discriminated against by the rest of the 
village ( as had been alleged by members of Minnat Ali’s 
bari ), but that there was a division between rich and poor 
in West Para. This analysis arose out of a discussion over 
the distribution of fertilizer, and other rationed commo­
dities. The member from Middle Para ( Abdul Rahim ) 
was responsible for distributing fertilizer in the village, 
but he denied fertilizer to our informants—Abdul Latif 
and Abul Fazal—while distributing to the richer peasants 
of the para like Minnat Ali and his bari, and Abdul Rashid 
( a rich ex-Member and semi-retired teacher ) from the 
para. According to Abdul Latif—“the rich can obtain 
these rationed commodities from the Member ( for Middle 
Para ) because they have the power to damage him. We 
have no such power, so we are denied.” ( The fertilizer 
distribution issue will be discussed more fully below, )
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Of the other baris, one consists of two half-brothers 
whose grandfather came from a nearby village to the 
South of Bondokgram. Their father had married Minnat 
Ali’s sister. Junab Mia, the elder of the two, had been 
the headmaster of a primary school ; had been associated 
with the Academy adult education programme, and is now 
the headmaster of a private school as he is retired from 
government service. In the past he had been an enthu­
siastic member of the Bondokgram K.S.S., which has 
members from North and West Para, and he is still a 
member of the Union-wide Multi-Purpose Society, a credit 
association (which has Minnat Ali as one of the directors). 
He is now very critical and suspicious about the leadership 
of the Bondokgram K.S.S.—accusing its managing commi­
ttee of theft and corruption. He had even sought the 
support of the Sardars in West Para—Minnat Ali and 
Abdul Rashid—in a dispute with the committee ; but in 
vain. The corruption allegation refers to the selling of 
water delivered by the tube-well to non-members at the 
expense of proper service to the K.S.S. members, with the 
Manager, Committee and driver taking the income for 
private use. Junab Mia is now disillusioned, although he 
remains a conscientious cultivator, and with 2.7 acres 
owned land ( also representing effective landholding ) he 
regularly produces a surplus. His son is also an electrician 
with WAPDA. At the same time, he avoids predatory 
transactions with poorer neighbours, and indeed also 
seems to find difiSculty in obtaining fertilizer indicating 
that his influence in the village or in the para is not high.
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Another small bari of three paribars has Abdul Rashid 
( the ex-Member ) at its head. He is a master in Bondok­
gram Primary School and owns 6 acres of land, making 
him one of the largest landowners in the village. During 
our work, he received a procurement order from the 
government for paddy. His descriptions of the way in 
which the procurement is being implemented in the village 
will feature later on in our analysis. In the same bari, 
Nurul Islam is engaged in a dispute over land with new 
Haji Bari in East Para which has involved several court 
cases ; and Abdul Hameed has an electrical shop in Dacca, 
occasionally lending money to others in the village— 
especially to relatives in other paras. The other baris 
need not be given a detailed description here, as they 
consist of peasant families ; mainly engaged in cultivation. 
Several of them are in surplus with owned holdings of 
around 2.5 acres. One of these is Suruj Mia, the Manager 
of the Bondokgram K. S. S.
The effective landholding picture for the para from 
our sample is shown below.
Table—IX
Size of Landholding 




25 + 2 20
TOTAL 10 100
Total number of paribars in Para-45
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We were unable to complete all the interviews in 
the samples—both the initial random, and the subsequent 
stratified sample—so the survey data here is hot as helpful 
it might have been. Our other data sources, which have 
been used for the description outlined above suggest that 
the proportion of those with effective holdings above 25 
acres should be higher than the 20% figure shown in the 
table. In general, the number of those with holdings 
below subsistence is low for this para. Our other data 
would also indicate that a higher proportion from this 
para have been able to enter alternative forms of employ­
ment to cultivation, although the service-holders and 
businessmen (in electricity especially) have certainly tended 
to come from the richer peasant families. The para 
therefore represents an interesting example of richer 
peasants having the capacity to diversify either into busi­
ness or through their sons becoming service-holders. In 
this way they are able to stabilise their class superiority 
in the village by not increasing the pressure to derive an 
income exclusively from land as the sons grow up. This 
in effect helps to avoid the problem of dividing the family 
holding into smaller non-viable units, where the prospect 
of entering a downward spiral is difficult to offset. It may 
also lead to joint family patterns of living, where one 
brother stays in the village to cultivate the land and 
provide a home for his brothers wives and the rearing of 
their children while they are employed elsewhere. There 
are signs of this tendency already.
CHAPTER IV 
M AIN FORMS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
As will be understood from the description of the 
paras, some people in Bondokgram obtain their income 
from a variety of sources in addition to cultivation. There 
are two main items of interest to us here : the employment 
position of the landless and the poor peasant ; and the 
pattern of diversification away from agriculture among 
different classes of peasant. The analysis of power struc­
ture depends critically on the nature of the dependency of 
the poor on the rich in terms of actually providing emp­
loyment, arranging employment elsewhere, or providing 
loaned capital to engage in petty trading activities. At the 
same time, the extent to which the richer peasant class is 
able to diversify into other secure forms of non agricul­
tural activity is vital to the preservation and indeed rein­
forcement of the strength of that class. We hypothesised 
in our earlier paper on ‘The Political Process in Rural 
Bangladesh,..‘that’ a stable, rich peasant class will emerge 
under conditions which reduce the vulnerability of fami­
lies in that class to the weakening process of fragmenta­
tion through inheritance as other non-agricultural sources 
of income become available as a result of initial higher 
productivity of holdings.’ We will pursue this analysis, 
and its significance in the next chapter, confining our­
selves here to a description of the main types of economic 
activity found amongst the peasants of this village. We 
begin by presenting a summary table ( Table X ) of the 
relationship between cultivation and other occupations by 
effective landholding category for the paribars and their 
members in the village. This table is derived from our 
initial random sample survey of paribars.
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DÎTersification into off-holding employment :
The first point to note is that about 16% of the pari­
bars in the village are landless, by our definition of 
effective landholding, with about 20% regularly enjoying 
the product of land in excess of 2.5 acres. In this ‘2.5 +  ’ 
category : 60% of paribars have at least one member in an 
off-holding occupations ; and 40% have at least 2 members 
off-holding occupations. The single largest category in 
the village are those holding between 1.00-2.49 acres, 
representing about 41% of the total. Within this category, 
45.2% of the paribars have at least one member in an off- 
holding occupation (com pared with 60% for the 2.5 + 
category ) : and 22.6% have at least 2 member employed 
outside the cultivation of the paribar’s holding.
From these figures, the hypothesis about rich peasant 
diversification is not refuted and would seem to warrant a 
more widespread analysis of the phenomenon. However, 
by considering the ‘less than one acre’ category, where 
55.5% of paribars have at least one member in off-holding 
employment it is clear that the concept of diversification 
has to be clarified and distinctions made between different 
types of occupation. Furthermore from our data, a high 
proportion of the paribar members in the ‘less than one acre’ 
category with one off-holding occupation in addition to 
own cultivation are the paribar heads themselves. This 
reflects a position of underemployment on the land, and 
the off-holding employment is very often iri^gular—for 
example agricultural labouring or petty trading. Some of 
these reservations about specifying the type of off-holding 
employment characteristics of the landless. One further
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note of caution from this table is that the figure of 42.1% 
for those paribars engaged only in cultivation of own 
holding may be extraordinarily low for the majority of 
villages in Bangladesh. But comparisons between villages 
of varying locations ( both in a regional and urban pro­
ximity sense ) is absolutely essential for understanding of 
the pattern of rural employment.
In proceeding to a breakdown of this off-holding 
employment pattern in the village, it might be useful to 
present first some data on the distribution of educational 
qualifications by effective landholding category. The 
following table refers to paribar heads only.





Education of Household Head
Total
Nil j Up to I Class 4
Class
5-8 S.S.C. H.S.C. |B.A.
0 No. 6 4 4 1 — --- 12
% 50.0 33.3 8.3 8.3 --- 100
0.01-99 No. 10 3 4 1 — --- 18
% 55.5 16.7 22.2 5.6 — --- 100
1.00-2.49 No. 13 7 8 8 2 --- 31
% 41.9 22.6 25.8 3.2 6.5 --- 100
2.5+ No. 3 3 5 3 1 --- 15
% 20.0 20.0 33.3 20.0 6.7 --- 100
Total 32 17 18 6 3 0 76
% of Total 42.1 22.6 23.6 7.8 9.9 0 100
It is immediately apparent that the level of education 
for the paribar heads is low, surprisingly so when the 
favourable location of the village is considered. Only
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those with holdings above 25 acres are significantly 
represented beyond class 8, and then only at the S. S. C. 
level (Secondary Matriculation). The proportion of those 
with an educational level below class 5 steadily declines 
through the landholding categories from 83.3%-72.2%, 
64.5%-40% ; but the figure is high. The figure for the 
landless—while expected—is of course a very depressing 
indicator of the dependency of this class, where the pari­
bar heads themselves are obliged to search for employ­
ment throughout the entire year either within agriculture 
or outside. The lack of education reduces the possibility 
or entering regular employment, and so they are con­
tinually obliged to resolve the problem of access to 
employment.
The impact of this distribution of educational qualifi­
cations on the pattern of off-holding occupations for indi­
vidual paribar members can be clearly seen from the 
following table.
Table : XII
Percentage Distribution of Individual Occupations (Off- 











































Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Note : Service = government clerks, officials, military
service and skilled service occupations 
like electrician.
Profession = teachers, doctors.
Petty Trading =  distinguished from business by absence 
of fixed capital, scale of operation, and 
seasonal variations.
The main division here is between those with less 
than one acre, and those with holdings over one acre. 
The most secure and usually most remunerative occupa­
tions—business, service and professions—are almost solely 
confined to those paribars with holdings over one acre. 
The reverse does not hold with equal emphasis for the 
petty trading, agricultural labouring, and the other 
manual jobs. It is interesting to note that in the manual 
job category where there is often a higher element of 
security ( e.g. peons, textile workers or artisans, including 
the carpenters of the village ), those in paribars with 
effective holdings in excess of one acre are more highly 
represented ( 43.75% ).
If we return to the unit of the paribar from the indi­
vidual, we find that the groups of off-holding occupations 
business/service/profession and petty trading/agricultural 
labouring/other manual jobs—correlate inversely with the 
size of effective landholding. By coincidence 24 paribars 
out of 76 in the sample ( 31.6% ) are involved in each 
group of off-holding occupations, and a few paribars are 
involved in both groups.
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Table XIII : Percentage of Paribars engaged in 
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Again it has to be noted that despite the correlation, 
the 1.00-2.49 acre paribar category is still well represented 
in the second column. This is perhaps some indication 
of the tenuous nature? their security on the land, and a 
response to the problem of multiple-inheritance and 
fragmentation. However this conclusion has to be modi­
fied, by recognizing that the 1.00-2.49 acre category is the 
largest in the sample ( 40.79% ). Furthermore 54.8% of 
the category is exclusively involved in the cultivation of 
own holdings whereas the corresponding figure for pari­
bars with holdings over 2.5 acres is 40%.
From this general description of the occupational 
structure, some qualitative description of the occupa­
tional types is relevant to our analysis. However we will 
not present an orthodox description of cultivation prac­
tice, etc. since there are numerous comprehensive acco­
unts for this area. We will focus only on those issues 
which relate to our overall theme.
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Cultivation :
Despite the location of the village, the amount of land 
irrigated by tube-well for boro rice is now very low— 
having declined over the last few years. East Bondok­
gram K. S. S. has yet to acquire a tube-well, therefore we 
have to consider only Bondokgram K. S. S. and Bondok- 
gram-Dhaninagar K. S. S. Bondokgram K. S, S, has been 
operating a tube-well since 1970. According to the reco­
rds, in 1970-71 100 acres were irrigated ; 70 acres in 
1971-72 ; and 60 acres in 1972-73. During 1973-74 and 
up to the present, this remained idle. There are several 
I explanations for this, one’s preferred explanation depen-
I ding on the position occupied in the system. ( The identi­
fication of ‘facts’ is not value-free ). Thus faculty at the 
j Academy will emphasise factionalism within the society ;
the A.C.F. understandably points out the high incidence 
of defaulting payments on loans ; the villagers refer to 
? organizational inefficiency of the ‘government’ ( the more
. informed will cite the BADC) ; and politicians will remind
I us of the post-liberation problems of the country in
I obtaining essential supplies of oil, fuel and spare-parts.
J The truth is most likely a combination of these observa­
tions,
) The Bondokgram-Dhaninagar K.S.S. has been opera-
! ting two tube-wells since 1966, one of which has land
j owned by Bondokgram residents from North Para under
j its command. These two tube-wells have irrigated on
I average 50 acres each per year, but again the coverage
' per tube-well has been sharply declining from year to
I year so that the current acreage irrigated is some way
Î below 50.
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The only significant addition to the quantity of land 
available for boro rice cultivation is that low land area 
on the edge of the canal, one-third of a mile North-East 
from the new Haji Bari of East Para. There is some 
irrigation by tank ( by Sardar Askar Ahmed from South 
Para ), but representing an insignificant amount.
Thus at present the extent of boro rice cultivation in 
the village is very low, probably representing no more 
than 10% of the land cultivated under Aus and Amon. 
However it has been higher in the past, affecting parti­
cularly some of the peasants from North Para and West 
Para. But we could not conclude that a triple cropping 
annual system with boro rice had been responsible for 
the wealth of the stronger baris in these paras, since our 
historical data on the families indicates that their supe­
riority stretches further back than this. When the tube- 
wells were introduced these families were of course in a 
position to take advantage of the new resource, but their 
adoption of the innovation seems to have been an outcome 
of their economic superiority rather than the cause of it. 
And, importantly, the continuation of this economic supe­
riority does not apparently depend upon the regular 
achievement of surpluses of rice derived from boro culti­
vation since alternative secure sources of income besides 
cultivation are already available to this class.
A further observation should be made about the 
impact of boro rice cultivation on the annual cropping 
cycle. There is some evidence from the village to 
suggest that much of the boro cultivation functions to 
displace an Aus crop from the same land—so that the
105
double-cropping pattern is altered but only a small pro­
portion of the land under boro is actually triple-cropped. 
Our data is not rigorous in this respect and the observa­
tion for Bondokgram must remain impressionistic. Howe­
ver more specific data for the thana has been collected 
by others at the Academy which supports this observation. 
In addition to this, it has to be noted that the yields from 
boro rice in practice often do not exceed those obtained 
from the cultivation of an Aus crop, since the appropriate 
conditions for realizing the full potential of HYV boro 
are rare at this time—water and adequate supplies of 
fertilizer. Thus the involvement in boro rice cultivation 
is not necessarily an indicator of a net addition to a 
peasant’s annual surplus.
W ith these reservations we present the following
figures based on the smaller, stratified sample of village 
households.
Table XIV : Number of Paribars engaged in Boro rice











1. Abdul Mannaff 4.0 3.2
2. Boshat Ali 4.0 2.8
3. Muklesur Rahman 0.4 0.33
4. Sirajul Islam 2.5 3.3
5. Rusmat Ali 2.8 2.5
6. Askar Ahmed 7.2 5.6
7. Junab Mia 3.1 3.1
Total in stratified sample = 23
Total in stratified sample with land owned and culti­
vated =*21.
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Although the total is small, and the stratified sample 
is small, the message of these figures is clear enough. 
With the exception of Muklesur Rahman, all of those 
from the sample engaged in some boro rice cultivation 
come from the richest class of peasant in the village. 
And if we were to extrapolate from this data, then 33.3% 
of the landholding peasants in the village are engaged to 
some extent in boro rice cultivation—although the 
amounts of land are small, Aus on the same land is often 
displaced ; and the yields of HYV boro fall a long way 
short of their potential. And if we were to extrapolate 
further, about 90% of those cultivating boro rice have 
effective landholdings above 2.5 acres—i. e. a category of 
peasant which might normally expect to produce a sur­
plus of foodgrain in addition to family consumption 
requirements with Aus and Amon alone, without the 
help of boro.
The issue of fertilizer for cultivation is ovbiously a 
critical one, and its overall scarcity apparent to all. In 
this situation, data on the use of fertilizer can be a vital 
index of power and influence in the village. Certainly 
one of major points of controversy between different 
groups of villagers concerns the way in which the supply 
of fertilizer is manipulated and controlled, and varying 
rates of successful access to ferti^er by different classes 
or factions among the villagers. However it is precisely 
this intense competition for fertilizer in a period of extreme 
scarcity which makes the data on usage very unreliable— 
partly because it is obtained sporadically and in small 
amounts so that recall is difficult, and partly because the
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method by which it was obtained involved some form of 
corrupt practice. The importance of fertilizer is Certainly 
not lost on the peasant and the problem is very definitely 
not one of extension but of access. Most of the cultiva­
tors ^ o u ld  like to use fertilizer on all their paddy crops 
where^the risk of the crop being damaged or destroyed 
through flooding, untimely cyclones, or lack of water (i. e. 
in rain-fed boro ). And in this last year, most of the 
cultivators would have applied more fertilizer where they 
did use it, if they had been able to obtain more. A few 
were satisfied, as they had sufficient power and access 
to obtain adequate supplies. We intend to illustrate these 
points in detail in the next chapter—referring to the struc­
ture of allocation, and leaving quantitative analysis for 
further investigation.
The village as a whole has a shortage of labour, 
which does not however mean that the landless of the 
village find regular employment on the holdings of the 
richer peasants. The village landless have to compete 
with a regular influx of migrant labourers from elsewhere 
in Comilla District—particularly the flood affected areas. 
As agricultural labour will be discussed in the following 
section, we need only note here that the peak demand for 
labour by peasant cultivators is during the period of Aus 
harvesting and Amon transplanting, with two lower peak^ 
at Aus transplanting and Amon harvesting. The healthy 
cultivator with no other form of employment regularly 
engages himself in most operations, especially ploughing, 
hiring labourers where the timing of an operation is criti­
cal. Other landholders who are perhaps older ; engaged
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in other activities ; or simply richer employ labourers as 
a substitute for their own energy or time—sometimes 
supervising themselves, or appointing a son or relative to 
the task.
The disposal of marketable surplus of foodgrain and 
vegetables involves the larger cultivator in a transaction 
with village or migrant petty traders. They move from 
house to house buying odd amounts of paddy, collecting 
to an average maximum of 1 maund 10 seers before carry­
ing the load to their own houses, converting it to rice and 
then carrying the same weight either to a local hat, or to 
the town. It appears to be cheaper for a cultivator with 
a large surplus of paddy to sell to a petty trader rather 
than engage labourers to convert paddy to rice. Peasants 
with a smaller surplus may sometimes do their own con­
version to rice ( involving the women of household ) 
and transporting it to the market. There exists therefore 
the possibility of a range of combinations of methods by 
which, the crop is marketed, depending upon the economic 
position and status of the cultivator, and the size of his 
surplus. The additional dimension of procurement fea­
tures later in this analysis.
Agricultural Labour ;
The attitude of the major employers of labour in the 
village was very frank, and displayed an acute apprecia­
tion of the harsh reality of the laws of supply and demand. 
The issue for us is the employment position of the land­
less and the consequent nature of their dependence upon
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their economic superiors in the village. Our main conclu­
sion for the village is that, despite a general shortage of 
labour in the village, the position of the Bondokgram 
landless in need of employment was weakened by the 
entry of outsiders into the local labour market.
These migrant labourers come from other thanas in 
Comilla District—Chandina, Burichang, Debidwar, Murad- 
nagar, Daudkandi, Laksam and Barura, and most frequ­
ently from Chandina and Burichang. These are areas 
regularly affected by flooding. The labourers are often 
landowners whose crops have either been damaged, or 
whose transplanting and harvesting operations occur at 
different times, or who are unable to crop at such an in­
tensity as in Kotwali Thana, or whose average yields are 
lower even though they may own more than their emp­
loyer ( rare. ). Often of course there is a combination of 
these reasons. This year was a good year for Bondokgram 
and its employers of labour, since the flooding had forced 
a higher number of peasants from flood-affected areas on 
to the labour market, keeping the price of labour low. 
Thus one informant—Sardar Askar Ahmed—admitted that 
he and others could have afforded to pay Tk. 7 + 3  meals 
for Amon transplanting and Aus harvesting during 1974, 
since the price of rice was so high ; but they were able to 
pay Tk. 4/5 + 3 meals as “the wage-rate is a commodity 
fluctuating like chillie, it depends on supply.”
In general outsiders are preferred to the local villa­
gers as daily labourers. Another informant—Boshat Ali 
( the indiscreet one )—remarked : “Local labourers get
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distracted by the demands of their own family. But out­
side labourers sleep here, and as they have no house here 
( i. e. no food ), so they have to work even if the rate is 
low.” Several informants said that the landless from the 
village were idle, and that “they go in for petty business 
instead of working.” It seems likely that the local land­
less and poor peasants are forced into these other insecure 
activities with narrow and fluctuating profit margins, 
( for selling rice, on average Tk. 10 a load—i. e. per day, 
which includes the labour of conversion to rice. A rare 
and lucky day might bring in Tk. 30, but more often even 
losses can be sustained. Out of this ‘profit* interest repay­
ments on loans have to be paid, since the capital required 
for the trading is usually loaned ). They are ‘forced* 
precisely because the migrant competitors are prepared to 
accept low rates for a short period of time to cover their 
own subsistence since others in their families are also 
migrants and their womenfolk and children have remained 
to subsist from the crop which has been harvested. But 
the landless of Bondokgram have no such means of provi­
ding for their women.
The outside labourers moreover are not given wages 
daily. They work for different people in Bondokgram—a 
few days here, a few days there—and then come to collect 
the total amount of cash owed to them when they decide 
to leave the village. One of the functions of this mode 
of payment is of course to regulate the behaviour of these 
strangers staying in the village. The main variation in 
the rate during the year is that only two meals are offered 
for Amon transplanting,-plus Tk. 4/5, “since the day is
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shorter.” For Aus transplanting the rate is usually 
highest—Tk. 5/(5 + 3 meals is common, although there are 
instances of the rate going as high as Tk. 8 +  3 meals. 
This is not the highest peak in the demand for labour, 
but the supply is much less at this time since the flooding 
does not usually affect the homes of these migrant labou­
rers until later in the year. The opportunities for the 
Bondokgram landless are higher at this time. In previous 
years Bondokgram has also been attractive for migrants 
in search of work during the winter where the introduc­
tion of HYV boro rice creates another season of labour 
demands. The decline in the acreage under boro has 
affected them adversely too.
This phenomenon of migration is not the immediate 
concern of this study except in so far as it functions to 
depress the local wage rate and further weaken the posi­
tion of the landless in the village. But the general issue 
of the relationship between patterns of labour migration 
and other variables such as flooding, the extent of HYV 
cultivation and levels of cropping intensity is an impor­
tant one sociologically and politically, and should not be 
overlooked.
C H A P T E R  V
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
The nature of politics :
The earlier description of the five paras of Bondok­
gram introduced the strong baris ; the interconnections 
between them ; the significance of the paras as distinct 
social entities ; and the acknowledged sardars within each 
para and for the village as a whole. It also referred to 
other institutions like the Union Parishad, co-ops, dealer­
ships, youth associations, the school and procurement 
operations. Here we describe them further, identifying 
their significance for our analysis of the structure of 
power.
The aspect of our lives which we call ‘political’ 
refers to two themes. How the social order of our 
community is maintained at a minimum acceptable level 
for those who dominate in that community. And how, as 
a corollary the competition for scarce resources can be 
regulated to achieve a distribution of resources which 
reflects the reality of social and class power and thereby 
remains consistent with the maintenance of social order 
and security. These social processes are maintained 
through a variety of forms—traditional lineage status ; 
religious sanction ; the syndrome of economic superiority 
and dependence ; the social structure of formal education 
(teacher-pupil ) ; the internal structure of a bari or paribar. 
( i. e. domination based on criteria of age, sex, education.
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earning pow er); and a general category of purposive 
transactions between individuals for long or short term 
mutual benefit: e .g . leader—follower, friends of equal 
status, clients and brokers. The list can be extended, but 
the point is made that there exists a complex network of 
relationships through which the social fabric is maintai­
ned. These relationships are interdependent, and represent 
different levels of social organization referring to different 
aspects of social behaviour. The following discussion is 
i, organized around two themes the structures within which
dpmination and exploitation occur ; and the significance 
of this domination for the future of the system as a whole.
Since we conceive of the problems of rural develop­
ment in a materialist perspective, we consider the analysis 
of the social relations of production and exchange to be 
the primary focus in discussions about domination and 
power. The poor in most societies have not the leisure 
to consider thé more refined aspects of domination and 
freedom and in Bangladesh where such leisure exists 
for thé poor it is enforced and implies an absence of 
material welfare. In short, it means they are dying. 
Accordingly, we are concerned with identifying the rea­
lity which lies behind the myth of a liberated people. If 
it is painful to read, it is because the reality is a vicious 
one, not bécàusé we fake a sadistic delight in selecting 
out only those features which attract moral disapproval. 
With these comments in mind, we now proceed to our 
formal description.
The units of social cohesion within which authority 
was recognized as legitiniate are perceived differently by 
the inhabitants of Bohdokgram. Different groups have
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different social horizons—for some the bari is the primary 
point of reference ; for others the para ; for a few the 
village as a whole ; and for some ‘territorial’ analysis had 
surrendered to class analysis although still within limited 
territorial horizons. The terminology with which different 
social institutions were described also varied between 
informants. This variation in perceptions perhaps 
suggests that if there was ever previously a consensus 
among the village people about the description of their 
social system, this consensus has been disturbed by an 
‘untidy’ reality in which the notion of a para or village 
as an integral community (a societal isolate) is. undermined 
by the differential relationships between classes of the 
peasantry and other classes in the country, and the State 
itself.
The social groupings in the village appear to exist 
alongside a structure of pervasive class domination which 
often crosses the boundaries between these territorially- 
based social entities as well as occurring within them. 
The rich peasants of one para (o r sphere within it ) on the 
one hand do not have to restrict their economic transac­
tions to that para ( or sphere ), but as a corollary neither 
do they have a monopoly of economic transactions within 
their para. We will have to analyse our data further to 
compare precisely the levels of intra-para economic inte­
raction with that between paras. But the para boundaries 
are certainly not absolute in this respect.
However this, picture alters when the ‘purer’ forms 
of political authority are examined.. Then there seems to 
be a definite hierarchy of authority extending from the
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paribar head, through the bari and the para (with perhaps 
an intervening level here referring to spheres of influence 
within the para ), to the village as a whole. Beyond the 
village the picture is not so clear and several alternatives 
appear.
The Bari Heads :
Apart from the direction of his own family’s affairs, 
the political role of the paribar head is one of loyalty to 
the bari, and its recognized head if it has one. Such 
loyalty from the members of the bari is essential if the 
bari is to enjoy any respect or leadership position in the 
para or village. And such respect among the village is 
important for the bari’s leaders to represent successfully 
the interests of the bari members—whether it be in 
marriage negotiations, the resolution of disputes, the 
allocation of fertilizer or relief, the location of a tube- 
well, and the distribution of water etc.
The internal solidarity of the bari is also important in 
this respect. A bari whose members have the reputation 
of quarrelling amongst themselves—like Sardar Askar 
Ahmed’s bari in South Para during the 1940’s—is unable 
to command any political authority in the village, leaving 
it vulnerable to ostracism or sabotage. However since 
internal conflict and competition between bari members is 
prevalent in most of the baris of the village, certain levels 
are tolerated and are not regarded as being prejudicial to 
the status of the bari. Thus loyalty to the bari’s leaders 
often coexists with a series of long-running disputes and
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relationships of exploitation between paribars—where the 
bari’s leaders recognize that they are powerless to inter­
vene. Indeed they are frequently involved in such rela­
tionships themselves. However, perhaps more importantly, 
to support one paribar head against another risks splitting 
the bari into factions thus weakening the position of the 
bari as a whole in relation to outsiders. In this way, the 
paribar heads are obliged to accept minimum levels of con­
flict, competition and exploitation among themselves where 
protection from another source may hot be forthcoming.
Underlying, therefore, a facade of internal bari soli­
darity, a bitter struggle for survival and advantage occurs. 
Our data contains.several examples of brothers borrowing 
from and mortgaging land out to brothers under extor­
tionate conditions, and of brother forced to sell, to brother, 
as well as disputes over the division of the inherited hol­
ding. Under these conditions of great pressure on the 
land, the bond of kinship has been displaced by c^idera- 
tions of the market price for credit and ‘assistance’. The 
‘zero-sum game’ aspect of inter-paribar relations is modified 
only by the recognition that other resources ( e. g. water or 
fertilizer) can only be obtained if the public status of 
the bari as a whole is maintained. This explains the gap 
between words and deeds—the presented image of har­
mony betrayed by land transactions and 100% interest 
rates often repayable only in kind between bari members
( i. e. no compensation effects for the declining real value 
of inflated currency during inflation ).
For Bondokgram these general observations have to 
be modified in the case of East Para where most of the 
baris recognize strong kinship links between themselves.
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Since the baris by common genealogical ideology, do not 
exist independently of eaçhj other, so indiyid%%l ,bari status 
is dependent not only on the .behaviour internal cha­
racteristics of the bari but alsq, upon its soga) status his­
torically ascribed. Most qf the baris claim membership 
of the sanie patrilineal descent grpup^ although there is 
nevertheless a social ranking between them according to 
the intensity of the ‘Haji’ connection. In this way the
boundaries between the baris are more diffusai and the 
status of individual baris consequently less, important in
determining the flow of resources to them,^ pr as a prm-
ci pie of recruitment of its members to wider leadership
status. Thus while this larger kinship group contributes
towards the identity of East Para as a distinct social grou-'
ping ( with 2 additions — Abdul Rahim ( Member ) Ëàri of
Middle Para, and Sardar Askar Ahmed’s Bari of South
Para, both immediatly adjacent ) with a higher degree of
internal - solidarity and cohesion than other para^ f; the 
wider kinship group has also facilitated a freer interplay 
of class forces within its ; boundaries, witE richer paiibars 
preying on members of their own baris according to the 
market-rate for transactions irrespective of any sense of 
barhterritory. And perhaps more importantly, as a result, 
this had generated a greater sense of class identity, and 
an acceptance of class interests as a more powerful 
criterion for behaviour than factional or bari interests.
It is w ithin I this, context that its new co-operative func­
tions, although it will be interesting to note whether 
factional conflict emerges after the tubew ell has been 
introduced, ( i. e. the,advantages, o f class unity have
been .achieved,; when the, allocation of water within thé 
class becomes the issue. )
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Most baris have an acknowledged head. But the 
small baris are often indistinguishable from larger neigh­
bours and so their heads are not generally recognized as 
bari leaders in the village. Some of the larger, more 
influential baris may in addition to their acknowledged 
head have other leaders. Where the head of a bari has 
recently died, it may be sometime before a successor 
emerges. And where the bari head is old or inflrm, his 
status is a formal one with other prominent baii^members 
attending village meetings and representing the bari’s. 
interests. We could not identify all the bari leaders in 
the village, but of the 22 whose bari leadership seemed to 
be generally recognized and about whom we have some 
data ( not necessarily from the sample ) —16 have effective 
holdings in the ‘2.5 + acre’ category, and 6 between 
1.00-2.49 acres. From this we might conclude at least
that bari leaders do not usually come from the landless 
and poor peasant class.
Besides a position of economic security ( if  not 
strength ), age is obviously an important qualification and 
usually precedes a succession through the line of the 
eldest son. Where several brothers or cousin brothers 
are of similar age, then the eldest may simply be regarded 
as primus inter pares, unless he has clearly been super­
seded by another on the further criteria of economic posi­
tion, education, perhaps a high-status off-holding occupa­
tion, and a history of wise and operational decisions.
The Para Leaders :
The criterion of age is reduced in significance at 
higher levels in the leadership hierarchy. Thus one infor­
mant—Abdul Mannaf—who was clearly a respected leader
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of his bari ( new Haji Bari ), although not a sardar^ sugges­
ted that to be a sardar “a man should have a sense of 
justice and an ability to dispense it” . But he also 
added that a sardar should come from strong gosti* 
(lineage). By this, he meant a numerically large bari, 
with respected social status and extensive economic influe­
nce in the village. In this way, such a bari leader in the 
role of sardar would obtain a respect for his decisions 
since his bari—between its members—would have a wide 
range of sanctions at its command. Thus if a party to a 
dispute was ordered to make redress in some way—failure 
to do so might incur retaliation to himself or one of his 
kinsmen in the form of physical assault ; harder conditi­
ons on which loans and other forms of assistance could be 
obtained ; denial of resources—e.g. water, fertilizer,relief, 
j a license ( if the sardar or one of his bari members is yrell-
connected at the thana level ) ; being ‘slack’ about grazing 
cattle near his plots ; and, by virtue of the bari strength, 
encouraging others to ostracise him.
Apart from Middle Para, there is at least one ackno- 
wledgeisardar from each para. In some paras. East Para 
especially, more than one is recognized although not all 
of them have an effective sardari status beyond the para, 
and may indeed have only a smaller ‘sphere of influence’ 
within the para. These ‘minor’ sardars constitute the 
occasional intervening level between the bari and the para. 
Where the para did not possess an obvious leader, the 
different sardars ( of minor and of village-level status) 
might represent different factional groups within the para, 
instead of being ranked in a hierarchy.
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The East Para, partly because of its size, the political 
structure is very complex combining into a system these 
different observations. Three mçn were most frequently 
referred to  as Sardars—Ansar All, Riasat Ali, and Siddi- 
qur Rahman—all of whom in this local context of Comilla 
District may be regarded as rich peasants. Among these, 
Ansar Ali was the eldest, the most. respected and came 
from the ^trongest*^ bari. However his advancing years 
and the recent'death Of his Only surviving son has reduced 
his sardari activity, thereby increasing the importance of 
the other two leaders. Ansar Ali’s overall position rema­
ins strong enough to offset any factional tendencies be­
tween all three of the sardars, although it is also clear 
that each of the sardars have their own sphere of influence 
within the para. The internal structure of these spheres 
of influence are interesting—Ansar A li’s dépends upon 
his leadership of a large, economically strong bari, so 
that kinship links represent an important source Of his 
power. Riasat Ali, the head of a much smaller bari, is 
engaged in diverse, one—dimensional transactions with 
dependents ( money lending, mortgagih)g, exchanging 
favours for obligations etc. ). SiddiqUr Rahman, coming 
from thei /policemen’s bâri in the sOülh-éast corner of the 
bari, is head of his' bari simply because elder brothers 
are: sefvingoin: thei police outside the area. His own econo­
mic position is secure, but he is not involved in Extensive 
transacticUml relationships^ with d'é^ènd'énTs. ' His id flûehce 
is based more strictly on the printiplek)f territorial proxi­
mity to his own bari. Yet none of these sardars may be 
regarded as" ‘minor’; for their leadership is not fesfricted 
to these immediate but - çjçtehdê’ thi ô ü to '  the
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level of the village,. These spheres are not then rigid 
social groups with distinct boundaries, united in support 
of one leader. They are looser entities, and able also 
to acknowledge other leaders—recognizing the reality of 
their strength and the utility of their patronage. In short 
the ties are crosscutting between leaders and spheres out­
side their immediate one. T h is functions to reduce 
factional conflict.
Part of the explanation for this structure of political 
relations can undoubtedly be found in the pervasive 
acceptance by richer peasants of market principles in their 
economic transactions with other peasants in the village 
( see for example the discussion on agricultural labour,
1 above ). The very openness of these transactions—not
j only with respect to labour, but in land and debt transac-
\ tions also—and the advantage to rich peasants of disenga-
j ging themselves from the obligations which accompany
1 the more traditional forms of patron-client relationship,
I preclude the emergence of exclusive political and social
J groups tied to one leader. In this way vertical cleavages
I between such groups are weak, and horizontal cleavages
) between emergent classes much stronger.
However we have introduced the notion of a ‘minor’ 
sardar to deal with a qualification to the picture given 
above. Ali Mia, the head of old Haji Bari, is also refe­
rred to by some as a sardar, and thinks of himself as such. 
But the reference is not widespread. His bari is of course 
•ucho-bangsha* along with the members of new Hàji-Barî, 
and yet neither of these ‘ucho-bangsha’ baris have pro­
duced acknowledged leaders in the village. Individually
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they are respected, and indeed others intermarry with 
them to ‘purchase’ their bangsha status. These two Haji 
baris are very concious of their bangsha status and have 
been antagonistic towards the sardars of the para. Thus 
Dr. Abdus Samad’s son from new Haji Bari alleged that 
the sardars “all take bribes from both sides to a dispute”. 
Ansar Ali and Raisat Ali were also bitterly criticised for 
arrogantly allowing their goats to grazejjl all over other 
people’s plots. Furthermore there have been disputes 
between Riasat Ali and the Haji Baris. It would seem 
that Ali Mia’s sphere is more exclusive, based largely on 
the ‘ucho-bangsha’ connection with little influence outside 
it. His claim to the title of sardar probably reflects a 
desire on the part of the Haji Baris to regain some of their 
political status, lost when Reajuddin ( the long serving 
Member of the Union Council ) and Nazir ( his murdered 
nephew, and Member for a short time ) died. However, 
although Ali Mia may be restricted to this narrow sphere, 
other sardars are not, so that the ‘uchorbangsha’ criterion 
of group cohesion is weakemng. P e rh ap s‘minor’ sardars 
of this type are a transitional phenomenon the shift 
from a vertical to horizontal cleavage pattern.
The sardari structure of the other paras is not so 
complicated, and has partially been described in the survey 
of the paras. Middle Para has its. Member, who is not 
regarded as a sardar, but who de facto  functions as such 
for many members of the Middle Para. The three sardars 
from: East Para are most recognized, particularly in the 
Member’s own bari, while the relationships of the other 
members of Middle Para tend to beTmediated through, the
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Member or one of bis brothers. In North Para, the late 
Kala Mia was regarded as a sardar ; but now the remai­
ning sardar is Sirajul Islam, whom we described earlier. 
As Sirajul Islam himself is old, his brother Bazlur Rahman 
is slowly taking over many of his functions. Although 
Dr. Sadu Mia is not recognized as a sardar, his position 
at the head of a large, wealthy bari gives him a leadership 
position in addition to the status carried as a doctor. South 
Para, much smaller, is dominated by Sardar Askar Ahmed, 
his position undisputed.
In West Para, two sardars are generally recognized— 
Minnat Ali and Abdur Rashid. Minnat Ali is the head of 
the strongest and richest bari in the para—his son is a 
Member ; and his grandfather’s brother’s son’s son— 
Panjat Ali—who is also in the bari is also occasionally 
referred to as a sardar. Panjat Ali has a narrow sphere 
of influence and should be regarded as ‘minor’ sardar. 
Abdur Rashid is one of the richest peasants in the Tillage ; 
was a Member of the Union Council ; was a headmaster ; 
and is now a master in the Bondokgram Primary School. 
Minnat AH’s position is based to a large extent on his lea­
dership of a ‘strong’ bari, and he is the most dominant 
leader of the para. By contrast, Abdur Rashid’s political 
status is based more on his personal reputation, outside 
the para as well as within it. He? does not dominate a nar* 
row support basci and is to some, extent independent of 
one. Therefore he does: not compete with Minnat A li for 
a sphere of influence within the-para. The reality of 
Minnat All’s domination in the para is accepted grudgingly»
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as many stories exist about the involvement of his bari 
members in corrupt practice—for example with the Bon­
dokgram K.. S. S. and fertilizer distribution.
These leaders are integrated into a political structure 
tor the village as a whole by the criteria of recruitment 
( described above ) ; the manner of their recruitment ; and 
the functions which they perform at different institutional 
levels in the village.
Recruitment of traditional leaders :
The way in which a peasant becomes accepted as a 
leader provides an important clue to the overall leader­
ship structure. The main characteristics which sardars 
have in common ( as described above and in the earlier 
discussion of the paras ) are : they are heads of baris, 
which are usually ‘strong’ ; have a reputation for making 
decisions which maintain and reinforce the social order ; 
and they are rich peasants. But not all people with those 
qualifications become sardars. Therefore the critical ques­
tion for us is whether sardars are accepted and afforded 
legitimacy for their status by other members of the domi- 
n ^ é  class from which they come, or whether acceptance 
by the subordinate classes of the village or para is a pre­
condition ? The question is important, since sardars who 
are primarily accountable to their own class define social 
order and acceptable competition by reference to the inte­
rests of their own class, and can be removed by that class 
if they fail to maintain and reinforce these interests. Any 
radical content to their leadership is therefore fantasy. 
Dependence on their own class also acts as a constraint to
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factional division, since class rather than factional support 
is responsible for the maintenance of the leadership status. 
Disputes may occur within the class, but usually only 
where the class is not in competition with other classes 
for a resource—e. g. under certain conditions, tube-well 
water or even other forms of irrigation like canals.
In popular commentary this recruitment process 
involved an institutionalised form of acceptance through 
the mass feeding of the village paribar heads. Attendance 
by other sardars indicated that the claim to sardari status 
had been accepted by them. To feed in this way implies 
an economic ability to afford it, and therefore the accep­
tance comes from other leaders who must themselves also 
be rich peasants. Of course the provider of all this food 
should already have acquired some of the other qualities 
of leadership otherwise his claim could not be taken seri­
ously a t all. This feeding of the village has disappeared 
from Bondokgram, and according to informants has never 
been a strong tradition. Thus the process of acceptance 
is more informal, and less public. Sardar informants will 
say that acceptance depends upon the quality of decisions, 
but that becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy if the sardar 
comes from a ‘strong’ bari and his decisions can be 
enforced. But perhaps more importantly the decisions 
m ade. by a sardar ( or ‘suggestions’ made by an aspirant 
sardar ) have to be of a nature which the ‘strong’ bari is 
prepared to enforce if necessary. It is unlikely then that 
decisions will conflict with the interests of the ‘strong* 
bari, and those who dominate within it.
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Leadership Succession :
With these considerations, the element of succession 
can be introduced, where a sardar in the evening of his 
life begins to nominate a younger member of his bàri to 
take on some of his functions ( mainly attending meetings 
at first ). This nominee will already have gained some 
reputation of being interested in village affairs, concerned 
with the maintenance of ethical conduct, and free himself 
from public criticism for faults and previous misdemean­
ours. The nominee may not always be the first son, but 
a younger brother, another son, a nepEew , etc. And a 
nominee may have a kinship connection to more than one 
sardar which obviously strengthens his position.
One example of this process is Ansar Ali—the senior 
sardar in the village from East Para. His father had been 
a sardar. When the father was old, he sent Ansar Ali to 
the meetings in the village, and Ansar Ali was encouraged 
to be a sardar. In addition, his father’s cousin brother 
was Reajuddin from the new Haji Bari who Was a Mem­
ber of the Union Council. When this Reajuddin màdè 
a pilgrimage to Mecca just before the formation of Pakis­
tan, he nominated Ansar AH to stand in this place. Ansar 
Ali thus became a member for 5 years. Now, Ansar Ali 
is an old man, and his brothers are old too, and he has no 
son. At first hc; remarked : “After me, A llah will give 
power to some one”. However one member of his bari—- 
Rafiqul Islam—̂was being ‘groome<P> for office; He: is 
the manager of the East Bondokgram K. S. S., and he has 
obviously devoted much time to mobilising support; for it 
within the para. Furthermore he-is diligent in remindmg
127
the AC F to give the K. S. S. high priority in allocating a 
tube-well, and in securing fertilizer dealership licenses from 
the Chairman of the Union for the K. S. S. Ansar Ali 
named Rafiqul Islam as his likely successor, and increa­
singly depends upon him for advice.
Another example is the case of Sirajul Islam from 
North para—whose father was a sardar, and who is now 
passing on his duties and office to his younger brother 
Bazlur Rahman. Perhaps the one obvious exception is 
the case of Sardar Askar Ahmed from South para, whose 
leadership position is à reflection of his superior economic 
status, thus indicating that the rule of succession is not an 
exclusive one and that sardari status can be accepted when 
the economic strength of the client makes it difficult to 
do otherwise. This exception therefore functions to rein­
force the analysis^ of a class basis to the leadership 
structure.
It is mainly through their conflict-resolution activities 
that these leaders articulate the political structure of the 
village and therefore maintain the system of social order. 
Occasionally they may. act on some general issue in the 
village, jointly requesting the assistance of the Union 
Parishad and its Chairman. One such.example was over 
the provision of watchmen for the village, and another 
over the school. ( which we will discuss later.). But 
otherwise their leadershipb functions do not extend to the 
organization of the village fo r development, and indeed 
the sardars are regarded as rather reactionary in this 
respect by the younger men of the village. In addition 
to conflict resolution saiîdars have traditionally been
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involved in the sensitive issue of feeding at marriages etc. 
They are consulted by the family concerned about who 
should be invited. The importance of this problem must 
not be underestimated. The unity and solidarity of a 
group can be disturbed and undermined if the correct 
formula is not found so that powerful people might not 
be excluded where to be so would constitute an insult. 
But since the prospect of having to feed an entire para 
( or even just its paribar heads ) is impossible for many 
families, a delicate balance of guests has to be achieved 
with strategic invitations thinly spread outside the imme­
diate kinship group. It is not unknown for the sardars 
themselves to make the invitations on the family’s behalf 
so that the family is relieved of the burden of having to 
exclude people. The social order functions of these 
decisions about feeding must not therefore be overlooked, 
particularly as the activity of feeding in most societies 
represents an important social gesture and statement of 
group identification.
The inclusive group for feeding is referred to in the 
village as the reyai, and for Bondokgram this unit coin­
cides for the most part with each para. ( I have been in 
village where there has been more than one reyai to a 
para, each reyai headed by a sardar having some of the 
appearance of^ function. ) Disputes within these reyais 
are in ' the first instance discussed by the respective 
sardars, and so the reyai becomes a reference group of 
political authority. However as we noted in our descrip­
tion 6f the paras, the structure is not this neat and has 
to be modified since the Member Bari of Abdur Rahim in
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Middle Para, and Sardar Askar Ahmed’s Bari of South 
Para are often included by our inform^j^s in the political 
territory of East Para. So the inter-dining group is more 
strictly confined to the para boundary than-the reference 
group of political authority. This seemed to be the only 
exception in the village ( discovered by asking which 
sardars are called to resolve disputes involving the infor­
mant or his family, ) but it does of course refer to two 
instances of leaders f  Abdur Rahim and Askar Ahmed ) 
who are both economically dominant over smaller neigh­
bouring paras. Thus political authority is exercised in 
Middle and South Paras by their respective dominant 
pesants, who themselves with their bafts are integrated 
with the political area of East Para.
As a result of this pattern, there is some ambiguity 
in moving to and describing the wider institutional context 
to which these reyais or paras are related. In its simplest 
form, “there is one reyai for each para, and five reyais 
constitute the samaj”. However this informant, Tiku Mia, 
from South Para, 'has not been accepted by the^dominant 
peasants of East Para in the way that Sardar Askar Ahmed 
has. Tiku Mia’s Bari is quite hostile to East Para, (see 
‘South P ara’ above ) and there has also been a disagree­
ment between East and South Para youth organisations 
(see below,). However Sardar Sirajul Islan from North 
Para also informed us that there was one reyai for each 
para, adding the complication that the samaj consisted of 
the five paras of Bondokgram and the one para of Dhani- 
nagar, although nomne else includes Dhaninagar. But 
we have also been informed by Muklesur Rahman from
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Abdur Rahim’s ( Member ) Bari that they “are in the same 
‘samaj’ as East Para for settling disputes*', and refers to 
the same group in different contexts as a ‘reyai’. From 
this information, we conclude that ‘reyai’ refers to the 
inter-dining group ; that because of the social significance 
of inter-dining for group identification, the ‘reyai’ is also 
more indirectly used to describe a territorial unit with an 
integrated structure of political authority ; that this looser 
use of the term ‘reyai’ may include neighbours who do 
not normally inter-dine ; that term ‘samaj* is most usefully 
and commonly applied to the institutional arena in which 
these reyais are represented by their sardars ; and that 
the term ‘samaj’ refers exclusively to a political grouping. 
A further term was used in the village which is perhaps 
less common, referring to the exclusively political aspect 
of the reyai as a ‘mel-darbar* (public court). It was also 
applied to the level of samaj as well.
Most disputes were settled at the level of the reyai 
in a mel-darbar ; where parties to a dispute call one or 
more sardars from the reyai to hear their complaints and 
defences. Disputes are discussed outside the reyai if more 
than one reyai has been involved in the incident, or if one 
or both of the parties remained dissatisfied with a pro­
posed solution and seek further discussion or support. 
Sardars at the reyai level are frequently called to settle 
disputes within baris and even paribars—for example, 
brothers or other close relatives in conflict over an inheri­
tance of land ; division of the holding; or some transaction 
(often involving;land) which began initially as an informal 
arrangement with subsequent disagreement over rates of
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interest, foreclosures and confiscation of property, and 
whether land was sold or mortgaged etc. Such disputes 
over land occur between other people as well as close 
relatives of course. Few disputes are discussed at the 
level.of the samaj, and according to our sardar informants 
no dispute in Bondokgram has required the intervention 
from sardars outside the village elsewhere in the Union. 
However the Chairman of the Union Parishad has his bari 
in Dhaninagar (although he mainly lives in Comilla), and 
has become involved sometimes in the affairs of Bondok­
gram both through the two Members, and the sardars.
Challenge to traditional authority :
Space permits only two further additions to the dis­
cussion _at this stage, both referring to changes in the 
role of these village leaders. The first concerns challen­
ges to the authority of the sardars. We were only given 
one clear example of this, but it is structurally important 
and has wider implications for the exercise of political 
control in the village. The dispute was between Jahed 
Mia ( of the ‘policemen’s bari* ) and Khorshed Alam from 
Sardar Ansar Ali’s Bari. Jahed Mia and Khorshed Alam 
are cousin brothers. The dispute was over land which 
Jahed Mia purchased from his father’s sister, who is 
also Khorshed Alam’s paternal aunt. Jahed Mia paid 
Tk. 3000 three years ago, and demands receipt of the land. 
Khorshed Alam has retained the land (on behalf of his aunt) 
displaying a ‘false* document saying that only Tk. 1000 
has been paid, and that a further Tk. 2000 is owed before 
the land can be released to Jahed Mia. The case was
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taken to the sardars of the reyai, and they decided in 
Jahed Mia/s favour that the land should be transferred to 
him. Khorshed Alam—despite his membership of Sardar 
Ansar Ali’s Bari—has ignored, this decision, although it 
has been restated on many occasions. Khorshed Alam is 
individually a powerful man in the village. He lends 
money and receives land in mortgage ( including some 
from Jahed Mia; which he also refuses to. return, although 
the.money- has .been offered to release it. Jahed Mia is 
not without iriends. and is supported here by the sardars; 
but to no avail. Neither he; nor*his closest .supporter— 
Sardar Siddiqur Rahman from the ‘policemen’s bari’—think 
that he will now be able to .obtain+heland. Jahed Mia is 
reluctant to go to court, as the decision usually goes in fav­
our, o l the  perscm holding:the land and verbal agreements 
are difficult to prove. The analysis of : this challenge to 
authority was suggested by Jahed Mia and Siddiqur Rah­
man themselves. They^ argue that the extraordinary 
increases; in the value of 'land; partly of course the result 
of increasing- pressure of population on the land,
stimulates an intense competition to accumulate land by 
any means, possible at a price below the market rate. The 
phenomenon of mortgaging can be explained in this way, 
and is.discussed below. W hat concerns us here is the im­
pact of this intense competition upon the structure of social 
and political behaviour. This, high value of land encou­
rages: land=^hungry peasants, with power to ignore the ethi­
cal code, established in the village, in which verbal agree­
ments arc adimred to as a grave matter^ of honour. I my­
self, was:sharply; reminded several times: by poor peasants 
that they would never.break their: word and claim back
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land which they had mortgaged out unless they had the 
funds to release it. The sardars—their position and role— 
eprtomise this ethical code, and it is of course their duty 
to maintain it and defend it. However in their defence of 
such a system, which depends heavily on trust and the 
ability of sardars to insist upon and maintain the value of 
trust, sardars^—and therefore the political structure which 
they embody—become highly vulnerable to successful 
challenges from the more unscrupulous of their own class. 
Furthermore the sardars themsèlvèS; as rich pensante de­
pending on their economic strength for their political 
power have two options. They may suppress these un­
ethical methods of enhancing economic strength in order 
to defend their own positions, or they must adopt similar 
methods. This latter course thereby undermines still 
further the principles of accepted behaviour—trust and 
honour—which constitute the ideological basis of the'poli- 
tical structure. The activities of some of the sardars are 
already close to this second alternative. The' lending 
and mortgaging activities of Sardar Askar Ahméd are an 
example. And there are also a wide number of allegations 
that sardars take bribes and are not impartial;
Traditional leaders co-opji^. into new system of 
patronage :
The second.addition , to the dfecussion concerns: the ' 
involvement of the sardars in relief distribution. For the 
first time in November 1974, the Chairman and Members 
of the Union Parishad asked the sardars to participate in 
actually disposing of the relief commodities. Nine sardars
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from Bondokgram were nominated. The timing of this 
invitation coincided with the arrest of several local black 
marketeers and Members from neighbouring Unions on 
charges of corruption. The distribution of relief noto­
riously provides an opportunity for corrupt behaviour. 
However the lists of those to receive relief goods had 
already been compiled by the Members, so that although 
the sardars were asked to distribute accordingly they had 
not been involved in the selection. The lists were an 
object of great suspicion in the village, as the criteria by 
which one’s name appeared was never made public in by 
the village. The function of this invitation to the sardars 
seems to have been a desire on the part of the Union 
politicians ( or politicians at other levels ) to deflect some 
of the unpopularity which was accruing to them, by using 
local leaders to ‘mediate’ their patronage to the village. 
In this way the sardars became exposed to the antagonism 
of those who are disappointed, since it appears that they 
have been responsible for the selection rather than the 
Union politicians. It is too early to conclude, but one 
possible outcome of this involvement might be to under­
mine the sardars position in the political structure of the 
village by alienating them from their narrower support 
bases. This in turn would prepare the way for a more 
thorough assertion of political authority by the Members, 
who at present are very unpopular in the village and 
compete with sardars for loyalty and support on very 
unfavourable terms.
C H A P T E R  V I
CLASS DIFFERENTIATION AND POWER IN 
BONDOKGRAM : THE MINIFUNDIST CASE
This chapter is preoccupied with five overlapping, 
interrelated themes ; the nature and direction of class 
differentiation ; the pattern of cumulative control over 
the principal means of production ( i. e, land ) ; relation­
ships of dependence and exploitation ; uneqal access to 
new opportunities and resources ; and the patterns of 
diversification of economic activity (e.g . labouring, share- 
cropping, petty trading, business and service ) which 
critically affects whether the peasantry is described in 
terms of ‘cyclical kulakism’ or in terms of families remain- 
I ing as stable members of persistent classes. Even for
 ̂ heuristic purposes it is not possible to file our remarks
exclusively under each of these headings.
First, it is quite clear from the landholding data ( and 
confirmed by other studies in the Comilla area ) that the 
socio-economic structure of the peasantry here is essen­
tially minifundist. The range of landholding is very 
narrow, and no household in the village owns more than 
7.2 acres of cultivable land. See Table II, page 68, above- 
Especially the ‘effective landholding’ column.
This situation is of course in great contrast to other 
parts of Bangladesh—Rangpur^ Kustia for example-where 
the range of landholding is much more extended. The 
issue is not just ownership ( or control ) of land ; but the 
implications of landholding size for one’s role as an 
employer of labour. The richer peasant in Bondokgram
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does employ labour-but not usually on a permanent basis, 
instead seasonally mostly employing migrant labourers. 
Thus the relationships between rich and poor within the 
village are not primarily those of emp 1 oyer-employee, 
centred around the direct extraction of surplus value from 
labour. This is in contrast to the other areas cited above, 
where the richer peasant in the village is a significant 
employer of labourers who originate from the village it­
self. The relationships between rich and poor iri that 
situation are very direct economic dependence mirrored 
by political subordination ; a rich man’s labourers are 
also his political retainers in the qùasî-feudàl conditions 
(particularly where the dimension of sharecropping is 
added to the equation). There is then the problem of 
labelling to what extent does the rich peasant in Comilla 
have much in common with the rich peasant in Rangpur 
in the context of his objective class position? Likewise 
the rural poor ? There is not only the problem of gene­
ralising about rural classes in Bangladesh, but also the 
problem of identifying common interests, states of consci­
ousness, alliance and therefore potential for m ohili^ tion  
of any sort.
In Bondokgram it is of course important to differen­
tiate between households in terms of ownership over land, 
but the nature of the dependency or exploitation of the 
poor does not occur by and large through the activity of 
labour. In this regard it is necessary to make distinc­
tion between ownership and control over land, which
immediately introduces the issue of sharecropping, mort­
gaging and money lend ing. The following table describes 
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From this table we can see that incidence of sha­
recropping in Bondokgram is not very high. This is not 
surprising for such a minifundist pattern of landholding, 
and certainly over the years the amount of land available 
for sharecropping had declined. There are the usual 
cav^s about peasants being reluctant to admit to share- 
cropping out ( no problem usually about sharecropping 
in ), but our cross-checking and re-interviews confirm that 
informants have on the whole been honest. There is con­
siderable competition among the poorer peasants to obtain 
land for sharecropping by offering terms to the owner. 
The conjuncture between desperation and a minimum 
level of resources to engage in cultivation ( bullocks etc. ) 
seems to settle at the 0.01-0-99 acre category of land­
owner, where 44.5% in that category sharecrop in some 
land. We can conclude for the purposes of this discu­
ssion that sharecropping does not significantly affect the 
pattern of control over land in the village and does not 
impinge greatly upon our analysis of its class structure. 
However again this highlights an important variation be­
tween the minifundist character of Dacca-Comilla belt and 
areas elsewhere in Bangladesh, where sharecropping is a 
much more significant element in the delineation of classes, 
and the relationships between them.
Mortgaging :
For Bondokgram, the issue of control revolves around 
mortgaging and moneylending transactions. From our 
data, som a generalisations are possible. First it should
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I be pointed out at although there is not much variation
between the landowning and effective landholding tables 
 ̂ in aggregate terms, quite a number of the households have
I shifted between categories as a result of the second calcu-
I lation. This indicates the number of households whose
f effective control over land has to be modified where their
sharecropping and mortgaging transactions are taken into 
I account. Second, out of the moneylending transactions
j which were identified, 58.5% of these transactions involved
I accompanying arrangements for mortgaging pieces of land
! at the outset of the negotiations. In addition there arecases of moneylending, where mortgage "clauses’ are in- 
j eluded at a later stage usually as a response to non-pay­
ment of interest ( let alone the principal ). Third, of the 
households which own land in the v illa ^ , 43.5% have 
some land mortgaged ou t,th is seriously^%e pattern of 
asset control and income distribution as indicated by 
simple landowning data.
The significance of these mortgages cannot be overs­
tated in this minifundist context, since they are likely to 
be a much more important part of the class structure and 
power distribution story in this area than elsewhere. The 
cumulative impact of these mortgages transactions func­
tion to increase and stabilise the gap between the richer 
and poorer peasants, thus offsetting the cyclical mobility 
patterns to often associated with minifundist situations. 
Whereas the process of land acquisition can**occur through 
sales and purchases in more polarised situations, the mar­
ket price for land in densely populated areas where most 
of the holdings are below 10 acres is often beyond the
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reach of the richest peasant households in that area. Thus
the mortgage transaction becomes the principal means
whereby land ultimately changes hands, and it is this
relation which truly characterises the antagonistic relations
between rich and poor classes and differentiates between
them, rather than labour or subordinate and inferior 
tenancies.
It is difficult to present a typical scenario for these 
transactions, since in detail there are many variations. 
However a critical part of the process is the conversion 
of inflated interest rates on loans which have accumulated 
over a year or two into an equivalent land value based on 
the going market price for land. Since the interest rates 
on credit are inflated beyond all reasonable hope for re­
payment, this amounts to an acquisition of land by the
lender^ k^elow the market price if he is prepared to wait 
for the interest to accumulate and run the minimum risk
( to his prospects for acquisition not to his Iqped out 
capital ) of repayment and foreclosure. In many cases it 
is not even a question of waiting where the lender has use 
of the land unitii either the debt is redeemed or he for­
mally acquires it. This process reflects a situation in 
which the demand for credit is in excess of the demand 
for land at the respective rates of supply.
Thus mortgaging not only underlines the need for a 
distinction between ownership and control, it also repre­
sents the principal device by which land is transferred 
between households in the village ( and occasionally to 
urban-based enterpreneurs ). It need hardly be added 
that this process of acquisition is both a reflection and 
expression of power, as well as functioning to reinforce
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the economic and political dominance of those who 
are steadily acquiring land in this way. However it is 
possible that this conclusion cannot stand alone, and 
requires support ; that this process of land acquisition 
and control can be contained within the cyclical mobility 
thesis and may not necessarily lead towards a greater 
polarization of the class structure. That is to say, the 
dynamic aspect of this process of acquisition is not 
regarded as structurally significant since it is offset by 
the demographic cycle of large families, which are natura­
lly in a stronger position to accumulate land until the 
sons inherit and divide the holding. This process, it is 
argued, acts as a leveller. Bertocci ( 1972 ) drew this 
conclusion from his work in the Comilla area. It is best 
to quote his position.
**-• it is unlikely that a family can maintain supe­
rior wealth over a long period of time without 
some difficulty. ...over time, unless land is 
consistently accumulated a given lineage taken 
collectively becomes vulnerable to the inexo­
rable problems of agriculture in a monsoon 
environment, in that as its property is progre­
ssively divided into smaller and smaller shares, 
the size of its individual segments ; holdings 
progressively diminishes and renders individual 
members of the lineage each less capable of 
maintaining amounts of land sufficient to ensure 
adequate production. Hence over time, unless 
accumulation of land is kept up a lineage’s 
collective w;ealth stands to be dissipated.” (p.47)
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In response to this conclusion, we had hypothesised 
that the extent of this circular mobility ( political as well 
as economic ) would dtcrease under conditions of new 
opportunities for increasing agricultural productivity, 
since such opportunities would thereby provide greater 
scope for investment in non-agricultural activities-like 
moneylending, but also forms of off-holding employment. 
Thus our reply to Bertocci is twofold. First that land is 
consistently being accumulated ; and second the oppor­
tunities provided both by superior landholding and con­
tact with development agencies facilities diversification 
of economic activity into off-holding sources of income. 
In other words, we now argue from the Bondokgram case 
that : a stable rich peasant class will emerge under condi­
tions which reduce the vulnerability of families in that 
class to the weakening process of fragmentation through 
inheritance as other non-agricultural sources of income 
become available as a result ( partially ) of initial higher 
productivity of holdings.
Diversification :
Bertocci does not seem to take account of either the 
possibility for richer peasants to prey on the misfortunes 
of others by acquiring their land, or the role of the new 
technology in stimulating other forms of rural ( but non- 
agricultural ) economic activity like moneylending. Nor 
does he take account of the enhanced capacity thereby 
gained to establish sons in other forms of employment 
( often with education as prior condition ). Furthermore, 
he appears ovenoptimistic about the potentiality for sub-
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aistence-holding families to improve economically espe­
cially if they are able to engage successfully in lending 
activities, in particular the taking of land in mortgage. 
“Surely—as we have discovered—subsistance level house­
holds could not compete with families already established 
in these activities ? And the economic ( and political ) 
interrelation characterised by exploitation betxveen the 
two classes in the village would prevent such competition 
in the first place.
It is obviously important to distinguish between diffe­
rent types of off-holding employment not only in terms of 
quantity of income, but also in relation to its security, its 
ability to keep pace with inflation, and the other benefits 
which might accrue to a strategically useful occupation. 
From Table X page 97 we can see that the extent of diver­
sification is higher among those paribars in the ‘2.5 acre’, 
effective landholding category. And from table XII, page 
100, we can also conclude that the members of this 
^ e fe t’ paribar^ category are well repre#sented in the busi­
ness and professional activities.
However it is also clear that the 1.00-2.49 acre category 
is also well represented in business and especially service, 
but the service category does include some semi-skilled 
activities which accounts for some of this representation. 
The data as it appears here is not as convincing as it should 
be to support our propositions above. However, higher 
up the landholding range this diversification becomes 
more evident with most of the sardari and ‘ucho-bangsha* 
baris and the two ‘member’ baris heavily engaged in off- 
holding economic activities. It is this kind of observation
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which reveals the importance of looking behind quanti­
tative data for its qualitative aspects, since this baris are 
strategically very significant in the analysis of political 
and economic structures in the village.
Economic and Political Access :
The issue of diversification extends beyond additional 
income and its structural impact. If a family is involved 
in business, professional activities or certain types of ser­
vice occupation ( e. g. ) a clerk at the Collectoxate, the 
District Court or the TCCA), then these provide connec­
tions and access to the various resources and items of 
patronage which are being distributed. Even the power 
to ‘lose a file’ can be an important asset, and one which 
is convertible into hard cash, a loan, or a fertilizer permit. 
Regular employment in the town naturally makes it easier- 
to petition offices, and lobby officials : and since education 
and literacy is highly correlated with business and pro­
fessional activity anyway, the access of this class to the 
resources and patronage of the state is further enhanced. 
Such access does of course strengthen the position of the 
family within the village-lending it superiority in a variety 
of transactions in the courts, getting land registered, 
obtaining credit and fertilizer at subsidised rates, getting 
licenses to trade etc.
Off-holding employment reduces the vulnerability of 
the family “to the inexorable problems of agriculture in a 
monsoon environment” through the provision of alterna­
tive sources of income and functions therefore to insulate
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the family from the necessity of borrowing with its con­
comitant downward spiral effect. In this way, off-holding 
employment ( of the right k ind) can actually facilitate 
innovation in agriculture, since capital for agricultural 
investment and access to information, credit and inputs 
has been acquired. This extends the willingness to invest
in high-yielding varieties of seed on a greater proportion 
of the holding. The set of preconditions for innovation 
in HYV’s should not be overlooked, although it consti­
tutes a reversal of the more expected direction of cause 
and effect.
In addition to these features reinforcing the position 
of the class within the village, there are wider implica­
tions. The diversifying class becomes intimate with urban- 
based enterpreneurs. The links between rich peasants 
I and petty bourgeois are often those between father and
I son, younger and elder brother. And for Bondokgram
I at least, this relationship is reflected in the recruitment of
( political leaders from the village and the structure of poli­
tical power between the state and the countryside. Both 
• of the members ( of the Union Parishad ) are from rich
\ peasant families in the village which have enjoyed consi-
I derable traditional political influence in village affairs.
I However both of the members are now successful enter-
i preneurs in Comilla town, residing there rather than in
i the village. They have become agents of the state, and
! it is difficult to see how a political class which achieves
1 its position through the subjection of others in the village
j can possibly become the champions of these dependents.
\  Their activities in distributing relief and fertilizer is
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adequate testimony of their disregard for the poor, whose 
poverty is a precondition for their own success and power.
Impact of ‘Market’ behaviour on traditional social 
order :
j
The continuous and intensifying struggle for control 
I over the means of production in the village—not only
i land, but water and other inputs—has repercussions
1 throughout the peasant social system. It is apparent now
j that the traditional structures of political and social order
j embodied in the sardari system and kinship relations are
I being undermined. It is no longer possible for example
( was it ever ? ) to identify all the members of one bari 
I  with the same class. We described above page 70 the
exploitation and class relations which can occur between 
brothers and other members even within the same bari. 
Under these present conditions of population pressure on 
the land, disputes over division of holdings are frequent. 
And instead of formal co-operation the bond of kinship 
has been displaced by considerations of the market price 
for credit for Irearing a bullock etc.
There is now a pervasive acceptance richer pea­
sants of market principles in their economic transactions. 
These transactions are very open with respect to labour, 
land and moneylending. Migrant labourers. and local 
labourers are hired at rates which consciously take acco­
unt of the supply and demand situation for labour. This 
openness is very convenient for the richer peasants, for 
they are disengaging themselves from the obligations
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which accompany the more traditional forms of patron- 
client relationship, under conditions of increasing land­
lessness where the market price alone will ensure the 
availability of labour. This principle of open recruit­
ment, together with the increasing phenomenon of class 
differentiation within baris (and certainly ‘Gostis’-Iineages) 
inhibits the traditional formation of exclusive political 
and social groups tied to one leader.
Thus groups consisting of leaders and followers or 
dependents are now less-^stable, and opposition between 
such groups is declining as a feature of conflict in the 
villages. In this way, the vertical cleavages which 
describe the opposition between such groups dominated 
by different leaders (rich patrons) in the village are becom­
ing much weaker as the character of the group formation 
changes. Certainly in terms of perceptions of the poorer 
peasants in the village, the horizontal cleavages between 
emergent classes are becoming much stronger. The 
representatives of dominant classes in any society will of 
course always deny such a proposition.
The Undermining of T rust :
It is interesting to note that the element of trust, a 
belief in the ‘word* of another, has usually characterised 
the atyle of transactions between peasants in a village. 
The traditional institutions of authority in the village em­
body these principles of trust. Besides, everybody knows 
most of everyone else’s business, so that to revenge on a 
deal is to incur the moral disapproval and disaffection of 
others ia the village, making it difficult to turn to them
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for assistance at a later date. Thus the element of trust 
has been a vital component in restraining conflict within 
the village, constituting the essence of a minimum ethical 
code of conduct. To be a sardar not only required mem­
bership of a ‘strong’ bari, one’s word had to be trusted ; 
for only then could the decisions which resolved conflicts 
( i. e. justice ) be respected and adhered to. However this 
ingredient of the social order has gone sour, so the com­
petition to accumulate land and other resources increa­
singly subverts the ethical code ( e. g. disagreements over 
whether a piece of land was mortgaged or sold, refusal to 
release deeds when the loans are paid off, refusal to allow 
foreclosures, reference to false documents and witnesses ) 
and the structure of political authority which embodies it. 
Even Sardars are now tempted to exchange the benefits 
of a respected leadership position for t h ^  based upon the 
more naked reality of economic power. The strength of 
their lineages and therefore their own status is undermined 
unless they adopt the new rules for capital accumulation. 
The result of course is an increasing dependency upon the 
political order provided by the state as a substitute for the 
social and political order of the village.
Interdependence of the state and village politics :
But the authority of the state is impersonal, ordered 
as it is around capitalist market relations and is maintained 
by more universal principles of recruitment to the political 
positions of authority-usually centred around a position of 
economic superiority as the means of obtaining political 
support with consequent favourable access to the state as
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the method of obtaining political patronage. A combina­
tion of market forces and access represents the new poli­
tical order.
The two members of Bondokgram are good examples 
of this process, and they increasingly confront and under­
mine the traditional structure of authority and leadership 
in the village. New resources are brought into the poli­
tical arena, as well as the economic sphere : the power to 
distribute or withhold relief ; issue licenses to deal in 
scarce commodities ( fertilizer, food, salt, kerosene etc. ) ; 
obtain favourable court decisions ; acquire fuel and service 
for pump sets ; have loan defaults ignored in the co-ope­
rative ; and so on. Such power establishes one’s authority 
in the village over other matters particularly where dis­
putes over the title and status of land are concerned.
But to ensure their re-election and a continuation of 
their leadership, members still depend upon the support 
of their own baris and their capacity to maintain a minimum 
loyalty of potential competitors from other baris ( how­
ever pragmatic such loyalty might be ). As a result there 
is a little scope for benevolent leadership, where access and 
power might be used in favour of the poor. The trade­
offs have to be made with one’s own class. Potential 
competitors have to ‘squared’.
Thus the ‘true colours’ of the state are revealed not 
by the pronouncements of national leaders whose inclina­
tion are to transcend the issue of class, but through these 
mechanics of recruitment to political positions in the 
countryside—the roles through which the state interacts
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with the people, the ongoing practice of politics in 
the fields and the compo^^é». It is here that the state 
acquires its class character, and from where—through the 
different levels of the political system—policies at the 
national level for rural development become constrained 
and biased : if not in word, then certainly in deed and 
implementation.
The Methodology of Class Analysis ;
The discussion so far has concentrated upon class 
formation, class cohesion and linkages outside the village 
by referring to the behavioural characteristics of the eco­
nomically and politically dominant peasants in the village. 
It should be clear by now that our definition of ‘richer 
peaseant’ is based as much on these behavioural charac­
teristics/, domination as it does on the more conventional, 
quantitative indicators which emphasise the amount of 
land held, levels of income, the production of a surplus, 
and so on. Since we are concerned with the question of 
consciousness among different classes and their respective 
capacities to act as a class in the interests of that class 
(whether the interests be those of exploitation by the rich, 
or revolutionary mobilisation among the poor ), we empa- 
sise in this chapter the interactions between classes rather 
than merely differentiating between them on the basis of 
quantitative scales—more or less of this and that.
Particularly in village situations, the activity of one 
group or class is a critical part of the explanation of the 
behaviour of other groups or classes. The poor are poor
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because of the rich, and the socio-political characteristics 
of each class is a function of the exploitative relations 
between rich and poor. If the poor peasantry is a frag­
mented, incoherent class, this is not just a function of 
poverty, but a function of poverty plus the social relations 
of production which are responsible for that poverty. 
Therefore the behavioural characteristics of the poorer 
peasantry, i. e. their position in the social relations of 
production are likewise part of the... characteristics of 
the poor peasant-class. And here regional variations 
again must be emphasised. As the rich peasant in the 
Comilla—Dacca belt is different from the rich peasant in 
Rangpur etc., so the ‘poor peasant class’ is a variable 
concept according to the structure of social relations of 
production obtaining in the particular situation. The 
minifundist large landholder variation affects the nature 
of the poor peasant class, as it does that of the rich 
peasant.
The Im pact of M igrant Labourers on the Landless :
I We must ask whether the landless have benefitted
i in any way from the Comilla HYV experiment in a non-
/ flooded area ? We must also remember that conditions
I could hardly be more favourable than in Bondokgram—
i Indeed the demand for labour in Bondokgram is substan-
I tial when compared with .flooded neighbours outside
k Kotwali Thana. And yet we noted above that the rela-
* tions between the rich and poor of Bondokgram was
i  not primarily centred around the issue of labour. We
I concluded earlier (page 89) that in Bondokgram, despite
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a general shortage of labour, the position of the village 
landless in need of employment is weakened by the entry 
of outsiders into the local labour market. There is no 
need to repeat that analysis here, except to point out that 
the presence of these migrant labourers force the land­
less of Bondakgram into insecure, non-agricultural econo­
mic activities.
The effect of the migrant labourers on the employ­
ment pattern of Bondokgram was to confine the number 
of adult males ( from households effectively holding less 
than 1 acre ) who were regularly dependent upon agricul­
tural labouring to approximately 15%. Non-agricultural 
manual work ( industrial workers in local textile mills ), 
peons, artisan occupations and petty trading accounted for 
the employment of about 70% of adult males from pari­
bars with an effective landholding of less than 1 acre. ,
However the economic independence of these groups from '
others in the village was not thereby greatly enhanced, 
for in addition to other loan transactions which might |
exist, petty traders require loans from patrons ( sufficient 
at least to purchase a load, which is 1 maund 10 kg. of 
grain ) and the other occupations require patronage, access i
etc. from those who were more influential in the village 
and could arrange jobs outside the village. A poor man 
does not have to work directly for a rich man to be depen- j|
dent on him. And in this situation by financing petty is
traders, the wealthier peasants indirectly participate in 
and control the process of marketing the, surplus—their ■
own, and the smaller ones of others. j
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There is a further regional variation to note here. 
The relative proximity of Bondokgram to the town of 
Comilla enlarge the possibilities for landless and near 
landless to engage in these non-agricultural occupations, 
but where villages are more remote these opportunities 
are reduced and the dependence of the poor on the rich 
 ̂ more absolute and desperate. However for Bondokgram
fi surely one of the most favoured villages in Bangladesh,
! we can now see that the poor peasant is steadily becoming
alienated from his land through usufructuary mortgage, 
and the landless are denied opportunities to work as agri- 
I cultural wage labourers by these migrant labourers.
\  Naturally as a result the employment structure of the
I poor becomes fragmented and inhibits the potential for
class solidarity, perceptions of mutual interest and so on. 
In this connection, the migrant labourers are very signi­
ficant and we return to them.
Migrant labourers and class consciousness :
No one concerned with rural development should 
overlook this issue of the relationship between patterns 
of labour migration and other variables such as flooding, 
the extent of HYV cultivation and levels of cropping 
intensity. There are important socio-political conclusion 
to be drawn. Here is a class of landless and poor peasant 
which is increasingly and continually being forced to he 
geographically mobile during parts of the year. Every­
where they go, they have the effecte^depressrag the 
local wage rate—making themselves popular with emplo­
yers and unpopular with others competing for employment.
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However it is this enforced mobility which reduces their 
independence on individuals although it transfers the 
relationship to one of dependence on a class of peasant 
employer.
Under minifundist conditions, our data suggests that 
peasant employers have a realistic appreciation of market 
forces. As we observed above, they are disengaging them­
selves from traditional patron-client relationships ( the 
multiple, undifferentiated role structure within which a 
loyal and regular labour supply could be secured ) as their 
demand for labour decreases—either in relation to supply, 
or partly as a result of the decreasing size of the farm 
through inheritance. As a result of this process labour 
becomes un tied, it is ‘freed’. Where opportunities do exist 
for diversification into off—holding employment among ri­
cher peasants the demand for non-family agricultural 
labour may be sustained. But where such opportunities 
do not exist among poorer peasants and in very remote 
areas, then the overall demand for this ‘freed’ and mobile 
labour will fall as holdings decline to size where they can 
only absorb family labour.
In other societies where a rural labour force has be­
come ‘liberated’ ( e. g. in England during the enclosure 
movements ), the period has also been associated with an 
accumulation of capital which has provided the basis for 
capitalist industrial development and the absorption of 
this labour force. The same cannot be said of this process 
of ‘liberating* the rural labour force in Bangladesh, to 
the extent that minifundist conditions obtain. D is n o t  
associated with an accumulation of bourgeois capital, but
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with the increased division of holdings ( the very opposite 
of enclosures, with their subsequent repercussions for the 
industrial sector—wool manufacturent production of machi- 
/ nery etc. ). The class potential of such a migrant popula-
i tion of ‘liberated^ t^ b o u r is explosive, and represents a
I  key element in the mobilization of the rural poor into a
class conscious of itself as such, for it becomes the trans- 
I mitter of information and discontent and of course recruits
eventually the traditionally dependent labour force which 
I it has itself displaced.
j Poor Peasants lack fertilizer :
Having considered the position of the landless and 
near landless, we can now turn to the poor peasant culti­
vators. From table X, page 97, our data ind icates that 
54.8% of the ‘1.00—2.49 acre effective landholding cate­
gory’ paribars derive their income solely from cultivation. 
This group is mainly at subsistence, rarely obtaining a 
surplus. Over half of the group ( See table XV, page
137 ) has an average of 29.4% of its locaF mortgaged out
( see below, Table XVI ).
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From table XV, page 137 only 24% of this 1.00-2.49 
acre group sharecrops land in. The economic position of 
this group is obviously very precarious, leaving an increa­
sed intensity of cropping with higher yields as the only 
means of improvement. The opportunities for this group 
to accumulate land or even extenAtheir sharecropping acti­
vities are very slim. However our data also suggests that 
despite the village’s location in the ‘command* area of the 
Comilla Programme this group has not been greatly bene­
fitted.
Although the poorer peasants have some disadvanta­
ges in obtaining tube-well water usually as a result of the 
initial decision about the location of the boring, they are 
mainly hampered as a weaker economic class in obtaining 
fertilizer, and fertilizer is not just applied for boro rice 
cultivation, but in the other seasons as well. This is an 
important observation, for in this minifundist context land 
is not really distributed around the village in any manner 
related to class. The location of a boring may be biased 
in favour of the lands of a strong bari or two, but richer 
as well as poor peasants may also have their land exclu­
ded from the command area of the well.
(Fertilizer is obviously a critical resource and its 
overall scarcity apparent to all. Data on the use of ferti­
lizer, is a vital index of power and influence in the village. 
One of the major points of controversy between different 
groups of villagers concerns the way in which the supply 
of fertilizer is manipulated and controlled and the diffe­
rential access to fertilizer by classes or faction within the 
village. The importance of fertilizer is not lost on any
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class of peasant and the problem is very definitely not 
one of extension but one of access, circumscribed as 
it is by socio-political variables. The fertilizer dealerships 
in the Bondokgram are either run by the co-operative 
dominated by a strong bari, or directly in the hands of ano­
ther strong bari ; or the members are involved and 
they are primarily concerned to square potential com­
petitors for their positions rather than an effect egalitarian 
distribution. Most of our poor peasant respondents refer­
red to their inability to obtain adequate supplies of fertili­
zer, alleging at the same time that the available supplies 
had been Goncor n ^  by the rich and powerful families in 
the village.
Class C haracteristics of HYV Innovation :
Only 33% of landholders are engaged in boro rice cul­
tivation, and 90% cultivating boro rice have effective 
landholdings above 2.5 acres. This is a category of pea­
sant which might normally except to produce a surplus 
of foodgrain in addition to family consumption require­
ments with Aus and Amon alone, without the help of 
boro ( assuming a constant family size of around .6 ). It is 
difficult to see ( although our data is not rigorous in this 
respect ) how more than 10% of the land cultivated under 
Aus and Amon was also cultivated for rice in the 1973-74 
boro season. The extent of boro rice cultivation has been 
higher in the past, as the decline in area irrigated by the 
tube-wells would suggest ( see above pages 103—108 ).
Several explanations are given for this decline : fac­
tionalism within the societies ; high incidence of defaul­
ting payments on loans ; organizational inefficiency of
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BADC and other government institutions ; and post-libe­
ration problems in obtaining supplies of fuel and spare 
parts for pump sets. Even recognizing that there has 
been a decline, we could not conclude that a triple crop­
ping annual system with boro rice been responsible 
for advancement of any group in the village. Our histori­
cal data on the richer families indicates that their supe­
riority stretches further back than this. When the tube- 
wells were introduced the richer families were in a posi­
tion to take advantage of the new resources, but their 
adoption of the innovation seems to have been an out­
come of their economic superiority rather than a cause 
of it. Furthermore there is a tendency to innovate on 
only a small proportion of the holding ; and often Aus 
is displaced so that double cropping persists.
2 4
C H A PT E R  IX
C onclusion  ® Implications for Rural D e v e ­
lopm ent S tr a te g y  in Bangladesh.
In this final section we attempt to set out briefly some 
of the connections between our analyses and the problems 
of formulating a socialist rural development policy at the 
national level. It is for this reason that we have been so 
concerned not to exclude the nature of the state from our 
discussions. The relationship between different classes in 
the countryside and the state has to occupy the central 
place in any serious thinking about rural development 
strategy. An analysis of policy alternatives themselves can 
tell us something about this relationship between the state 
and the society.
A lternative S trategies :
Perhaps for Bangladesh there arc four broad alterna­
tive sets of rural development objectives and methods—each 
appealing to a different combination of classes, groups and 
interests. The different objectives refer to the varying 
intentions to maintain or change the dominant mode of 
production. And the methods ( or process ) will vary be­
tween state-sponsored, self-reliance or revolutionary pea­
sant organization according to the philosophy of those 
combinations. Radical objectives are normally associated
238
with a radical process of changes. Whichever alternative 
is dominant depends upon historical circumstances and the 
balance of class forces.
First there would be the policy of pursuing agricul­
tural development within the prevailing dominant mode of 
production, which itself might vary for different parts of 
Bangladesh, quasi-feudal in some places, Chayanov’s peasant 
economy in others, or quasi-capitalist. The issue here is best 
regarded as one of intensity of governmental penetration in 
the countryside-until the late sixties (post-Ayub) the main 
rural development activities of the state in East Pakistan 
were confined to the Rural Works Programme (RWP), the 
Thana Irrigation Project (TIP) and the Union Multi-Pur­
pose Co-operative Society (UMPCS) in the districts outside 
Comilla. UntiTthe expansion of the Comilla Programme 
of KSS’s the extent of formal government involvement in 
the provision of new agricultural inputs in the province as 
a whole was slight, with little emphasis on a class of poor 
or middle peasants as a specific and exclusive target group.
S^ond there is the equation of rural development with 
agricultural growth and modernization. There is a strong 
emphasis here upon the introduction of new technology in 
agriculture with only a secondary concern for the nature 
of its distribution among different classes of peasant. The 
assumptions here are often, apolitical, involving a preoccu­
pation with technical aspects of production (the optimum 
ratio between labour inputs, fertilizer dose, regulated water 
supply, timing of operations etc.) and a belief that other 
problems are resolved by increases in output -increases
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which are dependent upon technological rather than poli­
tical variables. Although claiming a neutrality with res­
pect to class, this technological approach to rural develop­
ment is often associated with an attempt to alter the socio­
economic formation. And even where such interference 
is not intended, the differential access of rich and poor 
peasants to new resources usually implies that a technolo­
gical definition of modernization amounts to a policy of 
betting on the strong.
This brings us to the third and fourth sets of objec­
tives, where the technological opportunities are formally 
incorporated into political and economic definitions of rural 
modernization. But there is an ideological distinction with 
corresponding institutional variations. One refers to the 
transformation of pre-capitalist modes of production in the 
context of an expansion of the capitalist mode of produc­
tion i.e. changing peasants into farmers, involving higher 
levels of investment, crop specialization, profit-maximisa- 
tion as a motive, incorporation ^ m t o ^ e  capitalist market, 
employers of Wage labour etc. ' this is the concern
to transform both the pre-capitalist mode of production and 
the capitalist mode of production in agriculture into a mode 
where the means of production arc publicly owned.
It is within these broad sets of alternative objectives 
that the various strategies for rural development must be 
understood in the past and in the future. In this way we 
obtain a fundamental frame-work in which to locate policies 
and their organizational implications. And in doing so it is 
also necessary to distinguish between words and deeds. By
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applying such a frame of reference as outlined above, a 
phrase like ‘the socialist stî'atu^o development through co­
operatives’ becomes a contradiction if it clear that the co­
operatives is the organizational form v/hich corresponds to 
the third rather than the fourth set of objectives. It is clear 
to us that if contemporary pronouncements^^ about a radi­
cal, socialist path to development are to be given their 
logical expression in policy and commitment then we are 
concerned with the fourth set of objectives the transforma­
tion of both pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of produc­
tion into a mode where the means of production are pub­
licly owned. The debate concerns the capacity of the state 
apparatus to implement such a policy and the appropriate 
institutional forms to the applied. However, an explanation 
of this capacity depends precisely upon the way in which 
the state has until now been involved in pursuing one or 
more of the other sets of objectives, and whether the politi­
cal logic which lay behind those pursuits remains too str­
ong to permit any genuine shift to the fourth set of rural 
development objectives. [The pronouncements have chang­
ed, some of the personnel have changed, but has the nature 
of the state changed ? ] To what extent does the class 
structure in Bangladesh, which has evolved since 1947 and 
given the state its particular complexion, now impede the 
socialist transformation.
Regional V ariations ;
From our studies of minifundist conditions we have 
become alerted to the importance of regional variations in 
socio-economic structure for the problem of devising stra-
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tegies- for rural development (w hether by the state or 
among revolutionary movements ). These variations— 
historically and ecologically determined—are significant at 
the level of the mode of production and are therefore rele­
vant to any discussion of attempts by the state to intervene 
at that level. The precise regional characteristics of a 
mode of production will circumcribe the role and capacity 
of the state to engage in development activity in that 
region. And we must stress that our studies have been 
concentrated in the Comilla-Dacca belt, and so they are 
representative only of the minifund 1st socio-economic struc­
tures which typify that area. At the same time, we have 
established a basis for speculative comparison between this 
and other parts of Bangladesh. Hopefully in this way we 
are contributing to the planning of similar research in 
other areas.
These regional variations concern rural development 
strategies whichever of the alternative sets of objectives 
are preferred, but in different ways. If the fourth set of 
objectives are considered—the transformation of pre-capi­
talist and capitalist modes of production in the context of a 
radical upheaval—then the issue of consciousness and depen­
dence is essential. Without the direct participation of the 
rural poor—those who are in subordinate position in their 
respective modes of production ( tied labourer or indebted 
poor peasant )—with class consciousness as its precondition, 
this fourth set of objectives is unlikely to be achieved. A 
small benevolent elite at the centre committed to socialism 
cannot alone simply subordinate the politically and econo­
mically powerful classes, it depends upon the mobilization
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of the rural poor themselves. But the structural position 
of the rural poor affects the nature and extent of their 
consciousness. A high proportion of ‘tied’ landless labou­
rers and sharecroppers directly dependent for their liveli­
hood upon the favour of big landlords may provide fertile 
ground for the development of a class consciousness but at 
the same time offer little scope for collective action either 
in the form of taking control over resources such as land, 
inputs etc. or in the sense of joint productive enterprises 
such as co-operative farming and marketing schemes. And 
in this situation it would also be necessary to discover 
whether lineage differences run along class lines or cross­
cut them ( members of a ‘bari’ all in one class or distri­
buted between classes ), although we would hypothesise 
i that they would tend to follow the same cleavages as class.
) However the minifundist situation is different from
this the range of landholding is very narrow, making 
( small differences in holding very significant in terms of
1 class ; the structure of dependency tends to be indirect
through usufructuary mortgage and other forms of indeb­
tedness. The extent of competition zvithin ‘baris’ (between 
brothers etc.) over lajid, and the existence of dependency 
I relationships within ‘baris’ indicate that the dimension of
) class frequently crosscuts that of kin. One would expect
I the development of class-based consciousness to be inhibi-
I ted by these factors. Furthermore in this situation it may
j be particularly difficult for policy makers to isolate a cate-
I gory of poor peasants as a target group for co-operative
j farming activities, special subsidies on inputs, or conscious-
I ness mobilization, precisely because of the complex, inti­
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mate and multi-dimensional nature of the relationships 
between rich and poor peasants in a minifundist context. 
If the relationships of exploitation are relatively simple
i. e. one dimensional, devoid of kinship ties etc.—then it 
is relatively easier to manipulate or sever that relationship.
Regional variations prevent universal strategies :
But there is a distinction between d^aing with the 
existing mode of production in order to reform it and d ^ -  
ing with it as a necessary part of the task of radically 
transforming it. Where reform is envisaged—and any­
thing short of a pervasive socialist ownership of land is 
regarded as reformist—then variations in the mode of 
production will determine quite directly what can be 
achieved. It is, therefore, illogical and unrealistic to attempt 
to implement an universal reform when the structures to be 
reformed are not universal. The land reform legislation 
in Bangladesh ( and the same is true to India ) is a case 
in point, having no impact whatsoever on the problems 
of land distribution in minifundist areas. On the other 
hand, co-operatives of the Comilla type may work better 
and be more appropriate in the minifundist situation, 
although the politico-economic problems have been re­
counted at length even for the Comilla area by many of 
the BARD members themselves. But transplanted to 
other areas, where the gulf between rich and poor peasant 
is greater, the problems of political inequality within the 
co-operative are correspondingly more significant. And 
unless the ingredient of socialist ownership of land is 
added to new village co-operative scheme, the same criti­
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cisms of universal policies of reform still apply. It seems 
to us that until the inequalities in the ownership and con­
trol of land will always threaten to subvert the more 
purely political arrangements to ensure grassroots demo­
cracy. This is probably recognized, but what is important 
is that the extent of subversion will vary as a result of the 
regional variations in the dominant mode of production in 
peasant agriculture. What may be possible in minifundist 
area like Comilla is not likely to achieve the same degree 
of success in aaarea where a rich peasant/landlord has 50 
acres or so, monopolises access and patronage, and has a 
monopoly influence over the price of labour.
However this problem of regional variation is not 
removed simply by incorporating the socialist ownership of 
the means of production as an explicit objective. The co­
ercive powers of the state are not sufficient to implement 
such a programme of radical transformation over the heads 
of those classes which are dominant by virtue of their pri­
vate ownership and control oveHand. Thus the dominant 
mode of production in an area still has to be confronted 
even when the fourth set of objectives is contemplated. 
Whichever group of radicals are involved, whether ele­
ments of the state or revolutionary forces in the country­
side, universal strategies for a radical transformation-in­
volving rural mobilization and the raising of consciousness 
among the poor are also inappropriate. At its most ex­
treme, the class of large land.,lords can be eliminated for 
relatively profound effects if there is no significant strata 
of middle peasants ready to take their p^aee. (The stra­
tegy of the-Chinese Communist Party during the révolu-
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tion, especially after the Long March, was to involve 
middle peasants in the elimination of landlord classes thus 
commiting them to new institutions and a rejection of the 
old order). However such a strategy would be very in­
appropriate in the minifundist areas of Bangladesh, with 
the additional Bengali-Islamic complication of large 
‘baris’. The class to be eliminated is much more diffuse — 
behaviourally its position depends upon a variety of rela­
tionships rather than an absolute quantitative distinction* 
referring to land. And compared with areas of larger 
landlords, in the minifundist situation richer peasants are 
more numerous so that the ownership or control of the 
majority of villagdland is not confined to a tiny group.
The poor need higher forms of organization than the 
rich :
There are further problems for radical policy formu­
lation in addition to those of regional variation in socio­
economic structure. The first refers again to the issue of 
group or class consciousness and mobilization—a major 
component in current thinking about rural development in 
Bangladesh. Observers are frequently bemused by the 
existence of factional competition between richer peasants 
of the same class into thinking that these richer peasants 
are so divided among themselves to prevent economic be­
haviour which is objectively in their class interest. These 
observers assume that the richer peasants are concerned to 
maintain a traditional structure of clients and dependents
in the village— a secure band of followers etc. but on
the contrary, these richer peasants are increasingly follow­
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ing ‘marktf forms of behaviour in their transaction with 
poorer people in the village. We have shown this above. 
That is to say, these richer peasants are behaving accord­
ing to economic principles which are currently running in 
their favour (e.g. payment of labour, usufructuary mort­
gage, even with kin etc.). The competition and conflict bet­
ween richer peasants is by comparison insignificant and 
does not function to weaken the class differentiation reveal­
ed by this ‘market’ behaviour. The factors of cohesion and 
solidarity are not therefore so important in determining the 
objective nature of theinclass behaviour.
The position for the poorer peasant, near landless and 
landless is different from this. To improve their econo­
mic and political prospects, they are really bound to 
oppose and overturn the dominant mode of production and 
exchange which is not running in their favour. An ambi­
tion to improve their relative position within the dominant 
mode of production ( higher wages, less interest, more 
land ) is probably equally difficult to achieve. However 
for both strategies, the essential ingredient is organization 
the preconditions for which are consciousness, cohesion 
and solidarity, in that order. If you are in^subordinate 
oppressed position in a mode of production, it is logically 
impossible to behave in favour of your objective class in­
terest as an individual since you have to change the status 
quo rather than merely adhere to it. In this situation, the 
poor require class-based organization, while the rich can 
do without it until such time as they positively have to 
defend the status quo. But the poor peasantry and the
247
landless find class consciousness and organization parti­
cularly difficult precisely because of their poverty and 
subordinate position.
First, they ̂ dependent on their . patrons who are em­
ployers, or landlords, or creditors, and who have their free­
dom and strength to take their patronage elsewhere at the 
going market rate. Where simple survival is involved, the 
risk of the unknown (the untested ‘unity’ of one’s own 
class) is too great to contemplate. Second, to survive they 
have to try and keep ^  seeking employment, working 
hard on their own plots, begging, trying to obtain loans, 
looking for the best bargains in the market etc. This type 
of behaviour tends to isolate them from each other (even 
within the same village) these are all independent, lonely 
activities. Third, at the end of the day (food or no food) 
they are exhausted—angry perhaps, but too tired to act on 
it. They are unlikely to attend meetin^which might have 
to be clandestine ( on the edge of a village ) or in another 
village altogether. Fourth, their low-level of literacy and 
education makes communication very difficult ; and prevents 
the undermming of traditional loyalties to the patrons in 
the village, and the sense of community which is the rich 
peasant socio-political order. Fifth, with some important 
exceptions to be noted presently, they are less mobile both 
in terms of leisure time and financial capacity. It is difficult 
to envisage membership of a class of poor throughout the 
country when you have never travelled further than 8 
miles in your life. All these contraints some how have to
be overcome as part of a strategy to confront the mode of 
production in order to. change it.
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I
! The poor should organize outside of the village ;
I But perhaps this picture is not entirely hopeless—there
i are some exceptions to poor people’s lack of mobility. As
j petty traders, they move from village to village in the
I course of their work meeting others of similar status.
Also there are migrant labourers and they are very signi­
ficant, as we discussed earlier. And finally, we noticed an 
interesting correlation between poverty and the frequency 
of visits to the local hat (market). If you are very poor, 
you cannot make large purchases, you live from day to day, 
hand to mouth. Except in periods of peak employment 
like transplanting where there is less time and higher in­
come, the poorer people of Bandakgram and Mahajanpur 
/ were visiting a market 3 or 4 times a week. The hat there-
\  fore represents an important meeting place for poor pea­
sants and the landless, who are coming from different 
villages. Their weak position in the mode of production 
obliges them to be mobile in this way with this sort of 
frequency, while at the same time providing an opportuni­
ty for organization and mobilization. The factors of commu­
nication and mobility which are necessary for this are 
already part of a way of life of the poor. This pattern 
of movement involving the seems to offer greater scope 
for mobilization of the rural poor, than units of organiza­
tion confined to the village where there are no inherent 
features of the poor’s behaviour to facilitate their solida­
rity and counteract the superior power of the larger land­
holders.
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Ouraiïalysis therefore indicates.-that the socio-economic 
relationships zvithin the village are not conducive to poor 
peasant and landless political organization zvithin the 
village itself. Here the process of class differentiation— 
encouraged by the introduction of new agricultural techno­
logies—maintains the poor in an increasingly weak econo­
mic and political condition. By concentrating units of 
political and administrative organization at the village level 
without altering the competitive equipment of the oppre­
ssed groups (representation alone will not do as shown by 
the failures of Community Development and Panchayati 
Raj in India ), the probable outcome is a consolidation of 
the power of those who are already dominant in the village 
economy. There is always a danger with total village 
programmes ( through co-operatives etc. ) that the theme 
‘village community’ is re-emphasised, But class differen­
tiation is not thereby swept under the carpet. Instead, 
the notion of the community would be defined by the 
powerful in the village as embodying the behaviour and 
values of the status quo. The system of Panchayati Raj 
in India, where there are quotas for committee member­
ship in addition to the ‘democratic’ process of election, has 
been unable fo circumvent the power of the richer landlords 
and peasants in the villages. On the contrary, it has provi­
ded an additional statutory framework within which they can 
consolidate their class superiority. The poor can be stron- 
gervlhftn they are not confined to institutional arenas where 
they confront only their patrons and landlords. In wider 
arenas extending beyond the boundaries of the village, 
these confrontations can be more imperson$al and the 
solidarity of the poor ( oncS-generated ) becomes less vul-
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nerable to subversion. But as a precondition for radicali- 
zation through institutions at the village level, it is worth 
recalling Barrington Moore’s remarks* (referring to India) ; 
‘the villages cannot be democratised without democratising 
property relations’.
Perhaps there are many in Bangladesh who accept the 
validity of this proposition, but the problem is that legis­
lation at the centre about abolition of private property in 
agricultural land will have no effect in the countryside 
i unless the poor are mobilized in support of such an objec-
i tive. It is difficult to mobilize them without this abolition of private property in land as an explicit purpose of their I mobilization. There are no intermediate proposals of re-
I form which are exciting enough to stimulate the poor into
S organization. On the other hand, if the abolition of private
property in agricultural land is announced as an explicit 
objective, is there a danger of provoking the greater mobi­
lization of the richer peasant class ( perhaps in alliance^ 
with the petty bourgeoisie of the towns ) in defence of  ̂
status quo constituting therefore a reactionary counter-revo­
lutionary force. This is the current dilemma for the state 
in Bangladesh. But the possibility of achieving the fourth 
set of objectives in rural development recedes the longer it 
is postponed, for in the meantime the richer peasant classes 
consolidate their position any way.
♦Barrington Moore : The Social Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy, Peregrine, 1969.
2-5
APPENDIX ‘A’
Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development  
Kotbari, Comilla.
( Power Structure and Leadership Project )
Village Census Proforma 
Serial No. Name of Informant :
Relation to head of household :
1. Head of Household :





















( if not in 
paribar )












the household : From 1946
4. Home of daughters-in- Name of village, distance






5. Married Daughter : Father-in-laws house -  name
of village, distance & loca­






6. (a) Land owned by Paribar (ownership —can be sold,
mortgaged /transferred).
(b) In whose names is it registered ;
7. How much land is sharecropped in at this time by 
the paribar.
Does the amount vary by year and season ? 
g. How much of your land is cultivated by another 
paribar ?
Leased out on contract...........
Sharecropped...........................
Mortgaged...................................
9. Name of Bari used in village. (Title & status — 
Sardar or not).
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10. Note details of the Paribar member’s participation 
in: councils ( Union Parishad, Samaj, Reyai ) orga­
nizations, political parties, co-operatives, etc.
11. During the year October 1973—October 1974 has 
the paribar purchased foodgrain.
Was the Paribar surplus in foodgrain during this 
period.
APPENDIX ‘B’
B A N G L A D E S H  A C A D E M Y  FO R  R U R A L  D E V E L O P M E N T
Study on RURAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE.
Household Sample Survey. Name of Household
Head :------------------------------
Name of Informant :
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1. Small Genealogy :
1.1. Ego’s father’s brothers and their male descendants.
2.2. Ego’s mother’s brothers and their male descendants 
( if resident in the village. )
1 3. Ego’s brother’s and their male descendants (in resi­
dent in the village. )
( From previous survey, ego’s own children have been 
identified. )
N.B. Use accorapaying blank pages to make up the 
‘family tree’, with 1.2 on a separate page.
N.B. By each name in brackets, identify, where possi­
ble, with paribar serial number, bari and para 
membership ( if serial connection not known ), 
add approximate age.
N.B. Where names are unimportant ( e.g. in the case of 
small children ) use .symbols :
A  =  male 
3 = female
and A X o indicates that the male and female are 




2 1.1. How much land did your father have ?
A us/A m on------------------
Boro/Lowland-------------
No. of plots— -------------
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2.1.2. Did you receive your inheritance of land
before your father’s death ?__________
After your father’s death ? _________
2.1.3. How much land did you inherit ?
Aus/Amon _________
Boro/Lowland ___ -_______
No. of plots ____________
2.1.4. Did you receive the same share as your
brothers ? _____
2.1.4.1. If not, why ?
2.2.0. PURCHASE
2 2.1. Have you purchased land in addition to your
inheritance ?
(If yes)






2.3.0. Disposal of own Land




2.3,1. H o w  m u c h  of your own land do you cultivate 
yourself ?
Aus/Amon  ________ .
Boro/Lowland________
2.3,2. How much of your own land is
2.3.2.1. Sharecropped O u t  _
2.3.5.2. Mortgaged O u t____
Name Relation to you Amount For what period
2.3.3.I. Why is your land sharecropped by others ?
2.3.3 2. Describe the arrangements of the share-
cropping relationship. Do you look for 
sharecroppers, or do they look for you ? 
How is the sharing organized ? Have there 
been any disputes over sharing ? Or 
confusion over the arrangements and 
status of the land ?
Code N o . ________
2. LAND contd.
2.3.0 DISPOSAL OF LAND contd.
2.3.4 To whom is your land mortgaged ?




2-3.4.1 Describe how these mortgages are arranged ? How 
do you find out who wishes to take the land ? 
If the recipient of the land is outside the family, 
is the agreement written or verbal ? Are there 
any witnesses ? Are you expected to offer the 
land first to kin ? Do you two cultivate the land ? 
If so, under what conditions ?
2.3.5 Have you sold land ? No.
To whom Relation to Amount Date Price Reasonyou
2.3.5.1 Are you expected to offer land to relatives first ? 
Is the price fixed ? Do potential purchasers com­
pete, and the highest bidder is successful ? How 
is the transfer of registration and sale recorded ? 
Who are the witnesses ? Why ?
Code No._________
2. LAND contd.
2.4 0 LAND IN ADDITION TO OWNED LAND
2.4.1 Do you sharecrop land ?
No




2.4.1.1 Describe the arrangements. Do you look for land 
to sharecrop ? Do others approach you ? Do you 
have a formal agreement ? Are there witnesses ? 
Who ? Is the time period fixed ? How is the shar­
ing organized ? Are there any disputes or confu­
sion over the arrangements ? Who pays for 
irrigation, and other inputs ?
2 4.1.2 Has there been a decline in the amount of land 
available for sharecropping ? If so, why ?
2.4.1.3 If you are not sharecropping^ would you like to 
sharecrop land ? _
2 4.1.4 If you are sharecropping, would you 1 ike to share­
crop more land ?
2.4.1.5 Do people compete with each other to obtain land 
to sharecrop ? If so, how are the arrangements 
affected ?
2. LAND contd.
2.4.2 LAND IN ADDITION TO OWNED LAND contd.
2.4.2 Do you receive land in mortgage ?





2.4.2,1 Describe how these mortgage are arranged ? Do 
the persons who wish to mortgage their land come 
to you ? Is the agreement formal or not ? Are 
there any witnesses ? Who ? Do you cultivate 
the land ? Is the agreement tirne-bound ?
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Does this mortgaged land represent an important 
part of your total cultivable holding ? If the land 
was taken back from you, how would that effect 
you ? Would it reduce your surplus or push you 
below subsistence ?
2.4.2.3 Even if you yourself are not personally involved
in any mortgage arrangements, can you explain
why there is so mortgaging at this time ? (Is  it 
a substitute for purchase ? )
Code No:— --------
3. IRRIGATION
3.1.0 What proportion of the land which you cultivate 
is irrigated ?
3.1.1 By what method is it irrigated ?
3.2 If you do not receive irrigation, would you like 
to ? What are the problems for you ?
3.3 With whom do you have to co-operate to get the 
water to your plots ? What arrangements do you 
make ? How many other farmers are involved 
in the same piece of irrigation ? Are they your 
kin ? In your reyai or para ? Or outside ?
3.4.0 Have you joined a co-operative in order to obtain 
water ? Describe how you came to join the co­
operative ? Who approached you ? Who con­
vinced you of its value ? Are there now any 
difficulties ?
3.4.1 Does the membership of the co-operative consist 
largely of members of your reyai or para ?
3.4.2 Are the leaders of the co-operative the same 
people who lead the reyai or para ? Are they 
your kin, friends, employers ?
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3.5 Do you receive any irrigation outside of that 
obtained through the co-operative ? Describe 
the details.
Code No------------------
I 4. Annual Agricultural Cycle Dec 1973—Dec 1974
Name of crop ( taken by sequence through the year )
1..................P lanted ............. 2. Planted.................




















* (Landlord, moneylender, dealer, storekeeper, etc.)
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4.7 Note any further details, e. g. whether crops are 
even sold while still standing ; whether advances 
are taken for cultivation. Always probe for the 
ways in which the crop is distributed, and under 
what conditions e. g. sold at harvest time for a 
low price, because advances and debts have to be 
paid at that time.
Code No...................
5. LABOUR RELATIONSHIPS :
5.1. Cultivators :
5.1.1 For which agricultural activities do you require 
assistance from outside your family members ? 
When is your demand for labour highest ? Can 
you always obtain labour ?
5.1.2. Do the same people always work for you ?
5.1.3. If they are from this village, what are their names 
( -h bari and para identification ) ? How do you 
hire them ? Do they search for work, or do you 
search for them ? Do you provide them with any 
services in addition to wages ? What is the basis 
of the relationship : contract, tied or daily ? Do 
you give your labourers advances ?
5.1.4 If they are not from this village, from where do 
they come ? Why ? How are the arrangements 
made? Do they come looking for work ? What 
is the rate of payment ? For what operations ? 
Do they have a gang leader ? Is the work-on a 
contract or daily basis ?
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5.1.5. Is there any discussion over the wage-rates ? How 
are they fixed ? Do they change from season to 
season ? From year to year ? When did they 
last change ? How did you know they had chan­
ged ? Have there been any attempts by labourers 
to increase the wage-rates ? If so, how ? Strikes, 
meetings ? Are labourers from outside paid at 
different rates ? If so, why ?
Code No.-----------------
5. ABOUT RELATIONSHIPS contd.
5.2. AGRICULTURAL LABOURERS ( Full or part 
time, including family ).
5.2,1. Annual Employment : Activity by month and opera­
tion.













5.2.2. How are you hired ? Do you search for work ? 
Or do employers come to you ? D# you work on 
a daily or a seasonal basis ?
' Are there any discussions 
there seasonal variations in
5.2.3. How is the rate fixed 
about payment ? Are 
payment ?
5.2.4. Do you perform any additional services for emplo­
yers ; or any favours ( Loans etc. ) from them ?
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6 .
Do you go to them if you are in trouble ? Does 
anybody have first call on your time, if so why ? 




6.1. When did you start using ?
Fertilizer-  ----------
HYV of seed---------------
6.2. For which crops do you use fertilizer or HYV ?
Amon
Fertilizer—
HYV of seed —
6.3. How have your yields been affected by their use? 
With or without irrigation ?
6.4. Did you buy, in the last year ( Dec. 73-Dec, 74 )
Quantity Type Price Source
1
Fertilizer ?
HYV of seed ?
6.5. If you did not purchase in the last year, give 
reasons ?
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6.6. With the use of fertilizers and HYV of seed, 
and irrigation, have you :
6.6.1. Withdrawn land from sharecroppers into your 
own cultivation ?
6.6.2. Hired more or less labour ?
6.6.3. Sold more paddy / rice ?
( NB. obtain explanations whether answers in affirma­
tive or negative. )
6.7. How did you learn about the new technology ? 
From villagers Or outsiders ? From whom, 
when and how ? Did you take long to be con­
vinced ? Are you convinced of its benefits ?
6.8. What are your difficulties in obtaining fertilizer 
and HYV seed ?
6.9. How do you prefer to obtain fertilizer and 
HYV seed ?
Code hlo.— --------
7. VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS 
7.1. Disputes
7.1.1. Have you been involved in ahy dispute in the 
) last 2 years ? If so, describe the dispute and
I the way in which it was settled.
7.1.2. Why are there disputes in the village ? And do 
they occur mainly within paras, or between 
paras as well ? Can you give examples of both 
types of dispute ? How were they resolved ?
7.1.3. If you had a dispute with someone now, 
e. g. over land, who would you go to for 
a solution ? Why ? Would your relatives 
and friends go to the same person ? How 
did this person become a leader ? Dés*
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cri be his qualities in terms of background and 
performance. Were his father, uncles or brothers 
also leaders ? Do people support these leaders 
because they are connected to them in different 
ways? What ways? If you could not obtain 
satisfaction in this imaginary dispute, what would 
you do then ?
Code N o -----------------
7. VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS contd.
7.2 LEADERS I  V
How do the following leaders help yOu ?
(Note : e. g. advice, information, financial assis­
tance, arranging access to government offi­
ces or to important politicians, or to law­
yers, doctors etc., giving land in share- 
cropping, or receiving it in mortgage, or 
giving loans and advances at favourable 
rates of interest.
Also note what favours are expected in return :
e. g. voting numerical support at meetings running 
errands, labouring, canvassing, provision of infor­
mation, special gifts on certain occasions etc.
N. B. , Be cautious in probing. )
7.2.1 Bari head
7.2.2 Sardars
7.2.3 Co-operative Manager and Committee members
7.2.4 Union members and Chairman
7.2.5 Political Party workers
7.2.6 The local M; P.
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7.2.7 Others ( e . g .  service holders living in. village, 
moneylenders, traders, religious leaders. )
Code No--------------------
8. NON-AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES
8.1 What types of non-agricultural economic activity 
are you or other members of your family involv­
ed in ?
8.1.1 Business__________ _̂_______
8.1.2 Artisan ' ______ _
8.1.3 Service___________________
8.1.4 Other
(N.B. Include casual moneylending, dealerships, and
other types of marketing and petty trading ac­
tivity. )
8.2 Describe in detail your activity under 8.1. Are
you in partnership ? When did you start this ac­
tivity ? How did you learn what to do ? How 
did you obtain the capital ? Under what arrang- 
ment ? How did obtain your job ? Did you have 
to bribe,? Use influence ? What income on aver­
age do you obtain from this source ?
(Probe to discover the interactions which involve 
direct use of power and influence ; or which re­
present some sort of control or manipulation over 
critical resources—e.g. credit, inputs, selling of 




9.1 What loans,do you have outstanding at present ?
No. Date Amount Rate of What Source of
interest purpose loan
. .
(N.B. Source : identify whether government or private ;
then specify precise source of govern­
ment loan (coop, thana department etc.), 
and of private loan—from, friends, emp­
loyer, moneylender, landlord—and where 
possible obtain names.
9.2 Have you extended loans to other people ? If so, 
please give details of how you were approached, 
why a loan was needed, and by whom, amount etc.
9.3 What are your difficulties in getting loans when 
you need them ? From what source would you 
prefer to take them ? Is there any variation by 
source according to the purpose for which the loan 
is required, and the nature of the collateral which 
you cam offer ?
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10.1.1 Give details of purchases or sales of 10.1.0 in re­
cent years. N, B. date ; to or from whom ; price ; 
reason for acquisition or loss ; whether credit was 
required for the purpose, if so from whom, under 
what conditions ?
Also note whether livestock has been transferred 
as part of another transaction, e. g. failure to 
repay a loan or interest ; or ‘mortgaged out’ ; or 
leased out in some sort of share arrangement).
10.1.2 Do you hire out your animals for ploughing, or 
allow them to be used by others in any way ? 
What are the arrangements ? Price (cash or kind) ; 
to whom ? Why do you hire out ?
10.1.3 Do you hire in animals for ploughing ? Why ? 
From whom ? What price ? (N. B. To cultivate 
at all, ploughing power is essential, so therefore 
there must be a secure control over it or access 
to it.)
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11. Consumption In teractions
( Items purchased in addition to own source. )
N.B. select whatever time period is most appropriate to 
the article in question.
Appro­ Forms of Location of























( note details 
of movements. )
11.7. Ceremonial
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Amon—The main rice crop grown between August—Dec­
ember.
Aus—Rice crop grown between March and June.
B ADC—Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation. 
BARD—Bangladesh Academy for Rural Development. 
BDR—Bangladesh Rifles.
Boro—Rice crop grown between January and March.
HSC—Higher Secondary Certificate.
IRDP—Integrated Rural Development Programme.
IRRI—International Rice Research Institute.
KSS—Krishak Sa ma baya Samity ( Agril. Co-op. Society )






TCCA—Thana Central Co-operative Association.
TIP—Thana Irrigation Programme.
TTDC—Thana Training and Development Centre.
UP—Union Parish ad.






Bondokgram -  mortgaged village.
Bari—cluster of houses (usually of same lineage) or families. 
Bazar—market
Chula—kitchen ( persons eating in the same kitchen— 
culminating into a family ).
Dak nam—so-called ( fake name ), nick name 
Gram—Village ‘
Gosthi— lineage ( decehdants )
Hajat—the period under custody before trial.
Hat—market ( weekly once / twice ).
Haji—One who has performed pilgrimage to Mecca. 
Hookah hubble-bubble




Kotwali—main ( headquarter )
Kurta—man or woman’s wear ( Shirt / Blouse /  garments ) 
Lungi—man’s wear 
Madhya—middle
Mahajan—Moneylender ( greatman )
Maktab—religious school 
Matbar—Leader or Sub-leader 
Mel-baithak—public court (meeting)
Mistri—Carpenter




Para—Neighbourhood or a portion of a village. 
Paribar—Family (families)
Pardah—Veil (isolation of women)
Parishad—Board or Council









Sarri (shary)—Women’s wear (5/6 yard long). 
Thana—Police Station (Administrative unit). 
Ucho—High
Zamindar (i)—Landlord (Landlordism). .
PART 111
CLASS FORMATION AND STATE INTERVENTION IN RURAL BANGLADESH
3 1
Class Formation and ‘Antediluvian’ Capital 
in Bangladesh*
G e o f  I V o o d
Published data on rural c lass  d ifferentiation  in 
Bangladesh  is u n d erd ev e lo p ed  and inhibits  
e laborate description . T h is  is partly b ecau se  m o st  
o f  the research w as c o n d u c te d  until recently  by  
the Bangladesh  A c a d e m y  for  Rural D e v e lo p m e n t  
at C o m  ilia (Blair 1974: 122: V a n  S ch on d e l  1976)  
and has been based on a g r o -e c o n o m ic  surveys  in 
the d en se ly  popu la ted  an d  fertile region o f  
C om il la  itself. T h e  C o m i l la  findings form ed  the 
basis o f  ex tra p o la t io n s  for Bangladesh  as a w h o le ,  
provid ing  an im a g e  o f  a h o m o g e n o u s  agrarian  
structure described  in term s o f  sm a l l -ho ld in g  
farmers. T h u s  an overall  considera t ion  o f  the  
land d istr ibution  and tenure data on Bangladesh  
in the 1960s threw up turn m is lead in g  gen era l isa ­
tions: the ab sen ce  o f  a substantia l  c lass  o f  la n d ­
lords and landholders;  and  the lo w  level o f  
absolu te  average  size h o ld ing .  F rom  this data  
I t  I S  usually  c o n c lu d e d  th;it “ the rural e c o n o m y  
of  B angladesh  is best described  as a peasant  
e c o n o m y  bttsed on small fam ily  farm s operated  
primarily  with fa m ily  labour"  {e.g. .Abdullah and 
N ations .  1974: 9; a lso  Bose.  1973). T h e  C o m il la  
coo p era t iv e  p ro g ra m m e w a s  predicated on the  
ideo log ica l  ; issum piion  that c lass d iv ision within  
the peasant econom y" w a s  structurally  in s ig ­
nificant.
M ore  recently  this v iew  has been m odif ied  by  
recogn is ing  a critical d ist inct ion  b etw een  ‘su rp lu s’ 
peasants on the o n e  hand and subs istence ,  b e low  
subs istence  and landless on  the  other:  i.e., that  
m inor  var iat ions  o f  la n d h o ld in g  were  nevertheless  
critical ( .Abdullah and N a t io n s  1974: Bertocci  
1972). In this view, and a lo n g  w ith  m a n y  
subsequent  eva l iu it ions  o f  the C o m il la  c o o p e r a ­
tive strategy (K h a n  1971).  there are rural elites  
in B a n g la d e s h — but their ex is ten ce  is exp la ined  
largely in term s o f  traditional ly  strong  l ineages  
w hich have  m a na g e d  to d o m in a te  the c o o p e r a ­
tives. new irrigation opportun it ies ,  fertiliser  
distrinution thr ough  political c o n n e c t io n s  with  
g o v ern m en t  oihctils . By such m ean s  rural elites  
have m arginally  ex tended  their contro l  over land, 
H ow ever ,  there is the re kited notion  that these
T t i i s  pc ip e r  ba-^cd o n  a l o n c c r  d r a f t  c o n t a i n i n e  a d d i t i o n a l  
d f ' c n p r i v c  m a t t  r ia l  a n d  ^ t a t i ^ t i c s  a n d  e n t i t l e d  ' T h e  N a t u r e  
n! K u r a l  C i a ' '  ITi tf r e n t i a t i o n  in B a n i ; l a d c < h ' . w h i c h  w a '  
p r c ' - e n t c d  to  t h e  t ’ c a j a n t  S e m i n , . r .  C e n t r e  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  
a n d  A r e a  S t u d i e s ,  U n i v e r s i t y  o f  L o n d o n  in J u n e .  1977.
elites d o  not con st i tu te  a class, s ince  the d iv ision  
o f  the h o ld ing  b etw een  sons ensures  a process o f  
cy c l ica l  m o bil i ty ,  or. indeed, ‘cyc l ica l  K u la k is m ’ 
(B ertocc i  1972.) D ifferentiation in this perspective  
is a na lysed  as stratification ("objective" categories  
o f  w ea lth ,  in c o m e  and status through w hich  
actors  m o v e  up and d o w n )  rather than with  a 
fo c u s  on  the soc ia l  re lations o f  product ion  and  
ex ch a n g e .
T h e  leftist g r o u p s  in B angladesh  (see M aniruz-  
za m a n  1975) a n a ly se  its class structure differently,  
but they  are d iv ided  by fun d a m en ta l ly  opposed  
posit ions .  S o m e  groups like the East Pakistan  
C o tn m u n is t  Party o f  East Bengal,  describe social  
relat ions  in the countryside  as being feu da l  or 
se m i- fe ud a l .  In particular they fo cu s  on  the 
issues o f  sh arecrop p ing  and b on d ed  labour,  
p o in tin g  to the c lasses o f  landlords w hich  remain  
sign if icant  in the N orth  and W est  reg ions o f  the 
co u n tr y .  E lsew here ,  even in the d en se ly  populated  
D a c c a -C o m i l la  region ( inc luding  N o a k h a l i )  
sh a re cro p p in g  is still an im portant  c o m p o n e n t  
o f  m a n y  o f  the small farms. T h e  Jatiyo  
Saniajtrantr ik  Dal (.kSD. the R ev o lu t io na r y  
Socialist  Party) on  the other hand argues that the  
rural e c o n o m y  is b eco m in g  pervasively  capitalist.  
In particular it eva luated  the im pact  o f  d o m in a n t  
capital  from  the W estern wing o f  Pakistan (hence  
its tactical support  for ‘l iberat ion’): em p has ized  
the po lar isa t ion  o f  lan d ho ld in g  w hich  was  
disguised  by the aggregated national  statistics;  
and d e m o n s tra ted  the w ay  in w h ic h  agricultural  
p ro g ra m m e s  in Bangladesh  (and. b e fo re  1971. in 
Pakis tan)  w ere  b ig-farm er o r ien ted ,  especia lly  
w h en  the C o m i l la  strategy is ex ten d ed  into  other,  
m ore d ifferentia ted, regions.
A refinement o f  the J S D  posit ion is in order.  
In the specific c ircu m stan ces  o f  the partition o f  
Bengal in 1947 and the co lon ia l  d o m in a t io n  of  
East Bengal by West Pakistan with  the related  
restr ictions on  Bengali capital a c c u m u la t io n ,  the  
form al d estru ct ion  o f  the landlord-fenant  system  
did not bring about  the d ev e lo p m en t  o f  capitalist  
relat ions o f  production  in the countryside .  
Instead other fo rm s  o f  capital  w ere  re leased—  
m o n e y le n d in g .  trading. petty leas in g— w hich  
chtiracterised the relations b etw een  different  
ck issos o f  .Muslims, after H indu kindlords and  
m o n e y le n d e r s  derar ied .  It i  ̂ through these  
relat ionships that the polarisation o f  c lasses  is
39
occu rr in g ,  even  under ih e  'm in ifu n d is l '  agrarian  
c o n d i t io n s  o f  the D a c c a - C o m i l la  region. T h e  
d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  these  re la t ions  pre-dates the  
g o v e r n m e n t  strateg ies  o f  in te n s i fy in g  the level  o f  
capital  in agricu ltural p ro d u ctio n .  thereby  
s tructuring  the im p a c t  o f  these strateg ies a w a y  
f rom  the crea t ion  o f  cap ita lis t  p ro d u ct io n  
relat ions.  T h u s  the p ro cess  o f  c la ss  d ifferentiation  
in  B a n g la d esh  is the  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  u sur ious  and  
e x p lo i ta t iv e  re la t ion s  in the sp h ere  o f  e x c h a n g e  
rather than in the sp h ere  o f  p ro d u ct io n  p e r  se. 
It is a n o th e r  q u est ion  w h eth er  th e se  re lat ions are  
a t em p o ra r y  p h a se  o f  early  a c c u m u la t io n  d est in ed  
to  tr a n s fo r m  the so c ia l  f o r m a t io n  into  na t ive  
ca p ita l i sm  ( C h a t to p a d h y a y  1972); or  w h eth er  they  
are b o u n d  to  persist a n d  start the  d e v e lo p m e n t  
o f  ca p ita l i s t  re la t ions  in B a n g la d e s h  (Patna ik  
1972; A la v i  1975).
H o w e v e r ,  the  d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  th e se  an ted i lu v ian  
re la t io n s  is n o t  a u n i fo r m  p h e n o m e n o n  
th r o u g h o u t  all the  reg io n s  o f  B a n g la d e sh ,  a n d  it 
is the e x is te n c e  o f  s ign if icant  reg ion a l  v ar ia t ions  
in  the  re la t ion s  b e tw e e n  c lasses  w h ic h  is perhaps  
resp o n s ib le  fo r  the  c o n tr a d ic to r y  v iew ^ o f  rural  
c lass d i f feren t ia t ion ,  n o te d  a b o v e .  In particular  
the r e g io n s  in the  N o r th  and W est  o f  the c o u n tr y  
are ch arac ter ised  by a greater  d ifferentia tion  in 
la n d h o ld in g ,  larger land lords ,  n o  sharecroppers  
and h igher  land lessness .  T h is  pattern  is a ssoc ia ted  
with b o th  spec if ic  h istorica l  c o n d i t io n s  and  low er  
d en si ty  o f  rural p o p u la t io n  than  in the eastern  
r e g io n s  o f  the  co u n tr y .  T h u s  w h i le  a genera l  
picture o f  a n te d i lu v ia n  capita l  prevails ,  the  
precise f o r m s  o f  that cap ita l  and its effects  v a r y —  
m o re  petty leas in g  in the  N o r th  and  W est,  m o re  
usury an d  pet ty  c o m m o d i t y  e x c h a n g e  in the  East.
U n d e r  British rule the p ro v in c e  o f  B e nga l  w a s  a 
‘P e r m a n e n t ly  S e t t led ’ area ,  w h e r e  m ost  o f  the  
land w a s  d iv id e d  a m o n g  z o m i n d a r s — a hered itary  
c lass  o f  tax fa rm e rs  a n d  super  la n d lo r d s ’ taken  
o ver  b y  the British f r o m  the dec l in in g  M u g h a l  
em p ire  d u r in g  the e ig h teen th  cen tu ry .  T h e  cu lt i­
vator  with  p er m a n e n t  o c c u p a n c y  rights w a s  a 
ruiyut,  an d  he in turn m ight  rent o u t  all o r  part 
o f  h is  land to under-ro/yot.s or  sharecroppers .  
B e tw ee n  the zc in v n d a r  a n d  the r a iy a t ,  a c la ss  o f  
in te rm ed ia r ie s  or  t en u r e -h o ld ers  p ro l i fe ra ted  as  
zt i in i iu lars  su b -d iv id ed  the  ren t-c o l lec t in g  f u n c ­
tions. A p art  f r o m  the State ,  then ,  the c la sses  
v a r io u s ly  c o n n e c te d  w ith  the land w e r e :  
zcimiiulars ,  ra iy a fs ,  u n d e r - r a iy o l s ,  sh arecrop p ers  
and lan d less  labourers .  S h arecrop p ers  and  la n d ­
less lab ou rers  w ere  the m ain  c la sses  o f  l a b o u r  o n  
the land with  r a iy a ts  o c c u p y in g  the structural  
po s i t io n  o f  a g g reg a t in g  the  surp lus  fro m  su b ­
tenants  and lab ou r  and tran sm itt in g  it u p w ard s
in the fo r m  o f  rent.  T h i s  z a m i n d a r  s y s te m  w a s  
f o r m a l ly  a b o l i sh e d  in 1950  b y  the E as t  B enga l  
State  A c q u is i t io n  A ct ,  a l t h o u g h  the  part it ion  o f  
India in 1947 had  a lr e a d y  u n d e r m in e d  s o m e  o f  
its features .  T h e  p e r v a s iv e n e s s  o f  the s y s t e m ,  and  
the r e fo r e  its s tructura l  im p o r ta n c e  fo r  the soc ia l  
f o r m a t io n  a f ter  1950 ,  is d e m o n s tr a te d  b y  n o t in g  
that in pre-p art it ion  E a s t  B e n g a l ,  o u t  o f  a total  
o f  28 .8  m n  acres ,  a p p r o x im a t e ly  18 m n  acres  
w ere  he ld  b y  r a i y a t s  a n d  a fu r th er  2 m n  h e ld  
d irec t ly  b y  u n d e r - r a i y a t s ,  i .e ., a p p r o x im a t e ly  7 0  per  
cent .
L a n d  R e v e n u e  C o m m i s s i o n  reports  in the  1940s  
revea l  re g io n a l  v a r ia t io n s  in th e  s tru ctu re  o f  rural  
so c ia l  re la t io n s  w h ic h  u n d e r m in e  the a s s u m p t io n s  
o f  h o m o g e n e i t y  b ased  o n  n a t io n a l  level  a v era g es  
w h ic h  c o m p r i s e  the  m o r e  rece nt ly  p u b lis h e d  d ata  
o n  la n d h o ld in g s .  T h e y  s h o w  that the d istr icts  in  
the  N o r t h  and  W e s t  o f  E a s t  B e n g a l  w e r e  
d is t in g u is h e d  f r o m  e l s e w h e r e  in the  p r o v in c e  by  
greater  p r o p o r t io n s  o f  s h a r e c r o p p e r s  a n d  land less ,  
a n d  that  th e  c la s se s  o f  r a i y a t s  a n d  te n a n ts  w e r e  
m o r e  d if feren t ia ted  by  s iz e  o f  la n d h o ld in g .  In th o s e  
reports^ there  are  d e sc r ip t io n s  o f  M u s l im  j o t e d a r s  
(pe tty  l a n d lo r d s / r i c h  ra iy a ts ) .  T h i s  l e n d s  w e ig h t  
to  the  p r o p o s i t io n  tha t  there  w e r e  M u s l im  
su r p lu s ’ fa r m e r s  b e fo r e  a n d  d u r in g  the  e m e r g e n c e  
o f  P ak is tan  in certa in  a rea s  o f  East B e n g a l ,  as  
ag a in st  the  m o r e  fa m il ia r  n o t io n  that  these  
c la s se s  d e v e lo p e d  all o v e r  E ast  B e n g a l  s o le ly  as  
a result  o f  W e s t  P a k is ta n  c o lo n ia l  p o l ic y  or in 
r e s p o n se  to  the o p p o r tu n i t ie s  crea ted  b y  C o m i l la -  
ty pe  a g r icu ltur a l  d e v e lo p m e n t  stra teg ies .
A n  e x p la n a t io n  fo r  this reg io n a l  va r ia t io n  in the  
e x te n t  o f  d if feren t ia t ion  a m o n g  the  r a i y a t  c la s ses  
m u s t  in part  refer  to the  h istor ica l  sp ec if ic i ty  o f  
the  ‘b o r d e r ’ d istr icts  d u r in g  the  1940s.  T h e s e  
distr icts  w e r e  m o r e  e x p o s e d  to c o m m u n a l  ten s io n  
w h ic h  d e v e lo p e d  as a p re lu d e  to  the  M u s l im  
L e a g u e ’s c a m p a ig n  f o r  a se pa r a te  Is la m ic  State.  
T h is  c o m m u n a l  fa c to r  res tra ined  the  e x c e s s e s  o f  
( H in d u )  z a m i n d a r  o p p r e s s io n  o v e r  M u s l im  
t en ants  (e .g . ,  i l legal  c h a r g e s  in a d d i t io n  to  s ta tu to ry  
rent), thus r e ta in ing  m o r e  su rp lu s  at the  leve l  o f  
r a i y a t  fo r  a c c u m u la t io n  an d  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  
h o ld in g s .  A ls o ,  as the  rural p o p u la t io n  in bord er  
distr icts  w a s  m o r e  e v e n ly  d is tr ib u te d  b e tw e e n  
H in d u s  an d  M u s l im s  than  e l s e w h e r e  in the  
p ro v in ce ,  the im pa c t  o f  in ter-caste  r e la t io n s  on  
the pattern  o f  la n d h o ld in g  a n d  te n a n c y  w a s  
greater.  A n d  a f ter  1947, the d ep a rtu r e  o f  H in d u  
r a i y a t s  as  w e l l  as z a m i n d a r s  an d  te n u r e  h o ld e r s  
c rea ted  m o r e  ‘i l leg a l ’ o p p o r tu n i t ie s  than  fur th er  
east  for  the  r e m a in in g  r ich  M u s l im  p e a sa n ts  to  
e x p r o p r ia te  the land  v a c a te d  by  the  H in d u  r a i y a t s  
as w el l  as  land lords .  A s  a result,  in this  reg ion .
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w h ich  in any case  received the greater proport ion  
o f  n ew  im m igrants,  the n e w c o m e r s  b ecam e  
sharecroppers  and landless labourers rather than  
r a iy a ts  m o re  frequently  than elsewhere.
T h e  prop osit ion  is im portant  fo r  several reasons.  
First, it indicates a structure o f  rural class  
relat ions very different from  the ‘C o m i l la ’ m o d e l  
which  is genera l ly  app lied— n am e ly  a h o m o g e n o u s  
structure o f  undifferentiated,  sm all-ho ld in g  
peasants.  S eco n d ,  it un d erm in es  the related  
a ss u m p t io n s  a b ou t  the nature o f  p ow er  in East  
Bengal w h ich  has trad itional ly  been analysed  
so le ly  in terms o f  the asp irat ions o f  an urban  
pe lty -b o u rg eo is ie  leading  an undifferentiated mass  
o f  the peasantry against  the c o m m o n  oppressor  
from  the W est— e.g. the la n g u a g e  m o v e m e n ts  and  
(he rise o f  Bengali n a tional ism  (A lav i  1972; 
A h m ed  1973: 419-48: .Ali 1975; M an iru zzam an  
197‘'i. "VIore specifically  it fo cu ses  our attention  
on the role o f  these classes  in tran sform in g  the  
entire socia l  fo rm a t io n  both  through  their  
support  for the M usl im  L eague  and the quest for  
an independent  Pakistan,  and through their  
su bsequent  in fluence over  agrarian legislation and  
state po licy  in agriculture. T h e  M usl im  L e a g u e ’s 
policy  o f  part ition had the related ad vantage  o f  
rem ovin g  the stratum o f  H indu  landlords from  
their stu lt i fy ing  influence over  the aspirations o f  
the M usl im  jo te d a rs :  w h ile  the attack on  feudal  
rural relations had to be con ta ine d  at the point  
w h en  the co n d it io n s  for their o w n  appropriation  
o f  land and surplus had been fulf il led.
H o w e v e r  the political s ign if icance  o f  this class o f  
M u sl im  jo te d a r s  in the N o r th  and W est o f  
Ban glad esh  can on ly  be co n s id er ed  in c on jun ct ion  
with that o f  the Bengali petty  bourgeo is ie  
con s is t in g  o f  small traders, sh op k eep ers ,  profes­
sionals .  teachers, jun ior  officials and clerks in the  
provincia l  services. In a c ou n tr y  w here  the entire  
urban pop u la t ion  w as never m o re  than 10 per 
cent, this class had c lose  k insh ip  and other  
c o n n e c t io n s  with  the e c o n o m ic a l ly  stronger
classes o f  ra iya ts  and jo t e d a r s  in the countryside .  
It is not difficult therefore  to see the relationships  
b ew een  the frustrated asp irat ions  o f  a Bengali  
petty b ou rgeo is ie  w h o se  language  (and career  
prospects)  w as threatened and those  o f  the larger  
.Muslim farm ers and peasants w h o se  ow n
d e v e lo p m e n t  w as restricted by West Pakistani  
co lon ia l  policy. In this w ay  the lan eu age  m o v e ­
m ents  could  expand into broader Bengali
Ncitiomdi'-ni and lay the foun d a t io n  for the 
cre.it ion o f  a reformist  nationalist  party (the 
Aw:imi l eague)  w hich success fu l ly  co m b in e d  the 
respect i \ e  con cern s  o f  the larger rural petty
c o m m o d i t y  producers :md the urban petty
bou rg eo is ie  to reproduce W est Pakistani cap ita l­
ism in the East through a c o n st i tu t io n a l  
bo u rg eo is -d em o cra t ic  transform ation , w ith  a sso c i ­
ated career  prospects  for the Bengali inte ll igentsia  
in the  private and public sectors. A  c o m b in a t io n  
o f  populist  rhetoric and rural vo te  banks ( A y o o b  
1971) steadily  increased support a m o n g  the  
poorer  c lasses o f  Bengali  peasantry, cu lm in a t in g  
in the League 's  ov erw h e lm in g  electoral v ictories  
o f  1970 and  1973.
D e s p ite  the co n tem p o ra r y  signif icance o f  these 
tw o  c la sses— jo te d a r s  and urban petty  b ou rgeo is ie  
— and the all iance b etw een  them , they rem ained  
e c o n o m ic a l ly  weak from  1947 to 1971 as a result 
o f  East Bengal's status as a c o lo n y  o f  West  
P akistan .  T h is  has been well d o c u m e n te d  else­
w h ere  by  N a t io n s  (1971) and Sengupta (1971).  
T h e  M u sl im  League and the M o v e m e n t  for  
P akistan  had been  led essentially  by classes  
outs ide  East B enga l— landlords from  P unjab ,  
Sind and Central India; trading c o m m u n it ie s  
from  G ujarat  and B o m b a y  w hich fo r m e d  the  
basis o f  the Pakistani industrial capitalis t  class;  
and w esternised  M usl im  elites from  similar  
reg ions  w h o  const ituted  a profess ional  m iddle  
class and w h o  had staffed the bureaucratic  and  
military apparatuses o f  the co lo n ia l  State. East  
Bengal had been d om in a ted  by H in d u  traders and  
officials (as well as landlords)  as part o f  the  
Calcutta  hinterland. T h u s  M usl im s o f  East Bengal  
were historically  d isadvantaged  at the t ime o f  
P akis tan’s fo rm a t io n  in 1947. T h is  fac il itated  
their co lon ia l  exp lo ita t ion  by the western  region  
up to 1971. and a cco u n ts  for the restr icted and  
u n d ev e lo p ed  nature o f  a b ou rgeo is  class  
in d ig en o u s  to East Bengal.
East Bengal had a virtual w or ld  m o n o p o ly  in 
jute production ,  but the foreign  ex ch a n g e  earned  
by the export  of  this peasant-produced  cash  crop  
w as redirected by the m ilitary-bureaucratic  
o l igarchy  in W est Pakistan ( A)a\ i 1972) on b eh a lf  
o f  the d e v e lo p m e n t  o f  its ind igenous ,  industrial  
capita lis t  class.  T h e  c o m p u ls o r y  purchase o f  West  
Pakistani m anu factu res  by the East at inflated  
m o n o p o ly  prices led to  a further ou tf low  o f  
capital  w h ich  might have  been d ep loyed  locally.  
Further :ispects o f  this c o lo n ia l i sm  indirectly  
restricted the d ev e lo p m en t  o f  the Bengali c lasses.  
West Pakistani capital and its en trepreneurs  were  
signif icantly  present and in contro l  o f  East Bengal  
industry. v\ith Bengali M u sl im s  o w n in g  less than  
2.9 per cent of  private industrial assets,  f h u s  
m uch  o f  the w ealth created in East Bengal  
industrv w as repatriated to the West in the form  
o f  salaries,  d iv idends,  interests and profits;  and  
the related opportun ity  for multiplier  e ' iects  Iromi
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indigenous capital accumulation was also lost. 
Add to the picture the evidence from the First 
and Second Five Year Plans, in particular, that 
the greater proportion of funds for development 
was allocated to the Western Province, and the 
failure of an East Bengali bourgeoisie to emerge 
is hardly surprising. The dominarlt classes in 
W est Pakistan were engaged in an exercise of 
primitive capital accumulation.
T he developm ent o f social relations of production 
in Bangladesh and the pattern of rural class 
form ation cannot be isolated from these colonial 
effects. The principal contradiction was that the 
appropriation o f East Bengal’s rural surplus- by 
the emerging capitalist classes of the West 
(including an unwillingness to re-in vest in East 
Bengal’s agriculture) jeopardised the reproduction 
of social relations required to produce that 
surplus. During the 1950s agricultural output 
virtually stagnated (Bose 1973: 35; Government 
o f Bangladesh 1973: 84, passim). For example, 
rice production increased at 0.7 per cent per 
annum compared with a population growth of 
nearly 3 per cent per annum. Even the production 
o f jute declined in the 1950s, picking up in the 
1960s only because o f a large increase in  the 
acreage, since yields were declining. This evidence 
on jute is consistent with the tendency for land- 
holding to polarise, with land being transferred 
out of the hands o f small, mainly subsistence and 
rice-cultivating peasants. The squeeze on agri­
culture, both through adverse terms of trade and 
the low level o f state investment, restricted the 
capacity o f richer peasants to expand their 
control directly over productive assets. However, 
this squeeze, together with increases in popula­
tion, increased the vulnerability of the poorest 
peasants. W ithout the dubious advantages o f a 
zamindari system to rely on, their urgent require­
ments for credit, for land to sharecrop, or to 
sell their labour could only be met by the richer, 
surplus peasants— at a cost.
By thus restricting the developm ent of rural 
capitalism in East Bengal, Pakistani colonialism  
encouraged the developm ent o f other relations 
o f exploitation: usurious m oneylending often  
related to the mortgaging o f land; leasing o f land 
for sharecropping even where the owner’s holding 
is small and within the capacity o f family labour; 
and the use o f hired labour, sometimes migratory, 
at depressed wage rates (Alam gir 1974: 737-818; 
Clay 1976). In addition to taking on the money- 
lending functions o f the ‘deported’ Hindu Banias, 
the Muslim surplus peasants extended their 
participation in petty trade, either diversifying 
themselves into retail and marketing businesses in
local hats (bazaars) and towns, or financing the 
petty, peripatetic trading activities of the landless 
and near-landless at usurious rates (W ood 1976).
A lthough the context is different, Patnaik’s 
analysis of the role of metropolitan capital in 
structuring the transition from ‘feudalism ’ in 
India has many parallels for the East Bengal 
colony (Patnaik 1972). Pakistan broke up East 
Bengal’s pre-capitalist econom y but restricted 
and distorted the developm ent of capitalist 
relations. She argues that under conditions of 
manipulated stagnation by imperial exploitation  
it is the ‘antediluvian’ form s o f capital which  
emerge and flourish: m oneylending capital for 
usury, trading capital, and capital for purchasing 
land to lease out to petty tenants.
These ‘antediluvian’ forms o f capital represent 
capital in the sphere of exchange, and have to 
be distinguished from capital in the sphere of 
agricultural production which alone would be 
consistent with the developm ent o f capitalist 
social relations in the countryside. Thus under 
these conditions the distortion o f the pre-capitalist 
mode o f production does not necessarily entail 
its substitution by a capitalist mode.
This developm ent o f capital in the sphere of 
circulation of com m odities with the related 
‘antediluvian’ form s has the effect o f under­
mining independent small peasant production. 
There is an increase in landlessness and m ort­
gaging. Indebtedness abounds and the small 
peasants’ land is gradually expropriated de facto 
if not de jure so that the sm all peasant is trans­
formed into a sharecropper (of his own legal 
holding); a dependent labourer and servant; an 
insecure peripatetic trader carrying shoulder 
loads; a migrant agricultural,labourer; a hopeful 
on the urban labour market; or a vagrant (W ood  
1.976). In these circumstances the extension of 
wage labour cannot be interpreted as a sign o f  
advancing capitalist relations. Labour is free 
neither in the sense of being unbonded, nor in 
the sense of the availability o f alternative 
employment since the industrial developm ent o f  
East Bengal was also restricted.
These exploitative relations are institutionally 
disguised at the level of social relations in the 
village, both consciously through verbal agree­
ments and informal arrangements backed by 
sanctions; and more pervasively through the 
class-based management o f the hegem onic, 
egalitarian Muslim kinship ideology w hich  
denounces interest rates and the like.
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But the specificity o f agrarian conditions in East 
Bengal goes beyond that derived from the status 
of the province as a sub-colony o f Pakistan  
when the variations in rural class structure are 
considered. The general effect of Pakistani 
imperialism was not to produce a uniform set 
of responses all over East Bengal, instead it was 
articulated through the inherited regional differ­
ences in social relations. Thus under the ‘mini- 
fundist’ conditions o f the Dacca-Com illa region 
the relationships of debt and mortgage were the 
dominant ‘antediluvian’ form to emerge; while 
sharecropping and landlessness became more 
prevalent in the West and North-W est, where a 
class o f ‘surplus’ Muslim peasants was established 
in the form o f larger landholder and petty 
landlords. This is not to suggest that the other 
forms o f non-productive relation were not 
present in each o f the areas, but that the 
variations above constituted the determining 
relation in each case.
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Rural Development in Bangladesh 
Whose Framework ?
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to incite 
discussion rather than maKe claims to a com­
prehensive review of rural development ex­
perience in Bangladesh. It may give offence- 
either through criticism which is too harsh 
or beouase many of the smaller scale '‘success” 
stories have been overlooKed. There is no 
scarcity of experimentation in Bangladesh with 
30 many non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) 
both local and expatriate, at worK ; and this 
paper is probably evidence that results with 
broader implications are inadequately communi­
cated.
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However, in defence, what follow s is intended to be highly 
selective precisely in order to  dismantle (or at the least cast doubt 
upon) the notions o f framework, model, formula, strategy etc. when 
exam ining or participating in rural developm ent. O f course to be 
'anti-framework' reveals an implicit com m itm ent to som e other 
formula - but then one cannot entirely leave the stage without 
deserting the plot.
This is clearly an appropriate time to be com m enting on rural 
developm ent strategy in Bangladesh with the current formulation  
o f  the next FY P being accom panied by a wariness on the part 
o f  som e senior official o f  the various proposals for strengthening 
or discarding the IR D P framework. W here the issue becomes 
whether to  replicate Comilla or not, the key question must be to 
what extent ‘frameworks’ are o f  limited regional value, emerging  
only after a period o f  trial and error, o f  action research, o f  evalua­
tion, and above all o f  interaction between people and planners. 
T o insist upon applying an external formula to a locality becomes 
sterile im position if  it either is based on false assumptions or 
imitates an untypical experiment. This is the main criticism of  
rural developm ent thinking in Bangladesh.
There is a sense in which this discussion could be regarded 
as a luxury, since it does not address the crisis which I am not 
alone in believing is quickly returning to Bangladesh. The late 
m onsoon this year marks the end o f  a favourable sequence o f  
weather and harvests, and coincides with a further period o f world 
recession which will require emergency responses possibly beyond  
the current regime’s capacity to manage. The appearance o f stabiUty 
in the last 18 months has hardly been sufficient to legitimise the 
regime.
However, the differential vulnerability o f  classes, sectors and 
regions o f  Bangladesh to these events must be partly explained 
by shortcom ings o f contemporary rural developm ent efforts, along 
with the more familiar and still valid explanations o f colonial 
exploitation before and after 1947, class differentiation and greed, 
ecological and climatic disadvantages, and interrelated population  
growth. Presumably these shortcom ings, if  they continue, will 
increasingly account for future disasters as they represent failure
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to control these processes. But it would be misleading to refer 
to various shortcom ings as i f  they shared a com m on conceptual 
status, capable o f  being resolved by knowledge alone. Rural 
developm ent is par excellence a social process rather than a technical 
one - its content and form is the outcom e o f  relations between  
groups and classes internationally as well as nationally, and only  
in that way are criteria established for second order choices bet­
ween institutional and technical alternatives. A lthough this discussion  
mainly concentrates on this second order category o f  shortcom ings, 
it does so in  the knowledge that they are overdetermined by issues 
o f  political econom y and political struggle ; and that in societies 
like Bangladesh rural developm ent activity is a central feature o f  
struggle since for the majority the distribution o f  the most significant 
resources is at stake.
A t the outset therefore it is im portant to recognise that m ost 
discussions o f  rural developm ent (and this one may be no excep­
tion) find it necessary to suspend reality by assuming the exis­
tence o f  a benign state facing mainly problems o f  finance, m anpower, 
technology and knowledge. This assumption is a necessity for anyone 
involved in deploying public resources for growth and developm ent—  
whether they are policy makers or village level workers. However 
despite our personal hopes, such assumptions are rarely the truth 
in any society— government and popular leaders (indeed they may 
be populist) are inevitably constrained by the interests o f  dom inant 
class, which critically include the bureaucracy when other avenues o f  
employment and status are few. There is nothing to be gained by 
denying this reality, euphem istically referred to as ‘absence o f  political 
will” and it does not only apply to Bangladesh. But there are tw o  
further aspects o f  the reality which specifically characterise Bangladesh. 
First, we have witnessed the continuous search by successive cliques 
o f  pettybourgeois leaders for a coherent populist ideology which will 
capture mass imagination through the provision o f  attractive formulas 
in rural development. Secondly, there is the overwhelming presence 
o f  international, bilateral and voluntary aid/technical assistance 
agencies with private, capital waiting in the wings for the stage 
to be constructed and the script finished. Furthermore the relation 
between these two processes is significant, since the inevitable 
populism establishes the preconditions for the way in which different
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parts o f the state apparatus have becom e captured in thought 
and deed by permutations o f  external agencies. This is particularly 
evident in the policy and executive area o f  rural developm ent 
and agriculture, and sym ptom atic o f the internal contradictions 
within the Bangladesli state.
It is not mere M arxist preoccupation or ‘Third World ism’ to  
develop these themes o f dependency and internal disarticulation in the 
context o f  this discussion. Where the survival o f  ‘state’ classes 
(including elements o f the bureaucracy) has becom e inextricably 
linked to the maintenance o f  different forms o f  aid, then internal 
fractional struggles interact with and indeed thrive upon the external 
presentation o f  ideology, knowledge (research, evaluations, concepts, 
theories, m ethodologies etc.), and schemes. It is not a question  
o f susceptiblity to external propositions, but o f  interdependence 
where external agencies establish a territory o f  clients within the 
state apparatus and vice versa. The creation o f  m odels and slo ­
gans is a reciprocal process o f mutual accom m odation inspired 
by the imperatives o f  survival, institutionalisation and the con so­
lidation o f personal fortunes by national and international civil 
servants.
In South Asia, and in Bangladesh in particular, the IBRD  
has been very public in its voyage o f the m atic discovery from small 
farmer to marginal farmer, basic needs, the landless, area developm ent, 
target groups, and so on. The comm itment to area developm ent 
as revealed in the IB R D ’s R D  1 (and more or lesss adopted intact 
by D A N ID A , A D B, NITA and now possibly U K -O D M ) streng­
thened the IR D P interests white deserting the ‘true’ spirit 
o f  the TCCA/K SS framework. These ‘rcnt-a-thana’ strategies have 
contributed to the B A D C ’s hegemony over input distribution through  
bureaucratic allocations and subsidies. Ironically, the concentration  
o f  resources (in particular, scarce administrative and extension  
capacity) on a small proportion o f the IR D P thanas has seriously 
Weakened efforts elsewhere where indifferent experience is cited 
as a general criticism o f  the framework, and encourages 
even the initiators o f RD-1 and co. to look  now more favoura­
bly upon ‘com m ercial’, open-market solutions to rural production and 
distribution. It is certainly true that U SA ID  is increasingly com m itted  
to production-oriented, commercial strategies within the Ministry
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o f Agriculture (e. g. open fertiliser dealing), while at the same 
time domestic foodgrain prices are depressed by the efforts o f  
U . S. food aid.
There is no sense in being surprised or indignant about con­
tradiction and paradoxes o f government rural policy. For any 
society, especially those with substantial state involvem ent in the 
econom y, the view o f  a m onolithic, coherent state apparatus should  
be discarded. The management or late m onopoly capitalism any­
where involves contradictory responses which are reproduced within 
the state apparatus itself to produce a chaotic, pluralist even anarchic 
relationship between its constituent parts (Hirsch 1978). In an ex­
treme case like, Bangladesh where these contradictions are reproduced 
within the highly significant internal and bilateral donor agencies 
as well, the lack o f  coherence in policy is even more unders­
tandable.
It is a wonder then that two main trends in policy can actually 
be discerned. First, a commercial, production growth strategy based  
on individual farmers responding to prices for inputs as well as 
produce with a gradual phasing out o f  input subsidies, operated  
primarily through the Ministry o f  Agriculture. Critically associated  
with the trend and not the responsibility o f  the Agriculture M inistry 
is a ‘target group-basic needs’ element, centred around the provision  
o f  rural em ployment for those classes and groups who have no future 
in direct cultivation. Within this trend, land reform is m ore about 
legitimising existing processes o f consolidation and concentration than 
about redistribution. A related aspect o f  this trend is the recent 
introduction, with IB R D  support, o f  the T and V (Training and 
visits) extension m ethods, which indicates a further shift from the 
earlier Comilla-derived integrated developm ent formula o f  T T D C ’s 
and TCCA’s. This will be discussed in more detail later. The second  
trend ' is even m ore familiar in Bangladesh, and refers to the efforts 
this year by Akhter Hameed K han (A .A .K han 1979) to lobby  
for a revival o f  this earlier integrated strategy using T T D C ’s 
local council, co-operatives ; and the principle o f  thana planning 
for : the improvement o f  drainage and embankments, securing supplies 
of additional surface watef, and increased utilisation o f  ground 
water. Alongside these three elements, four other areas o f  activity are 
outlined— the generation o f  equity capital guaranteed supplies o f chem- 
cal fertilisers, pesticides and seeds ; training o f  co-op managers and
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seeds : training o f  co-op managers and m odel farmers instead o f  
extension agents with the posting o f  specialists at the thana level 
(in direct contrast to  the T  and V system) : and the creation o f  pro­
cessing and marketing units owned and operated co-operatively. In 
this re-assertion o f  the original Com illa theme, Khan is arguing 
that the indifferent experience with IR D P since 1973 is not so much 
a criticism o f  the m odel, (the framework) as evidence that it 
was mainly the KSS part o f  the IR D P formula that was attempted  
in the 250 thanas, and that it was introduced m echanically without 
regard for the spirit o f  the original idea. H e argues further that 
in this Programme co operatives have been m isconceived as targets 
for subsidy and relaxed credit disbursement, whereas they were 
intended to be fully viable com m ercial institutions with the TCCAs 
behaving according to normal banking criteria.
Neither o f  these approaches involves the principle o f  local 
participation in the form ulation o f  rural developnient policy, although 
both contain elem ents o f  participation for im plem entation but more 
in the sense o f  rural m obilisation on behalf o f  Projects and schemes 
already designed. The attraction o f  a framework, any framework, 
for a central planner is , that it provides a uniformity o f  
activity and procedure consistent with the norms o f  managing large 
functional M inistry— practices, supervision and accountability can be 
standardised, in short central control established. Which framework 
then becomes o f secondary importance. The dilemma which som e 
senior officials have expressed in Bangladesh is whether a process 
o f  participation in localised and policy and planning activities will 
lead to a myriad o f local philosophies and institutions which cannot 
be co-ordinated centrally let alone into a coheient policy. Further­
more a critical dim ension o f  regional diversification is the 
different forms o f  class struggle that obtain. The ethical dilemma  
o f ‘whose framework ?’ is certainly not just resolved by regionalising 
policy— making if  the pre-capitalist relations between classes render 
the majority effectively unfree to  engage in a genuine articulation  
o f their interests. However, if  class struggles were decentralised 
in this way, the purpose o f  struggle might become more meaningful 
to  those involved and would certainly re-align the pattern o f  influences 
on policy formulation.
At the same time it is clear that variations in regional con­
ditions are significant, and that rural/agricultural development thinking
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has suffered through neglecting the heterogeneity o f  Bangladesh 
in terms o f  clim ate, hydrology, soil structure and the historical 
patterns o f interaction between different rural classes and the land. 
Thus even if the overall description o f  the pattern o f influences 
on the Bangladesh state is accepted as accounting for the absence 
o f  radical rural developm ent programmes in the country, it can 
nevertheless be recognised that considerable scope exists within the 
current configuration o f  rural and urban classes for the inclusion  
o f  the regional dim ension in discussions about frameworks. The 
issue, however, is by what process local characteristics are d isco­
vered and responses to them devised. It is this question which 
takes the discussion ' beyond problems o f  content to problems o f  
m ethod ; indeed it substitutes method for content as the major 
way for outsiders (whether o f  the same national! ty or not) to assist 
rural poor. The focus on method is a meta-framework, the 
precise virtue o f  which is to avoid prior specification o f projects 
and the like for ‘other’ people.
The final part o f  this paper will return to  this theme. 
However to support some o f  the assertions (even allegations) made 
above, a summary follow s o f  som e o f  the problems and criticism  
which are generally, found o f  current strategies. It is intended to 
serve as a useful checklist o f previous experience as well as a 
basis for pursuing arguments about diversity, m ethods, participation  
and the limits o f  government intervention. Since it consists o f  a 
survey o f  critical literature, the emphasis is upon the presentation 
o f  arguments rather than any attempt to reconcile any differences 
between them.
R E V IE W  O F  P R O B L E M S  A N D  C U R R E N T STRATEG IES  : 
Population
T o begin there is the general context o f  population growth 
under conditions where private gain conflicts with social cost. 
(Arthur and M cN icholl 1978 pp 46-59). Furthermore the propo­
sition exists, although inadequately tested at this time, that in 
som e areas where the H Y V  package in rice has-been extensively 
adopted this is associated with relatively high population growth 
rates between 1961-1974. (Arthur and M cN icholl 1978 p32). I f  
this is true, the im plications are alarming ; and certainly the
The Journal of Social Studies/8
proposition requires lurtiier examination. (BIDS poverty study, careful 
use o f  next census d a ta ? )  The ramifications o f  population growth  
throughout the agrarian structure are pervasive : families living
off sam e size o f  holding ; fragmentation o f  holding ; dispossession  
o f  infrasubsistence peasants ; decline in availability o f  land for 
sharecropping : increase in the number o f  landless, enhanced value 
o f  children as income-earners and providers o f  old-age security, 
depressive effect on wages ; undermining patron-client dependency 
relations which offered minimal security to labour, as surplus labour 
contributes to the commercialisation o f labour relations.
Inputs, Institutions, and Class Differentiation
Further general propositions that significant class differentia­
tion occurs despite the predominance o f  small farms where 79% 
o f  the rural households own less than 4 acres (excluding landless) 
which represents 48% o f  the total net area (Bureau o f  Statistics 
Land Occupancy Survey 1977) ; the local councils and co-operatives 
are captured by the locally dominant classes ; that the segmentary, 
lineage structure of the village forms the basis o f  factional struggles 
preoccupied with division o f  scarce resources rather than the  
production o f  goods ; that factions prevent collaborative efforts 
through co-operatives to the benefit o f richer factional leaders 
and at the expense o f  the poor ; that factions com posed o f  ver­
tical patron-client dependency relations diffuse class relations ; that 
the domination o f co-operatives by the rural rich means control 
over tube-wells (their locations and management), better access to  
inputs and credit, and indeed the private re-lending o f  credit at 
higher interest rates ; that m oney lending yields higher returns 
than productive investment : that as a result o f  som e o f  these
processes, the introduction o f  HYV foodgrain packages is respo­
nsible for greater rural class differentiation.
Higher Rice Production : Irrigated or Rainfed ?
Critically, the diffusion o f  HYV technology cannot proceed  
without the availability o f  pumps, borings, seed, fertilizer— and the 
provision o f  these items remains a key constraint involving both 
import policy, domestic investm ent decisions in assembly, m anufac­
turing, raw materials extraction and processing plant, and o f course
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the efficacy o f  B A D C  dom ination over distribution. A ccording  
to the Bureau o f  Statistics 1977, by the end o f  A m on early 
1976, 15% o f  the gross rice cropped area was under high  
yielding varieties. A lthough there have been rapid increases in the 
use o f low-lift pum ps, tube-wells and fertilizer these have started 
from  a small base so that approximately 6.5%  o f  cultivated area 
is irrigated by low-lift pumps and 1.2% by tube-wells. Total cro­
pped area as a proportion o f  net cultivated area m oved from 127%  
in  the early 60s to  nearly 150% today. (Bureau o f  Statistics 1977) 
The inescapable conclusion from this is that rice, production has 
■not been greatly affected by irrigation and use o f  other inputs, and  
that higher production still depends on good rainfall for the tradi­
tional A m on crop.
Significance of Co-operative Membership
M ore specially in the context o f  the IR D P for 250 thanas with  
a related expansion o f  TCCA's and KSS’s, several studies conclude 
that the differences in yield between members and non-members 
for the same crop are not significant as long as non-members 
have access to  irrigation ; and that KSS membership p er se is 
less important than the widespread availabilty o f  HYV package o f  
inputs (Blair 1978). Even assuming an early success in Com illa 
with thé rapid expansion o f IRDP the KSSs in particular and 
TCCA s have become dominated by surplus farmers who m onopo­
lise institutional credit capture irrigation and are the largest loan  
defaulters. (Islam  1978, Khan A A , 1971, Stroberg 1977).
Subsidies
There seems to have an important relationship between credit 
discipline and the maintenance o f  subsidies. The rapid expansion  
o f  the TCCA/K SS system was accom panied by a sharp decline in 
credit discipline am ong the landholders especially (N B  the outs­
tanding loan situation in the R-DI thanas; % of loan outstanding  
from rice production in 1977 as o f  1.3.78 was 79.7% - Sonali Bank) 
and KSS savings were correspondingly low. A s a result, the pro­
gramme became heavily dependent upon high input subsidies thus 
undermining the ideology o f self-supporting co-operatives which 
originally lay behind the scheme. (Blair 1974). But the picture 
on subsidies has to be set against overall government investm ent
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in agriculture. Fertilizer subsidies are at 48% (B A D C  1977 10:11) 
capital costs o f  irrigation has always been com pletely subsidised and 
recurring costs subsidy for lowlift pumps is 77% and for deep  
tube-wells, 88%. In 1976/77 fertilizer subsidies represented 17% 
o f total expenditure on agricultural developm ent (CPRB 1978 : 
82 and table 13) but then note the declining proporton o f  public 
sector developm ent expenditure (34%  in 1973/4to 29: 1977/78) 
devoted to agriculture, rural institutions and water resources (CPRB  
1978 Table 1.8). Even less attention has been given to the appro­
priate technology aspects o f  agriculture which m ight be expected  
both to assist the poorer farmers and provide more em ploym ent. 
M anual and low  cost, m ethods o f  irrigation receive no subsidies 
at all, and Edwards argues that they are in effect taxed because 
o f  import duties on raw m aterials. (Edwards et al 1978).
Landless
Increasing attention by observers and som e official upon the 
plight o f  the landless has stim ulated criticisms about the extent 
o f  their exclusion from IR D P  and other public expenditure pro­
grammes. W e hardly need reminding o f  the grim statistics - the 
proportion o f  households in rural Bangladesh with only hom estead  
land or none at all (landless categories 1-2 o f  Land Occupancy 
Survey o f  1978) is 43.47%  and a further 31.29% o f households 
with less than 0.5 o f  an acre. W ith considerable definitional cav­
eats both the East Pakistan Census o f  1961 and the East Pakistan 
Census o f  1960 offer a figure o f  17% for the landless. A t least 
we can be sure o f  a dramatic growth in the numbers o f  landless 
and near landless. The increasing supply o f  labour through the 
rise in landlessness, partially caused by the subdivision o f  holdings 
which reduces the dem and for landless labour has contributed to  
a decline o f  50% approx. in the real value o f  agricultural wages 
between 1965 and 1975. (A .R .K han 1977 p. 152 see also Alam gir 
I9%4) Furthermore, R iswanul Islam  concludes from a review o f  
studies that “although there is som e evidence o f  increased labour 
demand consequent on the introduction o f  new technology, it is 
clear that it has failed to make any impact on the real wages 
o f  agricultural labourers.” (G PRA B , lylin. o f  Agriculture M ay 1978 
p.130).
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Public Works Programmes
It is true that the Rural Works Programme (RW P) and the Food  
for W ork (FFW ) programmes have contributed to  rural em ploym ent 
by, for exam ple, generating 100 million man-days o f work in 1976/77  
(Institute o f  N utrition  1977 A ), and in the process created consid­
erable physical infrastructure. Rural W orks is an important part 
o f  Akhter H am eed K han’s proposals, and several findings should  
be carefully considered in  this connection. D u e to local corrup­
tion the estim ates o f  man-days generated are probably exaggerated. 
Those m ost in need do not always benefit: according to the Insti­
tute o f  N utrition Survey findings (1977 B) 25% o f  RW P workers 
in C om illa owned m ore than 2 acres, and 45 % o f  workers in the 
FF W  programme (designed soley for the destitute) had alternative 
m eans o f  support. The seasonal nature o f  rural works - dry seasons 
when there is certainly a need - cannot easily cope with the needs 
say o f  perennially flooded families during the rains. F inally the 
operation o f  these programmes has been dominated by the locally  
rich acting as brokers and contractors with government and agencies 
-seizing the opportunities for an extension o f  patronage and a 
new form  o f  econom ic diversification. This process is reinforced 
where has been no prior organisation o f  the rural workers invol­
ved in the programmes, and where funds are channelled through 
thana and union councils, which are dominated by richer farmers 
and local entrepreneurs (Alamgir 1977). Perhaps this is an inevi- 
lable cost in order to achieve higher levels o f  agricultural production  
(on the lands o f  the rich) as a result o f  the infrastructural provision.
Comilla Formula; Appropriate for other Regions ?
In m any o f  the criticisms o f  the replication o f  Com illa through  
IR D P, there seems to be a key elem ent which itself has been 
overlooked - the possibility that the institutional structures and prog­
ramme content which emerged and took  shape over a decade in 
Com illa kotwali thana were inappropriate when transferred to other 
regional situations. (And even in Comilla, o f  course, the co-oper­
atives have been frequently criticised by the founders and members 
o f  B A R D  for their dom ination by local elites, and the tube-w ell/ 
inputs diflusion programme for its continuing dependence on sub" 
sidies.) (Faidley and Esm ay 1976).
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Regional Statistics on Landholding
It is interesting to note that despite the considerable number o f  
rural surveys in Bangladesh on landholdings and tenancy, there is very 
little published presentation o f  regional statistics. In the Land  
Occupancy Survey o f  1977 com m issioned by US A ID  the nearest 
we get to regional data is a series o f  tables, set side, based on 
7 Dinajpur Sainple Villages and 7 Chittagong R egion Sample Villa­
ges with no further indication o f  their location, characteristics 
etc. The summary report o f  the 1978 Land Occupancy Survey 
also aggregates the data to the national level. The exception to  
tliis pattern is the publication by B .A .R .C .: “incidence o f  Land­
lessness and Major Landholding and Cultivation Groups in Rural 
Bangladesh” . It made no pretence to a rigorous sample, with  
the limited resources at its disposal, and the report wisely cau­
tions about the reliability o f  its data (a refreshing adm ission in 
itself). The results from the 10 (out o f  20) agricultural districts 
presented in  the report are tentatively revealing, because the Comilla 
region is far from  typical. Comilla District shows the sm allest 
proportion o f  landless labourers (26.1% ), the smallest proportion  
o f  sharecroppers (13.0%) the largest number o f  owner cultivators 
by a large margin (54.6% ), and the smallest (but one) proportion  
o f  big farmers (more then 5 acres), (6.3% ). Dinajpur by contrast 
has 31.1% landless, 25.6% sharecroppers, 28.5% owner cultivators 
14.9% big farmers. Khulna and Rajshahi display similar patterns 
to Dinajpur.
It would be unwise to attach too  much significance to those 
patterns because o f the nature o f  the data-base, but these varia­
tions between Comilla and the other areas do conform  to other 
pictures o f  regional variations gleaned from village studies (Adnan  
et al 1974-1978, Arens and Van Beurd cn 1979)^ location-specific 
research and som e historical data-^Wood 1977) On this basis, 
let us speculate upon the significance o f  the variations in agrarian 
social relations, which is only hinted at in these figures.
The Peasant Economy Error
Until recently the two major contem porary sources o f  under­
standing agrarian relations in Bangladesh has been aggregated data 
collected during the sixties and seventies, and the research based
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on Comilla. These sources have produced two generalisations : 
the absence o f  a substantial class o f  landlords and rich landho­
lders, the low  level o f  absolute average size o f  holding and the 
predominance o f  owner-cultivators (74.5% o f  cultivating population  
in Comilla kotwali Thana, and 13.2% for the district ; B A R C  
1978, p.20). From  this and the aggregated data it has usually  
been concluded that “ the rural econom y o f Bangladesh is best 
described as a peasant econom y based on sm all fam ily farms 
operated primarily with family labour” (Abdullah and N ations  
1974 p.9). H owever if  we consider the Dinajpur picture, only41%  
are owner-cultivators conform ing to this ‘peasant econothy’ descrip- 
on, 37.9%  are share-croppers and 21.1% are big farmers (although  
this latter category in the case o f  D inajpur may be a little 
misleading. (BA R C  1978 p .30)
The Com illa programme o f co-operatives etc. was based on 
the assumption that class divisions within the ‘peasant econom y’ 
was structurally insignificant. And w ould it be fair to  say, tliat 
both original plan to  expand C om illa in the form  o f  IR D P  
and the current for a revival o f  the Com plete IR D P  is based 
upon a sim ilar assum ption? The analysis o f  the C om illa area 
contained further assumptions : that while surveys indicated that 
the K SS’s were dominated by rural elites, these elites did not 
constitute a class since the division o f  holdings between sons 
ensured a process o f cyclical m obility or indeed ‘cyclical Kulakism , 
(Bcrtocci 1972). The more pessim istic view o f  this process is that 
there is a steady process o f  fragm entation for all classes-steadily  
producing m ore landless, marginal farmers and em asculating the 
richer ones. This process is referred to by Akhter H am eed Khan  
as the collapse o f  the entire agricultural system, o f  which the 
landless are a symptom. A lthough by no means conclusive, other 
village-study work shows that even in Com illa K otw ali thana these 
propositions do not hold - that larger farmers acquire through land 
mortgage arrangements and debt relations, and the opportunities 
provided- both  by superior landholding and better access to develop­
ment agencies have encouraged this group diversify their econom ic  
activity in to  the sphere o f  exchange (rather than production) and 
professional employment. (W ood 1976, now  accepted in private 
com m unication by Bertocci, and reinforced by the findings o f  
Martins w ho worked in four other villages).
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Thus even the traditional view o f  agrarian relations in Comilla 
itself with its high number o f  owner-cultivators, and less numbers 
o f  landless and sharecroppers is being challenged. And on the 
basis o f  the available regional data, this picture o f agrarian 
relations in Bangladesh must be even m ore inaccurate when applied  
elsewhere - especially in the North and the W est o f  the country.
Dimensions of Regionally
I have attem pted elsewhere (W ood 1977 ,p p .2 -ll) to trace the exis­
tence o f  significant regional variations in the relations between  
classes, referring to historical data, and cannot repeat that analy­
sis here. Part o f  the argument is that in general rural class 
relations in Bangladesh have been characterised by the use o f  capital 
in the sphere o f  exchange rather than production, but that the 
precise forms o f  that capital are structured by particular histor­
ical conditions and the related variable effects o f  especially soil 
fertility, structure and elevation, but also flood vulnerability, drai­
nage and waterlogging, rainfall, temperature, population density 
and structure, cropping systems, pattern o f  livestock ownership, 
migrant settlers on marginal land and so on. The critical effect 
o f all this is on variations in the incidence o f  formal tenancy, 
the use o f  non- family labour, productivity and land values (irriga­
ted land in Dinajpur is valued at between Tk. 10,000-15,000 per 
acre and is probably 4 times that now  in C om illa), nature o f  
indebtedness, patterns o f  migration, scale and direction o f  diversifi­
cation from agriculture, intensification o f  agriculture production  
activity, family size, lineage structures, receptivity to  various forms 
o f  technology (with different capital-labour ratios).
The picture has emerged that the N orth and the W est have 
more landlords, sharecroppers and landless labourers than in the 
East ; that landlords have better access to inputs than owner-cul­
tivators but cultivate intensively on smaller proportions o f  their 
land; that sharecroppers and owner-cultivators are being slowly 
dispossessed o f  their land; or forced in the case o f  sharecroppers 
to  cultivate higher proportions o f marginal, less productive land 
in their holdings. Furthermore it is not correct to  argue that 
all categories o f  landholdings are fragmenting steadily, and red­
ucing all classes to the lowest com m on denominator. The
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holdings o f poorer classes are fragmenting and holdings are m ortg­
aged, eventually transferred, or sold as those classes descend the 
downward spiral. This land is being referred to  other classes 
and they are surely not ones who are also descending. So can 
we observe an opposite process o f  consolidation and concentra­
tion M any o f  these statements should still have the status 
o f  hypotheses, and anyway the relation between tenancy, prod­
uctivity and marketable surplus has to  be further investigated. But 
a general picture o f  regional variations o f  this type cannot be ignored  
and the principle o f  absorbing these dim ensions in policy and p lan ­
ning activities m ust be established,
Replication of Comilla—The Rd-I Test
I f  we return to the issue o f  replicating Comilla through the 
IR D P , it m ust be conceded that IR D P , as originally conceived  
has not been given a fair trial in Bangladesh. But the question  
must now  be whether the political, administrative, social and econo­
m ic preconditions exist for the revival o f  the earlier strategy without 
m odification. By drawing attention to the dimensions o f  regionality 
and especially the variations in landholding patterns (size and 
tenancy) even the attempt to apply a single project fo im ula  
loses its validity, let alone the contem plation o f  a revival. Even 
i f  the Com illa m odel was accepted as valid for Com illa, two  
sets o f  difficulties are encountered in its replication : administrative/ 
extension manpower resources and an exaggerated pattern o f  rich 
farmer dom ination over K SS’s.
First, it is often a r ^ e d  both for and against the replication  
o f  Comilla into IR D P  tM t the speed and partial character o f  its 
reproduction (involving inadequate training, lack o f  credit discipline, 
scarcity o f  specialist personnel at the thana level and administrative 
capacity generally) was responsible for the weaknesses in the pro­
gramme, and thus was not a fair test. • This pace must have been  
a contributing factor in the em asculation o f  the programme, but 
the question remains whether the Com illa m odel was in fact too  
costly in terms o f  the manpower resources (m obilisers, specialists, 
administrators, evaluators) require for im plem entation. The essence 
o f  Comilla, as I understand it, was the patient m obilising o f  farmer 
groups, educating them as to the econom ic opportunities which
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were available to them if they organised around some lumpy invest­
ment. If so many manpower resources and over a decade were 
required for Comilla, why should not the same apply elsewhere 
in Bangladesh ? If the justification for the investment in Comilla 
was that it was innovative, and required understanding of a detailed 
interaction with the local social-ecology-then surely the same argu­
ment must apply (if to a slightly weaker extent) when attempts 
are made to transfer the thinking to new situations ? In this 
respect it ,would be more helpful to talk of the Comilla S tyle  
rather than then Comilla model - that is a method of approaching 
rural development problems, identifying them, and resolving through 
constant re-adjustment and monitoring of performance. These are 
the enormous strengths from the Comilla experience which must 
be retained in the new policies.
^ ■ ■ . ■ . - . . .
Secondly the . distinctive feature o f. the Corhilla method was 
the relationship between the analysis of agrarian relation in Comilla 
(erroneous though it may have been ) and the devising of a response- 
viz. the TCCA/RSS strategy. The apparent homogeneity of land­
owning classes leading to the belief that farmers would join together 
on more or less equal terms to form a co-operative organisation 
in their own mutual interests. Leaving aside any problems which 
might have appeared at Comilla, how realistic is this strategy in 
districts like Dinajpur where owner-cultivators might constitute nearer 
28% of . the cultivating population instead of the 55% in Comilla, 
and the proportion of sharecroppers much higher too ? The entire 
pattern of dependency and patron client relations is of course 
determined by these differences in access to land and in landholding 
status. . These relations are. reinforced by the chronic indebtedness 
of the.niajprity of the rural population, and occur between close 
kin members as well. (Richer, kinsmen will assist poorer bari and 
lineage members with relief (thereby reinforcing dependency) but 
not with development assistance).
With these two sets of general problems in mind  ̂ it is useful 
10 comment on the experience of the IBRD’s BD-1 project (started 
in July 1976) in 7 z/w/zos of Mymensingb and Bogra. Its relevance 
sterns from the attempt to replicate and strengthen the Comilla 
approach with the assistance of 16 million dollars additional funding.
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“The project would streogthcu a number of production* 
oriented c^going rural programmes in project thanas. To 
ensure that benefits reach the rural poor, physical inputs 
and rural credit provided under the project would be chan­
neled through the Comilla type of co-operative (TCGA-KSS). 
A major effort would be made to improve the operation 
and management of these co-operatives. Technical services 
to the co-operative members would be strengthened- The
project would comprise rural works ; minor irrigation faci­
lities ; thana facilities ; rural credit ; strengthening of rural
institutions and services ; technical assistance, and monitoring 
and evaluation.” (IBRD—No 837—BD 31/10/1975 p. 9).
Despite attempts to invoje the BIDS, by March 1979 no 
mdependeot evaluation had been conducted. However in addition 
to the reports of personnel involved in the project, the reactions
of an IBRD review mission in April 1979 are interesting—they
are suihmariscd hcré from a longer discussion.
District and thana committees have concentrated more on 
rural \\^rks to the neglect of institution-building and production 
oriented components. There has been a severe lack of continuity 
in. staff due to frequent transfers, undermining morale and ensuring 
staff ignorance of and lack of commitment to the programme. 
Salary and status docs not match up to workloads so that appro­
priate quality of staff is not attracted. Data collection is haphazard, 
unanalyscd and not fed back for guiding policy and implementation. 
Large accumulation o f unspent funds (as of 30/6/78: 70% of Total 
releases by GOB was unspent) which' attracted interest while other 
projects in the country were starved of local currency funds. Th- 
tcrcsts earnings unaccounted for. Monthly statements of expenditure 
were at best 8 months late. Project funds for haild-pump credit 
were misused and whereabouts of collections unknown. Sale receipts 
from BADC facilities distribution (funded out of IDA allocation 
of 1.6 million dollars) unknown, and no decision taken on use of 
income. Auditors for financial years 70/77 and 77/78 have not 
conridcred these and other financial irregularities.
On rural works, .data on progress is inadequate, often totally 
unavailable. Overall progress estimated to be at least one year
17
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behind schedule. Cost estimates and scope of works have deviated 
from provision without knowledge of IIQ management.; and espe­
cially for Katcha works a familiar pattern of inflating quantities 
o f work completed and payments made by supervising staff without 
actual measurements. (A further commitment to a programme of 
Pucca road construction is worrying as the benefits are likely to 
be highly skewed in favour of richer farmers).
On agricultural extension, the T and V system has been introduced 
into the four Bogra thanas. According to a local FAG informant 
this has led to considerable confusion although the review mission 
refers only to some conflict between the T & V approach and the 
model farmer approach of IRDP. As a way of reconciling tliis 
it  is-suggested that model farmers be automatically included among 
the contact ■ farmers of the T & V ; it is further believed this will 
strengthen the co-operativcs. FAQ informant is highly sceptical, 
believing that T & V functions to undermine co-operatives precisely 
because the extention workers are monopolised by model farmers 
and others, who inevitably belong to the richer groups. This must 
be: further reinforced by the review mission’s observation that ex- 
tcntiqn staff do not work outside ‘office hours’ when most KSS 
-meetings are held. The I ’ & V system is based on a contact with 
individual. farmers rather than groups of then;. Contact between 
extension and research is weak on (agri-) cultural practices. (And 
is obviously non-existent on other aspects of cultural practices and 
social relations !)
There has been little compliance with project procedures 
for the allocation of low lift pumps (L L P 's) to pump groups. 
The. implication from the review mission’s report is that LLPs 
have, been going into richer, private hands whereas the intention 
: had been to maximise pump coverage and increase the participation 
: of small farmers. . Overall the minor irrigation activity based on 
STW‘s hand pumps and LLP’s has been low partly due to 
procurement, problems. But the criteria used for allocation has 
. been questionable.
Finally the most telling set, pf criticisms refers to the 
experience with co-operatives. Despite intensive efforts under the 
project less than 30% of the farm families in the project area 
arc covered by TCCA societies, and the participation of the
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TIP societies in TCCA is very limitrd. Less than 5% of the 
farm families in the project thanas arc receiving production 
credit under . the. project. Some of the reasons given for this 
include cumbersome lending procedures, ineligibility due to previous 
defaults, ^nd. overemphasis on short-term production loans. Small 
farmers remain dependent on moneylenders for the crucial medium- 
term loans for irrigation, livestock, etc. Recovery perfoimance on 
loans is no better than in any other ‘normal’ IRDP thana. Accounts 
arc poorly maintained at KSS level, and long delays iu auditing 
then occur. The iise of annual production plans ( instead of crop 
production plans ) as the basis o f annual credit plans has not 
been successful, as they are badly prepared on questionable 
facts and assumptions. Thé preparation of land registers for 
many of thé K SS‘s are intentionally or unintcntiohally inaccurate 
and certainly there is no appreciation at thana level of their 
potential use in extension works to estimate input and credit 
requirements, and allocate pumps. Irrigation ledgefs for KSS'S 
to protect members from overcharging/undeisupplying—Were not 
being maintained. Management of fertilizer dealerships by TCCA’s 
is unsatisfactory-no forecasting of demand and insufficient notice 
to BADC to ensure timely supply. There has been no significant 
improvement in training programmes for model farmers despite 
earlier requests from ID A .
Commercialism and ‘Relief*—the Dual Alternative to IRDP
Thus RD—I as an attempt to replicate Comilla on a modest 
scale with lavish resources, nevertheless is described in these ternis 
by an ‘in-house’ review mission. The longer term effects on the 
pattern of rural class formation have yet to be firmly established 
but, it is no I difficult to guess at what the general conclusion 
will be. Furthernipre these criticisms draw attention to the 
problems o f rimnihg' such a sophisticated, elaborate, integrated 
programme with large funding at speed with limited manpower 
resources in terms of experience and training. It seems clear that 
considerable Ica-kage of funds-corruption, patronage, access problems, 
rich ' farmers. dominance, entrepreneurial opportunism are among 
other possible descriptions—is occuring. The j rural poor are not 
only unable-txr benefit, they are witnessing a realignment of
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class forces—involving the strengthening of alliances between rich 
farmers, petty landlords, local contractors and elements 
of thé bureaucracy—which is further removing them from any 
access to state/foreign aid disbursements. As a tool for reaching 
the rural poor the TRDP’ formula in Comilla had its limitations, 
elsewhere it is a disaster even under the favourable, well lubricated 
conditions of RD-I.
With its discovery of ‘basic needs’, its support for ‘target 
groups’, and this recent commitment to the T <4 V extension 
approach, the Bank ‘experts’ seem to be recognising the limitaUons 
of IRDP. Perhaps as yet unconsciously, their thinking is drifting 
towards the alternative trend noted in the introduction-input 
oriented agricultural policy involving a specialist agriculture service 
(T .& V) to individual farmers and mobilisation of funds through 
commercial banks, and separate ‘basic needs’ programmes for poor 
‘target groups’. It could be that, there is some sense to this approach 
within the non-revolutionary framework of the dominant political 
forces in Bangladesh and their international allies. But it wpuld 
involve an acceptance of the rise, o f a special kind of Bangladeshi 
Kulak (probably happening anyway) with a recognition that: the 
dependence of such a class on state support (subsidies, credit, 
interest rates, pricing and procurement policy etc) ought to be 
phased out as more investment was made in the productive opportuni­
ties of other rural classes. For those of us who are Unsure about 
‘urban bias’ analyses, this seems an unlikely outcome. More likely 
is. a short'tçrm holding operation in which ‘basic needs’ proposals 
for. poor, ‘target groups’ attract more interest from donors than 
hitherto,;., and an emasculated vcrrion of IRDP involving an cxpansipu 
of T ; A .V; ; a curtailing of BADC activity as the procurement and 
distribution of inputs is increasingly managed by an expanding 
private, .commercial sector: and the continuation of state support 
for .̂ thc agriculti^e sector leaving it up to the contending classes how 
the benefits are distributed (like now.)
’ One alarming aspect o f this process is that all pretence at 
fural planning in Bangladesh might disappear—that a weakened IRDP 
might -mechanically pursued (stale air to fill the vacuum ?) along 
whh- a steady expansion of the T and V approach regardless of local
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conditions ; that, this will be accompanied by an aci hoc procedure 
of generating and allocating ‘basic’ projects to fulfil budgetary 
tnd regional quotas : and that finally in the process the role of 
rural outsiders will become .more powerful, with lip-service paid 
to the possibilities o f participation. It is the fear of this prospect 
which guides the remarks which follow.
Generation of Services : Methods and Style
In the context of the current foodgrain crisis and the hastily 
mobilised response to it, impatience with more abstract discussions 
about longer-term strategies ' is undei*standable. But at least part 
of current vulnertibillity can be attributed to a failure to involve 
groups of landless and poor peasants in viable productive activities 
as well as past failures to distribute Tninor irrigation facilities on 
a widespread basis. For any kind of long term strategic response 
to past failure and to the probable repetition of natural crises» 
more atten tion must be devoted to the methods of providing or 
generating services. And under conditions o f limited resource and 
administrative capacity the methods must involve greater participa­
tion ; more flexibility in interacting with specific sets of socio­
economic conditions ; and an awarenes o f the significance of 
regional variations to the point where the style o f extension involves 
more learning and less imposition and where institutional experi­
mentation is encouraged.
Building Organisations is Necessary
It is clear that the learning process should be stimulated by which 
rural people put their faith in each other, in their mutual organisation 
to provide basic. pecds and security rather than the private owner­
ship of means of. production. But where the rurab class structure 
is highly differentiated, caution must be the order of the day, since 
there must be a strong danger that the rise of a/class of rich 
peasants/ capitalist farmers will be further stimulated and that as 
it becomes eniic^d and pauperises both the , rural and urban 
poors, so a number of development objectives will become disturbed 
and undcrraincdrrrnot just the distributional ones but the so-called 
‘production’.oriented’ ones too,
By recognising that this hierarchy of agrarian social relations 
exists Wifft'tndfe or-less intensity in different regions of Bangladesh
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it is essential that the TCCA/KSS framework should not be univcr* 
sally applied without first considering its viability in a pariicular 
context, secondly experimenting with modifications to suit local 
conditions without surrounding the overall objectives; and tliirdly 
assessing the pace at which institutional innovations might be intro­
duced into an area.
Area Planning not just Implementation
The conclusion from this is that we must recognise a dis­
tinction between area Planning and area implementation and further 
recognise that apart from Comilla (the Comilla style) we have 
had mainly area implementation in Bangladesh. In tliis respect the 
decision to revive some version of Thana Plan Book of the 1960 ’ 
should be welcomed although again we must appreciate that even the 
proposes for physical, infrastructural projects,are likely be to media­
ted Jfirqugh the local power structure.
An Exercise in Regional Zoning
The problem which such a notion of area planning is the 
the demands placed upon scarce resources of manpower—scientific, 
social, scientific engineering administrative and extension-could be­
come enormous in terms of man-years and unrealistic in terms of 
qualifications in the present context of Bangladesh. In such a situation, 
compromises are necessary. One useful, practical suggestion at this 
stage would be to commission an interdisciplinary team (Bangladeshis 
and/or appropriate foreigners) to attempt an approximate regional 
and/-regional zoning of Bangladesh in terms of some of the variables 
noted earlier. A considerable amount of relevant material already exi­
sts which could be organised for this purpose (see Select Bibliography 
on^^Agricultural Economics and Rural Development with special 
reference to Bangladesh, May 1976 and the supplenient June 1978 
BARC N.Ô.6) by asking ‘regional’ questions o f the data and findings. 
Tho intention-would be to develop an awareness of the relationship 
between physical characteristics (and soil structure cannot be over­
emphasised); geographical location, agricultural practices and perfor­
mances, non-agricültûrai economic activities, landholding and settle­
ment patterns, kinship structures, labour and dependency rclation- 
shipi^ population density, fertility, family'sizes, nutritional levels, 
apdso on.- In one sense, this is of course a tall order—an entire
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social ecology of Bangladesh. However relevant experience 
exists within Bangladesh though, for example, the work of the BIDS 
Poverty Study, and the process of zoning in this way will obviously 
begin with approximations, and continue as an indelinitc process 
of refinement.
Institutional Experimentation
This zoning exercise would in the first instance provide more 
explanation of agrarian behaviour—both social and technical. 
Secondly the zonés so identified might constitute the level at which 
institutibhal experimentation should be conducted. It must cert­
ainly be recognised’ that to proliferate the number of ‘unique’ 
and ‘specific’ repons would complicate any approach beyond 
recognition—ten flowers might bloom but not 100. And there 
is a genuine problem of the relationship between the central 
administration of rural and agrarian development and a myriad 
of location-specific institutional forms.
Another way of looking at this problem is to conclude that 
regional zones in the sense of coterminous space do not exist, 
but that types o f social-ecological situations exist even if they 
cannot be grouped together cotcrminously on a map. Such a 
typology (although 1 normally shy away from classification in 
this way) specifying certain kinds of indicators (eg. cropping 
patterns, labour relations etc.) might then sensitise an official/or 
‘rural mobiliser’ ,toy<ards particular forms of institutional experim­
entation, and the pace at which he should proceed.
In cither case, the intention should not be to prescribe in adv­
ance a particular institutional form for a particular situation-thc 
Comilla style does require time for a process o f . institutional 
innovation. On the other hand, a prior zoning or typology exer­
cise might assist in the early elimination of potential alternatives. 
Here arc some examples: Co-operatives of shared interests cannot 
contain landlords and their sharecroppers; when this relationship 
is prevalent, try something else. The manager and model farmer 
‘extension’ strategy has a better chance of working in less differ­
entiated situations where crosscutting linkage tics also effectively 
exist; but in highly differentiated situations manager? and model
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farmers arc drawn from the rich and serve the rich. Several 
conclusions arc possible in the highly differentiated situation; have 
two model farmers, where one comes from the poorer groups ; 
supervise and audit the management more closely, or place more 
emphasis upon using official extension agents especially for the 
poorer groups. The same kind of thinking should apply to many 
o f the ‘critical input’ activities mentioned by Akhter Hameed Khan. 
The arrangements for drainage and water management work might 
be through cooperatives in some situations but be captured by 
landlords-cum-contractors elsewhere. In this case there is a chôicé 
between official, outside management, or through investing moxC 
tiine in building, up groups of workers to run their own commerr 
cially Viable public works contracting agency. If KSS’s are envi­
saged .as commercial groups in the private sector, why cannot the 
same apply to groups engaged in rural works?
No more Target Groups
At this point, it is appropriate to raise the issue of ‘target 
group’ strategics. The ‘basic needs’ atmosphere combined with 
conclusions about highly differentiated rural societies has led to 
programs directed at particular groups of poor defined by outsiders 
in terms of some criterion such as landholding status'or nutritional 
levels. There arc several problems here which prevent such an
approach being seen as an alternative or simple addition to farmers 
co-operatives. First ‘target groups’ arc generally defined by outsi­
ders and do not necessarily reflect a meaningful unit of social 
cohesion. As a result the programmes in which they arc involved
tend to be directed toward them as individuals, with often a 
high relief content. .Secondly, ‘target groups’ consist of indivi­
duals who arc members o f classes, and as such arc in relation 
to other classes. Any programme constitutes a tiny proportion of 
their pattern of social interactions, meanwhile all o f their other 
relationships of dependence, poverty and undcrdcvelopincnt con­
tinue and-thereby structure the impact of thé programme* Subsidies 
art ̂ passed on as indirect subsidies to their. landlords, unless the 
cost-shint and producc-share arrangements are altered as'a precon­
dition - although perhaps allowing some incentive to the land-lord 
to prevent the dispossession of the tenant. Credit to dependants
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'f any kind for production give creditors opportunities to foreclose 
nd receive payment. Is it feasible to offer consum ption credit 
n such situations, in order to break the cycle o f  indebtedness as 
. precondition for the successful use o f  production credit ?
fhe Extension Function
Thirdly the notion o f  ‘target’ implies recipient, and schemes f o r  
)eople instead o f  with them. For productive activities to be 
elfsustaining for any group (and this was certainly a principle o f  
he Comilla style), the group itself only com es into existence as 
he result o f a shared conception o f  econom ic opportunities, makes 
I commitment to a particular activity, and participates m all stages 
>f the subsequent creation. W ithout this involvem ent and consciou- 
ress, the activity is removed from their control, and it is either bure- 
lucratised or dominated by a local con tractor/entrepreneur/tout. 
Both o f  these tendencies are routes to alienation. I f  this is accepted  
hen extension work becomes m ore than a technical, advisory role 
—it involves patient analysis o f  local situations, assessm ent o f  local 
opportunities either in agriculture, servicing, agriculture, or outside o f  
agriculture, bringing together potential groups based on existing 
horizontal tics and discussing appropriate proposals for work. 
Only in this way will groups (especially those without initial control 
over any means o f  production) ultimately control the activity—  
though identifying their own needs and opportunities and participa­
ting in design and ma.nagement. Training and support from extension  
agents arc required at those stages.
Phases of Co-operative Activity—Start With the Simple
It is also important to distinguish between phasec o f  co-opera­
tive activity,perhaps for any group but certainly for non-cultivators or 
underemployed cultivators. Som e schemes are clearly more complex  
and difficult to  manage than otherj and requires more capital. 
Untrained, illiterates co-operatives have to  operate with the limits 
o f their capacity-current exam ples are : rearing o f  chickens and goats : 
fish tank clearing and cu ltivation  : o f  land by taking it on mortgage 
(with supporting loans) rich processing and selling, and other 
fom s o f  petty trading which would be financed at low  interest 
rates from TCCSs. Other larger schemes eg. rice m illing, handicrafts
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Inquire larger capital outlay (which should involve som e o f their 
own equity capital) management skills and marketing knowledge. 
Furthermore, large schemes might be too lum py for single co-opera­
tives and require federations so that the activity is located at the 
appropriate level-eg.brick kilns, manufacturing operations etc.
There is a further area o f  activity-servicing agriculture-which  
raises different issues. So far the government bureaucracy-in particular 
the BADC— has m onopolised this activity. But o f  course in many 
societies agriculture has directly provided em ploym ent for a population  
far in excess o f  cultivators and agricultural workers through
the provision o f  services to it. This a great strength o f  Akhter 
Ham eed K han’s proposals and can be extended— cooperative groups 
should be involved in the entire m anagement o f  water resources 
(generation, delivery, maintenance, sale, and continued generation  
with surface water and ground water system ) the distribution o f  
inputs to cultivators ; bullock hire ; even the extension o f  credit 
(through em ployment in the TCCAs), certainly marketing and proce­
ssing (as already suggested). However it is  im portant to remember that 
the transfer o f  this activity to the private sector^ in effect cons­
titutes a challenge and threat to the process o f  bureaucratic
expansion (which as a form o f em ployment which is wasteful 
without being labour intensive). Furthermore servicing agriculture- 
is likely to involve dependent classes in direct and continuous 
interaction with the richer, cultivating classes, ie. their patrons, 
landlords, creditors, and so on . Therefore thé tested unity o f  
their own groups through sm aller, earlier, more independent econom ic 
activity becomes an essential precondition for this later phase.
Rapid Rural Appraisal
This discussion o f  zoning and typology exercises, institutional 
experimentation, extension functions o f  m obilisation, multi-purpose 
management advice, and assessm ent o f  local capabilities clearly 
has important im plications for the developm ent o f  rural cadres 
o f  mobilisers and extension agents. There has been a tendency
in Bangladesh to  operate a strict division o f  labour between
rural researchers and extension workers— only the staff at the 
Academy in Com illa once com bined those roles. Their training 
activity lacked one vital com ponent—nam ely that extension agents
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should have dual roles as mobilisers and students o f  their rural 
environment. However it is possible to think o f  quick methods 
o f  trying to  understand a local situation in its socia l and physi­
cal dim ensions, w ithout asking all extension officials to becom e 
anthropologists. Careful use o f  local statistics, sensitive case 
study work, sm all purposive sam ples, and so  on— supported by 
thana or subdivisional w orkshops and probing questions o f  each 
other and m aybe visiting Academ ey staff - would produce many 
insights.
Conclusion : For Whom is the Thana Rented—the People or the 
Planners ?
This emphasis on style and m ethods challenges the usual 
form ulations o f  rural developm ent activity in terms o f  frameworks 
and projects. A t the very least it encourages m ore participation 
in the creation o f  any particular framework and m oves us away 
from the universal formula. It seems necessary to  challenge con s­
tantly the concepts and vocabulary o f  developm ent planning. 
Terms like “ integrated” , “area devlopm ent” , “ Project” and so on  
all carry assumptions o f  rationality and appropriateness whereas 
the reality-the real content o f  those terms-is different. This has 
surely now been dem onstrated for IR D P  in Bangladesh, and its 
various spin-offs. But although RD-1 has been found wanting, is 
the same critical exam ination o f  similar projects and proposals 
taking place ? Are the various current ‘area developm ent’ 
proposals the result o f  paperwork and hypothesis generation in air- 
conditioned offices, or are they the ou tcom e o f  participation and 
a process o f  interaction between ideas and behaviour ? F or whom  is 
the thana rented ? A nd  what definition o f  area is em ployed-the adm i­
nistrative one o f  thana ? Or is ‘area’ a variable concept according 
to the appropriate spatial lim itations o f  particular activity ? D oes  
‘integrated’ refer to an organic (a pun for som e) package o f  mutually 
dependent factors (tautology for others ?) Or is it a reference to  
the integration o f  rural poor into the mainstream o f  developm ent ? 
Or is it merely (and more usefully) a reference to  a looser com bi­
nation o f  activities (not interdependent where phasing tiihing and con­
sistency could nevertheless increase the marginal rate o f  return on 
any particular activity-ie. consitute a bonus ? The idea o f  a project
27
The Journal o f  Social Studies/8
(especially an integrated one in the package sense) presumes a know ­
ledge o f  the likely outcome o f  one activity upon another. Indeed 
it assumes an ability to predict the functional relationships between 
a large number o f  complicated variables before either knowledge 
o f  their nature exists or before the interventionist event has occured 
(ie. the im plementation o f  the first stage o f  the project) which 
will set in motion all kinds o f  responses and alter the course o f  
other behaviour. The extent o f knowledge required (for a project area) 
is rarely found anywhere, and certainly not in Bangladesh. The notion  
o f  the project must be made more tentative particularly when it 
purports to  be ‘integrated’, ‘area’ and com prehensive chain reactions 
to external intervention cannot be predicted without more use o f  pilot 
experiments— part o f  the extension/learning activity o f  field officials 
working alongside peasants and labour. However, it is unlikely that 
the T  and V approach will operate in this way, since it is based 
on the outdated assumption that a specific agricultural service is 
desired consisting o f  a package o f  exotic input and technology whose 
efficacy has been determined prior to any appreciation o f  a cultivator’s 
position in the social relations o f  production and exchange. H ow ­
ever, the chain reactions to more m odest, unintegrated interventions 
can only be truly assessed after the event, and such knowledge 
only then applied elsewhere where conditions at least appear similar 
(eg. in same region, or sub-region).
A t the same time while this invective against the contem  porary 
vocabulary o f  rural developm ent planning appears to strengthen the 
case for decentralisation a note o f  caution is necessary. It is im por­
tant to  remember that to little or too much administrative control 
can have a similar result. A  high degree o f  administrative control] 
merely strengthens the interests o f  dom inant classes which are likelyf 
to be represented by the State and its apparatuses. But too little con­
trol simply means that locally dominant classes are able to capture the] 
resources which they should be distributing more widely. This incon­
venient observation raises the familiar problem o f  accountability.
I f  the outcom es are similar whether the provision o f  service is 
decentralised or not because the power o f  certain classes is articulated 
successfully in both way (albeit through different institutions with 
different effects), then the problems for the poor are ultimately 
similar as well. In neither strategy o f  provision are the procedures
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and outcomes accountable to the poor-they do not constitute a 
social force o f  any political significance as they are divided and 
unorganised by virtue o f  their structural position in the social 
relations productions.
Finally and more hopefully perhaps (although only with the 
assumption o f  the benign state) it m ust be emphasised that this 
discussion o f  frameworks, methods and style must not unduly focus 
our attention upon institution building, even o f  the looser, local 
kind. The relationship between institutional strategies and substantive 
policy co n ten t, m ust be considered carefully. In particular much 
thought should be given to  policy area such as food-grain imports, 
input subsidies, pricing and incentives, distribution and procurement 
systems-their interrelations and significance for the kind o f  cooperative 
i activity which is to be encouraged. These policy items have crucial
I implications for process o f  class formation, and may operate in
i a contrary direction to . other efforts. Certainly it requires veryI  close co-ordination between at least the M inistries o f  Agriculture and
I Rural D evelopm ent. The objective o f  expanding agricultural produc­
tion has to be reconciled with a programme o f  rural m obilisation, and 
vice-versas. In many o f  the discussions for example about reducing 
food- imports and allowing dom estic prices to  rise as an incentive 
to increase not marketable surplus-the problem o f  net rural purcha­
sers o f  food grain seems to  have been overlooked. The relationship  
between such a policy outcom e, regional variations in areas o f  net 
exporters o f food-grain and forms o f  co-operative m obilisation  
is the meeting place o f  area and national agrarian planning.
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The Rural Poor in Bangladesh 
a New Framework ?
Introduction
In mid-1980 Bangladesh embarKed on its 
Second Five Year Plan. Preliminary drafts of the 
Plan indicate a substantial shift in government 
investment strategy toward the rural sector with 
primary emphasis placed on increasing foodgrain 
production and improving the employment and 
consequently the welfare position of the rural 
poor. Few would argue that a radical trans­
formation in rural Bangladesh to attacK the 
problems of growing landlessness, un-and un­
deremployment, and the polarization of rural 
wealth and power— are required to meet these 
objectives. Critical to this transformation will 
be the involvement of the rural poor.
* School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Bath, U. K.
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The basic object o f this paper is to  exam ine how the needs 
o f the rural poor can be met in the Second Five-Year Plan and 
what can be done to involve them in the process. The paper 
sets out a series o f  institutional possibilities which arise from  
contemporary experiments in Bangladesh ; and suggests how  
government should debureaucratize its approach to rural developm ent 
to allow  a range o f  institutional possibilities to  be created, applied, 
adopted and so on.
Since the question o f  rural developm ent and the institutions 
which suppport it, is in the final analysis a political question. 
The paper begins with a brief discussion o f  the process o f  planning 
and the interest groups involved in rural developm ent in Bangladesh. 
This is follow ed by exploration o f  the need for radical trans­
form ation in the rural sector, arguing strongly for agrarian reform. 
The paper closes with a discussion o f  possible programs that 
might be initiated during the Second Plan period to  m ove toward  
these essential reforms.
The Political Economy of Planning in Bangladesh
Essentially planning is a political process, in which the pressure 
o f time sharpens the conflicts between different interest groups in 
the government and the specific constituencies which they represent. 
It is important for the actors in this process to understand what 
is happening to them , and to  recognize that planning is not a 
technicorational exercise despite the use o f  m odels, targets and 
projections. It is to a large extent an artificial arena o f  bargaining 
and horsetrading.
Nowwhere in the process is this more clear than over the 
question o f institutions and proposals to intervene directly in the 
social relations between individuals, groups and classes ; for this 
question is about the rules themselves. Changing or preserving 
rules has costs and benefits for different classes and groups, 
not all o f  which are able to participate in the decisions. 
Ultim ately in the prevailing political realities o f  Bangladesh, formal 
decisions about such rules will be made by individuals whose 
accountability to  the people o f  Bangladesh, must be low at least 
in the short term. These decisions will establish the parameters 
within which the officials have to work. It is im portant in the
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process o f  developing parameters not to restrict the atm osphere 
o f  institutional experimentation which persists in Bangladesh and 
to  press f( r decisions which can be tested and modified over 
time. If an institutional discussion is to appear in the plan docum ent—  
let it be a discussion o f  range o f  ideas, rather than any attempt at a 
universal formula. N eat institutional wizardry at the top such as the 
mechanical expansion o f  Com illa into IR D P, is unlikely to  have 
much impact upon the lives o f  rural people.
In the developm ent o f  an institutional com ponent to  the 
Plan, a com plex matrix o f  individuals, interest groups and ideologies 
are involved. Discussions in various arenas— political, technical, 
academ ic, commercial, national and international— have occurred  
regarding the agrarian aspects o f  the Plan. The relation between the 
arenas as well as the elements need to be clarified.
The Needs of the Government
A  major consideration which must override other decisions 
are the needs o f  the present government to  develop a rural 
constituency. Various formulae have emerged— total village coopera­
tives, ‘gram sarker’, greater use o f  union and thana parishads, 
the expanding role o f  the M P’s in the governm ent’s local resource 
allocation system  in the drought food  allocation system, and on  
the Thana and Districts D evelopm ent Comm ittees. W hatever the 
outcom e o f  these and other possibilities, there will remain the 
question o f  the implications for the control and distribution o f  
goods and services for agrarian/rural developm ent, the relationship  
to agricultural cooperatives, and provision for and/or mobilization  
o f the rural poor. It will be necessary to return to  these issues 
below.
Land Reform
There is the no less political and no less fundam ental issue 
of land reform. Two opposing positions on the efficacy o f  land  
reform appear in the present debate ; that sharecropping relations 
and absentee landlordism depresses the potential productivity o f  
land by reducing the incentives to farmers to apply inputs and  
make land improvements (Jabbar 1977), and that land reform  
is decisive neither for efficiency nor for equity, ( G isselquist 
1979 ) since the differences in input use, output and em ploym ent
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absorption across farm sizes or between tenure classes w ould  
not significantly cope with the expansion o f  production or em ploy­
ment that is required. O f course, the question o f  land is much  
more com plicated than these aggregate notions affecting the fortunes 
o f  families through transfers, inheritance, indebtedness, and control 
and use o f  other means o f  production. Relations to land also
affect access to goods and services, and constitute the principal
material basis for the assertion o f  political influence and authority. 
On these grounds alone land reforms ought to  be considered. 
But for the same reasons, we cannot expect the Governm ent 
to  contem plate a land reform program since it depends on  the 
prevailing rural inequality and structures o f  power and authority 
in the countryside to maintain the rural ‘stability’ necessary 
for attracting more overseas investment to  expand the industrial 
sector. Can the government seriously afford to  desert this rural
constituency o f  landlords, landowners and entrepreneurs for an  
incoherent mass o f  tenants and laborers ? The need for a secure 
rural political base overwhelms any other arguments in favor o f  
land reform.
Bureaucratic Interests
As represented through different ministries and agencies,
the bureaucracy has established crucial areas o f  patronage through  
its m onopoly over inputs and services to agriculture and rural 
developm ent. Furthermore, m inistries and agencies internally re­
present separate territories o f  patronage involving the réintro­
duction o f  an informal market in which the difference between 
the subsidized price at any level o f  distribution and the price
at which the com m odity or service is in effect sold does not 
return as public revenue to the ministry or state as a whole, but sup­
plem ents individual incom es. In this process, classes o f  rural clients 
are affected d ifferently- the poorer have no access at all, the richer 
pay for their access and have opportunities to pass on these costs to  
others and extract a profit too . Bureaucratic allocation has certainly 
strengthened the positions both o f  officials as well as rural entrepreneurs 
and landholders, and in so doing has contributed to  the proce­
sses o f  polarization and differentiation in the countryside. The
point is that the bureaucracy has a vested interest in preserving 
the existing arrangements for the distribution and supply o f
25
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scarce goods and services— it is the basis o f both mini-empires 
and the accum ulation o f  wealth by some. In the face o f  these 
interests, national leadership has to com pete for influence and 
support in the countryside with few resources at its disposal. 
T o som e extent this is the basis o f  a struggle between different 
fractions, the bureaucrats/officials and the politicians/entrepreneurs, 
under the watchful eye presumably o f  the military w hose vola­
tility o f  recent years . has been reduced by large, external sources 
o f  funding independent o f  other budgets. The current anxiety 
o f  politicians seem to stem from their realization that they have 
so far failed to capture significant resources at the Thana level
to  develop a m ore secure support base in  the countryside. It
is in this way that a com m ercialization/private sector strategy
is attractive. It is an ideological resource in this struggle between
the different interest groups— and it must be doubtful whether 
there are any technical advantages which w ill survive its adoption.
Commercialization Strategy
In addition to  the discussions o f  land reform, there is the 
build up o f  external donor pressure— to liberate the rural econom y  
from bureaucratic management and controls by open market 
system s o f  food  and input distribution. Both the W orld Bank 
and U SA ID  have recommended a reduction in governm ent in­
volvement in the rationing system and a closer targeting o f  ration 
throughout to  the poor ; the lim iting o f  governm ent involvem ent 
in the grain market to  instances where open market prices 
deviate plus or minus 20% from planned price levels and the 
reduction o f  fertilizer subsidies. It is important to  recognize that 
these policies can only be undertaken if  liberal supplies o f  food  
and agricultural inputs are available. Given the magnitude 
o f  the program o f  ensuring adequate aggregate suppy at the appro­
priate time and place, the present proposals may involve unrealis­
tic assumptions about the developm ent o f  a physical and market 
infrastructure and perhaps about the m agnitude o f  funding availa­
ble. A lso, there is a major untested assum ption in these plans—  
that a com bination o f  support prices ( through a generous 
procurement price) and open market dealing in rural goods (  inputs 
and food  ) will encourage the landholders to  raise the productivity  
o f  their land, increasing their marketable surplus to  pay the
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full market price for inputs. M ost o f  the evidence on agrarian 
relations in Bangladesh points to higher rates o f  return on capital 
investing in usury, leasing, and trading. Returns have been 
reinvested in similar ventures or in land more inefficiently which 
when leased to sharecroppers under existing arrangements results 
in suboptimal production. On the other hand, if  the assumption  
is valid ( and especially if a supply o f  goods and services was 
not forthcoming) we could expect sharecroppers to  be dispossessed  
at a faster rate and sm all owner— cultivators to  be more dependent 
upon credit ( usurious or institutional ) in  order to com pete 
successfully in the market for inputs and where they failed to  obtain  
cheap sources o f  credit a t the right time for the productivity o f  
their land to  decline. A  conse-quence, o f  these tendencies would  
be a rise in the rural landless population.
These problem s along with the uncertainty o f  achieving 
favorable supply and delivery conditions d o  not m ake this trend 
in policy thinking very attractive for both  production and equity  
objectives. It runs the risks o f  leading to greater rural exploi­
tation, a further increase in the landless, higher proportions o f  
rural unem ploym ent, a reduction in effective demand for both  
agricultural products and inputs, and even a decline in production. 
O f course the com m ercialization strategy is very attractive to the 
urban and rural entreprenurial classes alike and w ill encourage 
richer landholders to diversify their usurious returns into sub—  
thana level trading. In this way, the strategy would reinforce 
the direction o f  class formation in Bangladesh,
Integrated Rural Development Program ( IR D P )
In developing an institutional strategy in the Second Plan, 
it cannot be forgotten that a major set o f  institutions for 
agrarian developm ent and the expansion o f  agricultural production  
exists through IR D P. Several reviews and critiques o f  IR D P  (SID A  
1979, P. 134 footnote I, for references, S ID A  1979 itself pp. 133- 
162, and W ood 1980 ) now exist. From  this literature the con­
sensus o f  problems are : IR D P is a diluted version o f  Comilla, 
missing in m ost cases the irrigation and rural works element 
(A .H . Khan 1979) ; cooperatives were established without adequate 
preparation by external mobilisers ; membership in cooperatives 
is low and they are dominated (even in Comilla) by rich farmers and
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landholders, who acquire a disproportionately high share o f  inputs ; 
regional variations in landholding/tenure relations involving more 
differentiation than in Comilla com pound the problem s o f replicating 
Comilla ; and, landless are excluded and sharecroppers discriminated  
against through dependence on land as collateral for loans. A  
less familiar problem but one relevant to arguments developed, later, 
is summarized in the follow ing extract from the S ID A  (1979) report :
“ .........  an important im plication o f  the quantitative difference
between the Comilla experiment in Com illa (sic) and the IR D P
should however be observed Within the district o f  Com illa,
insufficient dem and for grain never becam e a serious problem  : 
the output o f  rice could, as we have seen, more than double 
in ten years, and the surplus that arose could easily be sold  
outside the district, with only marginal effects on the general 
price level. I f  however lack o f  effective dem and is the perhaps 
m ost important long-term obstacle to  agricultural grow th in the
country as a w h o le  then a new dim ension is added to the
problems o f  replicating the Com illa experiment all over 
Bangladesh. In practice the whole IR D P  approach towards 
agricultural development is today based on the assum ption  
that all problems originate from the supply side, while a 
recognition o f  the key role played by dem and makes it 
imperative to abandon excessive emphasis on production and 
instead concentrate on the incom e distribution and em ploym ent 
creation objectives.” (p. 151)
Position of LGRD
Because the issue o f  effective demand has not received the 
political prominence o f  increased production themes, the M inistry 
o f  Local Government and Rural D evelopm ent (L G R D ) faces the 
prospect o f  having IR D P (coops rather than rural works) destroyed  
or substantially modified by the com m ercialization strategy. The 
plight o f  the M inistry is sym ptom atic o f  the way in which the 
planning process is failing to address the real questions o f  rural 
poverty. I f  the link between effective demand and production  
(let alone human rights) is established, L G R D  w ould have a 
central role to play in the overall production strategy, through 
developing institutional strategies for different classes o f  landholders, 
tenants and landless ; setting o f  realistic targets for input supply
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as well as realistic procedures for iheir distribution ; developing  
attainable targets for pro Auction expansion assuming effective demand 
and deriving em ployment targets required to generate the appro­
priate level o f effective demand to ensure favorable producer prices. 
Such em ployment targets would constitute the minimum level o f  
hoped for an acceptable performance.
Rural M obilization— Government and N G O ’s (excluding RVVP & FWP)^
A further dim ension to  the current thinking concerns the 
role o f quasi-governmental programs and the work o f  nongovern­
mental organizations (N G O ’s). Since Liberation, a variety o f  
institutional approaches have been developed and tested in Bangladesh. 
Ulashi type programs which have relied on m obilizing the rural 
people, using the theme o f  self-reliance, to participate in infrastruc­
ture/rural works projects. The Swanirvar program which is attempting 
to  create an awareness am ongst rural people about the developm ent 
possibilities in their individual area on the basis o f  their own  
resources supplem ented by proper utilization o f  under-utilized  
resources, physical and hum an, official and non-offiicial. (Chashi, 
p. 177, 1976). The organizational vehicle used in this process is the  
gram sarkar or village government—a village governing body com posed  
o f representatives from separate class-based village gioups. A  
third set o f  activities, carried out by a variety o f  private agencies, 
arc also active ; the A SA R R D  projects in Com illa, M ym ensingh  
and Bogra ; the TVD projects in Comilla ; BRAC ; PR O SH IK A  ; 
and the Grameen Bank Project in Tangail.
Each o f these approaches, although having problems, provide 
some suggestions for possible government action. The Ulashi approach  
was directed at the creation o f rural infrastructure. There is evidence, 
however, that such schemes are exploitative o f  rural landless labor- 
both in remuneration and long-term benefits and that they do 
not foster the creation o f  long-term village institutions. While rural
These programmes and their implications are also familiar to warrant 
repetitions here, and their implications for thinking about rural institu­
tions intimately connected with the original concept of IRDP. See SIDA  
1979 pp 191-211 and Wood 1980 inter alia. Furthermore while these 
programmes contribute to immediate relief, they do not add to the 
property rights of the landless and therefore imply no institutional reso­
urce to them.
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m obilization around major infrastructure projects is important, other 
preconditions are required to assure that labor, especially landless labor, 
shares in the increased productivity generated by their efforts.
Swanirvar, on the other hand, does have long-term  organizational 
im plications in the ideas o f  gram  sarkar. The system  was planned 
to  be a non-bureaucratic approach to  rural developm ent with 
central governm ent and the gram sarkars/Swanirvar villages operating 
on equal terms. The system  involves the gram sarkar in m obilizing 
village level resources and developing and forwarding proposals to 
the central government apparatuses (rather than vice-versa) on 
what external support is required. M ost evaluations o f  Swanirvar 
conclude that considerable inflows o f  external resources have 
occurred, but that official sponsorship has undermined the basic 
thrust o f  the program. Organizational proposals are being devised  
externally and the benefits from  the expansion o f  the means o f  
production in the village th r o u g h ‘joint’ activity (usually the work 
o f  landless laborers with little reward) are accruing disproportionately  
to  the holders o f  the land, the traditional ruling class in the 
villages. On the positive side, the program  has functioned to som e 
extent in opening up the thinking about institutional possibilities 
for rural developm ent in Bangladesh— counteracting the totemic 
influence o f  Com illa and the bureaucratic weight o f  IR D P.
A s a result, a variety o f  other non-governm ent programs have 
emerged (A S A R R D  and TV D  projects in Com illa, PR O SH IK A , 
BRAC, G R A M E E N  B A N K  PROJECT, etc.). The main com m on  
features o f  these programs should be noted since they in effect tackle 
the relation between expansion o f  production and the generation  
o f  effective dem and. Excepting T V D , the programs work exclusively 
w ith poorer farmers and the landless and in som e cases only the 
landless ; they depend critically upon the creation o f  ‘natural,’ 
internal solidarity within groups which is Tested’ in som e way 
before constituting the basis o f  collateral for loans ; the programs 
involve functional and informal education ; the involvem ent o f out­
siders (program workers) in defining a group, determining its form  
o f  activity and m anagement structure are m inim ized, thus avoiding  
preconceived m odels o f  organization.
A lthough a number o f  m odels are available, governm ent has 
n ot decided on a formula for local government. It is still left with
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the problem o f  devising a local governm ent system which at least 
looks inclusive and participatory, but which is either parallel to  
or incorporates the existing cooperative structure. The final decision  
will reveal the extent to which the distribution o f  goods and services, 
m obilization o f  rural labor, and management o f  production and  
product markets (including procurement) will becom e structures 
o f political patronage (overt or covert) or remain in the hands o f  
the bureaucracy. In a sense gram sarkar  and the other rural 
developm ent programs constitute the offer o f  an institutional 
theme to  the government which have been sponsored but n ot adopted . 
A Scenario o f Possible State Policy and Action
From  this brief and incom plete review o f  the various elem ents 
and arenas o f  discussion about the form and content o f  rural 
institutions in Bangladesh over the next Plan period and beyond, a 
further dim ension emerges : nam ely the significance o f  their com bina­
tion, and the extent o f  contradictory or com plem entary them es.
There is an emerging literature o f  role o f  the state in Bangladesh  
(e. g. Hussain 1979, Westergaard 1979) and perhaps som e consensus 
around the petty bourgeois (urban and rural) basis o f  the state. 
This is expressed in the dom inance o f  antediluvian/usurious capital 
in agrarian relations (W ood 1977), com bined w ith diversification  
into trading, through the expansion o f  a ‘comprador* bourgeoisie 
with the penetration o f  private and public m etropolitan capital into  
the urban industrial and com m ercial sector. These classes are 
incorporated into a metropolitan dom inated m anufacturing sector 
and a primary com m odity market, m aintained by a  class o f  
bureaucratic and military leaders w ho benefit directly or indirectly 
from these processes. (Directly to the extent that they m onopolize  
the allocation o f  foreign aid and establish the rules and conditions 
under which other classes are to  accum ulate from these resources). 
Although there are many who would now  accept this description, 
if  true then the m ost likely outcom e o f  this process for the rural 
sector, despite the objections o f  som e enlightened senior officials, 
would be a combination o f  eleven features :
—  limited commercialism ;
—  a retained but reduced role o f IR D P  and B A D C  ;
—  populist centrally-managed programs o f  rural m obilization ;
—  the possible insertion o f  a total village level cooperatives
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below the U nion Parishad com plicating the position o f  the 
IR D P coop ’s and TC C A ’s ;
—  stronger representation o f  elected ( i. e. usually rural 
rich ) representatives at Thana and District levels— provi­
ding renewed arenas for struggle between politicians and 
officials at those levels ;
—  but a retention o f  existing form s o f  central dom ination  
causing frustrated aspirations am ong national level poli­
ticians ;
—  and an associated reduction in the ability o f  officials in the 
central apparatuses to protect the erosion o f  authority 
and patronage o f  their field staff.
A lon g side this ;
—  no significant land reform ;
a pattern o f  input distribution ( including irrigation faci­
lities ) emphasizing H Y V ’s and wheat which will exacer­
bate the polarization o f  rural classes and fail to  match  
the rate o f  growth in demand for labor ;
—  inadequate separate em ploym ent generation programs ;
—  and finally with the com m ercialization strategy a possible 
decline in the proportion o f  the developm ent budget to  
agriculture ( goods and services— i. e. extention, training 
and research ).
I f  this picture o f  the possible com bination o f  policies for
the rural sector emerges during the Second Plan period, the
implications for both production and equity are disastrous.
11. The Argument for Agrarian Reform
In its recent ‘Food Policy Issues’ ( IB R D  1979 ), the authors 
list the physical constraints to the developm ent o f  agriculture as : 
scarcity o f  cultivable land ; limited yield potential ; clim atic ha­
gards ; and the need for dry season irrigation ; improved drainage 
and flood protection. However, they attribute the slow  growth 
o f agricultural output to ; weaknesses in agricultural support ; 
services ; inadequate provision o f  input supplies ; and constraints 
stemming from the agrarian structure. Their solutions take the 
form  o f open-market dealing in food  phasing out o f  fertilizer
(and other ?) subsidies ; and a major emphasis on H Y V  tech­
nologies in rice and wheat. A ll focus on efforts to  improve
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food grain supply with a noticable, lack o f  attention to food  
demand.
In assessing this strategy, it is important that the negative 
effects o f  a supply orientated H Y V  strategy be considered. G iven  
the present distribution o f  land and access to  im proved inputs 
which exist in rural Bangladesh, it is highly likely that larger 
landowners will benefit significantly from the strategy. W hile 
production may increase initially, it is questionable whether prices 
o f  labor demand will be sufficient to  sustain production. One 
could hypothesise a situation where production has increased but 
not enough to absorb new entrants into the rural labor pool. 
In fact projections o f  labor demand developed from  the output 
productions in the Second Five Year Plan docum ents indicate 
this w ill be the case. They predict that the rural labor force 
is likely to  grow by four m illion persons during the plan period, 
with only one quarter o f  this new labor supply being absorbed  
in agricultural production.
W hat does this mean for supply orientated approach presently 
under consideration ? Increasing numbers o f  rural unemployed  
would result in a further decline in rural wage rates, a reduction  
in the ability o f  the poor to  buy foodgrains, lagging foodgrain  
demand in the face o f increasing supply and eventually a decline 
in real foodgrain prices, the basic incentive for the adoption o f  
H Y V  technology. SID A  in its recent report provides a more
in-depth analysis o f  this scenerio and offer the following policy  
recom m endation:
“S elf-su ffic ien cy , defined as so  and so  many tons o f  
domestically produced foodgrains is a com pletely meaning­
less concept unless it is related to  the capacity o f  the 
people to  purchase the growing levels o f  production. 
Dem and tends to generate its own supply, but the
opposite is not equally true, and the K ey to susccess in
a production-oriented stra tegy in Bangladesh is to conceti- 
trate an efforts to increase effective dem and  ( S ID A  1979 
p. 96 my underlining ) .”
Issue of Transforming Non-Productive Capital
This critical relationship between effective dem and and levels 
o f production has been a historical reality in rural Bangladesh
33
5—
The Journal o f  Social Studies/10
since the colonial period. Its presence has led to socially unacceptable  
forms o f  rural capital investm ent such as usury and rack-renting 
and sharecropping ( W ood 1977, Westergaard 1978 ). The rates o f  
profit from these activities have traditionally been higher than 
investing in agricultural production and have led to  dispossession  
o f  small farmers, depressed production and em ploym ent opportunities, 
and depressed agricultural wages.
These problems are not recent and have shaped the form  
and determined the results o f  state intervention in agriculture 
since 1972. Such interventions, which include belated attem pts 
at land reform and the production/open market strategies recently 
fowarded by the World Bank, focus on the supply side o f  agricultural 
production, assuming that sm all marginal farmers act as independent 
producers with com plete control over the factors o f  production  
they require. These approaches fail to note the adverse terms 
o f  trade which exist in rural Bangladesh between small marginal 
farmers and rural elites, the alternative forms o f  capital investm ent 
available to  the latter group and the adverse consequence that 
an increase in capital controlled by elite rural groups w ill have 
on the existing terms o f  trade. To develop appropriate m echanism s 
for state intervention the com plete system o f  rural relations 
including the position o f the state, access to  the services it provides 
and the present system o f  resource allocation m ust be considered.
State Intervention and Access Problems
If w e take the question o f  state intervention, it is generally the 
case that the bureaucratic management o f  rural distribution system s 
result in cultural and class based problems o f  access. F or exam ple, 
present programs favour those w ho understand the system , generally 
the more literate, educated, socially and spatially m obile ; those 
experienced in dealing with government ; and those w ho can afford 
to  invest time, transport costs, and fees required to make appropriate 
connections.
T o som e extent these are underlying issues behind the general 
dissatisfaction with the experience o f  state intervention in the 
rural econom y since liberation. The governm ent has relied 
on state agencies like B A D C , IR D P  and the Extension  
Service to  deliver goods and services into a com plex agricultural 
system in which price, availability and timeliness are critical
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both to the rate o f  profit and the propensity to invest in new  
technology. However, because o f  the informal markets which 
developed around this structure, it failed to spread the benefits o f  
the new technology to those cultivating classes w ho would use it 
m ost productively and exploit their land m ost intensively.
Avoid Over-Reaction
These criticisms o f  the state intervention experience should not 
result in advocating a com m ercialisation strategy. I f  the state were to  
withdraw suddenly and dramatically from  its involvem ent in the 
agrarian econom y, the potentially m ost productive classes o f  sm aller 
cultivators w ould be left to the mercy o f  market forces. Problem s o f  
transforming rural usurious capital into productive capital, and the 
issue o f  effective dem and am ong the marginal peasants, sharecroppers 
and landless would not be resolved. T he institutional vacuum  
left by such a withdrawal w ould likely strengthen the present form s o f  
rural capital investm ent rather than d issolve them —with rich pea­
sants devoting m ore o f  their capital to trading in inputs, mortgaging, 
land acquisition and leasing as the victim s o f  the market were steadily  
marginalised and pauperised.
Even a partial withdrawal, a com prom ise in which the IR D P  
co-ops are retained in their present form, and open market system s o f  
food  and inputs com pete with licensed grain dealers and B A D C  
depots and dealers respectively, is unlikely to  resolve these problem s. 
In this later case it is likely that operators o f  both systems would  
benefit from scarcity in aggregate terms and scarcity in. the sense o f  
timeliness o f  supply. . This w ould apply critically to  credit, water and 
fertilizer markets on the input side.
Room for the State to Manouvre’̂
But if  state intervention itself has these effects anyway, is 
there any sense in which the state can withdraw from the rural 
econom y without exacerbating the present contradictions in the 
agrarian system.
From  the earlier discussin, it follow s that a central precondition  
m ust be to  embark seriously upon programmes which tacke the
2. I am borrowing this term from Mick Moore and Edward Clay at IDS, 
Sussex. Relative autonomy is a more familiar term in the Marxist 
literature on the capitalist and post-colonial states. Both terms are 
heuristic without being theoretically satisfying.
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question o f effective demand for agricultural products. The strategy 
behind such programmes is derived from  extending the understanding  
o f  rural property rights in Bangladesh.® T o date_ property rights are 
usually conceived o f  in terms o f  land, and the literature is preoccu­
pied with land reforms involving either ceilings and distribution; 
distribution on the basis o f  land to the tiller; providing greater secu­
rity o f  tenure; and/or measures to prevent distress sales o f  land.* 
A ccom panying all these ‘privatised’, individualistic alternatives is a 
standard list o f  associated conditions to  be m et concerning provision  
for credit, water and inputs.
However, property rights in land are rights to  benefit from the 
productivity o f  that land. In this sense the state has also  had rights 
in a proprietor’s land— through taxation and rents ( som etim es indi­
rect ) in return for ensuring the rights o f  the proprietor (protection  
through coercion and law). In the case o f  Bangladesh, East Pakistan  
and even Eastern Bengal before it, the state has never been in a 
sufficiently autonom ous relation to  the dom inant rural classes to  
challenge their ability to, dispossess other dependent classes.
Extend Notion of Rural Property Rights
But can we envisage other property rights that could  entail a 
right to the productivity o f  land in a predom inantly agricultural 
econom y at a rental value equivalent to or beyond that derived from  
leasing in or from agricultural labour ? R ights where the rules and  
custom s surrounding their possession are not so deeply em bedded in  
the social structure, partly because the potential significance o f  these 
rights ( or means o f  production ) are only just being realised in the 
context o f  technological innovations. The major exam ple o f  such 
rights in Bangladesh is o f  course water, especially in  the dry season
Although he is in no way responsible for the content o f this paper, 
I am grateful to Martin Hanratty for a discussion on this point and 
indeed his assistance and support throughout this paper. He has also 
contributed considerable editorial work on this version.
I distinguish these measures from land revolution in which ownership is 
dissolved and land as a means o f production is entirely socialised into 
collectives or communes. I have also not included partial formulae of 
private ownership and cooperative farming, with the pooling o f resources 
and labour, since it is not being seriously debated in Bangladesh to my 
knowledge.
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with new forms o f  irrigation.® The entire activity o f  constructing and 
maintaining the infrastructure for the various kinds o f  irrigation, the 
operation and maintenance o f  the machinery involved, the allocation  
of water between the cultivators, flood control and drainage works—  
the performance o f all these services constitutes the creation and 
possession o f  means o f production, required to be used in conjunction  
with land. The list can be easily extended to self-employed gangs 
undertaking land improvement as well as crop operations, the m anu­
facture and maintenance o f  farm equipm ent, the control and use o f  
processing equipment, post-harvest jute and sugar-cane processing, 
control over input distribution and so on. A dditional property rights 
som ewhat separate from agriculture, and therefore not involving the 
same kind o f  interaction with landholders and cultivators can also be 
envisaged: fish tank cultivation, rural works rearing o f  non-draught 
livestock, construction o f  buildings, trading, brick kilns, rural light 
industries and so on. It is important to remember, though that som e 
o f  these rights are currently held by w om en in  cultivating families.
It is this broader conception o f  rural property rights where 
customary rights are weaker which can provide the state w ith the 
basis o f  an orderly retreat over m any years. I  am  suggesting that 
sta te intervention in rural and agricultural development should be 
guided by the principle o f  establishing { as a precondition o f  its 
w ithdraw al) property rights other than land in the hands o f  those 
from  whom effective demand is  required in order to stim ulate an 
increase in agriculutral production.
This proposition recognises at least the outer limits o f  room  
for m anouvre for the state ; deals with the rural system as a totality  
by com bining the issues o f  effective demand, production and to a 
lesser extent equity ; reflects the lim itations o f  state intervention  
but avoids the disastrous consequences o f  an im mediate private 
sector solution in the prevailing system  o f  rural class relations. 
This is the key to a programme o f  agrarian reform which be­
cause it does not immediately confront the question o f  land reform  
may be within the realms o f  possibility. It represents in m y view  
the least that should be done both to  ensure the viability o f  the
5. Little is known, I think, about customary rights to water in Bangladesh. 
A research thesis here for an agrarian historian or lawyer.
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suppiy-side strategies envisaged by M O A , and to reverse the process 
o f rural poverty.
D oes this approach assist the creation o f  productive relations ? 
More equalisation o f  the rental share from the productivity o f land 
via the landless possession o f  property rights ( e. g. water ) means a 
shift in the terms o f  exchange between the factors o f  production  
surrounding agriculture toward m ore equal bargaining between the  
sub-sectors o f  rural econom ic activity. The near m onopoly position  
o f  larger landholders in establishing the price ( generally low  ) for 
goods and services will be challenged. Landholders w ill be obliged  
to  respond by optim ising the relation between their factors o f  
production. This logic is similar to the com m ercialisation approach 
(reducing subsidies and allowing food  prices to  rise) except here 
there is provision for generating effective dem and through a wider 
distribution o f  the product.
It is a corollary o f  this strategy that poorer farmers and tenants 
must continue to  be cushioned from the precipitous effects o f  this 
shift in the terms o f  rural exchange. This is a critical principle guiding 
possible institutional out-com es. H owever it should be the case that 
sharecropped land too  would becom e m ore productive under these 
conditions where the sharecropper was part o f  a group which was 
receiving non-land rentals. The likelihood, though, is that share- 
cropped land w ould steadily disappear under these conditions leading 
to increased land productivity ( i. e., the leasing capital relation 
would be transformed). H ow ever increases in the productivity o f  land  
will generally have this effect anyway.
These observations raise the issue o f whether such a strategy 
would exacerbate the concentration and polarisation o f  landholding ; 
and if  this is a possible result, does it matter ? The effects o f  
concentration would be offset by the proliferation o f  significant 
property rights other than land, and may even lead to  a greater 
rationalisation o f  the use o f  land. However, the risk o f  assisting the 
rise o f  a kulak  class is unacceptable - - to  me at least. Thus a feature 
o f  this strategy must be to invest greater resources in the protection  
o f  sm all farmers and sharecroppers particularly against the em ascu­
lating effects o f  usury. This protection can take several possible forms 
which are suggested in the next section o f  the paper.
Finally, there is a possible outcom e o f  this strategy which is o f  
long-term  concern. The initiation o f  such an agrarian reform strategy
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may establish the social and political preconditions required to extend  
the state’s room to manouvre on key issues such as land reform. 
Securing non-land rural property rights provides the material basis for 
more solidarity and mutual trust am ong poor cultivators and land­
less, are requirement for autonom ous political particpation. T o the ex­
tent that the holding pattern o f  these non-land property rights is held 
through group, association, union and cooperative arrangements then 
meaningful political pressure w ould exist from  a numerical majority 
to  socialise the holding o f  land. A s such the political structures which 
emerge constitute the preconditions for the eventual socialisation o f  
land.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR ACTION 
Combined Rural Policy
Programmes for the generation o f  effective demand involving  
the participation o f  those from whom  it is required, have to  be 
pursued in conjunction with the supply side objectives to  increase 
production. The m ethods o f  supply and the em phasis to  be given to  
the various categories o f  technology ( e. g. low  cost, quick yielding, 
minor irrigation activity ) need to  be determined in accordance with  
this strategy. The need is then for a com bined rural policy  which will 
reinforce rather than detract from agricultural production.
Subsidise Technology Used by the Poor
A  further general issue on the supply side concerns the 
question : which classes use which technologies. There is persistent 
evidence that the largest subsidies apply to the technologies from  
which the richer farmers benefit m ost (Edwards a t a l  1978). A s 
a general principle then, and as a matter o f  aggregate pricing 
policy on inputs, the pattern o f  technological use must be established- 
subsidising those technologies which smaller farmers use to  a greater 
extent as a proportion o f  their total investm ent. Lifting all subsidies 
on fertilizer or other inputs is not going to help the poorer 
farmers. Since the strategy is to retain the small farmer as a 
beneficiary o f  rises in land productivity-this issue is central.
Focus on Poor Group Activity Which Is Exclusive
T he relation between technologies and classes is not only 
relevant to supply and subsidy strategies. It raises an important 
question of the extent to  which an activity is exclusive to  par-
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ticular classes. If poorer groups arc associated with particular 
technologies and activity which the richer classes avoid, then 
support for such activity is less likely to be undermined by 
the rich. This criterion should be a guiding principle of the 
strategy. .A. clear example of such exclusiveness must be physical 
labour—so any programme involving a high element of personal 
physical labour would support the strategy (Greely (1979).
Cooperative Investment Not Just Saving
An emphasis upon cooperative investment must be another 
principle o f this strategy. This affords the greatest protection for 
the poor membership. Exclusive reliance on individual loans to 
the poor whether women or not, leaves the individual vulnerable 
to relationships of personal dependency with a patron. Coopera­
tive investment on the other hand is more likely to prevent a 
leakage of cheap credit to  service immediately pressing, more 
expensive and usurious rather then productive obligations.
Pace of Group Formation and Internal Composition
A further guiding principle of this strategy must be the 
pace at which groups develop and receive support in the form 
of loans, services, training etc.. Evidence of the group’s solidarity 
must be a criterion for such support, if the principle o f Cooperative 
investment is to be meaningful. A group with tenuous solidarity 
is more vulnerable to takeover and manipulation o f landlords 
patrons etc. functioning as brokers between the field workers 
and such groups. In discussions on this strategy, the assumption 
has been that a group might consist of the poorer kin in a
para, lineage or extended family. However the homogeneity 
of the group members in this sense may be its weakness 
since they would all be dependent upon the same patron (e.g.
from the strong gosti), and therefore jointly vulnerable because 
dependency relations were shared. A heterogeneous group 
membership (with respect only to this variable) may protect it
further, since the separate dependency relations would be a 
weaker threat to the attem pts to develop mutual trust among 
themselves. The N G O ’s have been particularly aware of these
issues of solidarity and pace, and some of them have tried to
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avoid  ihe Targe (.'group' uienlali ly.' '  (^W'ood 1980). g ro u p
V. hi.ch is e n .o u ra g c d  to take on lo o  m uch  too soon e ither co llapses  
or simply U ausfcrs  its dep endency  sy n d ro m e  to  the held w o rk e r  
instead o! being responsible for its ow n decis ions and  i in cs tm cn t .  
Phases of Cooperative Activity
The strategy also needs to consider phases of cooperative 
activity—identifying the easier perhaps more autonom ous projects 
first as a means of developing mutual trust within such groups before 
moving on to the more delicate task of interacting with larger land­
holders through the provision of goods and services to them (Wood 
1970). It should always be a guiding principle in rural development 
to begin with what people already do. With small farmers, for 
example, there are well established patterns o f mutual aid : sharing 
of bullocks, ioiiit cultivation of adjacent plots and mutual help on 
land improvement. From this basis other activities can develop such 
as collaboration on form-filling, jo in t meetings with VEA’s on 
technical issues, sharing of pumps, livestock management, grain p ro ­
cessing (involving female members especially in pooling site, equipment 
as well as labour).
Defence of Vulnerable Land Rights
In addition to earlier comments on alternatives within IRDF, 
there might be a policy of extending rural banking in a role of 
protection for victims and potential victims of usury and eventual 
expropriation of land. The formation o f sharecroppers’ cooperatives 
supported by a land mortgage bank system could achieve this. An 
individual small landholder in trouble would mortgage his land to 
the cooperative instead of to his creditor. The cooperative borrows 
the value of the mortgage from the bank which is passed through the 
mortgagee to pay off hi^ creditor without incurring crippling interest 
charges. I'hc mortgaged land is cultivated by the cooperative with the 
mortgagee as a member until such time as it can be released by the 
mortgagee ( at the lower bank ra 'c  of interest of course ).
6. Instead o f  ‘target groups’ detincd externally, developm ent groups sh- uid 
emerge through self-detinition prompted by the promise o f oxternai 
support for productive projects. T he field w orkers should be a catalyst 
in this process recognising that the strategy outlined here is based 
m ore on the principle o f  participation rather than m obilisation.
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The same cooperative would also attempt to become the collec­
tive village (or para, the unit is immaterial) sharecropper—convincing  
iandowmcrs (who may be small and absentee/infirm, as well as large 
and absentee or non-tilling) that if the land is held by the cooperative 
for a minimum o f  A ’ years ( enabling im provem ents and incentives to  
invest ) a one/third share to the landowner would be on the higher 
productivity o f  the land and his net rental return thereby increased. 
In this way a real possibility exists o f  extending irrigation to more 
sharecropped land. Even without an alteration o f  the crop-sharc, 
there is now evidence that irrigated sharecropped land matches 
owned/irrigated land for productivity. But the crop-share has to be 
altered to create the incentive.
Short-term Consumption Credit
Since these arrangements would be a form o f  cooperative inves­
tment, the risk o f leakage o f  benefits to  patrons/creditors would be 
reduced. If the rural banking sytem was also able to provide short­
term consum ption credit guaranteed by the cooperative then the cycle 
o f  usury and unproductive capital would be counteracted. This issue 
o f  consum ption credits tied to the group or cooperative’s guarantee, 
is o f  general relevance to all these possibilities o f dispersing property 
rights. W ithout it, the leakage problem threatens the entire strategy 
o f transforming usurious capital relations into productive ones.
W ater Rights—Large-scale, Surface, Water
Water clearly requires a longer and separate discussion to the 
btief remarks which follow  here. The first problem is the expansion  
o f  large-scale gravity-flow irrigation systems, which was referred to 
earlier in the remaks on canal digging. Experience with these systems 
elsewhere (e. g. in India) where they exist in (he context o f  private 
landholding, shows that the public nature o f  the goods and the 
associated services cannot be effectively absorbed within the com pe­
titive structure o f  relations between individual farmers, even if they 
are in the same class. Examples o f  problèmes are: stealing and hoar­
ding water; reluctance to host field channels routing water to the less 
favoured plots o f  one’s neighbours ; tail-enders; responsibility for 
maintenance; and ensuring timeliness o f  supply. The establishm ent o f  
of large irrigation departments to  m anage these systems has in effect 
placed this critical agrarian means o f  production in the hands o f  the 
bureaucracy and the state. This has resulted both in severe issues o f
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corruption/m arket m anipulation down through the hierarchy o f  engi­
neers and the absence o f  integration with the agricultural agencies and  
the agricultural requirements o f  the locality.
Again, the strategy being proposed in this paper has a poten­
tial to  address these problem s. A lthough the technology is lum py  
and cum bersom e, it does have the virtue o f harnessing natural 
resources ( surface water ), being labour intensive and reducing the 
dependence on  im ported technology. The RW P and FVVP function to  
retain this means o f  production in the control o f  the state, providing 
it with a resource o f  patronage to its petty-bourgeois contractor allies 
and through the unpredictable dispersal o f  bclow-subsistence wages to  
the landless. But the potential contribution o f  surface-water exploi­
tation to  the expansion o f  effective dem and could be much greater. 
The Formation o f  Irrigation M anagement Groups
Irrigation m anagem ent groups com posed o f  the landless ( and 
poor cultivators with additional em ploym ent/incom e needs ) may in 
effect function as ‘brokers’ between the public attributes o f  this form  
o f  irrigation and the private form  o f  its use. The possession o f  such 
water rights, involving the creation, control, management, allocation  
and maintenance responsibilities o f  the physical infrastructure, not 
only provides these groups w ith an incom e but places them in 
the position o f  arbitrating between the com peting claims o f  different 
farmers. To the extent that poorer farmers (owners or owner share­
croppers ) are members o f  these groups so  will the problem s o f biased  
distribution in favour o f  the rich be reduced, as the group’s manage­
ment decisions w ould reflect the needs o f  these members.
W ater Rights— Sm ai-scale and Ground W ater
The m ore divisible irrigation technologies do not face these 
sharp contradictions between the public nature o f  the good  and the 
private use o f  the service to the sam e degree. This is especially so  if 
aspects o f  the technology are m obile ( i. e. pum p sets ). But where 
mechanisation is involved, then an additional set o f  relationships 
would obtain between a group and either government agencies or 
private enterprises around supply, repair, maintenance, fuel, etc., and  
over the location and sinking o f  borings. The reform o f  the B A D C  
and ensuring its accountability is an integral part o f  the state guaran­
teeing the property rights on these foi ms o f  divisible and mechanised  
irrigation technologies.
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Water R ights—Potential
Finally the potential for establishing such a pattern o f  water 
rights in Bangladesh ought to be enorm ous since it is generally assu­
med that there is sufficient water to irrigate a further 7 m illion acres. 
This can only mean that the pattern o f  water rights in these areas, 
especially with respect to  non-traditonal technologies, has n ot be­
com e institutionalised with highly developed vested interests around  
them. This lack o f  institutionalisation is a considerable resource. 
Therefore a guiding principle, not only on the irrigation aspects o f  
these proposals but over other activities too , is to focus on those  
rights and in those areas where the rights are not so established. With 
water rights, a working hypothesis would be in the flood  prone/fam ine 
prone areas where the perennial system s are difficult to  maintain 
involving a corresponding higher use o f  m obile technology such as 
low-!ift pum ps.
Conclusion
These final references to  water rights and lan d less groups selling  
irrigation highlight a contem porary problem  o f  agrarian policy in 
Bangladesh. The governm ent is being urged by the W orld Bank and 
other internationl agencies to  embark upon an im m ediate program o f  
‘flooding’ Bangladesh with m inor irrigation technology, based on the 
principle o f  selling and renting the hardware in the open market at 
subsidized rates. The quantities o f  STW ’s and LLP’s through ID A  
credit (supported by an F A O /U N D P  project to  retrieve the D T W  p ro­
gram in the North-W est o f  Bangladesh ) promise to  be enorm ous. Over 
the next three years numbers o f  50,000 for LL P’s and 150,000 for 
STW ’s have been proposed. W ithout the widespread adoption o f  a 
countervailing strategy as outlined above, this prevailing policy on  
irrigation will quickly establish a new d a ss  o f  water-lords and effec­
tively deny any possibility o f  significant room  for m aneoiivre for the 
government over this critical asset. The same problem exists over 
a whole range o f  assets and com m odities.
The m otivation for this dramatic policy o f  rapidly expanding  
the supply o f  minor irrigation technology is a preoccupation with  
securing a higher rate o f  g ro m h  in agricultural production and corres­
ponding reduction in the level o f  food aid. It is the argument o f  this 
paper that far from being a recipe for growth, this policy w ill estab­
lish the preconditions for a long-term steady decline in the econom y
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by concentrating the pattern o f  ownership and profit. A rise in 
agricultural production under these conditions could only be secured 
through an expensive procurement policy to maintain price incentives 
to the potential producers o f a net marketable surplus. In this case 
all that would have been achieved w ould be a switch from food aid 
to capital aid to fund the procurement strategy, accom panied by an 
elaborate rationing system to distribute food  in the countryside to 
those excluded from income-generating activity— in short the extension  
o f a relief econmy. I think the onus o f  refuting this conclusion now lies 
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In  d raw in g  a t t e n t i o n  to  a p a r t i c u l a r  b u t  c e n t r a l  a s p e c t  o f  th e  
a g r a r i a n  s o c i a l  fo rm a tio n  in  B a n g la d e sh , th e  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  a  b ro a d e r  
s e t  o f  i s s u e s  c o n c e rn in g  c l a s s  s t r u c t u r e  c a n n o t  b e  ig n o r e d .  T h e re  i s ,  
o f  c o u r s e ,  an i n i t i a l  and fu n d am e n ta l p ro b le m  w h e th e r  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t o  
em ploy a c o n c e p t o f  s o c i a l  c l a s s  a t  a l l  in  d e s c r i b in g  r u r a l  B a n g la d e sh , 
o r  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  S .A s ia ,  when th e  d im e n s io n  o f  c o n s c io u s n e s s  o r  s o l i d a r i t y  
i s  c o n s id e r e d  ( B e r to c c i  1 9 7 7 ). T h is  i s  n o t  t h e  o c c a s io n  f o r  a 
t h e o r e t i c a l  e x a m in a tio n  o f  th e  c o n c e p t o f  s o c i a l  c l a s s ,  a l th o u g h  some 
o f  i t s  l i m i t a t i o n s  when a p p l ie d  t o  t h i s  m a t e r i a l  w i l l  u n d o u b te d ly  b e  
r e v e a le d .  However a  c o n c e p t o f  c l a s s  re m a in s  u s e f u l  i n  d e s c r i b in g  th e  
dynam ics o f  r u r a l  p ro d u c t io n  r e l a t i o n s  and t h e i r  im p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  th e  
b e h a v io u r  o f  r u r a l  p e o p le  even  i f  i t  i s  c o n c lu d e d  t h a t  a s  a  c o r r o l l a r y  
t o  th e  p r o c e s s  th e  fo rm a tio n  o f  c l a s s  c o n s c io u s n e s s  f o r  some c o n t in u e s  
t o  be  im peded . In  th e  s e a r c h  f o r  some g e n e r a l  e x p la n a t io n  o f  t h e  r u r a l  
p o l i t i c a l  economy i t  w ould c e r t a i n l y  be u n w ise  t o  g lo s s  o v e r  th e  
e x te n t  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  f ra g m e n ta t io n  -  in d e e d  i t  i s  p r e c i s e l y  t h i s  
f ra g m e n ta ry  f e a t u r e  o f  r u r a l  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  w h ich  i s  t o  be c o n ta in e d  
i n  o u r  f o rm u la t io n .
U n t i l  th e  m id - s e v e n t ie s  th e  a c c o u n ts  o f  a g r a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s  in  
B a n g la d esh  c o u ld  be c r i t i c i s e d  in  t h r e e  ways -  f o r  b e in g  a h i s t o r i c a l ;  
f o r  t h e i r  comm itm ent to  ho m o g en e ity ; and  f o r  t h e i r  m e th o d o lo g ic a l  b i a s  
in  u s in g  C o m illa  a s  th e  b a s i s  f o r  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s .
F i r s t ,  any d i s c u s s io n  o f  c l a s s  fo rm a tio n  in  B a n g la d e sh  c a n n o t  be  
s e p a r a te d  e i t h e r  from  th e  g e n e ra l  h i s t o r y  o f  c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  i n  E a s t  B engal 
o r  from  th e  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n d i t io n s  u n d e r w hich th e  in d e p e n d e n t  s t a t e
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em erged -  th e  p a r t i t i o n  o f  B engal i n t o  W est B engal and  E a s t  P a k i s t a n  
in  1947; th e  econom ic and c u l t u r a l  s u b o r d in a t io n  o f  m o st c l a s s e s  in  
E a s t  P a k is ta n  t o  th e  i n t e r e s t s  o f  a c o m b in a tio n  o f  p r o p e r t i e d  c l a s s e s  
i n  W est P a k is ta n  r e p r e s e n te d  m a in ly  th ro u g h  m i l i t a r y  and  b u r e a u c r a t i c  
l e a d e r s h i p  (A lav i 1972 , N a tio n s  1971, S e n g u p ta  1 9 7 1 ); and  th e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  
o f  I n d ia  (w ith  USSR s u p p o r t)  in  th e  ' l i b e r a t i o n '  o f  B a n g la d e sh  i n  1971 
(M aniruzzam an 1975, L i f s c h u l t z  1 9 7 9 ). The d e v e lo p m en t o f  n a t i o n a l i s t  
id e o lo g y  in  t h i s  c o n te x t  p r o fo u n d ly  d e te rm in e d  th e  way i n  w h ich  t h e  
a g r a r i a n  s t r u c t u r e  was r e p r e s e n te d  th ro u g h  th e  s i x t i e s  i n t o  th e  e a r l y  
s e v e n t i e s  " a s  a  p e a s a n t  economy b a s e d  on  s m a ll  f a m i ly  fa rm s  o p e r a te d  
p r i m a r i l y  w i th  f a m ily  la b o u r"  (A b d u llah  and  N a tio n s  1974 , Bose 1 9 7 3 ) .
T h is  was c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  n a t i o n a l i s t  s t r u g g l e  f o r  an  au tonom ous 
E a s t  B engal a g a in s t  th e  la n d e d  a r i s t o c r a t s  o f  t h e  d o m in a n t W e ste rn  w ing 
o f  P a k i s t a n .  I t  was a l s o  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  t h e  e a r l i e r  p i c t u r e  w i th in  
E a s t  B engal o f  Hindu Z am indars d o m in a tin g  M uslim  r a i y a t s  and  b a rg a d a r s  
b e f o r e  P a r t i t i o n  in  1947.
S e co n d ly  m ost o f  th e  a t te m p ts  t o  g e n e r a l i s e  r e l i e d  upon a g g re g a te  
d a ta  c o l l e c t e d  in  th e  1 9 6 0 's  (See A .R .K han 1977 f o r  s o u rc e s )  a b o u t th e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  la n d h o ld in g  and  t e n u r e  w hich  e m p h a s ise d  th e  u n i f o r m i ty  
o f  la n d h o ld in g  p a t t e r n s  and d i s g u i s e d  im p o r ta n t  r e g i o n a l  v a r i a t i o n s  w ith  
r e l a t e d  e c o lo g ic a l  and h i s t o r i c a l  s p e c i f i c i t i e s .  I t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  
t h a t  even  th e  B ureau  o f  S t a t i s t i c s  (GOB) Land O ccupancy S u rv ey  1977-1978 
( f in a n c e d  and l e d  by  USAID) c o n d u c te d  i t s  a n a l y s i s  a lm o s t  e n t i r e l y  
i n  a g g re g a te  te rm s , n e v e r  p r e s e n t in g  a  breakdow n on a  d i s t r i c t  o r  some 
o t h e r  r e g io n a l  b a s i s .
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T h ir d ly  th e  c o n te n t  o f  t h e s e  g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s  had  b een  b i a s e d  by a 
c o n c e n t r a t io n  o f  r e s e a r c h  in  th e  d e n s e ly  p o p u la te d  and f e r t i l e  r e g io n  o f  
C o m illa , b a se d  on ag ro -e c o n o m ic  s u rv e y s  c o n d u c te d  by th e  B a n g la d esh
Academy f o r  R u ra l D evelopm ent (BARD) ( B la i r  1974 , p l2 2 ;  Van S c h e n d e l 1 9 7 6 ) .
The C o m illa  f in d i n g s  form ed th e  b a s i s  o f  e x t r a p o l a t i o n s  f o r  B a n g la d e sh  
a s  a  w h o le , p r o v id in g  ein im age o f  an hom ogenous a g r a r i a n  s t r u c t u r e  d e s c r ib e d  
in  te rm s  o f  s m a l l - h o ld in g  f a rm e r s .
T hese  w e a k n e sse s  gave r i s e  t o  two s ta n d a r d  b u t  m is le a d in g  
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n s :  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  a  s u b s t a n t i a l  c l a s s  o f  l a n d l o r d s  and
la n d h o ld e r s ;  and  th e  lo w - le v e l  o f  a b s o lu t e  a v e ra g e  s i z e  o f  h o ld in g .
As a r e s u l t  th e  C o m illa  c o o p e r a t iv e  program m e from  th e  e a r l y  s i x t i e s  
was p r e d i c a t e d  on th e  i d e o l o g ic a l  a s su m p tio n  t h a t  c l a s s  d i v i s i o n  w i th in  th e
'p e a s a n t  econom y' was s t r u c t u r a l l y  i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  T h is  program m e was
l a t e r  e x te n d e d  in  1973 th ro u g h o u t  r u r a l  B a n g la d e sh  in  t h e  form  o f  th e  
I n te g r a t e d  R u ra l  D evelopm ent Programme (IR D P), and  to d a y  s t i l l  c o n s t i t u t e s  
d e s p i t e  m o d i f i c a t i o n s ,  d i s t o r t i o n s  and  ta k e o v e r s  (Wood 1980) th e  
p r i n c i p a l  ' i n s t r u m e n t '  o f  r u r a l  d ev e lo p m en t p o l i c y  i n  B a n g la d e s h . 
F u r th e rm o re , th e  IRDP i t s e l f  i s  a  c r u c i a l  i d e o l o g i c a l  a p p a r a tu s  o f  th e  
s t a t e  and r e p r e s e n t s  and r e p ro d u c e s  a  v iew  o f  c l a s s  m e re ly  by  p e r s i s t i n g  
in  a  form  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  b a s e d  on ' f a rm e rs  c o o p e r a t i v e s '
( k r i s h i  s ambaya s a m i t i s ) . I t  i s  t h e r e f o r e  an  im p o r ta n t  a c t  o f  c r i t i c i s m  
a s  w e l l  a s  d e s c r i p t i o n  to  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  r u r a l  c l a s s  
fo rm a tio n  in  B a n g la d e sh .
Of c o u rs e  th e  a ssu m p tio n  t h a t  c l a s s  d i v i s i o n  i s  s t r u c t u r a l l y  
i n s i g n i f i c a n t  need  n o t  p r e v e n t  i t s  a d h e r e n ts  from  r e c o g n i s in g  t h a t  some 
p a t t e r n  o f  s o c i a l  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  e x i s t s .  A d i s t i n c t i o n  was a c c e p te d
4 .
b e tw een  ' s u r p l u s '  p e a s a n ts  on th e  one hand  and  s u b s i s t e n c e ,  be low  
s u b s i s t e n c e  and l a n d le s s  on th e  o t h e r  b a se d  upon m in o r v a r i a t i o n s  
o f  l a n d h o ld in g .  (A b d u llah  and N a tio n s  1974; B e r to c c i  1 9 7 2 ) . B ut 
th e s e  v a r i a t i o n s  w ere n o t  c r e d i t e d  w ith  lo n g  te rm  dynam ic im p l ic a t i o n s  
f o r  c h a n g e s  i n  th e  p a t t e r n  o f  l a n d h o ld in g  d i s t r i b u t i o n .  In  t h i s  v iew , 
and  a lo n g  w i th  many s u b s e q u e n t e v a lu a t i o n s  o f  t h e  C o m illa  c o - o p e r a t iv e  
s t r a t e g y  (A.H.Khan 1 9 7 1 ) , t h e r e  a r e  r u r a l  e l i t e s  b u t  t h e i r  
e x i s t e n c e  i s  e x p la in e d  l a r g e l y  i n  te rm s  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  s t r o n g  l in e a g e s  
(g o s t i s ) w hich  have  m anaged t o  d o m in a te  t h e  c o o p e r a t i v e s ,  new i r r i g a t i o n  
o p p o r t u n i t i e s  and  f e r t i l i s e r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  th ro u g h  p o l i t i c a l  c o n n e c t io n s  
w ith  g o v ern m en t o f f i c i a l s .  By such  m eans, r u r a l  e l i t e s  hav e  m a r g in a l ly  
b u t  o n ly  t e m p o r a r i ly  e x te n d e d  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  o v e r  l a n d .  An im p o r ta n t  
a s p e c t  o f  t h i s  p r o p o s i t io n  i s  t h a t  su ch  e l i t e s  do n o t  c o n s t i t u t e  a 
c l a s s  s in c e  th e y  c a n n o t e a s i l y  r e p ro d u c e  t h e i r  econom ic p o s i t i o n  in  th e  
s o c i e t y .  The p r e v a i l i n g  sy stem  o f  m u l t i p l e  i n h e r i t a n c e  r e q u i r e s  a 
d i v i s i o n  o f  t h e  h o ld in g  be tw een  so n s  and  e n s u r e s  a p r o c e s s  o f  c y c l i c a l  
m o b i l i t y ,  o r  in d e e d  'c y c l i c a l  K u lak ism ' ( B e r to c c i  1 9 7 2 ) . D i f f e r e n t i a t i o n ,
i n  t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e ,  i s  a n a ly s e d  a s  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  t h a t  i s :  
c a t e g o r i e s  o f  w e a l th ,  incom e and s t a t u s  th ro u g h  w h ich  f a m i l i e s  move up 
and down. And in d e e d  B e r to c c i  (1 9 7 7 ), h a s  b e e n  c o n c e rn e d  a b o u t th e  
f a i l u r e  i n  B a n g la d esh  and e ls e w h e re  i n  t h e  s u b c o n t in e n t  " to  c o r r e l a t e  
econom ic i n d i c a t o r s  o f  c l a s s  w i th  n o n -e c o n o m ic , c u l t u r a l l y  s i g n i f i c a n t  
m a rk e rs  o f  r e l a t i v e  p r e s t i g e  o r  s o c i a l  r a n k " .
Thus B e r to c c i  i n  e f f e c t  a c c e p ts  W e b e r 's  c o n c e p tu a l  d i s t i n c t i o n  
b e tw een  c l a s s  and  s t a t u s ,  w hich  e n a b le s  him  t o  r e c o n c i l e  h i s  
n e o - C h a y a n o v i a n  v iew s o f  f l u c t u a t i n g  p e a s a n t  f a m i ly  econm oic f o r tu n e s  
w ith  o t h e r  c o n c lu s io n s  c o n c e rn in g :  t h e  r e p r o d u c t io n  and  m a in te n a n c e
o f  l in e a g e  s t a t u s ;  th e  r e t e n t i o n  o f  p a t r o n - c l i e n t  r e l a t i o n s  a s  th e
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m ain form  o f  s o c i a l  s o l i d a r i t y  a t  th e  v i l l a g e  l e v e l ;  a c o n s e q u e n t 
f r a g m e n ta t io n  o f  l o y a l t i e s  and a t ta c h m e n ts  on a v e r t i c a l  b a s i s  u n d e rm in in g  
th e  p o t e n t i a l i t y  f o r  c l a s s  s o l i d a r i t i e s  on h o r i z o n t a l  l i n e s ;  and 
b ro a d e r  q u e s t io n s  o f  c o n s c io u s n e s s  and  r e l i g i o u s  (B engal M uslim) 
id e o lo g y .  B e r t o c c i 's  s u b s ta n t iv e  c o n c e rn s  r e g a r d in g  w hat he c a l l s  
' s t r u c t u r a l  f r a g m e n ta t io n ' and  h i s  w o r r ie s  a b o u t  c l a s s  a s  a  b l u n t  
in s t r u m e n t  o f  a n a ly s i s  a r e  l e g i t i m a t e ,  b u t  he  t a k e s  an  e a s y  way o u t  o f  
th e  p ro b lem  by  m aking u s e  o f  t h e  p r o b le m a t ic  d i s t i n c t i o n  be tw een  
" c l a s s e s  i n  th e m s e lv e s "  and " c l a s s e s  f o r  th e m s e lv e s "  (o r  be tw een  
o b j e c t i v e  s i t u a t i o n  and s u b je c t iv e  a w a r e n e s s ) , c i t i n g  b o th  Marx and 
M eszaros (1972) in  h i s  s u p p o r t .  " . . . o n e  m ig h t c i t e  a  v a r i e t y  o f  
c o m p le x i t ie s  in  th e  r u r a l  p o l i t i c a l  economy w h ich  h in d e r  th e  
t r a n s f o r m a t io n  o f  'p e a s a n t  c l a s s e s '  th u s  f a r  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  l o c a l  pow er 
s t r u c t u r e  and  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  r e s e a r c h  from  'c l a s s e s  i n  th e m s e lv e s ' 
t o  'c l a s s e s  f o r  th e m s e lv e s '.  ( B e r to c c i  1977 p . 4 ) . T h is  i s  p e r i l o u s l y  
c lo s e  t o  t h e  ' f a l s e  c o n s c io u s n e s s ' p o s i t i o n  and  r e v e a l s  a s t r a n g e ly  
v u l g a r i s e d  v iew  o f  th e  l i m i t a t i o n s  o f  M a rx is t  c l a s s  a n a l y s i s .
The n o t io n  o f  c l a s s  w h ich  i s  em ployed in  su ch  a p p ro a c h e s  
i s  r e a l l y  s u p e r f lu o u s ,  s in c e  i t s  u s e  d o e s  n o t  a r i s e  o u t  o f  a  p r im a ry  
c o n c e rn  w ith  c h a r a c t e r i s i n g  th e  e x p l o i t a t i v e ,  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  and t h e r e f o r e  
dyncimic a s p e c t s  o f  th e  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t io n  and  exchange  in  
w hich  b o th  ru ra l-e c o n o m ic  a c t i v i t y  and  fo rm s o f  r u r a l  c u l t u r e  and 
p o l i t i c a l  r e l a t i o n s  a r e  l o c a t e d .  The c o n c e p t  o f  c l a s s  i s  d i s t i n c t i v e  
i n  t h a t  i t  c a n n o t  b e  d e f in e d  by r e f e r e n c e  t o  i n t e r n a l  a t t r i b u t e s .  I t  
i s  a r e l a t i o n a l  c o n c e p t ,  A c l a s s  o n ly  e x i s t s  i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  a n o th e r  
c l a s s ,  th ro u g h  s t r u g g l e  and o p p o s i t io n  w ith  i t  -  and c o l l e c t i v e  a c t i o n  
in v o lv in g  c o n s c io u s n e s s  i s  o n ly  one  (advanced) form  o f  su ch  s t r u g g l e  
and o p p o s i t i o n .  In  t h i s  s e n se  o f  c l a s s ,  th e  s t r u c t u r a l  f r a g m e n ta t io n
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r e f e r r e d  to  by B e r to c c i  i s  n o t  e v id e n c e  o f  some o t h e r  m ore d e te r m in a n t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p  b u t  t h e  e x p re s s io n  o f  c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  u n d e r  t h e  
h i s t o r i c a l l y  s p e c i f i c  s o c i a l  c o n d i t io n s  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  and  o t h e r  fo rm s 
o f  r u r a l  p r o d u c t io n  in  B a n g la d e sh . Marx n e v e r  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  c o l l e c t i v e  
a c t i o n  o r  c o n s c io u s n e s s  was a n e c e s s a r y  com ponent o f  t h e  d e n o ta t io n  o f  
c l a s s  -  o n ly  t h a t  such  c o l l e c t i v e  c o n s c io u s n e s s  o f  common e x p l o i t a t i o n  
was a d i s t i n g u i s h i n g  f e a t u r e  o f  th e  p r o l e t a r i a t  u n d e r  c o n d i t io n s  o f  
advanced  c a p i t a l i s m .  To demand o th e r w is e  w ould  make n o n se n se  o f  any  
r e f e r e n c e s  t o  th e  a n a ly s i s  o f  f r a c t i o n s  o f  c a p i t a l  (Marx -  a l s o  The E ig h te e n th  
B r u m a ir e . . )  on th e  one h a n d , and  t o  f e u d a l ,  l a n d e d ,  yeom an, p e a s a n t ,  
s e r f  e t c .  c l a s s e s  on th e  o t h e r  (Marx -  P r e - C a p i t a l i s t  Econom ic F o rm a t io n s ) .
I t  h a s  t o  be rem em bered t h a t  M a rx 's  fam ous r e f e r e n c e s  t o  t h e  p e a s a n t r y  
in  The E ig h te e n th  B ru n a ire  w ere made t o  com pare them  t o  th e  s i t u a t i o n  
o f  th e  P a r i s  p r o l e t a r i a t  -  t h a t  was a  p r e c i s e ,  h i s t o r i c a l l y  l o c a t e d  
c o u n te r f a c tu a l  r e f e r r i n g  t o  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw een  th e  s o c i a l  c o n d i t io n s  
o f  p r o d u c t io n  and  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f  a  c o l l e c t i v e  c o n s c io u s n e s s .  I t  
was c e r t a i n l y  n o t  a  d e n ia l  o f  c l a s s  s t r u g g l e ,  m e re ly  a  d e s ig n a t io n  o f  
i t s  n e c e s s a ry  form  u n d e r  th e  c o n d i t io n s  o f  t r a n s f o r m a t io n  in  m id - n in e te e n th  
c e n tu r y  F ra n c e .
O u ts id e  th e  h a n d fu l  o f  M a rx is t  o r i e n t e d  academ ic  t h e o r i s t s  i n  
B a n g la d e sh , i t  i s  th e  l e f t i s t  p o l i t i c a l  f o r c e s  w h ich  h av e  b een  m o st 
c o n c e rn e d  to  em ploy a  c o n c e p t o f  c l a s s  t o  d e s c r ib e  th e  a g r a r i a n  sy s te m .
However a  f a m i l i a r  d iv e rg e n c e  h a s  em erged and  t h i s  h a s  u n d o u b te d ly  
c o n t r i b u te d  t o  t h e  f r u s t r a t i o n s  w ith  t h e  c l a s s  a n a l y s i s  e x p re s s e d  by 
B e r to c c i  and o t h e r s .  Some g ro u p s  l i k e  th e  M a r x i s t - L e n in i s t  P a r ty  o f  
E a s t  B engal (M aniruzzam an 1975) d e s c r ib e d  r u r a l  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  a s  
b e in g  f e u d a l  o r  s e m i- f e u d a l .  In  p a r t i c u l a r  th e y  fo c u s  on th e  r e l a t i o n s  
o f  e x p l o i t a t i o n  ( B a n e r j i  1972) such  a s  s h a re c ro p p in g  and  bonded l a b o u r .
p o i n t i n g  e s p e c i a l l y  t o  th e  c l a s s e s  o f  l a n d lo r d s  w h ich  rem a in  s i g n i f i c a n t  
i n  th e  N o rth  and W est r e g io n s  o f  th e  c o u n tr y .  E ls e w h e re , th e y  c o n t in u e ,  
even  in  th e  d e n s e ly  p o p u la te d  D a c c a -C o m illa  r e g io n  ( in c lu d in g  N o a k h a li)  
s h a re c ro p p in g  i s  s t i l l  s e e n  a s  an im p o r ta n t  com ponent o f  many o f  th e  s m a ll  
fa rm s . The J a t i y o  S a m a j ta n t r ik  D al ( th e  R e v o lu t io n a ry  S o c i a l i s t  P a r ty  -  
s e e  L i f s c h u l t z  1979) on th e  o th e r  hand  s t i l l  a rg u e  t h a t  t h e  r u r a l  economy 
i s  becom ing p e r v a s iv e ly  c a p i t a l i s t .  In  p a r t i c u l a r  i t  c i t e d  t h e  im p a c t 
o f  d o m in an t c a p i t a l  from  th e  W este rn  w ing  o f  P a k i s t a n ,  v ie w in g  a s  a 
c o n seq u en ce  th e  1971 l i b e r a t i o n  s t r u g g l e  a s  a  p r o g r e s s iv e  a s s e r t i o n  
o f  i n f a n t  n a t i o n a l i s t  c a p i t a l  a g a in s t  th e  ' f o r e i g n '  c a p i t a l  o f  P a k i s t a n 's  
w e s te rn  w ing . I t  e m p h a s ise s  t h e  p o l a r i s a t i o n  o f  la n d h o ld in g  w h ich  was 
d i s g u i s e d  by th e  a g g re g a te d  r e g io n a l  s t a t i s t i c s .  And f i n a l l y  i t  r e f e r s  
t o  th e  ways i n  w h ich  a g r i c u l t u r a l  program m es have  become b ig - f a r m e r  
o r i e n t e d  e s p e c i a l l y  w i th  th e  e x te n s io n  o f  th e  C o m illa  c o - o p e r a t iv e  s t r a t e g y  
i n t o  o t h e r ,  m ore d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  r e g io n s .
How can  su ch  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  a n a ly s e s  be  r e c o n c i l e d  w i th o u t  s im p ly  
d i s m is s in g  them  a s  dogm atism s? The p ro b lem  i s  t o  c o n ta in  th e  v a r i a t i o n s  
i n  a p p e a ra n c e s  o f  r e l a t i o n s  o f  e x p l o i t a t i o n  w i th in  a c o n s i s t e n t  
fram ew ork w h ich  w i l l  a t  th e  same tim e  r e f l e c t  th e  u n ifo rm  a s p e c t s  o f  
B a n g la d e s h 's  r e c e n t  h i s t o r y  from  1947. The t h r e e  m e th o d o lo g ic a l  c r i t i c i s m s  
o u t l i n e d  above o f  e a r l i e r  a c c o u n ts  o f  a g r a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s  p r o v id e s  th e  
b a s i s  f o r  cin a p p ro a c h  w hich  com bines a  r e c o g n i t i o n  o f  t h e  h i s t o r i c a l  
s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  B an g la d esh  w ith  a  s e n s i t i v i t y  to w a rd s  i t s  i n t e r n a l  r e g io n a l  
v a r i a t i o n s .  T h is  a p p ro a c h , th o u g h , d o e s  n o t  c o n s i s t  j u s t  o f  e m p i r i c i s t  
d e s c r i p t i o n  o th e rw is e  i t  w ould rem ain  bem used by th e  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  
a p p e a ra n c e s  o f  th e  d a t a .  The a n a ly s i s  i s  c o n s t r u c te d  a ro u n d  p r o p o s i t i o n s  
c o n c e rn in g  d e p e n d e n t a c c u m u la tio n  u n d e r  t h e  c o lo n i a l  c o n d i t io n s  w hich
p e r s i s t e d  in  E a s t  P a k is ta n  d u r in g  1 9 4 7 -7 1 .
In  th e  s p e c i f i c  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  t h e  p a r t i t i o n  o f  B engal i n  1947 
and th e  c o lo n i a l  d o m in a tio n  o f  E a s t  B engal by  W est P a k i s t a n  w ith  th e  
r e l a t e d  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on B e n g a li  c a p i t a l  a c c u m u la t io n , th e  fo rm a l 
d e s t r u c t i o n  o f  t h e  l a n d l o r d - t e n a n t  sy s te m  (Z a m in d a r i) d id  n o t  b r in g  
a b o u t a  d i r e c t  d ev e lo p m en t o f  c a p i t a l i s t  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t io n  in  th e  
c o u n t r y s id e .  I n s t e a d  i t  was o n ly  p o s s i b l e  f o r  o t h e r  fo rm s o f  c a p i t a l  
t o  f l o u r i s h  -  m o n ey le n d in g , t r a d i n g ,  l e a s i n g  on a v a r i e t y  o f  in s e c u r e  
t e n u r e s .  T hese  fo rm s o f  c a p i t a l  ( 'a n t e d i l u v i a n ')  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  th e  
r e l a t i o n s  be tw een  d i f f e r e n t  c l a s s e s  o f  M uslim s, a f t e r  th e  H indu la n d lo r d s  
and m o n ey len d ers  d e p a r t e d .  Thus th e  p r o c e s s  o f  c l a s s  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
in  B a n g la d esh  h a s  b een  th e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  u s u r io u s  and o t h e r  e x p l o i t a t i v e  
r e l a t i o n s  su ch  a s  p e t t y  com m odity d e a l in g  w here  n e i t h e r  p ro d u c e r  n o r  consum er 
b e n e f i t ,  and r e v i s e d  te n a n c y  d e p e n d e n c ie s . The 'm e a n in g ' o f  su ch  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  h a s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  b e e n  h o t ly  d e b a te d  ( H i l to n  ( e d . ) 1976;
P a tn a ik  1972; C h a tto p a d h y a y  1972; A la v i  1975; R udra 1 9 7 8 ) . I t  i s  th e n  
w o rth  r e c a l l i n g  t h a t  w h ile  Marx c o n s id e r e d  a c c u m u la t io n s  o f  m o n e ta ry  
w e a lth  d e r iv e d  from  t r a d e  and u s u ry  a s  an e s s e n t i a l  p a r t  o f  th e  
d ev e lo p m en t o f  c a p i t a l i s m  o u t  o f  f e u d a l is m , su ch  a c c u m u la t io n s  " b e lo n g  
to  th e  p r e - h i s t o r y  o f  b o u rg e o is  economy" and  t h a t  th e y  do n o t  a u to m a t i c a l ly  
p ro d u ce  c a p i t a l i s t  d ev e lo p m en t o th e r w is e "  a n c i e n t  Rome, B yzan tium  e t c .  
w ould have ended  t h e i r  h i s t o r y  w ith  f r e e  l a b o u r  and  c a p i t a l " .
(Marx 1964 and s e e  I n t r o d u c t io n  by  E.J.H obsbaw m  p . 4 6 ) .
A t t h i s  s ta g e  i n  th e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  a g r a r i a n  r e l a t i o n s  in  B a n g la d esh  
i t  r e a l l y  does  rem a in  an open q u e s t io n  w h e th e r  th e  p o l a r i s a t i o n  o f  c l a s s e s  
o c c u r r in g  th ro u g h  th e s e  a n te d i lu v i a n  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i s  e v id e n c e  e i t h e r  
o f  a  fo rm a l su b su m p tio n  o f  l a b o u r  u n d e r  c a p i t a l  o r  (more re m o te ly )
9 .
o f  th e  r e a l  su b su m p tio n  o f  la b o u r  u n d e r  c a p i t a l  (B ren n e r 1 9 7 7 ) .
Such a p r o c e s s  i s  m ore e a s i l y  d i s c e r n e d  i n  o t h e r  p a r t s  o f  th e  s u b c o n t in e n t  
( e .g .  R udra 1978 , o r  A la v i 1 9 8 1 ) . B ut i n  B a n g la d esh  w h i le  th e  v a r io u s
m echanism s can  b e  i d e n t i f i e d  by  w h ich  a  r i s e  in  t h e  l e v e l  o f  a b s o lu t e  
s u r p lu s  v a lu e  i s  b e in g  a c h ie v e d , t h e r e  i s  n o t  y e t  much e v id e n c e  t h a t  
t h i s  p r o c e s s  i s  l e a d in g  to  an  e x te n d e d  r e p r o d u c t io n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
c a p i t a l  -  i . e .  a  t r a n s f o r m a t io n  o f  t h e  la b o u r  p r o c e s s  i t s e l f  ( se e  
A .K .G hose 1979 f o r  a  co m p ariso n  b e tw een  B en g a l and P u n ja b  in  t h i s  r e s p e c t ) . 
The e x p la n a t io n  f o r  t h i s  f a i l u r e  t o  i n v e s t  i n  expanded  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
p r o d u c t io n  can  be  found  w i th in  t h i s  form  o f  p o l a r i s a t i o n  w hereby  th e  
c o n c o m ita n t r i s e  i n  l a n d le s s n e s s  and  r u r a l  unem ploym ent r e d u c e s  th e  
l e v e l  o f  e f f e c t i v e  demand f o r  d o m e s tic  a g r i c u l t u r a l  o u tp u t  a t  m a rk e t 
p r i c e s  (d eV y ld er and A sp lund  1979 , Wood 1 9 8 0 b ). In  t h i s  p r o c e s s  
t h e r e  h a s  c e r t a i n l y  been  a s t im u lu s  to w a rd  th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  
n o n - a g r i c u l t u r a l  a s s e t s  (Ad nan  1 9 7 8 ) , a l th o u g h  incom es th u s  d e r iv e d  
a r e  o f t e n  'r e in v e s te d *  in  la n d  a c q u i s i t i o n  and r u r a l  m o n e y le n d in g . I t  
i s  c r u c i a l l y  im p o r ta n t  t o  r e c o g n is e  t h a t  t h e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  t h e s e  
r e l a t i o n s ,  even  u n d e r  th e  'm i n i f u n d i s t ' a g r a r i a n  c o n d i t io n s  o f  t h e  
D a c c a -C o m illa  r e g io n ,  p r e - d a t e s  th e  g overnm en t and  a id  ag e n cy  s t r a t e g i e s  
o f  a t te m p t in g  th e  i n t e n s i f y  th e  l e v e l  o f  c a p i t a l  in  a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o d u c t io n  
th ro u g h  c r e d i t  and  s u b s id i e s .  As a r e s u l t  th e s e  s t r a t e g i e s ,  w h ich  
d o m in an t th e  GOB 2nd F iv e  Y ear P la n  and th e  c o n te m p o ra ry  t h in k i n g  o f  th e  
W orld Bank and  USAID, have o n ly  a  l i m i t e d  im p a c t upon t h e  c r e a t i o n  o f  t h e  
c a p i t a l i s t  p r o d u c t io n  r e l a t i o n s  a d v o c a te d  by  th e s e  a g e n c i e s .
F i n a l l y  th e  d ev e lo p m en t o f  t h e s e  u n p r o d u c t iv e  r u r a l  r e l a t i o n s  i s  n o t  a  
u n ifo rm  phenomenon th ro u g h o u t  a l l  t h e  r e g io n s  o f  B a n g la d esh  and i t  i s  th e  
e x is t e n c e  o f  s i g n i f i c a n t  r e g io n a l  v a r i a t i o n s  in  th e  r e l a t i o n s  b e tw een
l o
c l a s s e s  w h ich  i s  r e s p o n s ib le  f o r  th e  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  v iew s  o f  
r u r a l  c l a s s  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  n o te d  e a r l i e r .  In  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e  r e g io n s  
in  th e  N orth  and th e  W est o f  th e  c o u n tr y  a r e  c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by a g r e a t e r  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in  la n d h o ld in g ,  l a r g e r  l a n d l o r d s ,  m ore s h a r e c r o p p e r s  ( a t  
l e a s t  o f  t h e  c o n v e n t io n a l ,  d e p e n d e n t ty p e )  and h ig h e r  l a n d l e s s n e s s .
T h is  p a t t e r n  i s  a s s o c i a te d  w ith  b o th  s p e c i f i c  h i s t o r i c a l  c o n d i t io n s  and  
a  lo w e r d e n s i t y  o f  r u r a l  p o p u la t io n  th a n  i n  t h e  E a s te r n  r e g io n s  o f  th e  
c o u n tr y .  Thus w h ile  a  g e n e r a l  p i c t u r e  o f  a n t e d i lu v i a n  c a p i t a l  p r e v a i l s ,  
t h e  p r e c i s e  fo rm s o f  t h a t  c a p i t a l  and i t s  e f f e c t s  v a ry  -  m ore p e t t y  
l e a s i n g  i n  t h e  N o rth  and W est, m ore u s u ry  and  p e t t y  com m odity exchange  
i n  t h e  E a s t .  I t  i s  th e s e  r e g io n a l  su b -fo rm s  o f  c a p i t a l  w h ich  d e te rm in e  
th e  p r e c i s e  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  f r a g m e n ta t io n  w ith  w h ich  B e r to c c i  
i s  p re o c c u p ie d  -  i . e .  t h e  s p e c i f i c  e x p r e s s io n s  o f  d e p e n d en c y , c o n f l i c t ,  
and s t r u g g l e  be tw een  th e  c l a s s e s  w h ich  d e f in e  t h e s e  su b -fo rm s  o f  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n .
TOPOGRAPHY, POPULATION AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS
B a n g lad esh  p r im a r i ly  c o n s i s t s  o f  a  lo w - ly in g  f e r t i l e  d e l t a  r e g io n ,  
w h ich  i s  th e  f lo o d  p l a i n  o f  two r i v e r s :  G anges and  B ra h m a p u tra .
T o g e th e r  w i th  o th e r  r i v e r s ,  th e s e  two b r in g  down s i l t  and  d e p o s i t  i t  
on t h e  p l a i n  -  b o th  e n h a n c in g  s o i l  f e r t i l i t y  and  e x te n d in g  t h e  d e l t a  
i n to  th e  Bay o f  B en g a l. T hese  'n e w ' la n d  f o rm a tio n s  a r e  known a s  
c h a r  l a n d s .  The a n n u a l c o m b in a tio n  o f  f e r t i l i t y  r e p la c e m e n t ,  f lo o d in g  
and warm humid c l im a te  p r o v id e s  good c o n d i t io n s  f o r  u n i r r i g a t e d  r i c e  
g ro w in g .
A t th e  same t im e  th e s e  c o n d i t io n s  hav e  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  em ergence 
o f  one o f  th e  m ost d e n s e ly  p o p u la te d  r u r a l  r e g io n s  o f  t h e  w o r ld :  now
a p p ro x im a te ly  89 m i l l i o n  -  an  a l l  B a n g la d e sh  a v e ra g e  o f  n e a r l y  1500 p e rs o n s
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p e r  s q u a re  m ile  o f  c u l t i v a t e d  la n d  w i th  t h e  a v e ra g e  f o r  th e  E a s t - C e n t r a l  
a r e a  ( th e  D acca -C o m illa  b e l t )  r a n g in g  from  2245 t o  2643 . The 
p o p u la t io n  g ro w th  r a t e  i s  a l s o  one  o f  th e  w o r l d 's  h i g h e s t  a t  a ro u n d  3% 
(W orld Bank 1981) u n d e r c o n d i t io n s  w here p r i v a t e  g a in  c o n f l i c t s  w ith  
s o c i a l  c o s t  (A rth u r and M cN icho ll 1978 p p .4 6 - 5 9 ) .  The r a m i f i c a t i o n s
o f  p o p u la t io n  g ro w th  th ro u g h o u t  th e  a g r a r i a n  s t r u c t u r e  a r e  p e r v a s iv e :  
l a r g e r  f a m i l i e s  l i v i n g  o f f  t h e  same s i z e  o r  re d u c e d  s i z e  o f  h o ld in g ;  
f r a g m e n ta t io n  o f  h o ld in g s ;  d i s p o s s e s s io n  o f  i n f r a s u b s i s t e n c e  p e a s a n t s ;  
d e c l in e  i n  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  la n d  f o r  s h a re c ro p p in g ;  i n c r e a s e  i n  th e  number 
o f  l a n d l e s s ;  enhanced  v a lu e  o f  c h i l d r e n  a s  in c o m e -e a rn e r s  and  p r o v id e r s  
o f  o ld - a g e  s e c u r i t y ;  d e p r e s s iv e  e f f e c t  on  w ages; u n d e rm in in g  o f  
p a t r o n - c l i e n t  dependency  r e l a t i o n s  w h ich  o f f e r e d  m in im al s e c u r i t y  t o  
la b o u r ,  a s  a r e s e r v e  army o f  la b o u r  c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  t h e  c o m m e rc ia l i s a t io n  
o f  la b o u r  r e l a t i o n s .
An e s t im a te d  91% o f  t h e  p o p u la t io n  l i v e  in  r u r a l  a r e a s ,  and 
a p p ro x im a te ly  80% a r e  c o n s id e re d  to  be  d i r e c t l y  d e p e n d e n t on a g r i c u l t u r e  
f o r  t h e i r  incom e. The o w n e rsh ip  o f  la n d  h a s  become i n c r e a s i n g ly  
c o n c e n t r a te d .  I t  i s  now e s t im a te d  t h a t  11% o f  r u r a l  h o u s e h o ld s  own more 
th a n  52% o f  a l l  l a n d ,  w h ile  o v e r  30% own no la n d  a t  a l l ,  and to g e th e r  w ith  
th o s e  owning l e s s  th a n  h a l f  an  a c r e ,  t h e  e f f e c t i v e l y  l a n d l e s s  c o n s t i t u t e  
a b o u t  48% o f  th e  r u r a l  p o p u la t io n .  (Land O ccupancy  S u rv ey  1 9 7 7 ) .
T h is  i s  accom panied  by h ig h  r u f a l  underem ploym en t and a  d e c l i n e  i n  r e a l  
a g r i c u l t u r a l  w ages (C lay  1 9 7 8 ). The p e r  c a p i t a  incom e was r e p o r t e d  
i n  1980 (W orld Bank 1980 p .  110) a s  e q u iv a l e n t  t o  U .S .D o l la r  9 0 , b u t  i f  
th e  c o n c e n t r a t io n  o f  incom es i n  u rb a n  a r e a s  i s  ta k e n  i n to  a c c o u n t th e n  
th e  a v e ra g e  r u r a l  incom e w ould  b e  c o n s id e r a b ly  lo w e r . I t  h a s  been  
e s t im a te d  t h a t  62% o f  r u r a l  p e o p le  had  i n s u f f i c i e n t  incom e to  s a t i s f y
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90% o f  th e  n e c e s s a r y  d a i l y  i n ta k e  o f  c o lô n ie s  (ILO 1 9 7 7 ) . By th e  end 
o f  th e  1970s t h e  p r o d u c t io n  o f  m a jo r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c ro p s  was o n ly  7.3% 
h ig h e r  th a n  1970.
The la n d  i s  f l a t  and  low w ith  few  p a r t s  o f  t h e  c o u n tr y  b e in g  m ore 
th a n  50 f e e t  above s e a  l e v e l .  The o n ly  s i g n i f i c a n t  e l e v a t i o n s  a r e  th e  
S y lh e t  h i l l s  i n  th e  N o r th -E a s t  and  th e  C h i t ta g o n g  h i l l s  i n  th e  
S o u th -E a s t ,  R a i n f a l l  v a r i e s  from  50 in c h e s  a  y e a r  i n  t h e  N o rth -W est 
t o  up t o  200 in c h e s  i n  th e  N o r th -E a s te r n  r e g io n  o f  S y lh e t ,  be low  Assam.
The r i v e r s  f lo o d  from  l a t e  J u ly  u n t i l  m id -S e p te m b e r , d u r in g  w h ich  th e  m ain  
t r a d i t i o n a l  u n i r r i g a t e d  r i c e  c ro p  i s  t r a n s p l a n t e d  (Aman). The p a t t e r n  o f  
f lo o d in g  i s  v e ry  com plex and  h a s  draw n a t t e n t i o n  to  th e  e c o lo g ic a l  
h e te r o g e n e i ty  o f  th e  a p p a r e n t ly  hom ogenous d e l t a  b a se d  on m in o r v a r i a t i o n s  
in  e l e v a t i o n  and p r o x im ity  t o  f lo o d in g  r i v e r s .  Some o f  t h i s  v a r i a t i o n  
h a s  been  r e p r e s e n te d  in  a  th a n a  b a se d  map r e p o r t i n g  s u s c e p t i b i l i t y  to  
fam ine  b a se d  on 10 c r i t e r i a :  f lo o d in g ;  g ro w th ; p o p u la t io n  p r e s s u r e ;  
fo o d  d e f i c i t ;  la c k  o f  em ploym ent o p p o r t u n i t i e s  ; low  c ro p  y i e l d s ;  
p o o r  la n d  t r a n s p o r t ;  r i v e r  e r o s io n ;  in c id e n c e  o f  c y c lo n e s ;  and 
m a l d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  a g i r c u l t u r a l  i n p u t s  (GOB 1 9 7 6 ) . The a r e a s  s o u th  and 
w e s t o f  th e  r i v e r s  G anges, Padma, and Lower Maghna a r e  t h e  w o r s t  a f f e c t e d ,  
b u t  a lm o s t a l l  th a n a s  b o r d e r in g  th e  m a jo r  r i v e r s  o f  th e  G anges, T e e s ta ,  D h a rla  
and B rahm apu tra  a r e  a t  r i s k .  T hese  v a r i a t i o n s  need  to  be  t r e a t e d  a s  s o c io -  
e c o lo g ic a l  s i t u a t i o n s  r a t h e r  th a n  r e g io n s  s in c e  th e y  c a n n o t n e c e s s a ry  be 
be g ro u p ed  t o g e t h e r  c o te rm in o u s ly  on a map.
H ow ever, t h e r e  a r e  r e g i o n a l  p a t t e r n s  to o  w hich  r e f l e c t  s i g n i f i c a n t  
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  s o i l  f e r t i l i t y ,  p o p u la t io n  d e n s i t y ,  h i s t o r i c a l  
c ir c u m s ta n c e s ,  in c id e n c e  o f  ow ner c u l t i v a t o r s  v e r s u s  te n a n c y  and wage 
la b o u r .  In  C o m illa , w here  s o i l  f e r t i l i t y  and p o p u la t io n  d e n s i t y  i s  h ig h , 
owner c u l t i v a t o r s  p re d o m in a te  (34.6% ); l a n d l e s s n e s s  i s  th e  lo w e s t  in
B a n g la d esh  (26 .1% ); th e  p r o p o r t io n  o f  s h a r e c r o p p e r s  i s  s m a l l e s t  a t  
13.0% ; and th e  s m a l l e s t  (b u t one) p r o p o r t io n  o f  b ig  f a rm e rs  (more 
th a n  5 a c r e s )  (6.3%) (BARC 1 9 7 8 ). A s i m i l a r  th o u g h  l e s s  ex trem e
p a t t e r n  h o ld s  f o r  o t h e r  d i s t r i c t s  i n  th e  D a c c a -C o m illa  b e l t :
N o a k h a li ,  D acca and T a n g a i l .  D in a jp u r ,  in  t h e  N o rth -W e s t, by  
c o n t r a s t  h a s  31.1% l a n d l e s s ;  25.6% s h a r e c r o p p e r s ;  28.5% ow ner 
c u l t i v a t o r s ;  and  14.9% b ig  f a r m e r s .  H ere and  i n  o t h e r  N o r th e rn
and W este rn  D i s t r i c t s  such  a s  K hu lna , H u s h t ia ,  R a js h a h i  and  R angpùr 
s o i l  f e r t i l i t y  i s  p o o r e s t  and p o p u la t io n  d e n s i t i e s  a r e  f a r  lo w e r .
I t  w ould be  u n w ise  t o  a t t a c h  to o  much s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  t h e s e  
p a t t e r n s  b e c a u s e  th e  BARC d a ta  d o es  n o t  a r i s e  from  a  r ig o r o u s  sam p le , 
b u t  th e  v a r i a t i o n s  n o te d  do conform  to  o t h e r  p i c t u r e s  o f  r e g io n a l  
v a r i a t i o n s  g le a n e d  from  v i l l a g e  s tu d i e s  (A d rian  e t  a l  1974-1978m  A rens 
and  Van B eurden  1977 , J a b b a r  1977, J a h a n g i r  1 9 7 9 ) . In  t h e  c o n te x t  
o f  t h e s e  v a r i a t i o n s  i t  i s  im p o r ta n t  t o  n o te  t h a t  i n  C o m illa  K o tw a li 
th a n a  ( th e  m ost h e a v i ly  r e s e a r c h e d  a r e a  d u r in g  th e  s i x t i e s  and  th e  b a s i s  
o f  t h e  c o o p e r a t iv e  m odel w h ich  h a s  been  r e p l i c a t e d  a l l  o v e r  B an g lad esh  
th ro u g h  IRDP) ow ner c u l t i v a t o r s  r e p r e s e n te d  74.5% o f  th e  c u l t i v a t i n g  
p o p u la t io n  ( i . e .  e x c lu d in g  l a n d le s s )  and  th e  C o m illa  D i s t r i c t  mean 
was 73.7% (BARC 1978 p p .2 0 -2 1 ) . The e q u iv a l e n t  f i g u r e  f o r  D in a jp u r
i s  41% w hich  c e r t a i n l y  b e l i e s  th e  'p e a s a n t  econom y' d e s c r i p t i o n  f o r  a l l  
o f  B a n g la d e sh .
Aman r i c e  r e f e r r e d  to  e a r l i e r  r e p r e s e n t s  a p p ro x im a te ly  60% o f  th e  
a n n u a l r i c e  c ro p . B ut c ro p p in g  p a t t e r n s  v a ry  to o  by r e g io n s  and w i th in  
them  m a in ly  on a c c o u n t  o f  e l e v a t i o n  b u t  a l s o  w ith  b r o a d e r  a s p e c t s  o f  
c l im a te .  The o th e r  c ro p p in g  s e a s o n s  a r e  Aus and  B o ro . Aus (25% 
o f  t o t a l  r i c e  p ro d u c t io n )  i s  p r im a r i l y  a  b r o a d c a s t  c r o p ,  d e p e n d e n t upon
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t h e  c a p r i c e  o f  e a r l y  monsoon r a i n s ,  and  h a r v e s te d  j u s t  b e f o r e  th e  
m ain  f lo o d in g  in  J u ly .  Boro r e f e r s  t o  th e  d ry  w in te r  s e a s o n
w hich  l a s t s  from  l a t e  November th ro u g h  to  Ju n e  -  i n  t h i s  s e a s o n  o n ly  
th o s e  w ith  some form  o f  i r r i g a t i o n  c a n  p l a n t  b o ro  ( r i c e )  w hich  i s  h a r v e s te d  
a ro u n d  A p r i l .  The same now i n c r e a s i n g l y  a p p l i e s  t o  th e  r a p i d l y  e x p a n d in g  
w in t e r  w hea t c r o p ,  a lth o u g h  l e s s  w a te r  i s  r e q u i r e d .  The p l a n t i n g  o f  b o ro  
( r i c e )  h a s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  b een  m ore p r e v a l e n t  i n  t h e  S o u th e rn  and 
E a s te r n  r e g io n s  o f  th e  c o u n try  w here t h e  w in te r  c l im a te  i s  w arm er and 
t h e r e  i s  a  h ig h e r  p r o p o r t io n  o f  lo w - ly in g  la n d  w h ich  r e t a i n s  some m o is tu r e .  
S t a t e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  w i th  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a s s i s t a n c e ,  h a s  in  
t h e  p a s t  fo c u s s e d  p r im a r i ly  on th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  t h e  b o ro  se a s o n  ( i . e .  t h e  
C o m illa  program me e t c . )  th ro u g h  th e  p r o v i s io n  o f  i r r i g a t i o n  and  o t h e r  i n p u ts .  
T h is  i s  s t i l l  t h e  c a s e  b u t  w ith  t h e  c r i t i c a l  a d d i t i o n  o f  w hea t t o  th e  
program m e w hich  a llo w s  th e  N o rth -W est t o  be  i n c lu d e d .  The a r e a  u n d e r  
w hea t h a s  d o u b led  betw een  1 9 7 5 -8 0 . and th e  o u tp u t  i n  1980-81  e x ceed ed  
1975 l e v e l s  by  5 t im e s  to  r e a c h  1 m i l l i o n  to n s  a p p ro x .
The m ain c a sh  c ro p  i s  j u t e .  D u rin g  th e  s i x t i e s  t h e  a c re a g e  u n d e r  
j u t e  was a lw ay s h ig h e r  th a n  f o r  b o ro  r i c e ,  th o u g h  n e v e r  m ore th a n  tw ic e  
a s  h ig h .  A creag e  u n d e r  j u t e  r e a c h e d  i t s  p eak  in  1970and s in c e  th e n  h a s  b een  
o v e r ta k e n  by b o ro  r i c e  (Bose 1 9 7 3 ) . J u t e  was an  im p o rtc in t e x p o r t  e a r n e r  
f o r  P a k is ta n  a s  a w hole and i t s  p r o d u c t io n  by  p e a s a n t s  i n  E a s t  B engal 
p ro v id e d  th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e i r  e x p l o i t a t i o n  by  th e  b o u r g e o i s ie  in  W est 
P a k i s t a n  (see  b e lo w ) . In  B a n g la d esh  j u t e  h a s  p r o v id e d  a b o u t  
t h r e e - q u a r t e r s  o f  th e  c o u n t r y 's  e x p o r t  e a r n in g s  and  re m a in s  ( p r e c a r io u s ly  
b e c a u s e  o f  c o m p e t i t io n  from  s y n th e t i c  s u b s t i t u t e s ) a  v i t a l  c ro p  in  th e  
economy a s  a  w ho le .
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LANDHOLDING AND TENANCY BEFORE 1 9 5 0
U nder B r i t i s h  r u l e  th e  p ro v in c e  o f  B engal was a 'P e rm a n e n tly  S e t t l e d '  
a r e a  w here m ost o f  t h e  la n d  was d iv id e d  among z a m in d a rs  -  a h e r e d i t a r y  
c l a s s  o f  t a x  fa rm e rs  and ' s u p e r  l a n d l o r d s '  t a k e n  o v e r  by  th e  B r i t i s h  
from  th e  d e c l in in g  Mughal em p ire  d u r in g  th e  e ig h t e e n th  c e n tu r y .
The c u l t i v a t o r  w ith  p e rm an en t o ccu p an cy  r i g h t s  was a r a i y a t  and  he  i n  t u r n  
m ig h t r e n t  o u t  a l l  o r  p a r t  o f  h i s  la n d  t o  u n d e r - r a i y a t s  o r  s h a re c ro p p e r s  
(b a r g a d a r s . ) Betw een th e  z a m in d a r and  th e  r a i y a t , i n t e r m e d ia r i e s  o r  
t e n u r e - h o l d e r s  p r o l i f e r a t e d  a s  z a m in d a rs  s u b - d iv id e d  th e  r e n t - c o l l e c t i n g  
f u n c t i o n s .  A p a rt from  th e  S t a t e , t h e n , th e  c l a s s e s  v a r i o u s ly  c o n n e c te d  
w ith  t h e  la n d  w ere : z a m in d a rs , t e n u r e - h o l d e r s ,  r a i y a t s , u n d e r - r a i y a t s , 
b a rg a d a r s  and l a n d l e s s  l a b o u r e r s .  B a rg a d a rs  and  l a n d l e s s  l a b o u r e r s  w ere  th e  
m ain  c l a s s e s  o f  la b o u r  on th e  la n d  w ith  r a i y a t s  o c c u p y in g  th e  s t r u c t u r a l  
p o s i t i o n  o f  a g g re g a t in g  t h e  s u r p lu s  from  s u b - t e n a n ts  and la b o u r  and  
t r a n s m i t t i n g  i t  upw ards i n  th e  form  o f  r e n t  (Wood 1 9 7 3 ) . T h is  z am in d ar
sy s tem  was fo rm a lly  a b o l i s h e d  i n  1950 by  th e  E a s t  B engal S t a t e  A c q u i s i t io n  
A c t, a l th o u g h  th e  p a r t i t i o n  o f  I n d ia  in  1947 had  a l r e a d y  u n d erm in ed  some 
o f  i t s  f e a t u r e s .  The p e r v a s iv e n e s s  o f  t h e  sy s te m , and t h e r e f o r e  i t s  
s t r u c t u r a l  im p o rta n c e  f o r  th e  s o c i a l  fo rm a tio n  a f t e r  1950 , i s  d e m o n s tra te d  
by  n o t in g  t h a t  in  p r e - p a r t i t i o n  E a s t  B engal (1 9 3 8 -4 0 ) , o u t  o f  a t o t a l  
o f  2 8 .8  m i l l i o n  a c r e s ,  a p p ro x im a te ly  18 m i l l i o n  a c r e s  w ere  h e ld  by 
r a i y a t s  and a f u r t h e r  2 m i l l i o n  a c r e s  h e ld  d i r e c t l y  by u n d e r - r a i y a t s  
i . e .  a p p ro x im a te ly  70%.
The R e p o rt o f  th e  Land Revenue C om m ission, B engal (G o v t .o f  B engal 
1940) r e v e a l  r e g io n a l  v a r i a t i o n s  w i th in  t h i s  o v e r a l l  z a m in d a r i  s t r u c t u r e  o f  
r u r a l  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  w hich  underm ine  th e  a s su m p tio n s  o f  h o m o g en e ity
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b a se d  on n a t i o n a l  l e v e l  a v e ra g e s  w hich  c o m p rise  t h e  m ore r e c e n t l y  
p u b l is h e d  d a ta  o f  l a n d h o ld in g s .  The R e p o r t  g iv e s  a b reakdow n f o r  th e  
14 d i s t r i c t s  o f  w hat was th e n  E a s t  B e n g a l, and w h ich  a lo n g  w i th  S y lh e t  
and th e  C h it ta g o n g  H i l l  T r a c t s  w ere s u b s e q u e n t ly  in c lu d e d  in  E a s t  
P a k i s t a n  (se e  T a b le  ' ) . From th e  sam ple  d a ta  (1 1 ,3 1 4  f a m i l i e s )  th e
o v e r a l l  p e rc e n ta g e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  in  1940 w as:
P e rc e n ta g e  o f  F a m ily  H o ld in g (a)
A verage  
h o ld in g  p e r  
f a m i ly ( a c r e s
L ess  th a n 2-3 3 -4 4 -5 5 -1 0 104-
 ̂2 a c r e s a c r e s a c r e s a c r e s a c r e s a c r e s
4 .0 2 4 5 .8 1 1 .0 9 .3 7 .5 1 6 .1 7 .7
(a) U n f o r tu n a te ly  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  la n d  in v o lv e d  i s  n o t  a v a i l a b l e
(b) p e r c e n ta g e s  do n o t  add up to  100 b e c a u s e  o f  ro u n d in g  o f f .
The d i s t r i c t  breakdow n o f  t h i s  d a ta  ( se e  T a b le  1 f o r  a  s e l e c t e d  
summary) show t h a t  th e  d i s t r i c t s  i n  t h e  N o rth  and  W est o f  E a s t  B engal 
w ere d i s t i n g u i s h e d  from  e lse w h e re  in  th e  p ro v in c e  b y  g r e a t e r  p r o p o r t io n s  
o f  s h a re c ro p p e r s  and l a n d l e s s ,  and t h a t  c l a s s e s  o f  r a i y a t s  and  t e n a n t s  
w ere m ore d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  th a n  e ls e w h e re  by v a r i a t i o n s  i n  th e  s i z e  o f  
la n d h o ld in g  in  th e  R a js h a h i  D iv is io n  (D in a jp u r ,  R an g p u r, B o g ra ,
R a js h a h i  and Pabna) w ith  th e  e x c e p t io n  o f  P abna d i s t r i c t  and  th e  
a d d i t i o n  o f  J e s s o r e  d i s t r i c t .
The d i s t r i c t s  in  th e  N o rth  and W est (D in a jp u r ,  R an g p u r, J e s s o r e ,  
R a js h a h i)  f a l l  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  below  th e  ' l e s s  th a n  2 a c r e '  a v e ra g e ,  w i th  
p e r c e n ta g e s  r a n g in g  from  24.2% t o  31.8% , and  r i s e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  above th e  
'm ore  th a n  10 a c r e s '  a v e ra g e  w ith  p e r c e n ta g e s  r a n g in g  from  15% t o  11.2% .
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B ogra d i s t r i c t  w h ich  i s  a l s o  in  th e  N o rth -W e st f a l l s  b e lo w  th e  
' l e s s  th a n  2 a c r e s '  a v e ra g e  w ith  34.5% , a l th o u g h  i t  f a l l s  be low  th e  
'm ore  th a n  10 a c r e s '  a v e ra g e  w ith  7.1% . T h e re  i s  a  s i m i l a r  d i s t r i b u t i o n  
f o r  Mymensingh d i s t r i c t ,  a l th o u g h  i t  d ro p s  o u t  o f  t h e  g ro u p in g  o f  
N o rth -W e s te rn  D i s t r i c t s  when th e  in c id e n c e  o f  s h a re c ro p p in g  and  wage 
la b o u r  i s  c o n s id e re d  (se e  s e c t i o n s  2 and  3 o f  T a b le  1 .)
The t o t a l  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  f a m i l i e s  l i v i n g  m a in ly  e i t h e r  a s  s h a r e c r o p p e r s  
o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  l a b o u r e r s  i n  1938-9  was 31%. The d i s t r i c t s  w h ich  ex ceed ed  
t h i s  a v e ra g e  w ere i n  o r d e r  o f  m a g n itu d e : K h u ln a , P a b n a , F a r id p u r ,
B o g ra , D in a jp u r ,  R a js h a h i  and R angpu r. A l l  o f  t h e s e  d i s t r i c t s  a r e  
s i t u a t e d  on th e  W estern  s id e  o f  t h e  N o r th -S o u th  r i v e r  com plex (B rah m ap u tra , 
Jam una, G anges, Padma, Lower M eghna). Thus th e  l a n d l e s s  p o p u la t io n  
ra n g e d  betw een  32-41% in  th e  N o rth -W e s te rn  r e g io n  o f  t h e  p r o v in c e  t o  
b e  c o n t r a s te d  t o  C o m illa  w ith  5.9% , J e s s o r e  w ith  12.1% and  C h i t ta g o n g  
13.4% a t  th e  o th e r  end o f  th e  s c a l e .  To th e s e  p r o p o r t io n s  o f  l a n d l e s s  
t e n a n t s  and l a b o u r e r s  m ust be added  a p r o p o r t io n  o f  s m a ll  p e a s a n t s  w i th  
i n s u f f i c i e n t  h o ld in g s  who w ere o b l ig e d  t o  e n t e r  s h a re c ro p p in g  a r r a n g e n e n ts  
o r  s e l l  t h e i r  l a b o u r .  Where t h e r e  e x i s t e d  a  h ig h  p r o p o r t io n  o f  p e a s a n t s  
w i th  h o ld in g s  o f  l e s s  th a n  2 a c r e s ,  t h e  demand f o r  a d d i t i o n a l  s h a re c ro p p in g  
o r  l a b o u r  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  w ould b e  h ig h  b u t  th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  w ould  be  low .
From t a b l e  1 t h e r e  do a p p e a r  t o  b e  some i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s  b e tw e en  
th e  am ount o f  la n d  and th e  num ber o f  f a m i l i e s  in v o lv e d  i n  s h a re c ro p p in g  
and  w a g e - la b o u r  r e l a t i o n s h i p s .  The ' l a b o u r ' co lum ns f o r  B ^ ^ e rg a n j 
and  K hulna s ta n d  o u t  p a r t i c u l a r l y ;  a s  d o e s  t h e  s h a re c ro p p in g  colum n f o r  
B a k e rg a n j , a l th o u g h  t h i s  may b e  e x p la in e d  by  th e  h ig h e r  p r o p o r t io n  
o f  la n d  h e ld  by t e n u r e - h o ld e r s  who w ould have  c u l t i v a t e d  th ro u g h
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b a rg a d a r s  r a t h e r  th a n  d i r e c t l y  w i th  t h e i r  f a m i l i e s  o r  w i th  l a b o u r e r s .  
F u r th e rm o re  i t  i s  i n t e r e s t i n g  t h a t  F a r id p u r  had su ch  a h ig h  p r o p o r t io n  
o f  s h a r e c r o p p e r s  (23.8%) w ith  i t s  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  la n d h o ld in g ,  
c o n f irm in g  t h a t  s h a re c ro p p in g  o c c u r s  even  w here th e  a b s o lu t e  a v e ra g e  
s i z e  o f  h o ld in g  i s  low . T h e re  i s  m ore r e c e n t  e v id e n c e  f o r  t h i s  from  
some s t u d i e s  i n  C o m illa , a l th o u g h  s h a re c ro p p in g  i s  f r e q u e n t l y  c o n n e c te d  
to  in d e b te d n e s s  and la n d  m o rtg a g e  d e a l s .  The s h a re c ro p p in g  colum ns 
f o r  J e s s o r e ,  D acca and t o  some e x t e n t  K hulna s u g g e s t s  t h a t  some 
s h a r e c r o p p e r s  m ig h t have  r e l a t i v e l y  l a r g e  h o ld in g s  w h ich  s h o u ld  rem in d  
u s  t h a t  th e  s h a re c ro p p e r  i s  n o t  a lw a y s  t h e  s u p p l i c a n t  i n  t h e  e x c h an g e . 
However t h e s e  f i g u r e s  do n o t  o f  c o u rs e  r e v e a l  w hat p r o p o r t io n  o f  
t h e  s h a re c ro p p e d  la n d  i s  c u l t i v a t e d  b y  r a iy a t s - c u m - b a r g a d a r s  ( i . e .  
n o t  l i v i n g  'm a in ly  a s  s h a r e c r o p p e r s ') .  T h is  may e x p la in  th e  low 
num bers o f  f a m i l i e s  l i v i n g  m a in ly  a s  s h a r e c r o p p e r s  o r  a g r i c u l t u r a l  
l a b o u r e r s  i n  J e s s o r e .  The r e l a t i v e l y  h ig h  am ount o f  la n d  w h ich  was 
a v a i l a b l e  f o r  s h a re c ro p p in g  in  D acca d i s t r i c t  p e rh a p s  r e f l e c t s  i t s  
s t a t u s  a s  an u rb a n  c e n t r e  ( a l th o u g h  o n ly  a s m a ll  p r o v i n c i a l  c e n t r e  a t  
t h a t  tim e) w ith  a s s o c i a te d  a b s e n te e is m  o f  la n d h o ld e r s  in v o lv e d  in  
v a r io u s  form s o f  u rb a n  em ploym ent.
T o g e th e r  w ith  th e  d a ta  on th e  l a r g e r  h o ld in g s  o f  r a i y a t s  i n  t h e  
R a js h a h i  D iv i s io n ,  t h e r e  a r e  d e s c r i p t i o n  o f  M uslim  j o t e d a r s  
( p e t ty  l a n d l o r d s / r i c h  r a i y a t s ) i n  D in a jp u r  i n  t h e  1942 D in a jp u r  
S urvey  and S e t t l e m e n t  R e p o r t (B e ll  , G o v t .o f  B engal 1 9 4 2 ) . T h is  
l e n d s  w e ig h t t o  th e  p r o p o s i t io n  t h a t  t h e r e  w ere  M uslim  's u r p l u s '  
f a rm e rs  i n  c e r t a i n  a r e a s  o f  E a s t  B en g a l b e f o r e  and d u r in g  th e  em ergence 
o f  P a k i s t a n ,  a s  a g a in s t  th e  m ore f a m i l i a r  n o t io n  t h a t  t h e s e  c l a s s e s
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d e v e lo p e d  a l l  o v e r  E a s t  B engal s o l e l y  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  W est P a k i s t a n  
c o l o n i a l  p o l i c y  o r  in  r e s p o n s e  t o  th e  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  c r e a t e d  by 
C o m illa - ty p e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  d e v e lo p m en t s t r a t e g i e s .
The e x p la n a t io n  f o r  t h i s  r e g i o n a l  v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  
d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  among th e  r a i y a t  c l a s s e s  m u st i n  p a r t  r e f e r  t o  th e  
h i s t o r i c a l  s p e c i f i c i t y  o f  t h e  'b o r d e r '  d i s t r i c t s  d u r in g  th e  1 9 4 0 's .
T hese  d i s t r i c t s  w ere  m ore ex p o sed  to  communal t e n s i o n  w h ich  d e v e lo p e d  
a s  a  p r e lu d e  t o  th e  M uslim  L e a g u e 's  cam paign  f o r  a  s e p a r a t e  I s la m ic  
S t a t e .  T h is  communal f a c t o r  r e s t r a i n e d  t h e  e x c e s s e s  o f  (H indu) 
z a m in d ar o p p r e s s io n  o v e r  M uslim  t e n a n t s  ( e .g .  ' i l l e g a l '  c h a rg e s  i n  
a d d i t i o n  t o  s t a t u t o r y  r e n t )  , th u s  r e t a i n i n g  m ore s u r p l u s  a t  t h e  l e v e l  
o f  r a i y a t  f o r  a c c u m u la tio n  and c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  h o ld in g s .  A ls o , a s  
t h e  r u r a l  p o p u la tio n  i n  b o rd e r  d i s t r i c t s  was m ore e v e n ly  d i s t r i b u t e d  
be tw een  H indus and M uslim s th a n  in  th e  p re d o m in a n t ly  M uslim  d i s t r i c t s  
f u r t h e r  E a s t  i n  t h e  p r o v in c e ,  t h e  im p a c t o f  i n t e r - c a s t e  r e l a t i o n s  on 
th e  p a t t e r n  o f  la n d h o ld in g  and te n a n c y  was g r e a t e r .  And a f t e r  1947, 
th e  d e p a r tu r e  o f  H indu r a i y a t s  a s  w e l l  a s  z a m in d a rs  and  t e n u r e - h o ld e r s  
c r e a te d  m ore ' i l l e g a l '  o p p o r t u n i t i e s  th a n  f u r t h e r  E a s t  f o r  th e  
re m a in in g  r i c h  M uslim  p e a s a n ts  t o  a p p r o p r i a t e  t h e  la n d  v a c a te d  by th e  
H indu r a i y a t s  a s  w e l l  a s  l a n d l o r d s .  As a r e s u l t ,  i n  t h i s  r e g io n ,  w hich  in  
any  c a s e  r e c e iv e d  th e  g r e a t e r  p r o p o r t io n  o f  new Im m ig ra n ts , th e  
newcom ers becam e s h a re c ro p p e r s  and l a n d l e s s  l a b o u r e r s  r a th e r^  th a n  
r a i y a t s  more f r e q u e n t l y  th a n  e ls e w h e re .
A lth o u g h  th e  d a ta  a r e  n o t  a v a i l a b l e  t h e r e  i s  e v e ry  re a s o n  t o  
b e l i e v e  t h a t  th e s e  r e g io n a l  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  in c r e a s e d  a f t e r  
1947 and c e r t a i n l y  a f t e r  1950 when t h e  Zam indari e s t a t e s  w ere f o rm a l ly
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a b o l i s h e d .  The E a s t  B engal A c q u i s i t io n  A c t l e g a l i s e d  t h i s  
de f a c t o  a p p r o p r i a t io n  o f  la n d  by c l a s s e s  o f  M uslim  j o t e d a r s  
i n  t h e  'b o r d e r '  d i s t r i c t s .  As p a r t  o f  t h i s  h i s t o r i c a l  s p e c i f i c i t y ,  
th e  v a r i a t i o n s  in  e c o lo g y  and th e  s u b s e q u e n t  v a r i a t i o n s  in  t h e  d e n s i t y  
o f  t h e  p o p u la t io n  w i l l  f u r t h e r  c o n t r i b u t e  t o  t h e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  r u r a l  
s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  a lo n g  d i f f e r e n t  p a th s  in  B a n g la d e sh . The h ig h  d e n s i t y  
o f  p o p u la t io n  i n  t h e  D a c c a -C o m illa  b e l t  i s  r e l a t e d  h i s t o r i c a l l y  t o  th e  
f e r t i l i t y  o f  t h e  s o i l  and f a v o u r a b le  c l i m a t i c  c o n d i t io n s  f o r  g row ing  
r i c e  d u r in g  th e  w in te r .  T h is  t o g e t h e r  w i th  th e  a b s e n c e  o f  th e  
'b o r d e r '  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  n o te d  above  m u st a c c o u n t  t o  some e x t e n t  f o r  t h e  
lo n g  h i s t o r y  o f  lo w e r a b s o lu te  a v e ra g e  s i z e  o f  h o ld in g  in  t h e  E a s te r n  
r e g i o n ,  and a  much g r e a t e r  c o n c e n t r a t io n  o f  h o ld in g s  a t  th e  lo w er 
end o f  th e  r a n g e .
The e v id e n c e  on j o t e d a r s  i s  im p o r ta n t  f o r  s e v e r a l  r e a s o n s .  F i r s t ,  
i t  i n d i c a t e s  a  s t r u c t u r e  o f  r u r a l  c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  v e ry  d i f f e r e n t  from  th e  
'C o m i l l a ' m odel w hich  h a s  been  g e n e r a l l y  a p p l i e d  -  i . e .  an  hom ogenous 
s t r u c t u r e  o f  u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d ,  s m a l l - h o ld in g  p e a s a n t s .  S eco n d , i t  
u n d e rm in es  r e l a t e d  a ssu m p tio n s  a b o u t  t h e  n a tu r e  o f  pow er i n  E a s t  B engal 
w h ich  h a s  t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been  a n a ly s e d  s o l e l y  i n  te rm s  o f  th e  a s p i r a t i o n s  
o f  an u rb a n  p e t t y - b o u r g e o i s i e  l e a d in g  an u n d i f f e r e n t i a t e d  m ass o f  th e  
p e a s a n t r y  a g a i n s t  th e  common o p p r e s s o r  from  W est P a k i s t a n  -  e . g .  th e  
la n g u a g e  m ovem ents and th e  r i s e  o f  B engal n a t io n a l i s m  (A la v i 1972;
Ahmed 1973: p p .419-48- A l i  1975; J a h a n  1973; M aniruzzam an 1 9 7 5 ).
T h ird  i t  f o c u s s e s  o u r  a t t e n t i o n  on t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e s e  c l a s s e s  i n  
t r a n s f o r m in g  th e  e n t i r e  s o c i a l  f o rm a tio n  b o th  th ro u g h  t h e i r  s u p p o r t  f o r  
th e  M uslim  L eague and th e  q u e s t  f o r  an  in d e p e n d e n t  P a k i s t a n ,  cuid th ro u g h  
t h e i r  su b s e q u e n t in f lu e n c e  o v e r  a g r a r i a n  l e g i s l a t i o n  and s t a t e  p o l i c y  i n
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a g r i c u l t u r e .  The M uslim  L e a g u e 's  P o l ic y  o f  P a r t i t i o n  had  th e  
a d v a n ta g e  o f  rem oving  th e  s t r a tu m  o f  H indu l a n d lo r d s  from  t h e i r  
s t u l t i f y i n g  in f lu e n c e  o v e r  t h e  a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  t h e  M uslim  j o t e d a r s .
A t th e  same tim e  a s  in  th e  n e ig h b o u r in g  s t a t e s  i n  I n d i a ,  th e  a t t a c k  
by  j o t e d a r s  on f e u d a l  r u r a l  r e l a t i o n s  had t o  be c o n ta in e d  a t  t h e  p o i n t  
w here th e  c o n d i t io n s  f o r  t h e i r  own a p p r o p r i a t i o n  o f  la n d  and s u r p lu s  
had  been  f u l f i l l e d .
CLASS RELATIONS AND THE EAST PAKISTAN COLONY 1947-71
The p o l i t i c a l  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h i s  c l a s s  o f  M uslim  j o t e d a r s  
i n  th e  N o rth  and W est o f  B a n g la d esh  c a n  o n ly  be c o n s id e r e d  i n  c o n ju n c t io n  
w ith  t h a t  o f  t h e  B e n g a li  p e t t y  b o u r g e o i s ie  c o n s i s t i n g  o f  s m a ll t r a d e r s ,  
s h o p k e e p e rs , p r o f e s s i o n a l s ,  t e a c h e r s ,  j u n i o r  o f f i c i a l s  and  c l e r k s  i n  th e  
p r o v i n c i a l  s e r v i c e s .  In  a  c o u n tr y  w here  t h e  e n t i r e  u rb a n  p o p u la t io n  
was n e v e r  m ore th a n  10%, t h i s  c l a s s  had  c lo s e  k in s h ip  and  o th e r  
c o n n e c t io n s  w ith  t h e  e c o n o m ic a lly  s t r o n g e r  c l a s s e s  o f  r a i y a t s  and  j o t e d a r s  
i n  th e  c o u n t r y s id e .  I t  i s  n o t  d i f f i c u l t  t h e r e f o r e  t o  s e e  th e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b e tw een  th e  f r u s t r a t e d  a s p i r a t i o n s  o f  a  B e n g a li  p e t t y  
b o u r g e o is ie  whose la n g u a g e  (and th e r e b y  c a r e e r  p r o s p e c t s )  was th r e a te n e d  
and  th o s e  o f  t h e  l a r g e r  M uslim f a rm e rs  and p e a s a n ts  w hose own d e v e lo p m en t 
was r e s t r i c t e d  by W est P a k i s t a n i  c o lo n i a l  p o l i c y .  In  t h i s  way th e  
la n g u a g e  m ovem ents c o u ld  expand  i n t o  b ro a d e r  B e n g a li  n a t io n a l i s m  and 
l a y  th e  fo u n d a t io n  f o r  th e  c r e a t i o n  o f  a  r e f o r m i s t  n a t i o n a l i s t  p a r t y  
( th e  Awami L e a g u e ) . T h is  s u c c e s s f u l l y  com bined t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  c o n c e rn s  
o f  th e  l a r g e r  r u r a l  p e t t y  com m odity p ro d u c e r s  and t h e  u rb a n  p e t t y  
b o u r g e o is ie  w i th  t h e  i n t e n t i o n  o f  r e p ro d u c in g  W est P a k i s t a n i  c a p i t a l i s m  
in  th e  E a s t  th ro u g h  a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  b o u r g e o is -d e m o c r a t ic  t r a n s f o r m a t io n .  
T h is  w ould have  a s s o c i a t e d  c a r e e r  p r o s p e c t s  f o r  t h e  B e n g a li  
i n t e l l i g e n t s i a  in  th e  p r i v a t e  and  p u b l ic  s e c t o r s .  A c o m b in a tio n  o f  
p o p u l i s t  r h e t o r i c  and r u r a l  v o te  ban k s (Ayoob 1971) s t e a d i l y  i n c r e a s e d
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s u p p o r t  among th e  p o o re r  c l a s s e s  o f  B e n g a l i  p e a s a n t r y ,  c u lm in a t in g  
in  th e  L e a g u e 's  overw helm ing  v i c t o r i e s  o f  1970 and  1973.
D e s p i te  th e  co n te m p o ra ry  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e s e  two c l a s s e s  -  
j o t e d a r s  and u rb a n  p e t t y  b o u r g e o i s ie  -  and  th e  a l l i a n c e  b e tw een  them , 
th e y  rem a in e d  e c o n o m ic a lly  weak from  1947 t o  1971 a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  E a s t  
B e n g a l 's  s t a t u s  a s  a  c o lo n y  o f  W est P a k i s t a n .
T h is  h a s  been  w e l l  docum ented  e ls e w h e re  by  S e n g u p ta  (1971) and 
N a tio n s  (1 9 7 1 ). The M uslim  League and  th e  Movement f o r  P a k i s t a n  had 
b e e n  l e d  e s s e n t i a l l y  by c l a s s e s  o u t s i d e  E a s t  B engal -  l a n d lo r d s  from  
P u n ja b , S in d  and  C e n t r a l  I n d ia ;  t r a d i n g  co m m u n ities  from  G u ja r a t  
and  Bombay w hich  form ed th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  P a k i s t a n i  i n d u s t r i a l  
c a p i t a l i s t  c l a s s ;  and  w e s te r n i s e d  M uslim  e l i t e s  from  s i m i l a r  r e g io n s  
who c o n s t i t u t e d  a  p r o f e s s io n a l  m id d le  c l a s s  and who had  s t a f f e d  th e  
b u r e a u c r a t i c  and m i l i t a r y  a p p a r a tu s e s  o f  th e  c o lo n i a l  s t a t e .  E a s t  
B engal had  been  d o m in a ted  by H indu t r a d e r s  and o f f i c i a l s  (a s  w e l l  a s  
l a n d lo r d s )  a s  p a r t  o f  th e  C a lc u t t a  h i n t e r l a n d .  Thus M uslim s o f  E a s t  
B engal w ere  h i s t o r i c a l l y  d is a d v a n ta g e d  a t  t h e  t im e  o f  P a k i s t a n 's  
fo rm a tio n  in  1947. T h is  f a c i l i t a t e d  t h e i r  c o lo n i a l  e x p l o i t a t i o n  by th e  
w e s te rn  r e g io n  up  to  1971, and a c c o u n ts  f o r  t h e  r e s t r i c t e d  and 
u n d e rd e v e lo p e d  n a tu r e  o f  a  b o u rg e o is  c l a s s  in d ig e n o u s  t o  E a s t  B e n g a l.
E a s t  B engal had  a v i r t u a l  w o rld  m onopoly i n  j u t e  p r o d u c t io n ,  b u t  th e  
f o r e ig n  exchange  e a rn e d  by th e  e x p o r t  o f  t h i s  p e a s a n t-p r o d u c e d  c a s h  c ro p  
was r e d i r e c t e d  by  th e  m i l i t a r y - b u r e a u c r a t i c  o l ig a r c h y  i n  W est P a k i s t a n  
(Alavi 1972) on b e h a l f  o f  th e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  i t s  in d ig e n o u s ,  i n d u s t r i a l  
c a p i t a l i s t  c l a s s .  The co m p u lso ry  p u rc h a s e  o f  W est P a k i s t a n i  m a n u fa c tu re s
by  th e  E a s t  a t  i n f l a t e d  m onopoly p r i c e s  l e d  t o  a  f u r t h e r  o u tf lo w  
o f  c a p i t a l  w h ich  m ig h t have been  d e p lo y e d  l o c a l l y .  F u r th e r  a s p e c t s  
o f  t h i s  c o lo n ia l i s m  i n d i r e c t l y  r e s t r i c t e d  th e  d e v e lo p m e n t o f  B e n g a li  
c l a s s e s .  W est P a k i s t a n i  c a p i t a l  and  i t s  e n t r e p r e n e u r s  w ere  
s i g n i f i c a n t l y  p r e s e n t  and in  c o n t r o l  o f  E a s t  B en g a l i n d u s t r y ,  w ith  
B e n g a li  M uslim s owning l e s s  th a n  2.9% o f  p r i v a t e  i n d u s t r i a l  a s s e t s .
Thus much o f  th e  w e a l th  c r e a te d  i n  E a s t  B en g a l i n d u s t r y  was r e p a t r i a t e d  
t o  th e  Wefet i n  th e  form  o f  s a l a r i e s ,  d iv id e n d s ,  i n t e r e s t s  and  p r o f i t s ;  
and th e  r e l a t e d  o p p o r tu n i ty  f o r  m u l t i p l i e r  e f f e c t s  from  in d ig e n o u s  
c a p i t a l  a c c u m u la tio n  was a l s o  l o s t .  Add t o  t h e  p i c t u r e  t h e  e v id e n c e  
from  th e  F i r s t  and Second F iv e  Y ear P la n s ,  i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  t h a t  th e  
g r e a t e r  p r o p o r t io n  o f  fu n d s  f o r  d e v e lo p m en t was a l l o c a t e d  t o  th e  
w e s te rn  p ro v in c e  and th e  f a i l u r e  o f  an  E a s t  B e n g a li  b o u r g e o i s ie  t o  
em erge i s  h a r d ly  s u r p r i s i n g .  The d o m in an t c l a s s e s  i n  W est P a k is ta n  
w ere engaged  in  an  e x e r c i s e  o f  p r i m i t i v e  c a p i t a l  a c c u m u la t io n .
The d ev e lo p m en t o f  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  p r o d u c t io n  i n  B a n g la d esh  
and th e  p a t t e r n  o f  r u r a l  c l a s s  fo rm a tio n  c a n n o t b e  i s o l a t e d  from  
th e s e  c o lo n i a l  e f f e c t s .  The p r i n c i p a l  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  was t h a t  th e  
a p p r o p r i a t io n  o f  E a s t  B e n g a l 's  r u r a l  s u r p lu s  by  th e  em erg ing  c a p i t a l i s t  
c l a s s e s  o f  th e  W est ( in c lu d in g  an  u n w i l l in g n e s s  t o  r e - i n v e s t  i n  E a s t  
B e n g a l 's  a g r i c u l t u r e )  je o p a r d is e d  t h e  r e p r o d u c t io n  o f  t h e  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s  
r e q u i r e d  to  p ro d u c e  t h a t  s u r p lu s .
D uring  th e  1 9 5 0 's  a g r i c u l t u r a l  o u tp u t  v i r t u a l l y  s ta g n a te d  
(Bose 1973; 35; GOB 1973: 84 p a s s im ) .  F o r exam ple r i c e  p r o d u c t io n
in c r e a s e d  a t  0.7% p e r  annum com pared  w i th  a  p o p u la t io n  g ro w th  o f  
n e a r ly  3% p e r  annum. Even th e  p r o d u c t io n  o f  j u t e  d e c l in e d  in  th e  1 9 5 0 's .
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p ic k in g  up  in  t h e  1960s o n ly  b e c a u se  o f  a l a r g e  i n c r e a s e  i n  th e  
a c r e a g e ,  s in c e  y i e l d s  w ere d e c l i n in g .  T h is  e v id e n c e  on j u t e  i s  
c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  th e  te n d e n c y  f o r  la n d h o ld in g  t o  p o l a r i s e ,  w i th  
la n d  b e in g  t r a n s f e r r e d  o u t  o f  th e  h an d s  o f  s m a l l ,  m a in ly  s u b s i s t e n c e  
and r i c e - c u l t i v a t i n g  p e a s a n t s .  The sq u e e z e  on a g r i c u l t u r e ,  b o th  
th ro u g h  a d v e rs e  te rm s  o f  t r a d e  and  th e  low  l e v e l  o f  s t a t e  in v e s tm e n t ,  
r e s t r i c t e d  t h e  c a p a c i ty  o f  r i c h e r  p e a s a n t s  t o  expand  t h e i r  c o n t r o l  
d i r e c t l y  o v e r  p r o d u c t iv e  a s s e t s .  H ow ever, t h i s  s q u e e z e , t o g e t h e r  
w i th  i n c r e a s e s  in  p o p u la t io n ,  in c r e a s e d  t h e  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p o o r e s t  
p e a s a n t s .  W ith o u t th e  d u b io u s  a d v a n ta g e s  o f  a  z a m in d a r i  sy s te m  
t o  r e l y  o n , t h e i r  u r g e n t  r e q u ir e m e n ts  f o r  c r e d i t ,  f o r  la n d  t o  s h a r e c r o p ,  
o r  t o  s e l l  t h e i r  la b o u r  c o u ld  o n ly  be  m et by th e  r i c h e r ,  s u r p lu s  
p e a s a n ts  -  a t  a c o s t ,
LANDHOLDING PATTERNS DURING th e  1960 -1 9 7 7 .
D ata  on la n d h o ld in g  c a n n o t r e v e a l  a l l  t h e s e  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  b o th  
b e c a u se  o f  th e  l e v e l  o f  g e n e r a l i t y ,  and b e c a u s e  th e  d a ta  a r e  b a se d  
upon r e p o r te d  l e g a l  t i t l e s  t o  p r o p e r ty  w hich  a r e  u n r e l i a b l e  and  m is le a d in g  
g u id e s  t o  th e  r e a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  a p p r o p r i a t i o n .  B ut w i th  t h e s e  c a v e a t s ,  
a r e  th e  d a ta  on la n d h o ld in g  d u r in g  th e  6 0 ' s  and 7 0 ' s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  
a rg u m en ts  p r e s e n te d  h e re ?  A t t h e  v e ry  l e a s t  th e  d a ta  a r e  n o t  
c o n s i s t e n t  w ith  t h e  d ev e lo p m en t o f  c a p i t a l i s t  a g r i c u l t u r e  on a w ide 
s c a l e  d e s p i t e  s t a t e  i n t e r v e n t io n  t o  t h a t  p u rp o se  s in c e  t h e  l a t e  6 0 's .
The d a ta  r e f l e c t  th e  i n c r e a s in g  p r e s s u r e  on th e  la n d  th ro u g h o u t  th e  
p e r io d  w ith  a  d ra m a tic  r i s e  in  t h e  l a n d l e s s  (LOS 1 9 7 7 ); a  d e c l i n e  
in  th e  mean s i z e  o f  owned farm s from  3 .5  in  1960 t o  2 .0  a c r e s  i n  1977,
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o f  o w n e r-c u m -te n a n t fa rm s from  4 .3  a c r e s  t o  3 .0  a c r e s ,  o f  t e n a n t  
fa rm s from  2 .4  a c r e s  t o  1 .5  a c r e s .  ( A g r i c u l tu r e  C ensus 1960 ,
T a b le  3 p . 29 , and LOS 1 9 7 7 ); and an i n c r e a s e  i n  h o u s e h o ld s  ow ning 
up  t o  5 a c r e s  from  78% in  1960 to  93% i n  19 7 7 , r e p r e s e n t in g  a s h i f t  from  
43% o f  t o t a l  c u l t i v a t e d  a r e a  t o  58% ( ib id )  i n  t h i s  c a te g o r y .  O th e r  
s e t s  o f  c o m p a riso n s  a r e  m a r g in a l ly  a f f e c t e d  b y  t h e  d i f f e r e n t  u n i t s  o f  
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  i n  t h e  s u rv e y s  in v o lv in g  5 .0 0 - 7 .5  a c r e s  and  7 .5 - 1 2 .5  
a c r e s  i n  t h e  1960 and  1968 s u rv e y s  (C ensus o f  A g r i c u l t u r e  and M a ste r  
S u rvey  o f  A g r i c u l tu r e  r e s p e c t i v e ly )  ; and  a s e r i e s  o f  on e  a c r e  u n i t s  
5 .0 0 - 6 .0 0  e t c .  in  t h e  1977 su rv e y  (LOS 1 9 7 7 ) . In  t h e  'm id d le ' 
ra n g e  o f  5 .0 0 - 1 2 .5  a c r e s  t h e r e  was a  d e c l i n e  i n  t h e  num ber o f  h o ld in g s  
from  18.6% o f  t o t a l  in  1960 to  14.4% in  1968 w ith  a  c o r r e s p o n d in g  
d ro p  i n  a c re a g e  from  38.4% to  33.2% (1960 t a b l e  3 p .2 9 , 1968 T a b le  2 (a )  
p . 1 1 . ) .  The 1977 s u rv e y  r e p o r t e d  a d ra m a tic  d e c l i n e  i n  th e  number 
o f  h o ld in g s  in  th e  5 .0 0 -1 2 .0 0  a c r e  c a te g o r y  t o  5.46% in v o lv in g  an  
a c re a g e  o f  26.2% o f  t o t a l .  W ith  th e  same m a r g in a l ly  a f f e c t e d  p ro b lem  
o f  co m p a riso n  th e  num ber o f  h o ld in g s  above 1 2 .5  a c r e s  f e l l  from  3.5% 
in  1960 to  2.6% in  1968 and c o n tin u e d  to  f a l l  f o r  an  above  1 2 .0 0  a c r e s  
c a te g o r y  in  1977 t o  1.2% . T h is  p i c t u r e  o f  c o n tin u o u s  f a l l  i s  n o t
r e p e a te d  how ever when a c re a g e  i s  c o n s id e r e d :  18.9% i n  1960 t o  15.4%
i n  1968 , b u t  h o ld in g  up  a t  15.5% ( f o r  above 1 2 .0 0  a c r e s )  i n  1977 . T h is
p a t t e r n  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  th e  f i g u r e s  f o r  a v e ra g e  s i z e  o f  h o ld in g  p e r  
h o u se h o ld  i n  t h i s  r i c h e r  c a te g o r y :  19.2% in  1960; 18.6% i n  1968;
and  19.4% in  1977.
The dynam ic p r o c e s s  i n d ic a te d  b y  th e s e  f i g u r e s  i s  co m p lex . The
d ra m a tic  w eaken ing  o f  th e  'm id d le ' ra n g e  (5 .0 0  t o  1 2 .0 0  o r  1 2 .5  a c re s )
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i s  n o t  th e  r e s u l t  o f  a  s im p le  p r o c e s s  o f  p o l a r i s a t i o n  s in c e  i t  i s  
accom pan ied  by a m ore o r  l e s s  c o n s ta n t  a v e ra g e  s i z e  o f  h o ld in g  in  th e  
above  1 2 .5  o r  1 2 .0 0  a c r e  c a te g o ry  th ro u g h o u t  2 d e c a d e s  r a t h e r  th a n  
an  in c r e a s e  w h ich  w ould  r e v e a l  a  p r o c e s s  o f  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  and p e rh a p s  
c o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  la n d  by r i c h e r  p e a s a n t s  and  l a n d l o r d s .  A t th e  
same t im e  th e  num bers o f  h o u s e h o ld s  i n  su ch  a  c a te g o r y  h a s  sh ru n k  to  
1 .2% , s u g g e s t in g  t h a t  th e  p r e s s u r e s  f o r  f r a g m e n ta t io n  o f  h o ld in g s  
among so n s  may s t i l l  a w a i t  th o s e  f a m i l i e s  who h av e  n o t  d i v e r s i f i e d  
th ro u g h  t h e i r  so n s  i n t o  incom e g e n e ra tin g  a c t i v i t i e s  u n r e l a t e d  t o  th e  
d i r e c t  o r  i n d i r e c t  e x p l o i t a t i o n  o f  la n d  and  th e  la b o u r  expended  on i t .
Of c o u rs e  t h e r e  i s  some c o n c e n t r a t io n  o f  l a n d h o ld in g  among p a r t s  o f  
t h i s  c l a s s  w h ich  d i s t i n g u i s h e s  th o s e  who a r e  v u l n e r a b le  t o  m u l t ip l e  
i n h e r i t a n c e  from  th o s e  who a r e  n o t .  F u r th e rm o re  d u r in g  a  p e r io d  
when p o p u la t io n  h a s  r i s e n  by 35% from  1960 t o  1974 t o  r e c a l l  th e  e a r l i e r  
d i s c u s s io n ,  su ch  a g g re g a t io n  d a n g e ro u s ly  ig n o r e s  r e g i o n a l  v a r i a t i o n s  
w h ich  a lo n g  w ith  p o p u la t io n  g ro w th  p r o v id e s  t h e  e x p la n a t io n  o f  how a 
s m a l le r  p r o p o r t io n  h o ld in g  above 1 2 .0 0  a c r e s  m a in ta in s  b o th  th e  a c re a g e  
u n d e r  th e  c l a s s ' s  c o n t r o l  and th e  a v e ra g e  s i z e  o f  h o ld in g  f o r  t h e  
h o u s e h o ld s  in  th e  c l a s s .  On th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e s e  f i g u r e s  com bined w ith  
t h e  a rg u m en ts  o u t l i n e d  e a r l i e r  i n  t h e  p a p e r  draw n from  an  h i s t o r i c a l  
a n a l y s i s  and c o n c lu s io n s  o f  m ic r o - s t u d i e s ,  t h e  'r e g i o n a l*  h y p o th e s i s  w ould 
m a in ta in  t h a t  th e  D acca -C o m illa  b e l t  was m a in ly  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  th e  
c o l l a p s e  o f  th e  'm id d le ' ra n g e  o f  l a n d h o ld in g  and  th e  e x p a n s io n  o f  th e  
below  5 a c r e  'm i n i f u n d i s t ' c a te g o r y ;  w h e re as  t h e  'N o r th -W e s t ' 
r e p r e s e n te d  th e  p i c t u r e  o f  some c o n c e n t r a t io n  acco m p an ied  by l o s s  o f  
h o ld in g s  by o t h e r s  a t  a l l  l e v e l s  r e s u l t i n g  i n  i n c r e a s e s  b o th  i n  l a n d le s s n e s s  
and te n a n c y  ( th e  l a t t e r  r i s i n g  n a t i o n a l l y  from  18% o f  t o t a l  h o ld in g s
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i n  1960 to  23% in  1 9 7 7 ) , a s  w e l l  a s  c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  th e  g e n e r a l  p i c t u r e  
o f  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  dow nw ards. In  t h i s  way i t  i s  n o t  c o r r e c t  to a rg u e  
t h a t  a l l  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  l a n d h o ld in g s  a r e  f r a g m e n tin g  s t e a d i l y ,  and 
r e d u c in g  a l l  c l a s s e s  t o  t h e  lo w e s t  common d e n o m in a to r . A sm a ll
b u t  s i g n i f i c a n t  c l a s s  o f  jo d e d a r s  r e m a in s ,  and  when th e  ra n g e  o f  
la n d h o ld in g  t o  be c o n s id e r e d  i s  w idened  t o  con fo rm  to  t h e  BARC 
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n  o f  'b i g  f a r m e r s ' w i th  m ore th a n  5 a c r e s  (BARC 1 9 7 8 ) , th e  
r e g i o n a l  c o n c e n t r a t io n  o f  j o t e d a r s  and  'b i g  f a r m e r s ' i s  c l e a r l y  a s s o c i a te d  
w i th  t h e  N o r th e rn  and  W este rn  d i s t r i c t s ,  d i s p l a y in g  a c o n t i n u i t y  w ith  
e a r l i e r  p a t t e r n s .
PROCESSES OF CLASS FORMATION
Such a  p i c t u r e  g le a n e d  from  th e  o n ly  a v a i l a b l e  th o u g h  im p e r fe c t  
m a c ro -d a ta  d o e s  p r o v id e  some b ac k g ro u n d  to  t h e  num erous v a r i a t i o n s  
in  t h e  r e a l  r e l a t i o n s  o f  a p p r o p r i a t i o n  r e p o r t e d  by  d i f f e r e n t  
m ic r o - s t u d ie s .  The te n d e n c y  t o  make e x t r a v a g a n t  c la im s  o f  n a tio n w id e  
r e le v a n c e  from  su ch  s t u d i e s  h a s  p ro d u c e d  s t e r i l e  e x ch an g es  be tw een  
p r o t a g o n i s t s  a d v a n c in g  t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  t h e s i s .  B u t i t  sh o u ld  now be  
p o s s i b l e  t o  r e c o g n is e  some common t h r e a d s  t o  t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  c l a s s  
f o rm a t io n ,  m e d ia te d  th ro u g h  p r e c i s e  h i s t o r i c a l ,  e c o lo g ic a l  and l o c a l  
econom ic v a r i a b l e s ,  and  w here d e b a te  o v e r  t h e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  l o c a l  
d a ta  re m a in s  l e g i t i m a t e  r a t h e r  th a n  a s s e r t i n g  t h e  r e l a t i o n s  i n  one 
l o c a l i t y  a s  t h e  m odel f o r  a l l .  A f u r t h e r  p rob lem  o f  a n a ly s i s  h a s  
b een  t h e  u n w e ig h te d  r e l a t i v i s m  shown by some co m m en ta to rs  ( e .g .  B e r to c c i  
1977 p . 9) who l i k e  R u d r a 's  d i s c u s s io n  on c l a s s  fo rm a tio n  in  I n d ia  (1978) 
have  s u c c e s s f u l l y  i d e n t i f i e d  an  e x te n s iv e  l i s t  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i th o u t  
com m enting upon t h e i r  s i g n i f i c a n c e .  Thus B e r to c c i  a t t e m p ts  t o  r e f u t e  
a c l a s s  a n a ly s i s  b a s e d  upon l a n d l o r d - t e n a n t  r e l a t i o n s  by  p o in t in g  o u t  t h a t
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p o o r  p e a s a n ts  a l s o  r e n t  o u t  t h e i r  la n d ;  l ik e w is e  t h a t  p o o r  p e a s a n t s  
a c q u i r e  te m p o ra ry  c o n t r o l  o v e r  m ortgaged  la n d  by  le n d in g  money in  
o r d e r  to  e s t a b l i s h  v i a b l e  farm s in  l a n d - s c a r c e  s i t u a t i o n s ;  and  
f i n a l l y  t h a t  p o o r  p e a s a n t s  employ b o th  c a s u a l  and p e rm a n e n t wage la b o u r .  
However i t  i s  u n s a f e  t o  c o n c lu d e  t h a t  ' t h o s e  f a c t s  w ould  seem t o  im p ly  
m y ria d , d y a d ic ,  o w n e r - te n a n t ,  c r e d i t o r - d e b t o r , p a t r o n - c l i e n t  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  w i th in  a s  w e l l  a s  a c ro s s  th e  l i n e s  o f  " p e a s a n t  c l a s s e s "  
a s  may b e  c o n c e p tu a l ly  d e l im i te d  w ith  r e f e r e n c e  t o  la n d h o ld in g  s i z e  
a n d /o r  t e n u r e  ty p e  a lo n e "  (B e r to c c i  1 9 7 7 ,p . 9 ) .  Such l i s t s  a r e  
n e v e r  an  a d e q u a te  s u b s t i t u t e  f o r  a n a l y s i s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  when a c c e s s  t o  
and  c o n t r o l  o v e r  la n d  i s  su ch  a c r u c i a l  v a r i a b l e  a s  i n  B a n g la d e s h .
The f a c t  t h a t  so  many a r e  l a n d l e s s ,  and many m ore (70%-80%) assum ed
t o  b e  l i v i n g  below  e s t a b l i s h e d  p o v e r ty  l i n e s  ( S a l im u l la h  an d  Is la m  
1976 , r e f e r r e d  t o  by  B e r to c c i  1977) do es  n o t  mean t h a t  th e  sc ra m b le  
f o r  t i n y  p i e c e s  o f  la n d  i s  i n s i g n i f i c a n t  -  on t h e  c o n t r a r y  i t s  v a lu e  
i s  g r e a t l y  enhanced  b o th  in  m o n e ta ry , econom ic and s t a t u s  te r m s .  T h is  
was a  m is ta k e  made in  C o m illa  by  B e r to c c i  (1972) and  o t h e r s ,  who assum ed
t h a t  th e  a b se n c e  o f  a s t a r k l y  u n e q u a l p a t t e r n  o f  l a n d h o ld in g ,  w here t h e
ra n g e  o f  la n d h o ld in g  was v e ry  n a rro w , was e v id e n c e  o f  c l a s s  harm ony.
B ut assum ing  c o n s ta n t  f a m ily  s i z e ,  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  a  few  d e c im a ls  i n  
su ch  c o n d i t io n s  can  make a l l  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw een  s u r v i v a l  and 
s u c c e s s f u l  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n ,  and a f a m i l y 's  c o l l a p s e  th ro u g h  u n v i a b i l i t y  
and  a  c o n s e q u e n t r e l e n t l e s s  p ro c e s s  o f  la n d  d i s p o s s e s s i o n .  (See my 
c r i t i q u e  o f  B e r t o c c i 's  'c y c l i c a l  k u la k is m ' i n  C o m illa , Wood 1 9 7 6 ) .
A p a r t  from  th e  i s s u e  o f  a t t r i b u t i n g  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  r e l a t i o n s h i p s ,  t h e r e  
i s  a l s o  t h e  q u e s t io n  o f  th e  m eaning o r  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  t o  b e  g iv e n .
For exam ple , t o  r e t u r n  to  th e  c a se  o f  p o o r p e a s a n t s  t a k in g  la n d  in  
m o rtg ag e  -  does t h i s  am ount to  a r e f u t a t i o n  o f  m o rtg ag e  a s  a  c l a s s
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r e l a t i o n s h i p  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  s ig n i f ic a n c e ?  N adigram  in  Mymensingh D i s t r i c t  
p r o v id e s  some i n t e r e s t i n g  c a se  m a te r i a l  (Arn 1978 p . 1 1 . ) .  The m ost 
common la n d  t r a n s a c t i o n  i s  g i r b i  (m o rtg a g in g ) , w here  a lan d o w n er in  
need  o f  money t r a n s f e r s  th e  r i g h t  o f  u s e  o f  o n e  o r  m ore f i e l d s  t o  th e  
h i g h e s t  b id d e r .
" T h is  sy s tem  f u n c t io n s  a s  a  'b a n k in g - s y s te m ' f o r  lan d o w n e rs  
who g iv e  o u t  la n d  on g i r b i  when th e y  n eed  money f o r  o th e r  
e x p e n d i tu r e s ,  m a in ly  to  buy la n d ,  o r  f o r  co n su m p tio n  n e e d s  
d u r in g  a  d i f f i c u l t  p e r io d  ( s ic k n e s s  f o r  exam ple) o r  t o  p ay  f o r  
t h e  h ig h e r  e d u c a t io n  o f  a so n .
The g e n e r a l  t r e n d  w i th in  t h i s  k in d  o f  la n d  t r a n s a c t i o n  i s  
t h a t  th e  r i c h e r  and m id d le  p e a s a n ts  g iv e  o u t  m ore la n d  on 
g i r b i ,  and th e  s m a l l ,  p o o r and l a n d l e s s  p e a s a n t s  t a k e  i n  m ore 
la n d .  F o r t h e s e  l a s t  c a te g o r i e s  th e  g i r b i  sy s te m  i s  one 
way o f  a c q u i r in g  la n d  t o  c u l t i v a t e  u n d e r  c ir c u m s ta n c e s  w here 
la n d  f o r  s a l e  i s  r a t h e r  s c a ra c e  and e x p e n s iv e .  When la n d  i s  
f o r  s a l e  th e y  can  seldom  com pete w ith  th e  r i c h e r  p e a s a n t s  who 
w i l l  g iv e  o u t  some o f  t h e i r  la n d s  on g i r b i  i n  o r d e r  t o  be 
a b le  to  b u y " .
Under t h e s e  c o n d i t io n s  w here a m ark e t f o r  la n d  e x i s t s ,  t h e  m o rtg ag e  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  a s s i s t s r i c h e r  and m id d le  p e a s a n t s  t o  e n t e r  t h a t  m a rk e t 
w ith  f in a n c e  and a c cu m u la te  la n d  f o r  th e  f a m i l y 's  u s e  i n  t h i s  g e n e r a t io n  
o r  th e  n e x t .  Thus a lth o u g h  p o o r and l a n d l e s s  p e a s a n t s  a r e  t e c h n i c a l l y  
th e  m o n ey le n d ers  in  t h i s  s i t u a t i o n ,  th e y  a r e  u n a b le  t o  c h a rg e  i n t e r e s t .
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t h e  la n d  h as  to  be  r e tu r n e d  w ith in  12 y e a r s  and  i t  i s  u s u a l l y  redeem ed 
e a r l i e r ,  a c c o rd in g  t o  A rn . These a rra n g e m e n ts  r e v e a l  t h e  s t r u c t u r a l  
w eakness o f  th e  p o o r  p e a s a n t s ,  w h ich  h a s  t o  b e  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e i r  l a c k  
o f  c o n t r o l  o v e r  la n d  and  a d e s p e r a t io n  f o r  i t  w h ich  e n c o u ra g e s  su ch  te m p o ra ry  
s o lu t i o n s  and d i v e r t s  t h e i r  own s a v in g s  away from  lo n g - te rm  a c c u m u la t io n .
And rem em ber i t  i s  c a sh  hu n g ry  p e a s a n ts  who a r e  p r o v id in g  la n d  f o r  t h i s  
m a rk e t i n  t h e  f i r s t  p l a c e .
In  C o m illa  my own s tu d y  in  Bondokogram (1976) r e p o r t e d  a  h ig h  in c id e n c e  
o f  m o rtg a g in g  (bondok) w h ere , in  th e  a b s e n c e  o f  a  m a rk e t f o r  la n d  
( i t s  enhanced  v a lu e  i n  th e  c o n te x t  o f  t h e  C o m illa  program m e p la c e d  i t  
beyond th e  r e a c h  o f  open p u rc h a s e  by  l o c a l l y  r i c h e r  b u t  s t i l l  m in i f u n d i s t  
p e a s a n t s ) , th e  a c q u i s i t i o n  o f  la n d  in  m o rtg a g e  from  c a s h -h u n g ry  p o o r  
p e a s a n ts  w ith  accom panying  h ig h  r a t e s  o f  i n t e r e s t  r e s u l t i n g  in  p e rm a n en t 
t r a n s f e r s  o f  th e  p l o t  a f t e r  a  few y e a r s ,  c o n s t i t u t e d  t h e  m ain  p r o c e s s  
o f  la n d  a c c u m u la t io n . The r i c h e r  p e a s a n ts  w ere  i n  a  s t r o n g  p o s i t i o n  
t o  im pose t h e s e  h ig h  r a t e s  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  s in c e  th e y  c o n t r o l l e d  th ro u g h  
t h e i r  la n d  th e  la b o u r  o p p o r tu n i t i e s  f o r  i n f r a - s u b s i s t e n c e  p e a s a n t s  who 
n eeded  to  s e l l  t h e i r  l a b o u r .  T h is  p r o c e s s  c o n t r i b u te d  (a lo n g  w ith  th e  ' 
o p p o r tu n i t i e s  th e r e b y  r e l e a s e d  f o r  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  among r i c h  o r  p e a s a n t  
f a m i l i e s )  t o  o f f s e t t i n g  th e  'c y c l i c a l  k u l a l i s m ' p r e s e n te d  by B e r to c c i  
(1972) w hereby  f a m i l i e s  w ere  supposed  t o  d e c l i n e  th ro u g h  m u l t ip l e  
i n h e r i t a n c e ,  a l lo w in g  o t h e r s  to  r e p l a c e  them  in  t h e  h i e r a r c h y .
Thus two 'd i r e c t i o n s '  o f  m o rtg ag in g  may a p p e a r  t o  hav e  o p p o s in g  im p l ic a t i o n s  
f o r  c l a s s  f o rm a tio n , b u t  o n ly  i f  a r b i t r a r i l y  i s o l a t e d  from  o th e r  f e a t u r e s
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o f  th e  l o c a l  a g r a r i a n  sy s te m . Taken i n  c o n te x t ,  b o th  r e v e a l  fo rm s 
o f  d ependency  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  te rm s  o f  ex ch an g e  and  p a t t e r n s  o f  
l a n d h o ld in g  w h ich  c h a r a c t e r i s e  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  l o c a l i t i e s .  I t  i s  in  
t h i s  s e n s e  t h a t  B e r t o c c i 's  n o t io n  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  f r a g m e n ta t io n  i s  
u s e f u l  -  n o t  t o  deny  c l a s s  s i t u a t i o n s ,  b u t  t o  l e a d  u s  a l l  t o  s p e c i f y  
them  m ore c l e a r l y .  The fo rm s o f  s t r u g g l e  im p l ie d  v a r y  c r u c i a l l y  
b e tw een  N adigram  and Bondokgram -  a  cam paign  a g a i n s t  m o n ey len d in g  and  h ig h  
i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  w ould make l i t t l e  s e n s e  t o  p o o r  p e a s a n t s  i n  N adlgrcun.
T h is  exam ple o f  i n t e r p r e t i n g  th e  m eaning  o f  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  beyond  th e  l e v e l  
o f  a p p e a ra n c e s  a p p l i e s  w ith  e q u a l  f o r c e  t o  te n a n c y .  The e v id e n c e  from  
J h a g ra p u r  (K u s tia  D i s t r i c t )  (A rens and v an  B eurden  1977) r e v e a l s  
s e v e r a l  'c l a s s - d i r e c t i o n s ' o f  s h a re c ro p p in g  r e l a t i o n s h i p .  A lm ost 
40% o f  a l l  f a m i l i e s  i n  J h a g ra p u r  w ere r e p o r t e d  a s  s h a re c ro p p in g  some 
la n d ,  b u t  o f  a l l  t h e  la n d  w h ich  i s  s h a re c ro p p e d  o n ly  o n e - t h i r d  was 
c u l t i v a t e d  by  s m a ll p e a s a n t s ,  s in c e  th e y  had  no d ro u g h t  a n im a ls  o r  
s o u rc e s  o f  c r e d i t .  50% o f  s h a re c ro p p e d  la n d  was c u l t i v a t e d  by  
60% o f  t h e  m id d le - p e a s a n t  f a m i l i e s .  14% o f  th e  s h a re c ro p p in g  f a m i l i e s  
in  J h a g ra p u r  w ere  from  r i c h  p e a s a n t  c l a s s e s  f o r  whom th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
was n o t  a  s u b s i s t e n c e  n e c e s s i t y .  The p a t t e r n  o f  s u b l e t t i n g  d id  n o t  
o n ly  in v o lv e  r i c h  l a n d l o r d s ,  s in c e  th e  a u th o r s  fo u n d  t h a t  15% 
o f  a l l  s m a ll p e a s a n ts  s u b le t  some o r  a l l  o f  t h e i r  l a n d .  To t h i s  
e x t e n t ,  B e r t o c c i 's  c a v e a t s  a b o u t th e  'd i r e c t i o n s '  o f  su c h  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  
i s  j u s t i f i e d  -  b u t  i s  th e  c o n te n t  o f  th e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  t h e  same in  t h e s e  
d i f f e r e n t  c a s e s ?  S m a ll p e a s a n t s  who l e a s e  o u t  t h e i r  la n d  d id  so  from  
an in v o lu n ta r y  p o s i t i o n  o f  w eakness -  th e  p l o t s  w ere  to o  f a r  away t o  be 
p e r s o n a l ly  c u l t i v a t e d  and s u p e r v i s e d ,  th e  s m a ll  p e a s a n t  was a widow
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(40% o f  th e  la n d  i n v o lv e d ) ; t h e  s m a ll  p e a s a n t  h a s  no c a s h  t o  r e n t  
in  a  p lo u g h  o r  a n im a ls  a n d /o r  i s  d i s a b l e d  (25% o f  th e  la n d  in v o lv e d )
(A rens and van  B eurden  1977 p p .1 0 6 -1 0 7 ) . R ic h  l a n d lo r d s  who l e a s e  o u t  
la n d  f o r  s h a re c ro p p in g  conform  t o  t h e  m ore f a m i l i a r  p a t t e r n :  th e y
r e c i e v e  50% s h a r e ;  em ploy th e  s u r p lu s  i n  c o n s t r u c t i o n ,  la n d  a c q u i s i t i o n  
and  m o n ey le n d in g ; and f a i l  t o  make any  in v e s tm e n t  e i t h e r  i n  t h e  in p u t s  
on t h e  s h a re c ro p p e d  la n d  o r  on a g r i c u l t u r a l  in n o v a t io n s  on t h e i r  own 
la n d  (p ass im  and  p . 1 2 3 ) .
T h e re  a r e  o t h e r  m ic r o - s tu d ie s  i n  B a n g la d esh  from  w h ich  one  c a n  now 
p r o l i f e r a t e  su ch  o b s e r v a t io n s  ( s e e  P ra y  and  A b d u lla h  1980 f o r  b i b l i o g r a p h y ) , 
and  th e  p ro b lem  i s  w h e th e r  th e y  can  be  r e c o n c i l e d  w i th in  an  o v e r a l l  
t h e s i s  o r  l e f t  t h e o r e t i c a l l y  (and p o l i t i c a l l y )  u n d ig e s te d ?  An 
e x a m in a tio n  o f  la n d h o ld in g  s t a t i s t i c s  m ig h t b e  i n d i c a t i v e  b u t  i n  
th e m s e lv e s  c a n n o t s p e c i f y  th e  p r o c e s s  o f  c l a s s  fo rm a tio n  n o r  i n  
t h e i r  a g g re g a te  form  c o n ta in  th e  s t r u c t u r a l  f r a g m e n ta t io n  r e v e a le d  by  
th e  m ic r o - d a ta .  The common t h r e a d  b o th  h i s t o r i c a l l y  and  s p a t i a l l y  
seem s t o  b e  lo c a te d  a ro u n d  th e  i s s u e  o f  r u r a l  c a p i t a l  f o rm a tio n  -  o f  
c e n t r a l  c o n c e rn  b o th  t o  th o s e  a t t e m p t in g  to  c h a r a c t e r i s e  th e  
mode o f  p r o d u c t io n  in  B a n g la d esh  (W e s te rg a a rd  1978) and  t o  p o l ic y -m a k e rs  
w h e th e r  i n  GOB o r  IBRD. W hile  W e s te rg a a rd  g iv e s  much e x p la n a to r y  
s i g n i f i c a n c e  t o  u s u ry  a s  a  c o n s t r a i n t  t o  th e  d e v e lo p m en t o f  p r o d u c t iv e  
r u r a l  c a p i t a l  (B h ad u ri 1973 , P ra s a d  1 9 7 4 ) , t h e  w ork o f  A t iq u r  Rahman 
(Rahman 1 9 8 0 ) , q u a l i f i e s  t h i s  p e r s p e c t i v e  on th e  b a s i s  o f  s u rv e y  m a t e r i a l  
b o th  from  C o m illa  (K o tw ali?  Thana) and  P h u lp u r  Thana in  Mymensingh 
D i s t r i c t  i n  1975. (A cco rd ing  to  th e  BARC (1978) S u rv e y , C o m illa
K o tw a li th a n a  had  26.6% l a n d l e s s ,  12.1% s h a r e c r o p p e r s ,  54.6% o w n er-
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c u l t i v a t o r s  and 6.7% 'b i g  f a r m e r s ';  and  th e  r e s p e c t i v e  f i g u r e s  f o r  
P h u lp u r  was 41.7% , 23.2% , 2 6 .6 .% , and 8 .5 % ). H is  m ain  o b s e r v a t io n  f o r  
b o th  a r e a s  was t h a t  l a n d lo r d s  d id  n o t  h av e  s i g n i f i c a n t  c r e d i t  r e l a t i o n s  
w i th  t e n a n t s ,  and t h a t  u s u ry  incom e t o  l a n d lo r d s  was much s m a l le r  th a n  
t h a t  d e r iv e d  from  r e n t a l  incom e so  t h a t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  r e n t a l  s h a r e s  w ere  
m ore s i g n i f i c a n t  th a n  r a i s i n g  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  i n  a p p r o p r i a t i n g  t h e  s u r p lu s  
from  la b o u r .  M oreover t h e r e  w as l i t t l e  p a r t i c i p a t i o n  by l a n d l o r d s  
in  i n p u t - s h a r i n g  w i th  t h e i r  t e n a n t s ,  and  when t e n a n t s  d id  in n o v a te ,  
t h e  s h a re  a rra n g e m e n t was r e p la c e d  b y  a f ix e d  r e n t  w h ich  l e f t  th e  t e n a n t  
b e a r in g  a l l  t h e  r i s k .  C r e d i t  from  o t h e r  n o n - i n s t i t u t i o n a l  s o u r c e s -  
r i c h  p e a s a n t s ,  r e l a t i v e s ,  f r i e i d s  -  was n o t  a lw a y s  l in k e d  t o  la n d  
m o rtg a g e  a r ra n g e m e n ts  b u t  i t  was o b s e rv e d  t h a t  t h e  " r a t e  o f  r e t u r n  
on m o n ey len d in g  in  u n o rg a n is e d  r u r a l  c r e d i t  m a rk e ts  w a s , i n  many c a s e s ,  
h ig h e r  th a n  r e t u r n s  from  p r o d u c t iv e  in v e s tm e n t" .  (Rahman 1980 p . 5 2 ) .  In  
a d d i t i o n  t o  th e  m o tiv e  o f  le n d in g  i n  o r d e r  t o  a p p r o p r i a t e  c o l l a t e r a l s ,  Rahman 
s u g g e s te d  t h r e e  o t h e r  r e a s o n s :  t o  e n s u re  t h e  r e p r o d u c t io n  o f
d e b t o r s '  l a b o u r ; t o  e n s u re  t h e  s u p p ly  o f  la b o u r  t o  c r e d i t o r s  when 
demanded and t o  m a in ta in  c o h e s io n  b e tw een  th e  c r e d i t o r s '  l o c a l  p o l i t i c a l  
f a c t i o n s .  On th e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  la n d h o ld in g  v a r i a t i o n  b e tw een  C o m illa  
and P h u lp u r ,  one w ould  e x p e c t  R ah m an 'd L an d lo rd -ten an t e x p la n a t io n s  
o f  c o n s t r a i n t s  t o  r u r a l  c a p i t a l  f o rm a tio n  t o  h av e  m ore r e l e v a n c e  t o  
P h u lp u r  and th e  l a b o u r - s e c u r in g  m o tiv e s  f o r  le n d in g  to  a p p ly  m ore 
c l o s e l y  t o  C o m illa . I f  s o ,  th e n  R ahm an 's f in d i n g s  w ould  c o n s t i t u t e  
a  m icrocosm  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l  t h e s i s  c o n c e rn in g  r e g i o n a l  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  th e  
fo rm s o f  a n te d i lu v i a n  r u r a l  c a p i t a l  i n  B a n g la d e sh .
Mahabub H o ssa in  (1980) r e i n f o r c e s  t h i s  them e a b o u t  th e  d e p re s s e d  r a t e  o f  
r u r a l  c a p i t a l  fo rm a tio n  in  h i s  a rg u m en t f o r  la n d  r e d i s t r i b u t i o n  in  B a n g la d e sh .
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He m a in ta in s  t h a t  a l th o u g h  th e  m a rg in a l  r a t e  o f  s a v in g  i s  h ig h e r  f o r  
t h e  l a r g e  la n d o w n e r, th e  s a v in g s  a r e  n o t  em ployed f o r  p r o d u c t iv e  
p u r p o s e s .
" I n  t h e  B a n g la d e sh  c a s e  a common f in d in g  i s  t h a t  a  l a r g e  p o r t i o n  
o f  t h e  s u r p lu s  o f  th e  r i c h  b a s i c a l l y  f in a n c e s  th e  d e f i c i t  o f  
t h e  p o o r ,  th ro u g h  la n d  p u rc h a s e s  and s a l e s  and p r o v i s i o n  o f  
c o n su m p tio n  l o a n s .  A lso  th e  b e t t e r  o f f  f a m i l i e s  u s e  a  p o r t i o n  
o f  t h e i r  s u r p lu s  f o r  c o n s p ic u o u s  co n su m p tio n  l i k e  e x p e n d i tu r e  on 
s o c i a l  c e re m o n ie s  and  c o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  h o u s e s ,  and  f o r  
in v e s tm e n t  i n  t r a d e  and  b u s in e s s " .  ( I b i d .  p . 8 2 ) .
T h is  d e s c r i p t i o n  by  H o ssa in  h i n t s  a d d i t i o n a l l y  a t  a  c r u c i a l  f e a t u r e  o f  
c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  in  B a n g la d e sh . W ith  th e  r a p id  r i s e  in  l a n d l e s s  r u r a l  
p o p u la t io n  and th e  r e l e n t l e s s  p r o c e s s  o f  p a u p e r i s a t i o n  f o r  many o th e r  
p o o r  p e a s a n t  c l a s s e s  e i t h e r  th ro u g h  u s u r y ,  c h a n g e s  i n  te n a n c y  a r r a n g e m e n ts ,  
th e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  la n d  t o  l e a s e  and d i s t r e s s  s a l e s  o f  goods and la n d ,  
t h e  o b v io u s  q u e s t io n  t o  a sk  i s  why r u r a l  B a n g la d esh  d o e s  n o t  b u r s t  
a s u n d e r  in  o r g a n is e d  r e v o l u t io n  o r  c h a o t i c  a n a rc h y ?  The s t r u c t u r a l  
f r a g m e n ta t io n  o f  c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  p e rh a p s  a c c o u n ts  f o r  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  th e  
fo rm e r  w ith  l o c a l i s e d  c o n d i t io n s  d e te rm in in g  a n a rro w  form  o f  c l a s s  
s t r u g g l e  a ro u n d  c r o p - s h a r e  and wage d i s p u t e s .  The form  o f  im m is e ra t io n  
i s  n o t  u n i v e r s a l .  B u t why n o t  t h e  l a t t e r ?  The p o s t - l i b e r a t i o n  s t a t e  
in  B a n g la d esh  h a s  n o t  b e e n  e f f e c t i v e l y  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  th e  m a in te n a n c e  
o f  r u r a l  law  and o r d e r  n e i t h e r  i n  i t s  r e p r e s s i v e  n o r  i d e o l o g i c a l  fo rm s; 
and  i t  h a s  c e r t a i n l y  b e e n  u n a b le  t o  g u a r a n te e  t h e  r i g h t s  t o  p r o p e r ty  and
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w ork o f  v u ln e r a b le  c l a s s e s .  In d eed  t h e r e  h av e  b een  p e r io d s  when 
th e  s t a t e  had  no c o n t r i b u t i o n  a t  a l l  t o  make t o  a r u r a l  p e t t y  b o u rg e o is  
p e a c e  -  f o r  exam ple a f t e r  th e  f lo o d s  o f  1974 th ro u g h  th e  s u b s e q u e n t  fam in e  
to  S h e ik h  M u jib u r R ahm an 's d e a th  in  A ugust 1975 ,
Such r u r a l  s t a b i l i t y  a s  e x i s t s  u n d e r  t h e s e  c o n d i t io n s  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n  
h a s  b een  m a in ta in e d  th ro u g h  v e r t i c a l ,  se g m e n ta ry  a l l i a n c e s .  T hese  
a r e  o f t e n  e x te n d e d  f a m i l i e s  and l in e a g e s  i n  w h ich  p o o r  h o u s e h o ld s  a r e  
p a u p e r i s e d  b u t  f i n a l l y  c u s h io n e d  a g a i n s t  d e s t i t u t i o n  th ro u g h  u n re p a y a b le  
l o a n s .  T hese  l e a d  t o  s e r v a n t  bondage f o r  some h o u s e h o ld  members w h ile  
o t h e r s  ( i . e .  a d u l t  m a le s )  m ig r a te  on a  lo n g  and  s h o r t - t e r m  b a s i s  i n  
s e a r c h  f o r  em ploym ent a t  wage l e v e l s  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  t h e i r  own s u b s i s t e n c e  
b u t  n o t  f o r  r e p r o d u c t io n .  The p o l i t i c a l  form  o f  su ch  a l l i a n c e s  h av e  
o f t e n  b een  d e s c r ib e d  a s  f a c t i o n s ,  and em ployed t o  deny  th e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  
c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s .  B u t su ch  d ependency  r e l a t i o n s h i p s  i n  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  
e x p r e s s io n s  a l l  o v e r  B a n g la d esh  a r e  p r e c i s e l y  e v id e n c e  o f  p r e - c a p i t a l i s t ,  
l o c a l i s e d  r e l a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  a p p r o p r i a t io n  w h ich  u n t i l  r e c e n t l y  a t  l e a s t  have 
in c lu d e d  th e  im p e r a t iv e  o f  s e c u r in g  a s u p p ly  o f  l a b o u r  d u r in g  p eak  p e r io d s  
o f  i t s  demand e i t h e r  th ro u g h  d e b t  o r  te n a n c y . W hile  i t  w ould be wrong 
to  deny an e le m e n t o f  com passion  among f a m i ly  members o f  d i f f e r e n t  c l a s s  
p o s i t i o n s ,  i t  i s  e q u a l ly  unw ise  t o  become t r a p p e d  in  t h e  id e o lo g y  o f  
c u l t u r a l  b a s e s  o f  s o l i d a r i t y  in  B a n g la d e s h i r u r a l  l i f e .  B e n g a li  
M uslim  p e a s a n t s  a r e  n o t  f a l s e l y  c o n s c io u s  b u t  some A n th r o p o lo g is ts  a r e  
w i th  f a n c i f u l  n o t io n s  o f  a  m o ra l com m unity . The p a r t i c i p a t i o n  o f  l a n d lo r d s  
and r i c h  p e a s a n t  m o n ey le n d e rs  i n  th e  m a in te n a n c e  o f  r u r a l  o r d e r  i s  a 
p r a g m a tic ,  s t r u c t u r a l  r a t h e r  th a n  e t h i c a l  im p e r a t iv e .
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CONCLUSION
By c o n s id e r in g  th e  p r e - l i b e r a t i o n  h i s t o r y  o f  B a n g la d esh  and d raw in g  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  i t s  e x te n d e d  e x p e r ie n c e  o f  im p e r ia l i s m  up t o  1971 ( a t  l e a s t )  , 
t h i s  p a p e r  h a s  a rg u e d  t h a t  i n  g e n e r a l  r u r a l  c l a s s  r e l a t i o n s  hav e  been  
c h a r a c t e r i s e d  b y  th e  u s e  o f  c a p i t a l  i n  t h e  s p h e re  o f  exchange  r a t h e r  
th a n  p r o d u c t io n  w h ich  h a s  e f f e c t i v e l y  r a i s e d  th e  l e v e l  o f  a b s o l u t e  
s u r p lu s  v a lu e  a c c r u in g  t o  c e r t a i n  c l a s s e s ,  b u t  w h ich  i s  n o t  c u r r e n t l y  
c o n t r i b u t i n g  to  an  e x te n d e d  r e p r o d u c t io n  o f  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c a p i t a l  and th e  
r e a l  su b su m p tio n  o f  la b o u r  u n d e r  c a p i t a l .  S e c o n d ly  i t  h a s  a rg u e d  t h a t  
t h i s  f a i l u r e  t o  d e v e lo p  p r o d u c t iv e  a g r i c u l t u r a l  c a p i t a l  i s  to  b e  fo u n d  in  
t h e  form  o f  p o l a r i s a t i o n  d u r in g  th e  s i x t i e s  and  s e v e n t i e s  in v o lv in g  a 
d ra m a tic  r i s e  i n  t h e  num bers o f  l a n d l e s s  and l e v e l s  o f  r u r a l  unem ploym ent 
c r e a t i n g  a  p rob lem  o f  e f f e c t i v e  dem and; and a d e c l in e  o f  m id d le  p e a s a n t  
c a t e g o r i e s  w here th e  m a rg in a l  r a t e  o f  s a v in g  i s  h i g h e s t  and  m o st l i k e l y  
d i v e r t e d  i n t o  c a p i t a l  f o rm a t io n .  T h i r d ly  t h a t  th e  p r e c i s e  fo rm s o f  
t h i s  p r e - c a p i t a l i s t  c a p i t a l  ( a n te d i lu v ia n )  have  b e e n  s t r u c t u r e d  by  p a r t i c u l a r  
and  r e g i o n a l  c o n d i t i o n s ,  and a t  t h i s  l a t e  s ta g e  t h e  a rgum en t can  in c lu d e  
r e l a t e d  v a r i a b l e  e f f e c t s  ( to o  num erous t o  d i s c u s s  s e p a r a t e l y  h e re )  
o f  e s p e c i a l l y  s o i l  f e r t i l i t y ,  s t r u c tu r e  and e l e v a t i o n ,  f lo o d  v u l n e r a b i l i t y ,  
d r a in a g e  and w a te r lo g g in g ,  r a i n f a l l ,  t e m p e r a tu r e ,  p o p u la t io n  d e n s i t y  and 
c o m p o s i t io n , c ro p p in g  s y s te m s , p a t t e r n  o f  l i v e s t o c k  o w n e rs h ip , and 
m ig ra n t  s e t t l e r s  on m a rg in a l  l a n d .  T hese  h i s t o r i c a l  and o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  
hav e  b e e n  r e s p o n s i b le  f o r  a p r o c e s s  o f  s t r u c t u r a l  f r a g m e n ta t io n  i n  c l a s s  
r e l a t i o n s  w ith  s p a t i a l  v a r i a t i o n s  in  t h e  in c id e n c e  o f  fo rm a l te n a n c y ,  th e  
u s e  o f  n o n - fa m ily  l a b o u r ,  p r o d u c t i v i t y ,  la n d  v a lu e s ,  n a tu r e  o f  
i n d e b te d n e s s ,  p a t t e r n s  o f  m ig r a t io n ,  s c a l e  and  d i r e c t i o n  o f  d i v e r s i f i c a t i o n  
from  a g r i c u l t u r e ,  f a m ily  s i z e  and  l in e a g e  s t r u c t u r e s ,  and r e c e p t i v i t y
3 7
t o  v a r io u s  form s o f  te c h n o lo g y  (w ith  d i f f e r e n t  c a p i t a l - l a b o u r  r a t i o s ) .
The p i c t u r e  w hich  em erg es , th o u g h  n o t  f u l l y  docum ented  h e r e ,  i s  t h a t  th e  
N o rth  and th e  W est have more l a n d l o r d s ,  s h a re c ro p p e r s  and  l a n d l e s s  
l a b o u r e r s  th a n  in  th e  E a s t ;  t h a t  l a n d lo r d s  may h av e  b e t t e r  a c c e s s  t o  
i n p u ts  th a n  o w n e r - c u l t i v a to r s  b u t  c u l t i v a t e  i n t e n s i v e l y  on s m a ll  
p r o p o r t io n s  o f  t h e i r  la n d ;  t h a t  s h a re c ro p p e r s  and  ow ner c u l t i v a t o r s  a r e  
b e in g  s lo w ly  d i s p o s s e s s e d  o f  t h e i r  la n d ;  o r  f o r c e d  in  t h e  c a s e  o f  
s h a re c ro p p e r s  t o  c u l t i v a t e  h ig h e r  p r o p o r t io n s  o f  m a r g in a l ,  l e s s  p r o d u c t iv e  
la n d  in  t h e i r  h o ld in g s .  The h o ld in g s  o f  p o o r e r  c l a s s e s  a r e  f ra g m e n t in g  
and th e y  a r e  i n c r e a s i n g ly  m o rtg a g e d , e v e n tu a l ly  t r a n s f e r r e d  o r  s o ld  
a s  th o s e  c l a s s e s  d e sce n d  th e  downward s p i r a l .  T h is  p r o c e s s  i s  accom pan ied  
by some c o n c e n t r a t io n  and p o l a r i s a t i o n  a s  t h i s  la n d  i s  b e in g  t r a n s f e r r e d  
to  o th e r  c l a s s e s  who a r e  n o t  a l s o  d e s c e n d in g .
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